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Chapter 1
Biodiversity Healing
Elena Casetta, Jorge Marques da Silva, and Davide Vecchi
With the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) that entered into force in 1993, 
the conservation of biodiversity was recognized for the first time in international 
law as “a common concern of humankind” and almost the entire world committed 
to it. Conserving biodiversity, however, is far from being an easy task, as shown by 
the difficulties to reach the conservation targets articulated in the strategic plans 
connected to the CBD. The failure of the 2010 Biodiversity Target “to achieve by 
2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss at the global, 
regional and national level” has been explicitly recognized (Butchart et al. 2010). 
Moreover, there is a widespread scepticism, at present, concerning the possibility of 
achieving the Aichi Biodiversity Targets by 2020 (Tittensor et  al. 2014), i.e., 20 
time-bound targets included into the CBD strategic plan 2011–2020 (such as, for 
instance, making people aware of the values of biodiversity and the steps they can 
take to conserve it (Target 1) or identifying and eradicating invasive species (Target 
9)).1 Despite increasing communication, accelerating policy and management 
responses, and notwithstanding improving ecosystem assessment and endangered 
species knowledge, conserving biodiversity continues to be more a concern than an 
1 For the comprehensive list, see the CBD website: https://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/default.shtml
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2accomplished task. Why is it so? The overexploitation of natural resources by our 
species is a frequently recognised factor,2 while the short-term economic interests of 
governments and stakeholders typically clash with the burdens that implementing 
conservation actions imply. But this is not the whole story. This book develops a 
different perspective on the problem by exploring the conceptual and practical chal-
lenges posed by conserving biodiversity. By conceptual challenges, we mean the 
difficulties in defining what biodiversity is and characterising that “thing” to which 
the word “biodiversity’’ refers to. By practical challenges, we mean the reasons why 
assessing biodiversity and putting in place effective conservation actions is arduous. 
In order to situate the multi-farious conceptual and practical challenges faced when 
trying to outline the path From Assessing to Conserving Biodiversity, we think an 
interpretive device is useful.
An analogy is generally recognised (see, for instance, Soulé 1985; Sarkar 2002; 
Casetta and Marques da Silva 2015) between medicine—the discipline whose main 
mission is human health preservation—and conservation biology—the discipline 
whose main mission is biodiversity conservation. Unusually for sciences, both have 
a normative dimension. According to this analogy,
Conservation biology differs from most other biological sciences in one important way: it 
is often a crisis discipline. Its relation to biology … is analogous to that of surgery to physi-
ology and war to political science. In crisis disciplines, one must act before knowing all the 
facts. Crisis disciplines are then a mixture of science and art, and their pursuit requires 
intuition as well as information. (Soulé 1985: 727)
When biodiversity conservation is at issue, theoretical and practical matters go hand 
in hand, and practical challenges are intertwined with conceptual ones, requiring the 
cooperation of the natural sciences and of the humanities in a concerted effort. This 
book, including contributions from biologists and philosophers from different fields 
and traditions, reflects this necessary multidisciplinarity.
1.1  Assessing and Diagnosing the Patient. Estimating 
Biodiversity: Data Collection and Monitoring Challenges
Consider a first aspect of the analogy between medicine and conservation biology. 
The first thing medical doctors have to do when dealing with patients is to assess 
their general health state and the severity of the condition affecting them. Diagnosis 
on the basis of the collection of patients’ data and their classification, as well as on 
the measurement and monitoring of symptoms, comes before treatment prescription 
and provision. In the case of biodiversity, two main kinds of diagnostic challenges 
2 In this sense, Diamond (1989) refers to the “Evil Quartet”, the four horsemen of the apocalypse: 
habitat loss and fragmentation, overharvesting, introduced predators and competitors, and second-
ary extinction, while E.O. Wilson (2002) expresses similar concerns by characterizing the HIPPO 
(i.e., Habitat destruction, Invasive species, Pollution, (human) Population growth and 
Overharvesting).
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3have to be addressed: on the one hand, the difficulties concerning data collection 
and systematisation (Chaps. 2, 3 and 4); on the other hand, the choice of the appro-
priate measurement techniques and ways of monitoring (Chaps. 5, 6 and 7).
Starting with the first challenge, probably the most striking aspect of the living 
world is its amazing variety, so immense that it eludes even our hardest  systematisation 
attempts. Buffon, in the First discourse of his Histoire Naturelle (1749) already 
highlighted this aspect of the natural world:
… it takes a peculiar kind of genius and courage of spirit to be able to envisage nature in the 
innumerable multitude of its productions without losing one’s orientation, and to believe 
oneself capable of understanding and comparing such productions… The first obstacle 
encountered in the study of natural history comes from this great multiplicity of objects. But 
the variety of these same objects, and the difficulty of bringing together the various produc-
tions of different climates, is another apparently insurmountable obstacle to the advance-
ment of our understanding, an obstacle which in fact work alone is unable to surmount. It is 
only by dint of time, care, expenditure of money, and often by lucky accidents, that one is 
able to obtain well-preserved specimens of each species of animal, plant, or mineral, and 
thus form a well-ordered collection of all the works of nature. (Buffon, First discourse, 
quoted in Lyon 1976: 145)
Things have not become easier over time. Taxonomic knowledge, as all empirical 
knowledge, is hypothetical in nature, hence always susceptible to revision as new 
data become available and new theoretical frameworks replace old ones. In such a 
context, the challenge posed by taxonomic revisions is a fil rouge connecting the 
first three chapters of this part of the book. The puzzle these contributions pose is 
effectively a taxonomic version of Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis: are the data 
collected and systematised according to a certain taxonomy translatable, so to 
speak, into another? Notice that taxonomic revisions, either caused by a change in 
the theoretical framework or by the availability of new data, have important conse-
quences for biodiversity conservation. As Agapow et al. (2004) argued, for instance, 
a reclassification of endangered species adopting a phylogenetic species concept 
(which defines a species as a group of organisms that share at least one uniquely 
derived character) could increase the cost of recovering all species currently listed 
in the Endangered Species Act from $4.6 billion to $7.6 billion.3 Counting species, 
and their members, is not only fundamental for assessing the patient’s general health 
state, but it is also for assessing the severity of the condition affecting the patient 
and, hence, for determining treatments prioritisation.
Chapter 2, The hidden biodiversity data retained in pre-Linnaean works: a case 
study with two important XVII century Italian entomologists by Francesco Andrietti 
3 In their article, Agapow and colleagues surveyed the primary literature searching for examples of 
sets of organisms that had been classified by both the phylogenetic species concept and non-phy-
logenetic concepts (typically defined, at least for animal species, by means of the biological spe-
cies concept, according to which species are groups of populations that are reproductively isolated). 
Reclassifying species under the phylogenetic species concept would lead, this is their conclusion, 
to an apparent rise in the number of endangered species for two main reasons: the detection of 
“new” species (for instance by the splitting of “old” ones) and the subsequent reduction in geo-
graphic range (a frequently used diagnostic indicator in establishing whether a species is 
threatened).
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Barberousse and Sophie Bary focus respectively on pre-and post-Linnean archi-
val data on biodiversity: what was the pre-Linnean knowledge on the extent of bio-
diversity? And how to systematise, today, in digital databanks, the incredible—and 
at the same time insufficient—amount of information on biodiversity in order to 
help both researchers and conservationists in their respective endeavors? While in 
Chap. 2 Francesco Andrietti and Carlo Polidori tackle the issue by analysing a case 
study, i.e., the classification of Hymenoptera in the pre- and post-Linnean taxo-
nomic frameworks (how to make available today data “on species” collected before 
those species were given their contemporary name?), Anouk Barberousse and 
Sophie Bary bring to attention the taxonomic vicissitudes of earthworms, from 
Linnaeus’ description to the Barcoding earthworms programme. Notice that these 
two case studies are particularly significant for biodiversity conservation. Several 
members of the Hymenoptera order (bees, wasps, ants, and parasitoids) are major 
pollinators, and several members of the family Lumbricidae play a fundamental role 
within the natural soil ecosystem, as Darwin already recognized in his 1881 book, 
The formation of vegetable mould. In Chap. 4, Anne Chenuil and colleagues dis-
cuss the Problems and questions posed by cryptic species: to what extent do nomi-
nal species (identified through morphological characters and referred to by Linnean 
binominal names) and biological species (identified instead typically through repro-
ductive isolation) overlap? In this contribution, a rational and practical classification 
of cryptic species is proposed, based on the crossing of distinct levels of reproduc-
tive isolation with distinct levels of morphological differentiation. The focus is on 
marine biodiversity, and the conceptual challenge of establishing the possible com-
mensurability between morphological and biological species is taken up with the 
help of genetic tools, such as genome sequencing and the use of genetic markers, 
whose impressive development (and rapidly decreasing cost) is allowing identifica-
tion at an increasing rate of cryptic species, i.e., biological species “hidden” within 
nominal species.
The second challenge addressed in the first part of the book concerns the choice 
of the appropriate biodiversity measurements and the ways of monitoring the condi-
tion of the patient. Measuring biodiversity is a fundamental operation in biodiver-
sity conservation, for instance because, when we need to choose and implement 
conservation actions, financial resources are usually limited; accordingly, ecologi-
cals systems and/or places—i.e., specific regions on Earth’s surface “filled with the 
particular results of [their] individual story” (Sarkar 2002)—have to be prioritised 
and, to do so, biodiversity must be measured. There is widespread agreement that 
biodiversity cannot be measured directly:
…conservation biologists almost never measure directly the full range of phenomena that 
they take to constitute the biodiversity of a system. Rather, they … rely on measurable signs 
that vary (they believe) with biodiversity itself. Samples and signs are biodiversity surro-
gates. (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, p. 133)4
4 On the “surrogacy problem”, see for instance Sarkar (2002).
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whose characteristics are particularly sensitive to heat fluctuations and easily mea-
surable, a biodiversity surrogate is thought to be a sort of biological thermometer 
that would allow to measure biodiversity, even though indirectly. Intuitively, the 
surrogate par excellence seems to be species richness:
Eliminate one species, and another increases in number to take its place. Eliminate a great 
many species, and the local ecosystem starts to decay visibly. Productivity drops as the 
channels of the nutrient cycles are clogged. More of the biomass is sequestered in the form 
of dead vegetation and slowly metabolizing, oxygen starved mud, or is simply washed away 
… Fewer seeds fall, fewer seedlings sprout. Herbivores decline, and their predators die 
away in close concert. (E.O. Wilson 1992, p. 14)
As it can be grasped from the above quote, species richness is considered to be 
important because it is supposed to be related with the well-functioning or the sta-
bility of an ecosystem. But it can be argued that the number of species is not the 
only surrogate to be taken into account when estimating biodiversity. Another 
important feature is so-called evenness: a biological community, an ecosystem, or a 
geographical area are said to have evenness when the abundance of all species pres-
ent is similar. However, establishing whether and how surrogates such as species 
richness and evenness are correlated with one another as well as with patterns of 
species abundance remains an open theoretical problem that has, moreover, impor-
tant practical repercussions (for instance, how to infer, from the data collected from 
an actually sampled area via such surrogates, a possible general estimation of its 
diagnostic status). Chapter 5, by Luís Borda-de-Água, The importance of scaling 
in biodiversity, is devoted to these topics, focusing on the species-area relationship 
(a mathematical expression relating how the number of species changes as a func-
tion of the size of the sampled area) and the scaling of species abundance distribu-
tions (i.e., the relative abundance of species). Chapter 6, Measures of biological 
diversity: Overview and unified framework by Vincenzo Crupi is dedicated to 
diversity indexes, more precisely to the challenge of integrating them in a unified 
formalism. Here, Crupi presents a unified framework, taken from generalised infor-
mation theory, to measure biological diversity embedding a variety of statistical 
measures. While Chaps. 5 and 6 mainly rely on insights coming from information 
theory, mathematics and statistics to address specific problems primarily related 
with the choice of the appropriate biodiversity estimation techniques necessary to 
assess the status of the patient, Chap. 7, Essential biodiversity change indicators for 
evaluating the effects of Anthropocene in ecosystems at a global scale by Cristina 
Branquinho and colleagues tackles, from a conservationist point of view, the prob-
lem of monitoring the condition of the patient. Once conceded that measuring all 
forms of biodiversity everywhere and over time is an impossible task, this chapter 
proposes to broaden the outlook from species diversity to the “essential biodiversity 
variables” proposed by the Group on Earth Observations—Biodiversity Observation 
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community composition, ecosystem structure and ecosystem function. Putting into 
practice a global monitoring network to track biodiversity change is far from being 
an easy endeavour, and the chapter discusses these difficulties as well as suggesting 
possible solutions.
1.2  Are We Taking Care of the Right Patient? 
Characterising Biodiversity: Beyond the Species 
Approach
If measuring biodiversity poses a series of mainly practical challenges, it also opens 
a Pandora’s box of conceptual ones, which are dealt with in the second part of the 
book. Consider a second aspect of the analogy between medicine and conservation 
biology. Diagnosis depends on the appropriate characterisation of the biological 
organism as a unit of medical intervention. Organisms can be decomposed in a vari-
ety of entities such as organs, tissues, cells, proteins, genes, microbiotas etc. that 
interact in the context of metabolic, developmental, immunological, neurological 
etc. processes. The intervention on the medical patient is thus dependent on the way 
in which the biological organism is characterised. For instance, we might character-
ise the organism as made of proteins, and we will be right in treating mad cow dis-
ease and Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease. However, not all illnesses are linked to protein 
abnormalities. Analogously, the biosphere is composed of a variety of entities clas-
sifiable in many different ways and interacting in the context of a variety of ecologi-
cal and evolutionary processes. Species are just one of these entities. To conserve 
biodiversity by focusing merely on species loss is analogous, let us say, to maintain-
ing the health of an organism intervening on protein deficiencies only.
In this part, two main kinds of foundational issues for diagnosis will be considered: 
on the one hand, the conceptual challenges in individuating the salient units of biodi-
versity (Chaps. 8, 9 and 10); on the other, the contrast between entity-based vs. pro-
cess-based and function-based approaches to biodiversity (Chaps. 11, 12, 13 and 14).
Except for Chap. 7, the implicit underlying assumption of the contributions of the 
first part of the book is that assessing and measuring biodiversity ultimately amounts 
to counting species or, at most, taxa. This is probably the most traditional and widely 
used strategy: counting taxonomic groups and estimating their frequency (Maclaurin 
and Sterelny 2008, p. 135 ff.). This should come as no surprise. In fact, when it made 
its appearance in 1986, the term “biodiversity” was, implicitly or explicitly, intended 
to refer to species diversity. Assessing biodiversity was considered as one and the 
same thing as inventorying species, and conserving biodiversity consisted in main-
taining the inventory. In the words of E.O. Wilson (1992, p. 38):
5 See: https://geobon.org/ebvs/what-are-ebvs/
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biology. Not to have a natural unit such as the species would be to abandon a large part of 
biology into free fall, all the way from the ecosystem down to the organism.
Counting species is relatively easy in practice and theoretically well motivated. In 
fact, we already possess good (even though neither complete nor fully coherent, as 
particularly emphasised in Chaps. 2 and 3) species inventories, some fairly reliable 
ways to recognize them in practice as well as methodologically solid ways of count-
ing them. Moreover, there is a widespread agreement that the concept of species 
refers to a fundamental unit of biological organisation (Mayr 1988) and that species, 
by speciating, produce new biodiversity. However, two major problems remain: on 
the one hand, the concept of species is severely flawed (as the persistency of the so- 
called “Species Problem” shows, cf. Richards 2010; Zachos 2016) and, on the other, 
it is questionable whether it can be applied across all branches of the tree of life, for 
instance to bacterial biodiversity.
Given this state of affairs, a question is in order: if biodiversity has to be con-
served, are we describing and treating the right patient when we focus on species or, 
more largely, on other taxonomic groups? If we give a negative answer to this ques-
tion, then the conceptual challenge consists in proposing a viable characterisation of 
biodiversity able at the same time to go beyond a mere species-centred approach 
(whose merits and limits have been mentioned above) and to account for the variety 
of entities other than species, and of processes other than speciation, that might be 
considered targets of conservation practice. But then, an entirely new set of basic 
challenges, both theoretical and practical, opens up: how can we individuate the 
salient units of biodiversity? How do such units interact among them within the 
same and other levels, and how can this interaction give rise to novel diversity? Is it 
possible to keep together, in an ideally comprehensive account, this enormously 
complex interplay of units belonging to different levels and describable and evalu-
able at different temporal and spatial scales? How to bridge epistemologies con-
cerning biodiversity conservation? And how to link these epistemologies with the 
practical concern of conserving biodiversity? These and similar questions are 
addressed in the second part of the book.
Notice that, to go back to the medicine analogy, in discussing how the patient 
should be better characterised, and which of its parts, properties and functions should 
be emphasised, the chapters in this section do not miss to keeping an eye on the rela-
tion between diagnosis and treatment, i.e., on the issue of what it would mean, for 
conservation purposes, to characterise biodiversity in one way rather than another. 
The three initial chapters in this part couple evolutionary with conservationist con-
siderations in order to go beyond a species-centred approach by individuating differ-
ent salient units of biodiversity. In Chap. 8, Thomas Reydon suggests an answer to 
the question: Are species good units for biodiversity studies and conservation 
efforts?, embracing a radical approach: species are not good units of biodiversity; 
yet, a pragmatic notion of species can be used as an epistemic tool in the context of 
biodiversity studies. Two other contributions try to characterise biodiversity in a 
more encompassing way by including other entities. In Chap. 9, Why a species-
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Jorge Marques da Silva and Elena Casetta take a look at the microbial world, 
where the application of the concept of species is particularly controversial. This 
chapter suggests that entities such as multispecies biofilms, where interaction among 
parts gives rise to a putative multispecies individual, might play a crucial role in the 
generation of biodiversity and that, as a consequence, could be adequate targets of 
conservation. In a similar spirit, in Chap. 10, Considering intra-individual genetic 
heterogeneity to understand biodiversity, Eva Boon aims at enlightening an unex-
plored dimension of biodiversity, again focusing on entities other than species, i.e., 
multicellular life forms characterized by intra-individual genetic heterogeneity (such 
as, for instance, genetically mosaic and chimeric entities). This chapter argues that 
studying biodiversity through the lens of intra-individual genetic heterogeneity facil-
itates thinking in terms of interactions between biological entities rather than in 
terms of organismal function, allowing a new light on the ecological and evolution-
ary significance of biological diversity.
The other chapters in this part also couple evolutionary with conservationist con-
cerns. In order to go beyond a species-centred approach, they focus on the role of 
processes (other than speciation) and functions (such as, for instance, evolvability, 
evolutionary potential, plasticity). In Chap. 11, Biodiversity, disparity and evolv-
ability, Alessandro Minelli argues that taxic diversity is not necessarily the most 
important aspect of biodiversity if what most matters is maintenance of ecosystem 
function. This chapter articulates a rationale for prioritising focus on those species 
providing the largest contribution to overall phylogenetic diversity, thus proceeding 
towards an evo-devo approach to conservation focused on evolvability, robustness 
and phenotypic plasticity. The potential role of the process of phenotypic plasticity 
in the production of new diversity is also stressed by Davide Vecchi and Rob Mills 
in Chap. 12, Probing the process-based approach to biodiversity: Can plasticity 
lead to the emergence of novel units of biodiversity? This contribution aims to pro-
vide a model to test the hypothesis that plastic populations of a species might be 
considered evolutionary significant units amenable to conservation. In addition to 
Chaps. 11 and 12, Chaps. 13 and 14 also propose a characterisation of biodiversity 
based on process and function that reveals a common ontological ground. The ratio-
nale of a process-based approach to biodiversity is that a mere focus on entities does 
not address the issue concerning whether evolutionary and ecological processes 
have the capacity to create novel, salient units of biodiversity. The suggestion is that 
a process-based approach should integrate an entity-based one. Process-based and 
function-based approaches are, as a matter of fact, strictly related to the historical 
roots of the concept of biodiversity. In fact, while it might be argued that the term 
“biodiversity” only entered the scientific and public discourse the mid-1980s—i.e., 
on the occasion of the National Forum on Biodiversity that took place in Washington 
DC in September 1986 (Takacs 1996)—the concept goes back at least to the diver-
sity-stability debate that animated ecology in the middle of the twentieth century 
(McCann 2000). Yet, at least in its beginning, conservation biology displayed little 
interest to previous research in ecology, addressing instead the more pragmatic 
aspects of conservation. It seemed, in other words, that, as it often happens, two 
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talking past each other. This stand-off started to unlock with the Harvard Forest 
Symposium in 1991, where it was explicitly recognised that, in order to effectively 
conserve biodiversity, a more precise knowledge of the functioning of ecosystems 
would be needed (Blandin 2014). In this perspective, it becomes clear that a charac-
terisation merely in terms of species diversity does not seem to fully capture the 
multitude of dynamical interactions at different levels and scales from which biodi-
versity results. Again, neither do all species play the same role in a community or in 
an ecosystem, nor do they have the same evolutionary history and potential. 
However, when species are counted through indexes, they are treated as being 
equivalent conservation units; in fact, indexes are not easily able to mirror the pos-
sibility that a species may be more important than another for the functioning of the 
ecosystem. Moreover, in biodiversity conservation, it is not sufficient to preserve 
current biodiversity, but what is also ideally needed is to maintain diversity in the 
face of possible future losses; but to do so, a metric able to indicate whether diver-
sity in a certain place is mostly constituted by rare species (that are more likely to 
go extinct) would be needed. Chapters 13, 14 and 15 are mainly dedicated to eco-
logical theoretical perspectives on biodiversity and to the challenge of connecting 
evolutionary, ecological, and conservation considerations. Through Chap. 13, 
Between explanans and explanandum: Biodiversity and the unity of theoretical 
ecology, Philippe Huneman clarifies the key-role of the concept of biodiversity in 
ecology as both an explanans and an explanandum, while Antoine Dussault, in 
Chap. 14, Functional biodiversity and the concept of ecological function, eluci-
dates some aspects of the concept of functional diversity. Starting from the assump-
tion that measures of biodiversity based on species richness have epistemological 
limitations, this chapter explores the notion of “ecological function” and character-
ises it in non-selectionist terms. Finally, in Chap. 15, Integrating ecology and evo-
lutionary theory: A game changer for biodiversity conservation?, Silvia Di Marco 
spells out the interaction between conservation science, evolutionary biology, and 
ecology in order to understand whether a stronger integration between evolutionary 
and ecological studies might help clarifying the interactions between biodiversity, 
ecosystem functions and ecosystem services.
1.3  Treating the Patient. Conserving Biodiversity: 
From Science to Policies
In the light of the ongoing complex work of characterisation of the patient articu-
lated in the various contributions of the previous part, it is not surprising that we do 
not possess a final, universally agreed upon, definition of “biodiversity”. The crucial 
question is therefore whether putting in place effective conservation actions without 
a satisfactory definition of “biodiversity” makes sense at all. The third part of the 
book deals with this issue. Consider a third aspect of the analogy between medicine 
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and conservation biology. After diagnosis and proper characterisation of the unit of 
medical intervention, medical doctors prescribe treatment. The aim of dispensing 
treatment is always the benefit of the patient as an organism, however successful 
treatment is. In the case of biodiversity, there exist incompatible ways to character-
ise the aim of conservation policies. Part of the treatment problem, to which some 
contributions of this part are dedicated (Chaps. 16 and 17) is that the term “biodiver-
sity”, not being well defined, is potentially used differently by the various actors 
(e.g., scientists, policy-makers and conservationists) devising and implementing 
conservation policies. A flipside of the treatment problem can be understood if we 
take into consideration another facet of the definitional conundrum: the term “bio-
diversity” might have inherited, from the intentions of its original proponents 
(Takacs 1996), an intrinsic normative element that has to do with biodiversity pro-
tection and preservation. However, normativity poses a series of challenges to which 
the rest of the contributions of this part is dedicated: the first ones (Chaps. 18 and 
19) have to do with the characterisation of normativity while the others (Chaps. 20 
and 21) concern the global-local tension of conservation aims and constraints.
In his often-quoted review of definitions of “biodiversity”, DeLong (1996) listed 
no less than 85 definitions. It is thus not surprising that the term is recognised by 
some authors as remarkably vague (Sarkar 2002). Other authors think that the term 
is clearly defined or, at least, that conservation science possesses perfectly workable 
operational definitions to prescribe treatments (Bunnell 1998). The role of defini-
tions in science is controversial. On the one hand, it can be said that “definition is 
one of the most crucial issues in any science; an improper understanding of it can 
vitiate the success of the whole enterprise” (Caws 1959). On the other hand, it can 
be claimed that scientific enterprises can proceed quite well even without having 
clear, univocal and unambiguous definitions of their key terms. After all, focusing 
on disciplines like biology and ecology, it is widely recognized that no univocal, 
universally agreed upon, definitions of terms such as ‘life’ (Benner 2010), ‘organ-
ism’ (J. Wilson 2000), ‘species’ (Richards 2010), and ‘ecosystem’ (Sarkar 2002) 
can be provided. Still, biologists and ecologists successfully go on with their work. 
Why would the situation be different in the case of the term  “biodiversity”? 
Following Bunnell’s (1998) suggestion, whether a definition plays a crucial role or 
not in scientific endeavours probably depends on the nature of the specific enter-
prise at issue. For instance, when J. Wilson (2000) wrote that “Biology lacks a cen-
tral organism concept that unambiguously marks the distinction between organism 
and non-organism because the most important questions about organisms do not 
depend on this concept”, he was clearly not making reference to conservationist 
needs. But where the theoretical enterprise is strictly intertwined with pragmatic 
objectives, as it is the case with biodiversity studies, things are different.
In particular, two main reasons may be given for why a definition of the term 
“biodiversity” is needed, together with some reasons for why not having it would be 
a source of impediments in finding agreed-upon methods to evaluate management 
and conservation strategies and in the implementation of conservation actions. The 
first reason is that, unlike other scientific terms, “biodiversity” is supposed to play a 
unifying role for the plethora of discourses (Haila and Kouki 1994) produced by the 
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different disciplines and actors involved in facing the so-called biodiversity crisis. 
On the one hand, the term performs a unifying function for the scientific disciplines 
involved in estimating biodiversity and those studying how it is generated (evolu-
tionary biology, genetics, ecology, biogeography, systematics, and so on), for the 
disciplines involved in its management and conservation (from environmental eco-
nomics to conservation biology) as well as for all those socio-political disciplines 
concerned with the interactions between our species and biodiversity exploitation 
and conservation (from the social sciences to political philosophy and ethics).6 
Furthermore—but not less importantly—this unifying role serves to make scientific 
discourses uniform for a variety of social and political actors: from the general pub-
lic to stakeholders, from governments to policy makers. The term “biodiversity” is 
often used as a flagship, with no explicit definition provided. However, if scientist 
and the different social and political actors involved in facing the biodiversity crisis 
define biodiversity in fundamentally different ways, the agreement necessary to per-
form common actions could be severely impaired and the presumption that common 
actions are actually oriented towards the same goal could be false. Accordingly, “to 
create solutions for biodiversity loss, it is essential for natural and social scientists 
to overcome such language barriers” (Holt 2006).
Georg Toepfer embraces a different view. In Chap. 16, On the impossibility and 
dispensability of defining “biodiversity”, Toepfer argues that it is exactly because 
the term is vague that the concept of biodiversity is able to tie together many differ-
ent discourses from the fields of biology and bioethics, aesthetics and economics, 
law and global justice. Chapter 17, The vagueness of “biodiversity” and its impli-
cations in conservation practice, by Yves Meinard, Sylvain Coq and Bernhard 
Schmid, articulates a different argument. A tension emerges here between the theo-
retical function of the concept and its pragmatic use: providing concrete case studies 
to support their argument, the authors suggest that the lack of transparency in using 
the word “biodiversity” can hide profound disagreements on the nature of conserva-
tion issues, impairing the coordination of conservation actions, hiding the need to 
improve management knowledge, and covering up incompatibilities between disci-
plinary assumptions.
Sarkar (2002) highlighted a second reason for why a definition of “biodiversity” 
is needed. It concerns the “sociologically synergistic interaction between the use of 
“biodiversity” and the growth of conservation biology [that] led to the re- 
configuration of environmental studies that we see today”. In other words, the term 
would convey the necessity of conserving something we are losing and we care 
about. In this respect, the vagueness of the term “biodiversity” implies a lack of 
clarity as to what has to be conserved. At this juncture, a particularly thorny issue is 
whether a good definition should reflect the normativity that—according to several 
6 Many concepts may play a similar unifying role in biology and science at large. For instance, the 
concept of gene is definable in multifarious ways and has undergone a series of profound concep-
tual transformations. Nonetheless, it has continued to play an important theoretical and heuristic 
role in classical and molecular genetics as well as in genomics, constraining and directing both the 
thoughts and actions of biologists (Kay 2000).
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philosophers (Callicott et al. 1999; Norton 2008)—is embedded into the concept of 
biodiversity. Such normativity was presumed in the early literature on biodiversity, 
like Soulé’s (1985) manifesto of conservation biology, which included explicit nor-
mative postulates besides scientific ones. In Chap. 18, Sahotra Sarkar asks: What 
should “biodiversity” be?, and distinguishes between “scientistic”, “normativist”, 
and “eliminativist” approaches to biodiversity. In direct dialogue with Chap. 19, 
Natural diversity: how taking the bio- out of biodiversity aligns with conservation 
priorities, in which Carlos Santana embraces a strongly eliminativist approach 
according to which the concept of biodiversity should just be dismissed and replaced 
by the more encompassing concept of natural diversity, Sarkar instead advocates a 
strongly normativist position: biodiversity should be understood as a normative 
concept, although constrained by a set of adequacy conditions that reflect scientific 
analyses of biological diversity. The main problem with normativism is, of course, 
as the chapter underlines, that values are usually culture-dependent: global values 
ranging across cultures are probably a myth, and local norms (supposedly revealed 
by the local commitments of people living in their habitats) can be in conflict with 
each other as well as with alleged global values (Vermeulen and Koziell 2002). The 
last two chapters of the book are devoted to this tension between local and global 
values. Andrea Borghini in Chap. 20, Ordinary biodiversity. The case of food, 
focuses on an often-neglected aspect of biodiversity, which might be called “the 
edible environment”. This chapter poses a series of questions concerning the nature 
of the criteria for inclusion in conservation effort. The way this contribution tries to 
answer this question is by asking whether these criteria are global or local, whether 
they are applicable equally to all living entities, for instance to wild and domesti-
cated species alike. Finally, Markku Oksanen and Timo Vuorisalo, in Chap. 21, 
Conservation sovereignty and biodiversity, look at the “owners” of wild and domes-
ticated biodiversity: on the one hand, states are self-determining actors and the prin-
cipal possessors of biological resources in their territories but, on the other hand, the 
actual fragmentation of conservation labour is not always efficient from the conser-
vation perspective. This contribution tries to address this stand-off.
1.4  The Way Ahead: Interdisciplinary Solutions 
to Biodiversity Healing
Aiming to cover the entire conceptual and practical pathway that leads from assess-
ing to conserving biodiversity, this book highlights some critical issues that must be 
addressed to foster effective biodiversity conservation. These include both concep-
tual and philosophical issues as well as scientific and technological challenges. In 
Part I, concerned with the assessment of biodiversity, it becomes clear that technical 
and practical advances are needed. From its origins, the study of living beings was 
mainly concerned with their phenotypes. The main systematic classification efforts, 
from Buffon to Linnaeus, were built under a phenotypic paradigm. The concept of 
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gene, formally introduced by the Danish botanist W. L. Johannsen in 1909, started 
its slow way into biology with Mendel’s work in the nineteenth century, received a 
significant boost in the middle of the twentieth century with the unravelling of DNA 
structure, ultimately becoming dominant in the 1980s, with the development of the 
polymerase chain reaction and other molecular techniques. This prevalent role of 
genes in the conceptual corpus of biology was accompanied by the rapid develop-
ment of gene sequencing technologies. This had a positive effect on the pursuit of 
biodiversity inventories—think of the use of DNA barcoding—but at the expense of 
a decrease on the original focus on the description and characterisation of pheno-
types. In fact, the number of “classical” (i.e., non-molecular) taxonomists among 
professional biologists is sharply decreasing (Coleman 2015). Nonetheless, pheno-
typic studies are still crucial for the inventory of biodiversity—think about the need 
to correctly identify cryptic species—and for understanding evolutionary trends, 
given that selective pressures act on individual phenotypes. Fortunately, in the last 
few years, the scientific community became aware of the imbalance between geno-
typing and phenotyping efforts and started an international interdisciplinary venture 
to fix it (Dayrat 2005; Fiorani and Schurr 2013). Adding machine learning and/or 
multivariate statistics to digital image and/or spectroscopic analysis led to high 
throughput phenotyping and the new discipline of phenomics (Houle et al. 2010). 
High throughput phenotyping has so far been used in biotechnology contexts—both 
medical (Maier et al. 2017) and agricultural (Crain et al. 2018)—but not yet applied 
to the inventory of biodiversity, except for the artificial biodiversity of agronomic 
traditional plant landraces (Costa et al. 2015). For instance, the recent global initia-
tive (Soltis 2017) to digitalize the 350.000.000 specimen stored in 3.500 herbaria all 
over the world may provide the conditions for automated pipeline image analysis 
and therefore high throughput phenotyping, fostering the understanding of plant bio-
diversity. Altogether, these emerging trends suggest that a combination of digital 
image analysis and artificial intelligence techniques has the potential to boost the 
phenotypic characterisation of the species inventory.
The use of air-born and satellite images for biodiversity studies is not new, but 
also here the application of automated artificial intelligence-supported image analy-
sis (Keramitsoglou et  al. 2004) may help making operational biodiversity units 
other than species (communities, habitats), as suggested by some contributions to 
Part II. Also, the new generation of earth observation satellites, with their increased 
capacity for remotely estimating ecosystem functions (e.g., photosynthetic produc-
tion, Joiner et al. 2011) may help making operational the concepts of process-based 
and function-based approaches to biodiversity conservation defended in other con-
tributions to Part II. Moreover, the emerging extension of bioinformatics to pheno-
typic analysis, through the development of controlled phenotypic ontologies 
(Mungall et al. 2010), led to the novel concept of “computable phenotypes” (Lussier 
and Liu 2007; Deans et al. 2015). Phenotypic ontologies, in conjunction with eco-
logical ontologies (Madin et al. 2007), open new avenues to unravel evolutionary 
trends. This putative in-depth understanding of phenotypes might contribute to the 
integration between ecology and evolution, a need emphasized in several contribu-
tions to Part II.  All these new approaches are strongly interdisciplinary. 
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Interdisciplinary science still faces, however, a series of constraints (institutional, 
financial, sociological, epistemological, Vasbinder et  al. 2010; Marques da Silva 
and Casetta 2015) that must be overcome to foster biodiversity knowledge.
Part III discusses the problem of biodiversity definition and its consequences for 
conservation policies, also addressing the possible relation between mainly episte-
mological issues (such as measuring, inventorying and, indeed, defining biodiver-
sity) and mainly axiological and moral issues (i.e., concerning, respectively, the 
possible value of biodiversity and our correct behaviour towards it). This discussion 
is not new. In the early 1970s Arne Naess developed the concept of “methodological 
vagueness” (Glasser 1998). The aim was to broaden the support basis of his deep 
ecology political project. Arguably, the vagueness of the biodiversity concept might 
play a similar role in biodiversity conservation. The incapacity to clearly identify 
the object to be conserved might not be an unbearable burden, since targeting a set 
of closely related objects might have an additive positive effect on biodiversity con-
servation (albeit this could be a problem when resources are scarce and a prioritisa-
tion of conservation targets is needed). Even if we come to a universally shared 
definition of biodiversity, the ethical question whether we should be committed to 
biodiversity conservation remains, and the axiological problem persists. Some con-
tributions to Part III address the tension between local and global values. In this 
respect, moral and political philosophy, for instance theoretical bioethics and envi-
ronmental ethics, may provide useful resources to enlighten conservation policies. 
At the same time, part of moral philosophy provides compelling arguments against 
cultural relativism. This is not to deny, however, that there are cultural differences 
between societies and that these differences might dictate different biodiversity con-
servation policies. In fact, institutions such as as the Indigenous Peoples’ Biodiversity 
Network are deeply concerned with this issue. Here, theoretical bioethics might 
help. For instance, Engelhardt Jr. (1986), working in a medical bioethics context, 
argued that in multicultural societies there are fundamental incommensurable moral 
tenets. His bioethical system, therefore, renounces to achieve the ultimate bioethical 
“truth” and, instead, provides a framework to reach “minimum operational agree-
ments” between multicultural stakeholders, i.e., it becomes a framework for “moral 
diplomacy”. Efforts to clarify the intrinsic value of natural diversity, however, still 
persist in environmental ethics. Departing from peculiar systems of environmental 
aesthetics, contemporary authors such as Allen Carlson (2000) and Holmes Rolston 
III (2002) aim to provide a universal system of recognition of the intrinsic value of 
natural diversity. Ongoing global scientific, technological, conceptual and norma-
tive efforts aim to provide better policies and programs for biodiversity  conservation. 
The success in preventing the so called Big Sixth mass extinction is dependent on 
this global interdisciplinary collective effort.
Needless to say, the aim of this book is neither to provide a set of contributions 
that are exhaustive of the virtually unlimited issues raised by biodiversity studies 
and conservation, nor to solve problems once and for all. The attempt is rather to 
provide a tool for teaching and for research on a topic that by its own nature is 
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hugely complex and multidisciplinary, without falling into the temptation of simpli-
fying the conceptual and practical challenges involved. On the contrary, we think 
that bringing such challenges to the fore and thematising them might be a fruitful 
research approach. We hope the reader will enjoy the book and, above all, find it 
stimulating and useful.
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Chapter 2
The Hidden Biodiversity Data Retained 
in Pre-Linnaean Works: A Case Study 
with Two Important XVII Century Italian 
Entomologists
Francesco Andrietti and Carlo Polidori
Abstract Before Linnaeus published the Systema Naturae, in which introduced the 
modern species concept, a huge amount of information on ecology, behaviour and 
diversity of many animals had been accumulated. This information, often extremely 
detailed, suffers from the lack of the assignation of the studied organisms to their 
modern specific names. Here, we examine in detail the works of Antonio Vallisneri 
(1661–1730), one of the most important figures of early experimental entomology 
in Italy. We analyse the ecological and ethological contributions of Vallisneri, as 
well as those that Diacinto Cestoni (1637–1718), another Italian naturalist, sent to 
Vallisneri, to the knowledge of parasitoid, predatory and gall-making wasps 
(Hymenoptera), by studying the Saggio de’ Dialoghi sopra la curiosa origine di 
molti Insetti and the Quaderni di Osservazioni I-III, trying to assign current taxon-
omy to the observed insects based on eco-ethological and morphological descrip-
tions. Valuable data have been found in the analysed works on taxonomically diverse 
ecological webs involving wasps. Information regarded a variety of hymenopteran 
parasitoids of other Hymenoptera, dipteran parasitoids of Hymenoptera, coleop-
teran parasitoids of Hymenoptera, and hymenopteran parasitoids associated with 
non-hymenopteran hosts. Overall, about 20 wasp genera could have been objects of 
Vallisneri and Cestoni observations, which include the first detailed ecological and 
ethological data on many of them. Detailed re-examinations of ancient studies may 
contribute to our knowledge on biodiversity by providing historical distribution data 
as well as unveiling trophic interactions that may have been modified due to biodi-
versity loss in the last century.
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2.1  Introduction
Naturalists provided through many centuries a large amount of data on the ecology, 
behaviour, distribution and morphological diversity of animals. However, before 
Linnaeus published the Systema Naturae (Linnaeus 1735), in which the modern 
species concept was introduced, this information, often extremely detailed, obvi-
ously lacked the assignation of the studied organisms to their modern specific 
names, making these old studies a great source of hidden biodiversity data. A 
detailed re-examination of these works could, however, bring these data to surface 
in a modern context. In particular, studying ancient works is important for several 
reasons: (1) it may provide historical distribution information on organisms before 
Linnaeus, a period generally not covered in the analyses of communities’ variation 
through time; (2) it may provide additions on species composition and species inter-
actions in habitats and environments that may have been lost in the last century 
through human activity; (3) it may unveil information on behavioural ecology of 
species that could be compared with information on behavioural ecology retrieved 
from modern populations of the same species. All these points are directly linked 
with three of the main shortfalls of biodiversity knowledge: the Wallacean shortfall 
(the knowledge on the geographic distribution of most species is incomplete), the 
Raunkiæran shortfall (lack of knowledge on species’ traits and their ecological 
functions) and the Eltonian shortfall (lack of enough knowledge on species’ interac-
tions and their effects on individual survival and fitness) (Hortal et al. 2015).
The present study makes an attempt to bring to light old “hidden” biodiversity 
data by primarily analysing the works of Antonio Vallisneri (1661–1730), a natural-
ist strongly associated with the development of experimental entomology in Italy. 
Particularly concerning wasp (Hymenoptera) biology, Vallisneri is credited one of 
the first people who correctly interpreted insect parasitism. Secondarily, because 
additional important observations on wasp biology were also recovered (and pub-
lished) by Vallisneri from letters that Diacinto Cestoni (1637–1718), another Italian 
naturalist, sent to him, we also analysed the Cestoni observations.
The motivation underlying Antonio Vallisneri’s analysis of the world of insects 
proves to be two-fold:
 1. The first, that we shall call simply biological, relating to its origin, but which, at 
the time, was considered to be philosophical, as it was set within the great debate 
about the science of life between the supporters of spontaneous generation and 
those which, instead, maintained that every animal necessarily came from a 
parent.
 2. The second, a more specific motivation, which led him to examine in minute 
detail the lives and habits of these insects with a curiosity and zeal which made 
him a prototype of the modern naturalist and entomologist, desirous to directly 
verify the results of the facts he was describing and to throw off the weight of 
that erudite stance which still strongly characterized naturalistic studies.
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These two points are actually only apparently separate as there are significant 
elements conjoining them. Although Redi, around the mid XVII century, had shown 
that the commonly held belief that many insects spontaneously materialized in rot-
ting matter – an opinion given authority by Aristotle himself – was false, the case of 
insects which were parasitoids of others was still problematic, as was that of insects 
found inside plant galls (Parke 2014). In both cases the various situations seemed to 
confirm the theory of equivocal generation, which many hoped to refute. Only a 
very careful and thorough examination of these phenomena could clarify the prob-
lem satisfactorily.
These authors focused their studies mainly on parasitoid wasps and galler wasps, 
but also on predatory wasps and bees, thus covering many life-histories shown by 
Hymenoptera. This insect order includes ants, bees, wasps and sawflies and is one 
of the richest (115,000 species described worldwide), and represents a diverse and 
ecologically relevant component of biodiversity, since its members are involved in 
a wide range of interactions with plants (pollination, herbivory, gall formation), 
fungi (parasitism), and other animals, both invertebrates and vertebrates (parasitoid-
ism, predation) (La Salle and Gauld 1993). Furthermore, many Hymenoptera inter-
act with other components of environment, such as the soil (e.g. through nesting 
activities). Thus, any new information on species identities and their biology that 
could be retrieved from ancient studies may be important for biodiversity studies. 
Indeed, from one side the species is the most commonly used unit of biological 
diversity, and from the other side, adding data on behaviour and ecology to the spe-
cies identification substantially increases the detail of biodiversity studies, since it 
gives information on the functioning of ecosystem and may also bring to light intra- 
specific diversity (Boenigk et al. 2015). At last, relying not only on species taxo-
nomic identity but also on their behavioural ecology can be relevant for biodiversity 
conservation, since these data may help understanding how proximate and ultimate 
aspects of behaviour can be of value in preventing biodiversity loss (Berger-Tal 
et al. 2011).
In this chapter, we analyse the contribution of Vallisneri (and Cestoni) to the 
knowledge of wasps with two different life-style: parasitoid and predatory wasps 
(whole females lay eggs on or into a host and caused host death by brood feeding on 
it) and gall wasps (whose females lay eggs into plant tissues and cause tissue defor-
mations (galls) serving as food for the brood). We will confine ourselves to illustrat-
ing some of the ecological and ethological aspects in which Vallisneri was 
particularly interested, and, more specifically, we will try to identify the considered 
insects. The latter task is not always easy, as the descriptions provided by Vallisneri 
are very different from those used in the current system, and only in a few cases 
the insects at issue can be properly identified, at least at the genus-level. Some of 
the eco-ethological data provided in the work of Vallisneri (and Cestoni) are 
 particularly interesting in the light of biodiversity studies, since they are directly 
related with food webs (i.e. parasitoid – host relationships), and it is well known 
how food webs are vulnerable to biodiversity loss (Dunne et al. 2002).
As regards parasitoid and predatory wasps, we have used the Saggio de’ Dialoghi 
sopra la curiosa origine di molti Insetti (Vallisneri 1696, 1700) as the main source, 
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whereas, for gall wasps, we have mainly used the Quaderni di Osservazioni 
(Vallisneri 2004; Vallisneri 2007; Vallisneri unpublished manuscript), of which vol-
umes I and II have been recently transcribed.
2.2  Parasitoid and Predatory Wasps
The Dialoghi sopra la curiosa origine di molti Insetti take place between two per-
sonages, Pliny and Malpighi, the revered scholar who had died only 2 years previ-
ously, and who is no other than a stand in for Vallisneri himself. In the first Dialogo 
Pliny, who supports traditional beliefs, says
May the Modern Gentlemen forgive me, they are depriving themselves of a great, compas-
sionate Mother always ready to succour them in their most urgent needs. They should keep 
her close as a reference point, because they will eventually find forms of generation which 
they will not know how to explain honourably, without recourse to this universal benefactor, 
or some other phantom they have thought up. Amongst other things which may still be hid-
den, I have seen little flies hatching out of the eggs of caterpillars, and Large Flies, Flies and 
Wasps from the Chrysalises or Cocoons of Butterflies and moths, inside which I do not 
know how the mothers could have laid their eggs, or their worms. (Vallisneri 1696, p. 311)
Pliny has in fact hit on some of the most distinctive features of the parasitoids, in 
other words, the fact that they develop, feed and grow at the expense of eggs or 
larvae of other insects. In some cases these parasitoids are Diptera, but they are 
mostly Hymenoptera of the Parasitica (= Terebrantia) group. As to whether they are 
called flies or wasps or even bees should be disregarded, since Vallisneri often uses 
these terms interchangeably.
Malpighi replies
One day, from 40 eggs of a big Butterfly [or moth], of the size and colour of the sort of mil-
let they call “of the “Sun”, hatched over a hundred tiny Little Flies […] in each egg I saw 
two holes, one big one […] and ten times bigger than the other […] out of which the little 
flies kept on coming out, the other just visible with the Microscope on top of each one […] 
The tiny hole was the one made by the worms, which penetrated the egg searching for food, 
[…] the big hole was made by the Little Flies, after they had become Chrysalises inside the 
egg, and then flying insects […] In short, they went in by one door and came out of the 
other, and nothing was generated by itself inside there, but rather came out of the eggs of 
the same sort of Little Flies […] even if they were so small as to look like little flying atoms, 
I could make out their nubby little antennae, […] heads, and wasp-like bodies […] we 
might call them tiny little wasps. (Vallisneri 1696, pp. 311–312)
In these passages, Malpighi is referring to wasps which live on the eggs of a not 
specifically identified butterfly or moth (“Parpaglione”), inside which they hatch 
and develop, presumably belonging to the Trichogrammatidae or Platygastridae as 
already observed by Pampiglione et al. (2000, p. 16). We are here dealing with a 
case of endophagous oophagy, because the whole life cycle of the parasite takes 
place inside the egg of its host, from which the parasite emerges as an adult wasp. 
The small hole is probably not where the larvae got in, as Vallisneri mistakenly 
believes, but was made by the ovipositor of the mother wasp when laying the egg.
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In another case the butterfly is easier to identify
[…] one day I saw odd little flies hatch out from half of the eggs of a butterfly with eyespots 
on its wings and, from the other half, black caterpillars. (Vallisneri 1696, p. 312)
The pattern on the wings and the colour of the caterpillar seem to be those of the 
Inachis io (peacock) butterfly. The eggs of this species are parasitized especially by 
Telenomus (Platygastridae) and Trichogramma (Trichogrammatidae) (Hondō et al. 
1995), which are amongst the most active parasitoids of butterfly and moth eggs 
(Shaw et al. 2009, p. 147).
Malpighi lengthily discusses other cases of oophagous parasitoids, particularly 
those emerging from the eggs of Heteroptera (bugs) and Homoptera (Vallisneri 
1696, p.  312) observing that, even if there is sometimes a specific relationship 
between the species of host and parasitoid, some hosts may be parasitized by vari-
ous parasitoid species. He then goes on to talk of cases in which the parasitoids do 
not emerge from the eggs of the host, but from its larva or chrysalis or cocoon
Others from large cocoons made of the rough silk of the second Moth, inside which one day 
I found fourteen empty Chrysalises […] (Vallisneri 1696, p. 312)
The appearance of the cocoon and the dimension of the moth suggest the possibility 
that we are dealing with the genus Saturnia (pavonia?), which is known to have 
numerous parasites that hatch from its cocoons (Grandi 1984, Vol. II, pp. 249–251; 
Peigler 1994, p.  3), where they complete their development. Amongst the most 
common are the dipteran Masicera (Grandi 1984, Vol. II, pp. 249, 251, 556; Peigler 
1994, p.  81) and Agrothereutes (= Spilocryptus) (Ichneumonidae) (Grandi 1984, 
Vol. II, p. 251; Peigler 1994, p. 23) a number of whose pupae can be found in a 
single moth cocoon.
Parasitoids can also be found in the hard, earthen nests of Sceliphron mud-dauber 
wasps (Sphecidae) or the cocoons of the caddis fly (Trichoptera) (Vallisneri 1696, 
p.  312): presumably, these are mostly parasitoids from the Ichneumonidae and 
Braconidae (including from the subfamily Aphidiinae), with perhaps a few dipter-
ans. In the case of the Trichoptera, we are dealing with Agriotypus (Ichneumonidae: 
Agriotypinae).
Vallisneri seems to have noticed the difference between eggs laid on or inside the 
body of the host i.e. between endo- and ectoparasitoidism
[…] having seen various holes one day under the Microscope in the body of a caterpillar I 
had just discovered (I am not referring to their “breathing holes” [spiracles]) and, another 
day, various small eggs amongst their hairs, this led me to understand immediately that 
those too came from the Mothers […] (Vallisneri 1696, p. 312)
He also reports
I also saw many Little Flies hatch out of the small, spherical, almost membranaceous, fol-
licles of a little worm, which ought to turn into a certain type of wee aphid  [gorgoglioncino], 
which dwells in the Great Mullein and the Tiny Leaves Figworts, and also out of another 
worm which, as it was found between the two membranes of the external part of the leaves 
of an elm, should have hatched out as an aphid similar in form to those found on broad 
beans, grass peas, and similar legumes. (Vallisneri 1696, p. 312)
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This is actually an observation made by Francesco Mattacodi, which was passed 
on to Vallisneri, in the same words given in the above quote, in a letter sent to him, 
which was subsequently published by Vallisneri himself (Vallisneri 1726, 
pp. 61–62). Tremblay and Masutti (2005, p. 37) have apparently wrongly identi-
fied this parasitoid (“Little Flies”) since, in our opinion, its host, the “wee aphid” 
(“gorgoglioncino”) does not belong to the genus Aphis (Homoptera: Aphididae) 
as “the spherical, almost membranous follicles” remind one more of a scale insect 
(Homoptera: Coccidae). As concerns its parasitoid, we are spoiled for choice, 
even if it cannot be a genus specialized in parasitizing aphids (subfamily 
Aphidiinae) as was proposed (Tremblay and Masutti 2005, p. 37). It might have 
been a chalcidoid wasp from the subfamilies Aphelininae (Aphelinidae) or 
Encyrtinae (Encyrtidae). The latter are known to cause multiple infestations: thus 
a single egg laid by the parasitoid can produce a number of its like, as we can see 
from the above quote.
Moreover, Vallisneri also subsequently introduces other quotes from the same 
letter received from Mattacodi into his Dialoghi, without any reference as to their 
source
From live forest Bugs, and live Beetles [“Cantaridi”] I have observed on several occasions 
after a single worm has come out of their nether regions, without any detriment to them. It 
was enclosed in a perfect egg [=cocoon], and then produced a nice little fly or, when 
enclosed in a little follicle, a fly elongated in shape came out of it. (Vallisneri 1696, 
pp. 312–313)
And, immediately afterwards,
Many little worms, which also came out of two caterpillars raised from eggs, wrapped 
themselves up shortly afterwards in long cocoons, from which emerged little flies, without 
preventing the said caterpillars from turning into the usual Chrysalises, and afterwards the 
sort of whitish butterflies which are so harmful to Cabbages […] (Vallisneri 1696, 
pp. 312–313)
The two passages quoted above come from Mattacodi’s letter (Vallisneri 1726, 
p. 61) and follow the same wording almost exactly. In the first case this could refer, 
according to Tremblay and Masutti (Tremblay and Masutti 2005, p. 37), to an infes-
tation of Heteroptera and adult Coleoptera by tachinid Diptera; the second seems to 
bear witness to parasitoids emerging from the skin of the caterpillar (which, when 
the infestation is not excessive, may survive and finish its life cycle (e.g. Meijden 
et al. 2000), which will be further discussed below.
Mattacodi also observed parasitoids emerging from insect eggs, giving emphasis 
to the case of the “biggest moth” (Saturnia pyri) and believing, like Vallisneri after 
him, that the parasitoid entered in its larval form, not as an egg (Vallisneri 1726, 
p. 61). He would, moreover, observe parasitoids emerging from butterfly chrysa-
lises, although he admitted that this had already been observed by Vallisneri 
(Vallisneri 1726, p.  61), who would put the fact into his Dialoghi. In particular 
Mattacodi relates that he had found a cocoon which, in addition to the remains of its 
maker, contained another cocoon belonging to the parasitoid, which, however, he 
again believed to have entered as a larva, not as an egg (Vallisneri 1726, p. 62).
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The basic problem concerns the birth of the parasitoids. Indeed, Pliny goes on to 
ask: “And all these, and those, do they come out of an egg, or out of the worm?” [“E 
tutte queste, e questi, nascono dall’uovo, o dal verme?”] (Vallisneri 1696, p. 312).
There follows Malpighi’s answer
Those who can find the patience to look will always see the two holes described in all the 
eggs. They will never see Little Flies or Large Flies or Flies emerge from the Chrysalises if 
they protect them well enough, I mean the cocoons and such like, from which it can be seen 
that a Mother is always required. It seems far stranger that those which come out of a 
Caterpillar’s body alive should be born of a Mother, and then make their cocoons immedi-
ately or harden into Chrysalises […] (Vallisneri 1696, p. 312)
The last sentence reported above alludes to what happens, for example, with the 
genus Apanteles (Braconidae), a parasite of lepidoptera larvae, in which they lay 
numerous eggs during the early stages of their host’s development. After having 
grown to full size, the larvae emerge from their caterpillar host, making their own 
cocoons on or beside it.
Pliny recalls the observations of other two naturalists who had seen the same 
phenomenon, Aldrovandi and Redi; however, both of them had taken the cocoons of 
the parasitoids which had emerged from the host for eggs laid by the caterpillar 
(Vallisneri 1696, p. 313). To which Malpighi replies
I doubt that both these great men, let it be said with all reverent modesty, could have been 
mistaken. As you know, it is not caterpillars which lay eggs, but butterflies, and even if they 
confused eggs with Chrysalises, I still do not believe that the caterpillars made the silk 
cocoons mentioned by Signor Redi, but that the worms did so as soon as they had hatched 
[…] That this is what happens is clearly shown by the silk, which they admit to having seen 
around them, which certainly did not come out of the rear end of the caterpillars, and my 
eye showed this to me one day, as I had seen them hatch and, then and there, make the little 
cocoons described. (Vallisneri 1696, p. 313)
In the second Dialogo Pliny introduces the matter of the “vespe icneumoni”. We can 
find mention of these in texts by Aristotle (as well as in Pliny and Aldrovandi), even 
if these are “very unclear, and limited” [“oscurissimi, e scarsi”] (Vallisneri 1700, 
p. 357), as Malpighi was then made to observe. Indeed, in chapter XX of Book 5 of 
Aristotle’s Historia animalium, it is said that these lesser wasps nest in the walls and 
feed on spiders, even if  – it is added – those of a larger size do the same thing 
(Vallisneri 1700, p.  357). As regards the former, Malpighi reports the following 
observations
On the 20th day of June, I observed a swift Little Wasp going frequently in and out a hole 
made at some point by a nail in a wall in a little frequented Room […] On the 12 of July, I 
found it [the hole] closed up on the outside, and with the greatest of diligence daubed with 
a crusting of fine earth, or mud from the fields. I got the urge to open it up, and I can tell you 
quite frankly that the plug made of this earthen paste was a good finger in thickness. When 
I removed it, I saw a little cell with lots of Little Spiders inside and a fat, juicy, whitish- 
yellow worm, which was greedily devouring the same. When I took this away, there was 
another little cell further back, with a worm of the same kind, but a bit larger, shut up with 
other Tiny Little Spiders, and this little cell was in between two other contiguous ones, 
which also had their respective guests living in them, along with, as one might say, these 
still steaming corpses. Still further back, there were others without any flaws in them, but I 
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was so clumsy when I broke [the structure] up that I made a fine mess of the whole thing, 
and I was unable to make […] any further observations […] I found yet another one amongst 
the splintered remains of a fallen in house, which I observed to be set up with a total of 
eleven little cells built in a most orderly manner behind a common passageway, so that 
almost all of them could get into it to leave [the nest] without going through the cells of the 
others, by gnawing through just one wall between the aforesaid passageway, and their cell. 
(Vallisneri 1700, p. 357)
This description could fit with the genus Trypoxylon (Crabronidae), which habitu-
ally builds its cells in a linear sequence inside empty plant stems or dead branches, 
but also in tunnels made in the wood by other insects or artificially produced holes. 
One would be led to think either that the walls of the room were made of wood or 
that the “nail” had been hammered into a supporting beam. The cells are constructed 
starting from the bottom of the hole, supplied with a goodly number of little spiders, 
an egg added and, finally, each unit is separated off from those to be subsequently 
built with an earth diaphragm. After the construction of the last cell, a plug of earth 
is applied to isolate the nest from what lies outside. The difference in size of the 
larvae may be due to the fact that the inner cells are made ready and provisioned first 
and thus the corresponding larvae would be older (and larger) than the ones nearer 
the outer part of the nest. Their “common passageway”, on the other hand, remains 
unexplained.
However, the difference relating to size is interconnected with another two: the 
first is, again, a matter of size but, this time, relating to sex (males are smaller than 
females); the second is the difference between wild “Vespe Icneumoni” and their 
domestic counterparts. The latter, which the reader is reminded were of the type also 
described by Aldrovandi (Vallisneri 1700, p. 358), were observed
[…] in various places in the house, not only isolated and unfrequented ones, but continu-
ously visited places, even under the smoky old Mantle of a Chimney, where the Kitchen fire 
was constantly burning. (Vallisneri 1700, p. 358)
This habit matches that of the genus Sceliphron (Sphecidae) as this can be con-
firmed from the description of the wasp which has its abdomen separated from the 
thorax by a “long pipe” (Vallisneri 1696, p. 358), and has a black head and thorax 
(which seems to indicate the species Sceliphron spirifex) (Pagliano and Negrisolo 
2005, p. 82), from the number of cells in a nest (14 but, as would be observed further 
on, varying between 1 and 22) (Vallisneri 1700, pp. 358, 368), from the spiders 
contained in a cell (10–12) (Vallisneri 1696, p. 358), from the yellow and black of 
its legs, the greater length of the back legs and, finally, from its way of collecting 
mud from a puddle, and also due to its propensity for building its nests in warm 
places, like a chimney mantel, as well as on beams and under roofs or inside the 
walls (Vallisneri 1700, p. 359).
The “wild” variety is not so easy to identify. These also have a long waist, but are 
very different in colour and shape from the former (Vallisneri 1696, p. 359). Here is 
what Malpighi says with regard to wild “vespe icneumoni”
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Out walking on the 15th day of March […] raising my eyes, I saw, on top of a Great Branch 
of a dead Oak, about eight arm’s lengths high, an earthen nest, southern facing, there 
exposed to every gust of wind. […] I shut it up jealously in a glass jar […] it had been made 
the previous year, and it had been all winter in the snow and ice and wind. On the 12th day 
of June out hatched a Wasp with a really long pipe in its belly, but with a colour and shape 
rather different from the aforesaid domestic variety […] On the 14th and 15th another two 
[…] And these were all of the same size and very similar in shape. On the 17th, Bigger Ones 
started hatching out, and these looked stronger and bolder […] Counting the holes, there 
were only fourteen, although all the Wasps together numbered seventeen, three of them 
having pierced the dividing wall of their cells and come out of the little windows already 
made by their neighbours […] I supposed, and I swear by your Aristotle that I am making 
a good faith guess here, that the bigger ones were female and the smaller ones […] were 
male […] (Vallisneri 1700, pp. 359–360)
One has the definite impression that this is a description of a eumenine wasp 
(Vespidae: Eumeninae), due to the fact that, unlike in the “domestic wasps”, “the 
pipe which divides off the belly bells out like a trumpet” (Vallisneri 1700, p. 360). 
The observation that the males, which are smaller in size, emerge from the nest 
before the females is interesting, as this is typical for these Hymenoptera. The 
earthen nest described would seem that of a Eumenes, perhaps Eumenes unguicula-
tus (Eumeninae) (see, for example, Grandi 1961, Fig. 23, p. 39). Although this is 
correct, the assertion that they probably feed on spiders (Vallisneri 1700, p. 358), 
like the “domestic” ones (which is more taken for granted than supported by spe-
cific observations) is not. Indeed, the wasps in question use Lepidoptera caterpillars. 
On the other hand, later in the work, Malpighi would say, with regard to other (wild) 
wasps, which build
[…] a roundish, earthen Nest looking rather like a breast, and like a walnut in size. Once I 
had detached it and opened it, I found it all empty, in other words, it had just one cell, and 
with just one solitary worm in it […] I observed that it ate caterpillars […] It took the Little 
Wasp until the 20th of June of the following year to hatch. For the record, this was similar to 
the females of wild “icneumoni” described, but a good bit smaller […] with the very same 
structure, and perhaps, or even actually, there is another one of the same species, which usu-
ally builds a rough-looking nest inside walls facing East or south, which also feeds its young 
on little caterpillars […] and walls up ten or twelve of them, half-alive, inside each little cell 
as food relished by the future Little Wasps. I even found two nests in the window of a coun-
try House. They were facing East, quite close one to another, and made of hard, white clay, 
rather pointed towards the top, and roughly rounded off, very much smaller than the afore-
described. When I opened one up, I saw just one white worm similar to those mentioned in 
a round and shiny little cell, which was greedily devouring imprisoned geometer moth lar-
vae a lot smaller than the aforementioned caterpillar […] (Vallisneri 1700, pp. 364–365)
These passages remove all doubt as to the identity of the wasps in question (and also 
that of the previous one), wild “vespe icneumoni” which, as it is explicitly stated, 
have the same structure, even if they are smaller. Again we are dealing with wasps 
of the genus Eumenes: the first of this second group of smaller wasps, probably 
Eumenes pomiformis, builds mud nests with a shape reminiscent of a wineskin, is 
made up of a single cell (unlike Eumenes unguiculatus, whose nest was multicel-
lular) and is provisioned with caterpillars of microlepidoptera.
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Malpighi also speaks of “Wild (Silvestri) Bees”, which he had briefly mentioned 
before, calling them “Forest (Silvestri) Bees” (Vallisneri 1700, p. 358), about which 
he says
[…] even though it works its little honeycomb out of mire and the tiniest of stones, it does 
still perhaps still retain the nobility of the Bees, as it feeds its little foetuses, inasmuch as I 
have been able to observe, solely on sweet juices. I would place these amongst the ichneu-
mon owing to the similarity of their earth nests which, from the outside, are hardly distin-
guishable […] as we can also find some built by the said Wasps with almost the very same 
material.” (Vallisneri 1700, p. 361)
But, although the structure of the nests is similar to that of the “ichneumon” wasps, 
the same does not hold as regards the appearance of the insect, seeing that
The Wasps, or rather the Bees which build these [nests] have really similar features to com-
mon Bees, possessing a very different form to that of the aforementioned ichneumon […] 
(Vallisneri 1700, p. 362)
Both the descriptions reported above, that of the nest and that of the insect, are con-
sistent with the bee Megachile, probably Megachile parietina (= Chalicodoma pari-
etina) (Megachilidae), which builds earth nests (Grandi 1961, p. 324). Regarding 
these bees, Malpighi reports the following observation regarding the chrysalis of 
one of these, which had been separated and placed in a twist of paper so that its 
development could be followed
Looking at this chrysalis on the first day of July, I found on top of the same 4 little spherical, 
white eggs […] and looking carefully at the twist of paper I found it had been pierced right 
through by a beetle, which had industriously penetrated through a little split in the first 
outside wrapping, and this led me to understand even better, how easily the Gentlemen who 
Defend spontaneous generation can be led astray […] by not observing that ingenious […] 
Mothers have secretly laid their eggs, precisely as happened to the aforesaid unfortunate 
Chrysalis, or Nymph, from which, most purposefully kept and watched over, hatched four 
rather hairy little worms with ringed segments and, when it was time, the Little Worms 
changed into Nymphs, and the Nymphs into Beetles. This did not happen to the other 
Nymphs of the Bees shut up in their impenetrable nest, seeing that Bees flew out of there, 
and not Beetles. (Vallisneri 1700, p. 362)
In all probability, we are dealing with Trichodes (Coleoptera: Cleridae), a parasite 
of bees and wasps which attacks the larvae and probably also their food stocks 
(Grandi 1961, p. 321; Müller et al. 1997, p. 262). Irrespective of the naturalistic 
interest of this observation, it is also important in a much more general sense, to 
counterattack the opinions of those who, when faced with the phenomenon of the 
apparent generation of an insect different from the one it originated from, attributed 
it to a case of spontaneous generation.
There later appears a consideration made by Pliny regarding a mistake made by 
Aldrovandi, who had allegedly confused the nests of “domestic ichneumon wasps” 
(Sceliphron) with those of the “wild bees” (Megachile) once described by Aristotle, 
not having taken into account the different colouring of the larvae and having trusted 
in the mistaken description of a countryman (Vallisneri 1700, pp. 362–363).
Returning to the subject of wild bees (Megachile parietina), Malpighi observes 
that larvae of two sorts come out of the same nest – one which is bigger and black 
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in colour, the other smaller and more colourful  – considered to be, respectively, 
females and males (Vallisneri 1700, p. 363). Indeed, the males of Megachile pari-
etina are very different in colour from the females (Grandi 1961 p. 324; Müller et al. 
1997, p. 268). As we have seen, Malpighi had already revealed, in connection with 
wild bees and, in particular, Megachile, that the bees, unlike the wasps, which build 
earthen nests and live “of Little Spiders and Small Caterpillars and Geometers 
moths larvae” [“di Ragnateli, di Bruchetti, di Geometri”] (Vallisneri 1700, p. 361), 
feed their own larvae, at least as far as he has been able to ascertain, on a vegetarian 
diet, consisting of “sweet juices” [“dolci sughi”]. This is an important point, to 
which Malpighi subsequently returns, with an interesting observation comparing 
the structure of the tongue in Megachile and that of the honey bee
[…] a long tongue, composed of, as one might say, five little shiny, sharp tongues, almost 
as if they had teeth, because of some short hairs, which made them look rough and coarse. 
The one in the middle was twice the length of the others […] very sharp-looking, and also 
a bit hairy […] The other four were made differently from the aforesaid […] This new dis-
covery as to the tongues led me to the increasing suspicion that that they feed on juices, 
honey, dew and other like things, because they are very similar to those of ordinary Bees, 
and they seem much more suited to taking away and manoeuvring all sorts of liquors with 
their roughnesses, whether these consist of branchy, yielding particles or sweet, sticky ones. 
And, indeed, I have often seen them on flowers […] (Vallisneri 1700, p. 364)
As regards the vegetarian diet, Pliny asks for confirmation
Are you sure that they feed their little ones only on juices, and not sometimes on tender 
Little Mosquitoes, maggots, tiny flies, small spiders or other such things? (Vallisneri 1700, 
p. 364)
Malpighi, in view of the lack of other observations to add to those already given, 
which do not exclude the possibility of a mixed diet, tries to support his hypothesis 
by putting forward some further information, presumably again regarding Megachile 
parietina, reported to him in one of Cestoni’s letters
[…] in Livorno there are a huge number of earth Nests attached to the stones on the facades 
of the Houses […] which look like so many pieces of earth thrown haphazardly by a human 
hand, inside the little cells of which he [Cestoni] often found a little piece of brown honey 
intended to nourish the worms, which further supports my suspicion, if we suppose that 
these were built by Bees of the aforesaid race. (Vallisneri 1700, p. 364)
The persistence on this subject is certainly justified by the importance of the ques-
tion brought up by Vallisneri. The difference between the diets the larvae are fed on 
is indeed fundamental when making a distinction, whether ecological or systematic, 
which separates the large taxon made up of Hymenoptera Aculeata (bees, stinging 
wasps, ants) into two halves.
Another important note is contained in a passage part of which has already been 
reported above
[…] and it walls up ten or twelve of them, half alive, inside each cell as food relished by the 
future Little Wasps. […] I found two nests […] much smaller than the aforesaid. On open-
ing one, I saw just one white worm, curled up, similar to those mentioned, in a shiny 
rounded little cell, which was greedily devouring imprisoned geometer moth larvae […] 
and I saw that there were two still alive, brought there incredibly skilfully without killing 
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them […] so that they would continuously provide fresh and tender food for the little one, 
and so they would not rot or dry up before they [the offspring] reached the required size. 
And this admirable providence I have also seen practised in some of the Nests of the wild 
ichneumon Wasps [the Eumenes before considered], and perhaps, also, in domestic ones, 
and in all those which live in the very little holes in the walls [Trypoxylon] […] in which 
almost all the Small Spiders, which they were going to leave as food for their little ones, 
were alive. So I saw that it was not always true, as Aristotle said, in the Book 5 Chap. 20 
quoted, that the ichneumon wasps, Phalangia perimunt, occisaque ferunt in parietinas, aut 
aliquid tale foramine pervium [they kill spiders, and bring the killed ones in ruins or any-
thing other similar place provided with holes] […] (Vallisneri 1700, pp. 364–365)
This observation, which is of primary importance, holds with reference to 
Eumenes, Sceliphron, Trypoxylon, in other words to all the observed predatory 
wasps, and consists in the fact that they do not kill their prey (as Aristotle main-
tained) “so that they would continuously provide fresh and tender food for the little 
one, and so they would not rot”.
The wasps Aristotle is alluding to are, with all probability, Pompilidae, spider- 
hunting wasps which Vallisneri does not seem to have observed personally. However, 
he will report Bellonio’s description of how the spider is stung and carried away by 
the wasp (Vallisneri 1700, p. 361).
Malpighi continues as follows
When they are grown, the Worms make a white cocoon […] When I looked on the sixth day 
of June, I found two long Little Wasps had hatched, that is, one from each nest, which had 
emerged from the back part of the aforesaid, which was already open, by which it was 
attached and fixed tight to the Wall, having in the meanwhile avoided the bother of gnawing 
away at the front wall of the same. These are half smaller than the aforementioned ichneu-
mons, but almost exactly the same shape. […] They have a big back and a broad chest, from 
which spring six legs, divided up into seven sections, the last of which are really long, and 
they have a long spine at the end of the third, as have the second legs too. The thorax is 
connected to the abdomen by a long, hard, black tube, shaped like a trumpet. The abdomen 
[…] from the end of which is always unsheathed, and ready to strike, a very long but, as I 
think, innocent tricuspid sting, in the shape of a straight tail. It is almost as long as the whole 
of the abdomen, and it does not flatten and unsheathe it, as other Wasps do with their harm-
ful, stinging needle. Indeed, it is adorned and hung on one side and the other with two very 
black and hairy threads, which are usually crooked and contorted like old, intertwined 
grapevines […] (Vallisneri 1696, p. 365)
Pliny replies
These may well be the Little Wasps ex Minuti &c. mentioned (even if he was then talking 
more of Wasps), although this was believed in passing, by my Aristotle in the place you 
mentioned which, as he says, nomine carent [have no name] even though nidos e luto par-
vos, aut ad sepulcra, aut ad parietinas configunt, atque in iis vermiculos pariunt &c. [they 
build small nests from the mud and fix them either to sepulchres or ruins, and inside them 
they give birth small worms] as industriously as the larger and, if it does not seem overly 
bold to give a name to an insect which was not given to it by Aristotle, I would call them, at 
least so as to distinguish them from the other ones, tailed domestic Ichneumons. (Vallisneri 
1700, p. 365)
The two “Little Wasps” that Vallisneri saw coming out of the back of the nest 
were ichneumonid parasitoids (in the currently accepted sense of this term) which 
had fed on the larvae of the host and its prey.
F. Andrietti and C. Polidori
33
Following a discussion as to whether or not wasps which build earth nests could 
have wings covered with hard elytra, which seems to have been something main-
tained by Aristotle, as reported by Pliny, Malpighi is made to reply
Pliny, to be quite frank with you, I really do not think that Aristotle then understood them 
to be Wasps, even if he was dealing with this issue, and men with a great amount of good 
sense, and most worthy besides, firmly believed this. And indeed, out of all those Wasps and 
Forest Bees that I have observed making all or a part of their mud nests, of which, besides 
those described, I still have many others to describe, I have never found any which have 
shell wings over their membranous wings […] I have often found strangers living in the 
aforesaid earthen nests, and false guests which have either managed to get inside, or have 
been laid inside by their wise and industrious Mothers, so that they can feed on this juiciest 
of sweet worms that there is inside[…] I found one of the domestic variety stuck tight under 
the arch of a public Portico, which […] contained a beautiful, live Beetle […] all of it a 
lovely cinnabar colour, and patterned, with wings dashingly edged with a bright purple […] 
(Vallisneri 1700, pp. 365–366)
Urged by Pliny to say whether he has seen other insects “dall’ali superiori di crosta 
[“with upper wings made out of shell”] in the wasps mud nests, Malpighi replies
Just once, I saw a really odd one, but I imagined that it was (as it indeed turned out to be), 
an itinerant inhabitant of cells that were not its own. This one had a round Orange, smooth 
and shiny Head, and was shaped like the bare skull of a dog with a long muzzle […] This 
was definitely not a Wasp, as you might hear, but rather some sort of beetle of a kind of its 
own, quite dashing, and strangely shaped. (Vallisneri 1700, p. 366)
In the last two passages quoted, we have cases of beetles which are using or parasit-
izing the nests. The latter is probably a beetle belonging to the Ripiphoridae family 
(Coleoptera), whose genera are all parasites of Hymenoptera Aculeata. To be more 
precise, it could be Macrosiagon, a parasite of some species of predatory wasps, in 
particular Sceliphron, as could be those which build mud nests here considered 
(Batelka and Hohen 2007).
Malpighi’s answer to Pliny’s question as to how the wasps’ parasites manage to 
get into their nests and as to whether there are others, apart from the beetles he has 
already described, is as follows
[…] it is probable that they sneaked in unseen when the Mother Wasp had not yet closed off 
the top of the cells. I have not only seen the aforesaid Insects, but also a certain sort of Fly, 
which lays Maggots, or worms that are infamous eaters of live meat […] and the Mother 
Wasps being absent, they get into the cells of the latter before they are closed and after hav-
ing laid their unnoticeable little eggs on the tender little worms, go off. The Maggots, 
shortly after they have hatched, bore or drill holes into the worm’s skin, and sucking out all 
its white blood […] and delicate little entrails grow greedily on the ruins, and on the car-
nage of others. Nor are they content to devour just one, but smelling the nearby prey they 
pierce the dividing walls with this sort of awl they have, which is really hard and black, 
attached to their mouths like a spout […] and they move from one to another, until they are 
swollen, and sated with those wretched little worms, they reach their destined size […] 
from one nest of wild ichneumon Wasps I found hatched […] four Flies, and just one Wasp. 
Looking at the nest I saw, in addition to the big hole that the Wasp had emerged from, a little 
hole also made freshly as could be seen from the detritus above a cell of its home. Opening 
this, and following the narrow path of the little one, and the unused tiny aperture, I found 
four cast offs, or empty shells of the Chrysalises of the aforesaid Flies, and two Chrysalises 
which were still full, along with some excrement and the remains of the devoured Worm 
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[…] in another wild nest closed in a box […] I found it pierced in three places, that is, with 
two big holes and one little one. The usual Little Wasps had come out of the big ones and 
six Flies of the sort described above out of the little one. Again following the trail left by the 
little hole, I found in the offended cell the shells of the Chrysalises of the six flies which had 
come out looking the same, with the same features and in the same number as those men-
tioned. There was also a lateral hole, which led into another cell, and in that one another 
hole, which led into yet another cell, both of them empty, and bereft of their legitimate 
owner, just leaving a dry heap of droppings, closed off with the usual webbing in one cor-
ner. This led me to suspect that, in this case, the first worm devoured was the one in the first 
cell, since there were no droppings of any sort there and that, once they had finished, they 
had got in to the other cells to eat up the others, which they had found fully grown and ready 
to spin their cocoons, and to change into Nymphs (since they had prepared the cell, and 
neatly collected the faeces), then they went back into the first one, and there they changed 
into the usual chrysalises. And if you are itching to know what these bold and ingeniously 
insolent Flies look like, I can tell you that they are very similar to those which fly and buzz 
about our houses every day […] although they are a bit more bristly, and a little smaller, 
rather more ash-grey in colour, more marbled, and they are edged with black and have a 
silvery head […] from other earth nests, particularly those made by domestic ichneumon, 
sometimes twenty-five or thirty Little Flies of the same kind as the Small Worm-eating 
carnivores, which also came out of eggs laid by their Mothers inside the little cell in ques-
tion before the Wasp which had built the cell had closed it off, so that they might eat up the 
worm which Owned that cell. (Vallisneri 1700, p. 367)
This last quote is a masterly discourse on behavioural ecology regarding Diptera 
which parasitize Eumenes and Sceliphron. In the case of the second wasp (“domes-
tic ichneumon”) the parasite is very probably Pachyophthalmus signatus (= Amobia 
signata) (Diptera: Sarcophagidae), as pointed out by Tremblay and Masutti (2005, 
p. 37), which first feeds off the egg and then the prey stored up by the wasp (Grandi 
1961, pp. 160–161).
Malpighi also reports some observations he made about bees which reutilize the 
abandoned nests of Sceliphron
[…] a certain nest of dashing Bee, and tiny and ingenious inhabitant of holes in the wall, 
and also of old, empty nests of domestic ichneumon Wasps […] dashing little Bees, the 
little ones mentioned […] which live not only in holes in the wall, but are also innocent 
guests in the nests of domestic ichneumon wasps found Empty. (Vallisneri 1700, p. 369)
These are probably bees of the Osmia genus (Megachilidae), which may make their 
nests in the abandoned nests of other Hymenoptera, in particular Sceliphron (Cane 
et al. 2007).
Instead, another of Malpighi’s observations can easily be connected with the 
genus Trypoxylon considered above
[…] a sort of Wasp which, finding a Bramble stem hacked off, immediately dug into the 
yielding, spongy tissue within and, inside that long, dug-out gallery, it laid its eggs sepa-
rately, neatly spaced out, and together with the eggs, Little Spiders it had caught, and then 
closed off the space, making a hard earth plug between one egg and another, so that each of 
the little worms born should have its own little cell and its own store of food. And these old, 
empty Brambles are […] hidden nests which are very well suited to various Insects which 
are believed by certain idle and credulous Putrefactionists to arise of themselves […] 
(Vallisneri 1700, p. 369)
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In a situation such as the one under consideration, in other words, insects which, in 
the following season, had apparently sprung from a dead branch, only an analysis as 
thorough as that provided by Vallisneri could effectively discredit the theory of a 
spontaneous generation from rotting vegetable matter. This was a further example 
of the need for a naturalistic analysis which was sufficiently detailed to provide help 
for the broader “philosophical” questions implicit in the theory of generation.
If we move on from La Galleria di Minerva to consider the Quaderni di osser-
vazioni, which in part have recently been transcribed, we find reported an important 
observation, made by Mattacodi, regarding another parasite of the “domestic 
Ichneumon”. It is presumably the wasp Acroricnus seductor (Ichneumonidae) found 
in a nest of Sceliphron (Polidori et al. 2011)
In one smaller little house [cell] there was a little white worm only half the size of the oth-
ers. However, it was divided up into twelve rings, with a strip of transparent humour not 
only in its body, but also in its back […] Its little cocoon was all covered with white spittle.” 
(Vallisneri 2004, p. 66: 27 September 1694)
The colour of the “worm”, the dorsal line and the appearance of the cocoon indicate 
that it was an Acroricnus larva. In addition to this, Mattacodi reports the presence, 
in the nest, of the larva of a parasitic (or inquiline) beetle
This was of a reddish colour and all hairy, with a little flattened, but very hard, head, and 
with six feet in the three foremost rings, using which it dragged behind it the whole bulk of 
the rest of its body, which was considerably bigger and longer than the forepart. (Vallisneri 
2004, p. 66–67: 27 September 1694)
Judging by the description, this could have been a Ripiphoridae larva.
2.3  Diacinto Cestoni’s Letter
Even if the work of this naturalist was well appreciated during his life time (Generali 
2004, p. 107), after his death he was relegated to a secondary role or quite ignored, 
up to recent times. The reason is probably that he never published anything and 
preferred to confine his observations to letters that he sent mainly to Vallisneri, but 
also to other important researchers of his time. Only in the last years the importance 
of his observations has been acknowledged (see, for example, Tremblay and Masutti 
2005, p. 37; Generali 2004).
The letter we are concerned here is generally recognised as being of great impor-
tance, together with its great value as regards our present interests. This has been 
particularly emphasized by Tremblay and Masutti (2005, p. 37) who, quite rightly, 
point out that the descriptions and explanations of behavioural ecology provided by 
Cestoni are equally as good, if not sometimes even better, than those given by 
Vallisneri himself. This makes Cestoni’s work relevant in the debated importance of 
building a framework unifying detailed behavioural data and conservation sciences 
(Berger-Tal et al. 2011). The letter, dated 1692, was sent to Vallisneri in 1698, with 
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the declared intent of confirming “various findings of the aforesaid Gentleman 
[Vallisneri] as regards the curious Origin of many Insects, described in his First and 
Second Dialogue” (Vallisneri 1726a, p. 89) [“vari ritrovamenti del suddetto Signore 
intorno la curiosa Origine di molti Insetti, descritti nel suo Primo, e Secondo 
Dialogo”], and subsequently published by Vallisneri himself (since the letter was 
sent before the publication of Vallisneri’s Second Dialogue, one must assume that 
Cestoni had already read it, in some manuscript or preliminary version). We feel it 
would be appropriate to examine it in detail, as most of it is devoted to parasitoid 
wasps (and their hosts). Basically, this is a specialized scientific monograph, as it is 
exclusively dedicated to “little creatures” found on cabbage leaves, which were 
examined with a thoroughness and precision which could serve as a model for a 
modern research study.
The first observation of Cestoni relevant to the present paper regards the “fleas” 
that can be found on cabbages, but also on many other plants and flowers, which 
Aldrovandi had also mentioned, but only in passing (Vallisneri 1726a, pp. 91–92)
These horrid little animals are idle, stupid, and very slow to react, and on any plant they live 
on, they all look the same, or very similar. They have a bold, round little body, very like that 
of Spiders, six legs, two antennae, or very long horns, two black eyes, a long, thin, sharp 
rostrum, with which they very often pierce the leaves, to graze on the moist, delicate and 
tender substances of the plants […] In short, they take on the colour or of the juices they 
swallow, having, amongst other things, an extremely thin skin, and being very fragile crea-
tures […] never having personally seen any one of them up to now about the Act of Mating 
[…] However this much I have observed that, when they are fully grown, all of them give 
birth, and produce their little ones alive […] when they have become as big as they will ever 
get, these also start to reproduce, and to produce their young alive in the same shape as the 
others […] Amongst the little creatures described, there are many which become winged, 
so I could not help but wonder whether these were of another race, notwithstanding the fact 
that before they grow wings, not much difference can be seen between them […] (Vallisneri 
1726a, pp. 92–93)
The observation regarding the parthenogenetic viviparous females – which, there-
fore, do not have to be fertilized to produce their offspring – is of particular impor-
tance. This significant biological discovery (subsequently and unfairly attributed to 
Charles Bonnet), together with the shape of the animals, their universal distribution, 
the presence of winged generations which alternate with unwinged ones, allows us 
to identify the “fleas”, without a shadow of a doubt, as aphids (Grandi 1984, Vol. I, 
pp. 827–830). It is thus rather peculiar that, having such precise information at their 
disposal, Tremblay and Masutti (2005, p. 37) came to the conclusion that the insect 
was Aleyrodes proletella, another homopteran belonging to a different family 
(Aleyrodidae instead of Aphididae), perhaps deceived by the name “cabbage white 
fly” as it is commonly called. But the described species is actually only one of the 
various insects found on cabbage leaves, as Cestoni clearly indicates (Vallisneri 
1726a, pp. 89–105). On the other hand, Cestoni does not say he has ever seen the 
eggs of these fleas (Vallisneri 1726a, p. 95), which, are in fact easy to spot in the 
case of Aleyrodes, as they often form a distinctive pattern on the underside of the 
leaf, alerting the viewer to the presence of the insect in question (Grandi 1984, Vol. 
I, Fig. 666 p. 824).
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Strange things happen to these “fleas”
A few days later, when the aforesaid Insects have given birth, both the winged ones and 
those without wings, they can mostly be seen to be quite unmoving, and attached with all 
six feet to the same leaves, and with their rostrum forever stuck in the same, as if, just the 
same, they were continuing to suck; but once I had had a good look at them, I realised that 
they were doing anything but suck. They had actually died like that, even if their bodies 
remained well-preserved, big, fat, round and swollen, as if they were alive, the only differ-
ence being that they were starting to turn yellow. I started observing a number of these little 
creatures; whereupon I found a few of them whose heads and thoraxes had in fact dried up, 
and the lower part of the abdomen too. However, aside from this, when I squeezed them, I 
saw and felt that there was still a tiny portion of fresh matter inside. I found yet others that 
were not only shrivelled and all dried up, but mostly they were completely empty, so that all 
that remained of them was very simply the outer skin, the husk, or shell, or whatever one 
prefers to call it, in which a tiny hole could be seen. This observation immediately made me 
wonder whether there were other animals which went around devouring the insides of these 
Fleas; whereupon, in order to gain more insight into the matter, I took a large number of 
these newly-dead animals and, having separated the winged ones from the unwinged sort, I 
put them separately into two glass jars which I immediately covered very carefully, then, 
not many days later, looking into these jars again, I saw (to my great amazement), that a lot 
of Little black Flies had come out of these Fleas. They were very lively and slim, and they 
walked and flew about inside those jars incredibly quickly. And, at the same time, I observed 
that the Fleas had been left with just their skins, completely emptied out inside, just as I had 
seen happening in the other cases I described above. Being unable to imagine the reason, 
how such a bizarre metamorphosis could come about, and ever more desirous of discover-
ing its cause […] and after a lot of assiduous research, I was lucky enough to discover how 
and whereby and why the mentioned transformation should necessarily take place. 
(Vallisneri 1726a, pp. 94–96)
In the end, the parasite responsible for the “transformation” observed was found and 
its interesting behaviour described. This was one of the first descriptions made in 
Europe of a true case of oviposition by a parasitoid (van Lenteren and Godfray 
2005, p.  14), something Vallisneri supposed had happened, but never seen for 
himself.
[…] near these Fleas I saw certain Little Flies buzzing about which, after having walked and 
flown quite a lot around the Fleas, gradually moved closer to the largest ones, as if identify-
ing those fit for their purpose […] I armed my eye with a really good Lens, following one 
of these […] I observed, that that particular Little Fly had got so close to one of the Fleas 
that it was almost touching it with its head. Close as it was in this way, I saw that, once it 
had firmly planted its feet, it raised its wings, as if it wanted to fly and, at the same time, 
holding its wings raised like that, it plunged its lower abdomen under its chest. As its abdo-
men was a little longer than the rest of its body, it thus stuck out further than its head; folded 
over, as its body was in that position, it bent itself so far down, and made so much effort, 
that it put the very end of its body under the belly of the Flea and, keeping it like that for a 
very short time, it went away, and I saw that it was going about the very same thing around 
the other ones. To clarify for myself, and see what this Little Fly might be doing by putting 
its abdomen under the body of that other Insect, I decided then and there to turn it over, and 
[…] I found that that Little Fly had very kindly laid an egg under the belly of the other 
insect, and was doing the same thing with the others. Having this piece of good news, it was 
not hard for me to find out why Little Flies flew out of those Fleas which looked dead, in 
view of the fact that lots of little maggots hatch out of these eggs and, as soon as they hatch, 
the pierce the bellies of the Fleas underneath which they have been laid, and entering their 
bodies, they use them both as food and as a room: and when they are well enough nourished 
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and grown, they make a chrysalis inside the same Flea, then in less than a Month the Little 
Flies coming flying out, one from each Flea. (Vallisneri 1726a, pp. 96–97)
The parasitoid in question is certainly a genus of the subfamily Aphidiinae, perhaps 
of the species Aphidius, which is characterized by this particular way of laying eggs 
on the underside of the aphid, bending its abdomen forward, which is made to pass 
under the thorax and the legs of the wasp (Grandi 1984, Vol. II, Fig. 978 p. 1004) in 
the way described by Cestoni. When the egg hatches, the larva of the parasite enters 
the host and eats it up from the inside, turning it into an empty shell, or mummy, as 
it is called in entomological jargon. In this case too, the mistake made by Tremblay 
e Masutti (2005, p. 37) is hard to understand. These authors hold that the parasitoid 
was an Aphelininae (Aphelinidae), an identification which might be appropriate, as 
we have said, in the case of the parasite of the “gorgoglioncino” reported by 
Mattacodi and discussed above.
But the aphids living on cabbage leaves studied by Cestoni have other two perse-
cutors even if, this time, they are not parasitoid wasps. The first of these is probably 
a ladybird (Vallisneri 1726a, p. 97), a carnivorous beetle which, both as a larva (as 
observed by Cestoni) and as an adult insect, is a hearty consumer of aphids. The 
second (Vallisneri 1726a, p. 97) is the larva of a Syrphidae (Diptera) (hoverfly), as 
its green colour striped with white indicates (Rotheray 1993) and the fact that the 
adult of this fly
[…] which, when it flies, you very often see it hold itself in the air, exactly in the same way 
that larks do when they hang in the air singing. Nor should you, most Honourable Sir, think 
that they do this by chance; it is done on purpose, in order to observe, and see where the 
Insects are, and when it sees some, it lands on that Plant, and lays one or two eggs, then it 
goes off to fly somewhere else, since it never lays more than two eggs on the same leaf, at 
least as far as my observations go. (Vallisneri 1726a, p. 98)
Returning now to parasitoid wasps, Cestoni talks of those which parasitize the cat-
erpillars of “lovely big, white cabbage butterflies (= Pieris brassicae) (Vallisneri 
1726a, p. 98). Cestoni describes some aspects of the biology of these butterflies, 
such as the fact that they lay their
[…] eggs under the leaves of the aforesaid Cabbages, and arranging them with a wonderful 
neatness, they place about fifty, or sometimes seventy in a patch, one next to the other, tidily 
in one place, about the size of a nail on the hand. I said under the leaf, because very rarely 
do they lay them on the upper side, but habitually place them on that part of the leaf which 
faces the ground, so that they remain covered and are not hurt by the rays of the Sun. These 
eggs look yellow on the outside, and in the space of two or three days a lot of little worms 
hatch out of them, which immediately start eating the leaf upon which they were laid […] 
(Vallisneri 1726a, pp. 98–99)
When they have finished eating, the caterpillars turn into chrysalises which, after 
ten days, will produce new butterflies. What is more interesting is the fact that, in 
some cases, instead of a butterfly, “a number of Little Flies” (Vallisneri 1726a, 
p. 99) comes out. This was a fact that had already been reported, even if more sum-
marily, by Vallisneri in the Primo Dialogo, as we have seen above, but here the 
discussion becomes more precise and detailed
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The bizarre birth of the aforesaid Little Flies, noticed also by yourself, Honourable Sir, 
encouraged me to make a move to determine their origin, as I had then fully recognised the 
existence [of said phenomenon] […] To fully understand the metamorphosis mentioned, or 
the development of so many minute Insects, one needs to know that, during the time that the 
above-mentioned caterpillars live and feed on the leaves of Cabbages, certain Little Black 
flies fly around them. They are bigger than those of wine (whose origin You discovered, Sir, 
in your much praised Dialoghi), very slow when they move forward, but very quick-flying, 
the females of which land on the most unfortunate caterpillars, and lay a number of tiny 
eggs on them, almost invisible to the naked eye, out of which in less than two days hatch 
these really tiny maggots, and then these almost invisible worms, just hatched, like the 
Small Worms of Mange, poke themselves in under the skin, and they get so far in that, little 
by little, they eat them up inside. However, these caterpillars keep on eating and growing, 
just the same. Nonetheless, one can clearly tell which ones are affected by these little mag-
gots, because they start to turn yellow […] so they no longer think about making a chrysalis, 
but all of a sudden, when the other healthy and lucky caterpillars set about making their own 
Chrysalises, the infected ones burst down one side, and all these little maggots, which have 
fed on the caterpillar’s substance, come out of the crevice in each one. These unrestrained 
little maggots, which have come out of the bodies of the aforesaid caterpillars (which of 
course then die and dry up) get silk out of their mouths, with which they bundle themselves 
up, and tangle themselves so much in it that they end up looking like a heap of little cocoons 
covered with a yellowish silk. Then, at the end of about twelve days, lots of little flies jump 
out. And this is not a misfortune which happens just to Cabbage caterpillars, but likewise to 
various other kinds of caterpillars and worms, as I and You yourself, Sir, have observed on 
a number of occasions, as illustrated in your above-praised Dialogue. (Vallisneri 1726a, 
pp. 99–100)
Here we are probably dealing with Cotesia (= Apanteles) glomerata (Braconidae: 
Microgastrinae), which attacks Lepidoptera Pieridae, laying 50 eggs or more 
(Grandi 1984, Vol. II, pp. 995–996). Cestoni thus clarifies once and for all the afore-
said mistakes made by Redi and Aldrovandi, who had taken the cocoons, made by 
the larvae of the parasitoid, for “eggs” laid by the caterpillar which could generate 
animals different from themselves (Vallisneri 1696, p. 313). Vallisneri had arrived at 
the same conclusion (Vallisneri 1696, p. 312), seemingly without ever having wit-
nessed the act of oviposition, as Cestoni had done (Tremblay and Masutti 2005, 
p. 36).
Cestoni also observed a female parasitoid wasp smaller than the one previously 
described laying eggs on the same larvae or those of other Lepidoptera. The size of 
the parasitoid and the identity of the host indicate that they were, in all probability, 
Pteromalus puparum (Pteromalidae: Pteromalinae), which, as the name tells us, 
emerges from the chrysalis of Pieris brassicae, and also of many other butterflies. 
Vallisneri had given some cases which, on the surface, appeared to be similar, since 
they should actually have been connected with “eggs […] laid upon the Chrysalis” 
[“uova […] depositate sopra della Crisalide”] (Vallisneri 1726a, p. 101), as Cestoni 
observes after carefully reading the already quoted passage of the Primo Dialogo in 
which Malpighi asserts that
Many Flies and Large Flies come out of cocoons, or Pupae made by worms […] others out 
of the their Chrysalises […] They will never see Little Flies or Large Flies or Flies emerge 
from the Chrysalises, if they protect them well enough, I mean the cocoons and such like 
[…] (Vallisneri 1696, p. 312)
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Instead, the parasitism observed by Cestoni is different and more sophisticated in 
nature
Other Little black Flies, smaller than the ones I have described [Apanteles glomeratus], less 
than half the size, land just the same on top of the caterpillars, and offload their eggs on 
them, and these are so small that they cannot be seen by the eye, unless one has a superb 
Lens. After some time, longer than it takes for the aforesaid little flies, likewise, little mag-
gots hatch out of these eggs, and they also get into the caterpillar but, as they are quite a bit 
later in feeding, the caterpillar has time to grow and make its Chrysalis (and this indeed 
happens) and, during this time, those nasty little maggots continue to feed in the same way 
on the substance of the caterpillar inside its chrysalis, without emitting faeces. When they 
have finished feeding, they do not emerge from the caterpillar in order to make a Chrysalis, 
but they do this inside the caterpillar itself, and they stay there over a Month, and then the 
Little Flies come out. There are really so, so many that one cannot even imagine that they 
could have been inside that Chrysalis, wherein the Little Flies make a tiny hole, or perhaps 
the first Little Fly does so, because it wants to get outside. Indeed, after that, all of them 
pour out of that same hole. (Vallisneri 1726a, pp. 100–101)
The fact that the egg of the parasite is not laid directly on the pupa or chrysalis, as 
Vallisneri seems to believe in his Dialoghi (something which actually occurs with 
other parasitoids), is an example of delayed parasitism, which makes more difficult 
to identify the parasite living in the larva of the host until it turns into the chrysalis 
which will, eventually, be eaten up. Thus the parasite does not emerge from the larva 
upon which it has been observed laying its eggs, but from the chrysalis into which 
the larva has turned, a situation which could have been exploited to support sponta-
neous generation without Cestoni’s shrewd analysis.
The last observation regards the “Little white Butterflies” commonly found on 
the leaves of cabbages (the homopteran Aleyrodes proletella (=brassicae), already 
quoted), for which Cestoni gives a painstaking biological description noting, for 
example, how they mate and the characteristic distribution pattern of the eggs, men-
tioned above, and observing that they feed “on that juice, which bathes the outer 
skin of the leaves” (Vallisneri 1726a, pp.  103–104) [“di quel sugo, che viene a 
irrorare l’esterna buccia delle foglie”] apparently without harming the plant. Let us 
follow Cestoni’s description:
These Little Butterflies are generated in precisely the same way as happens with most ani-
mals, in other words, by means of the male and female […] which, carrying on with each 
other, mate, and when the females are pregnant […] they lay their eggs, which they gener-
ally arrange in a semicircle in batches of ten, twelve, fourteen, and sometimes sixteen […] 
from each of these emerges a little white animal with six legs and a bit of fuzz on its back 
[…] I have decided to call them Little Sheep from now on […] and these start walking […] 
when they have got to where they have to stay […] they arrange themselves a little apart 
from one another, so that, as they grow, they won’t touch each other; thus, seen under the 
Microscope, they look like a lot of little white sheep standing still in a little green field. 
After that, remaining still and attached, they grow […] It may seem to You, Honourable Sir, 
to be an error of judgement, my having given the name of little sheep to the aforementioned 
creatures, but thinking through what happens to these poor Insects […] it will not seem so 
unreasonable […] just as sheep are subject to being devoured by Wolves, these […] also 
have their Wolves, which hunt them down. The latter are a breed of Little black Flies, which 
[…] live on nothing else but the aforesaid dear little sheep … A copious quantity of the 
aforementioned Little black Flies constantly buzz around the said little sheep, and some of 
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them linger around the most tender ones, and slowly but surely, they suck out all their sub-
stance, so that in the end they just leave them with their outer skin. Others land on the larg-
est ones, that is, those which have grown to their fullest size or nearly so, and sit on them 
for a long time; whereupon, having paid particular attention to this, and to what they were 
doing there, I saw that the Little wolf Flies, after having pierced the back of the little white 
sheep they were sitting on, proceeded nonchalantly to lay an egg in that hole, from which 
shortly afterwards I observed that a nasty little maggot had hatched, which started to eat up 
its poor little sheep […] It is an easy thing to recognise when the dear little sheep have been 
unfortunate, and the Little Wolf Flies have laid eggs on them, seeing that they begin to turn 
from their usual white, to a livid hue, and to go past the time when they would normally 
emerge as winged insects, which usually takes no longer than twenty days when they have 
not been ruined by the Wolves […] when these little maggots have finished feeding, they set 
about making their Chrysalises, and for their ends, they use the skin of the little white sheep 
themselves, which they have eaten up, inside which they can be clearly seen to be enveloped 
and turned into chrysalises. And there they remain for about twenty days or more, before 
they come out of that, than the aforesaid little butterflies. Then, at the end of that time, tear-
ing that skin, healthy Little winged Flies come out and fly away, to start doing the same 
thing over again with the other little white sheep, thus continuing to reproduce at the cost of 
the innards and the flesh of the unfortunates, while the lovely little butterflies feed and 
multiply under the leaves of the Cabbages without doing any harm to them whatsoever. 
(Vallisneri 1726a, pp. 102–105)
Cestoni also provides a drawing of this parasite, and its host. We are dealing with 
Encarsia (Aphelinidae: Coccophaginae) which uses predominantly the more fully- 
grown stages of its host (the “largest ones” [le “più grosse”]) for the purposes of 
oviposition (Liu and Stansly 1996).
In Table  2.1 is given a summary of the species considered in the previous 
analysis.
2.4  Gall Wasps and Other Gall Insects
The discussion regarding the origin of galls will not be reported in the present work 
(see, e.g., Vallisneri 2004, p. 134 and note 653). In Table 2.2, we will confine our-
selves to giving a synoptic list of what we were able to find out as regards the iden-
tity of the galls and the insects connected with them. The latter can be divided in 
species which form the galls on the plants, i.e. Hymenoptera (Cynipidae and 
Symphyta: Tenthredinidae); Diptera (Cecidomyiidae); Hemiptera (Pemphigidae), 
and species which are parasitoid of the gall-forming species (Pteromalidae, 
Torymidae, Eurytomidae, Ichneumonidae), and inquilines (Cynipidae and 
Coleoptera Curculionidae). Due the difficulty to identify species according to the 
original descriptions (see Discussion), the determination of inquilines and parasit-
oids was often made very tentatively.
Vallisneri explicitly points out the large number of species that can be found in 
just one gall
And I did not just see beetles [“cantarelle”] in the said little swellings [galls on willows 
produced by Pontania], but the maggots of various flies, particularly carnivorous ones, all 
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of them bastards, foreigners and uninvited guests. I also observed the same thing in the 
scaly ends of willow shoots throwing out narrow leaves. I found inside, apart from the cen-
tral worm or fly, which is black with long antennae and a really long sting, all sorts of other 
little flies, and I counted seven different kinds one day […] And not only did the said Little 
Flies which there ought to have been come out, but all these others, of Father unknown, and 
wild. (Vallisneri 1696, pp. 316–317)
The finding of Vallisneri regarding the large number of insects associated to a single 
gall is in fact true. For example, Grandi (1984, Vol. II, note 1 p. 1013) reports that 
Fahringer (1924) had observed 101 species of insects associated with the galls of 
Andricus kollari, which is probably fewer than the number found in more recent 
studies.
However, it was Mattacodi who identified, more clearly than Vallisneri ever did, 
the presence of parasitoids in the gall, which live at the expense of the inducer insect
So in the blisters formed on elms, and in any sort of goitres found on poplars, the worms of 
flies can often be found, which kill the little flies that are born there by sucking at them, and 
they live in this womb they have appropriated for a long time, and yet those worms did not 
cause that goitre […] (Vallisneri 1726, p. 66)
The galls were therefore not caused “by a variety of Insects” but were induced
[…] solely by the aforesaid little caterpillar, and the little worms then got inside it in order 
to eat up the caterpillar, and gain any other nourishment they could find. (Vallisneri 1726, 
pp. 65)
Mattacodi therefore holds that it were the larvae of the parasitoid which somehow 
entered the host gall, as happened when eggs (and chrysalises) were parasitized, an 
opinion with which Vallisneri himself agreed as we have seen.
Another interesting observation regards the life cycle of Pontania (Tenthredinidae) 
(Table 2.2), whose larvae, once they are fully grown, come out from the gall (con-
firmed by Mattacodi (Vallisneri 1726, pp. 65)) and go down to earth to pupate (see, 
for example, Kopelke 1998)
Having carried out some necessary duties, I found that the true caterpillar [the inducer of 
the gall, not one of the many others connected] of the Willow in question, when it is fully 
grown, emerges from the Swelling [the gall], and comes down to earth, where it buries 
itself, and hides itself up, there making its little cocoon […] to protect itself against the 
winter cold […] (Vallisneri 1696, p. 316)
Mattacodi also reports that the inquilines of a gall occupy positions further away 
from the centre than the larvae of the inducer
[…] up until now, I have always observed the same fly in the middle of the gall, and it nearly 
always comes out in the Autumn [to pupate, see above], whereas the other inhabitants place 
themselves between the middle of it and the perimeter, having got into the fully developed 
gall, where they even later complete their metamorphosis, and they cannot leave the gall 
before the next Summer. (Vallisneri 1726, p. 66)
In confirmation of the above Vallisneri would write, again as regards oak galls 
(Quaderno I: [124r-126v])
I have observed many galls, which I collected until September last year, and I found, on the 
8th January 1695, many completely empty, many without their original worm, but with the 
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original hole where the worm emerged full of flies and ants and other little insects, with the 
mouth of the hole closed off with earth. Other galls, although they did not contain the origi-
nal central worm in it, nonetheless had lots of tiny little worms around the centre, and in one 
I counted as many as eight. (Vallisneri 2004, p. 155)
One is dealing with galls of Andricus kollari (Cynipidae) (Table 2.2), in which the 
cell of the larva of the inducer insect lies at the heart, whereas the smaller ones, very 
presumably of the inquiline Synergus umbraculus (Cynipidae) (Table 2.2), establish 
themselves in the peripheral area around it (Redfern and Askew 1992, p.  35, 
Fig. 160; Pénzes et al. 2012, p. 4).
Another interesting observation, again from Mattacodi, relating to the specificity 
of the relationship between the gall and the galler insect (Table 2.2), is: two rose 
galls, both of them spongy, but one of them hairless (“non cappelluta”), the other 
hairy (“cappelluta”), are actually caused by two different “kinds of little flies” 
(Vallisneri 1726, p. 67) (presumably two different species of Diplolepis (Cynipidae) 
(Redfern and Askew 1992, p. 69)).
However, there are still a few cases, reported both by Mattacodi and Vallisneri 
(Vallisneri 1726, p. 66; Vallineri 1696, p. 316), in which a willow gall is used only 
as a temporary shelter by an insect which lives part of the time outside it and, in 
Mattacodi’s opinion, this can be explained as reuse of a gall which the larva has left 
in order to migrate into the earth, as we have said.
2.5  Discussion
This work is not the first attempt to produce a systematic determination of the para-
sitoid wasps identified by Antonio Vallisneri and his cohorts. To our knowledge, it 
has been preceded by at least two other studies here cited: one by Pampiglione et al. 
(2000), the other by Tremblay and Masutti (2005). However, these works are not of 
great help when trying to identify the insects described: the former, because it con-
fines itself to describing the work Vallisneri did on these organisms very generically, 
with few identifications of the wasps he actually studied; the latter, as it proposes 
implausible identities, which are sometimes decidedly erroneous, as pointed out 
above. Moreover, as regards the galler insects described by Vallisneri, we do not 
know of any other modern analysis. And this should not be surprising, considering 
that these descriptions are mostly taken from unpublished works, from the Quaderni 
di Osservazioni to be precise (only the first and second of which have recently been 
transcribed), while just a few are from published works (Table 2.2). Instead, the 
descriptions of parasitoid wasps are mostly taken from La Galleria di Minerva and 
from a published letter written by Cestoni.
Valuable data have been found in the works we analysed on various aspects of 
parasitoid-host relationships in taxonomically diverse ecological webs. Vallisneri 
and Cestoni provided information that could be associated with a variety of 
hymenopteran parasitoids of other Hymenoptera (e.g. Ichneumonidae attacking 
Sphecidae, Torymidae attacking Cynipidae), dipteran parasitoids (e.g. Tachinidae, 
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Sarcophagidae) of Hymenoptera, coleopteran parasitoids (e.g. Ripiphoridae, 
Cleridae) of Hymenoptera, and hymenopteran parasitoids (e.g. Chalcididae, 
Pteromalidae) associated with non-hymenopteran hosts such as Homoptera, 
Lepidoptera and spiders. Overall, about 20 wasp genera could have been objects of 
Vallisneri and Cestoni observations. Noteworthy, Vallisneri and Cestoni provided 
about 300 years ago the first detailed ecological and ethological data on many wasp 
species from a wide range of life-histories.
Our study provides thus an example of the “hidden” biodiversity data that could 
be brought to light through detailed analysis of pre-Linnean works. By assigning 
taxonomic names (with the precision that was possible given the descriptions avail-
able, see below) we have provided information that could be incorporated in biodi-
versity databanks, that clearly play a fundamental role in biodiversity science 
(including conservation science).1 Contribution to biodiversity data through the 
inspection of pre-Linnean works was already highlighted for botany, e.g. by analys-
ing ancient herbaria and thus retrieving information on distribution and diversity of 
plant species >300 years ago (e.g. Pulvirenti et al. 2015), though such studies seem 
to be scarcer for zoology. In addition, our study revealed many aspects of the behav-
iour and ecology of a number of species, notably on their interactions with other 
species, thus providing data on ecological networks at the time of Vallisneri and 
Cestoni. Geographical data associated with pre-Linnean insect identification have 
furthermore the potential to better reconstruct a species’ distribution more than 
300 years ago, thus revealing changes in distribution across the last centuries.
The result of the present work is actually fragmentary, due to the difficult identi-
fication of insects based on the morphological descriptions; however, its is interest-
ing in that several ecological and behavioural characteristics of these species could 
be used to help such identification. However, these aspects are rather lacking in the 
case of gall insects, apart from the few cases mentioned. Thus the insects have to be 
identified on the basis of morphological descriptions, which, although painstakingly 
thorough and rich in detail, often lack the features utilized in modern systematic 
criteria. Despite such obvious flaws in our species identification, we still believe in 
the importance of inspecting ancient studies and do the best to assign a taxonomy to 
the observed individuals. This could in most cases be the genus but not the species. 
However, for the problems associated with the co-occurrence of cryptic species, a 
valuable option may be to consider a taxonomic sufficiency approach, i.e. using 
higher taxa instead of the species in biodiversity analyses.2
At the end of the XVII century, as for most of the Eighteenth century, naturalists 
did not possess systematic methods to precisely identify the majority of insects, 
which have a variety and a complexity of forms unaccountable by using descrip-
tions of an intuitive nature, even if they are as exhaustive as possible, as are those 
given by Vallisneri. This was a problem Réamur, too, would come up against in his 
monumental work devoted to these organisms, around 40 years later. The identifica-
1 See Barberousse and Bary, Chap. 3, in this volume.
2 See Chenuil et al., Chap. 4, in this volume.
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tion of the insects according to their morphological features in the times of Vallisneri, 
like the one produced by Ulisse Aldrovandi around a century before Vallisneri or the 
then very recent example given by John Ray, did not go much beyond an elaboration 
of what Aristotle had said in his Historia Animalium. It should be remembered that 
even the distinction between the two most important groups that Vallisneri is exam-
ining in connection with the studies which concern us here  – Diptera and 
Hymenoptera – is often hazy and unclear. Even if, in this case, the difference is very 
obvious – Diptera are two winged, Hymenoptera four – something which Vallisneri 
definitely realised; their general appearance, which is often very similar, seems to 
eclipse this fundamental difference. Francesco Mattacodi proves that this problem 
exists, in one of the letters already considered
However, I should think that these little mosquitoes are incorrectly called so, like those 
from the blisters found on elms and poplars, regarding which I must beg you, when you 
have leisure to do so, to explain how Lyster makes his distinctions between mosquitoes, 
wasps and flies etc., as I fail to understand how various sorts of Insects with four wings, 
even if their features conform to those of flies, should not be called by that name, seeing that 
flies have, again according to Aristotle himself, only two wings. (Vallisneri 1726, p. 67)
Here we can see direct evidence of the lack of a “methodical” system, which would 
allow a few, clearly defined distinctive features to be isolated in order to avoid this 
sort of ambiguity. On the other hand, even Linnaeus, the inventor of the “Method”, 
would not go far beyond subdividing insects into their principal orders. For exam-
ple, in the tenth edition of Systema Naturae (Linnaeus 1758, pp.  553–583), 
Hymenoptera were divided into eight genera: Cynipis (Cynipidae, gall-making 
Hymenoptera Parasitica), Tenthredo (Tenthredinidae and other Hymenoptera 
Symphyta), Ichneumon (Ichneumonidae), Sphex (Sphecidae), Wasp (social and 
sphecid wasps), Apis, Formica, Mutilla (a genus of Hymenoptera Aculeata parasit-
oid of other Hymenoptera Aculeata), giving a total of 229 species for the whole 
Order.
Vallisneri’s and Cestoni’s “systematic” classification does not make use of this or 
other similar terminology, as the only valid grouping they give is actually the indi-
vidual “species” [“spezie”]. At this level, the number of species described is greater 
by several orders of magnitude than the corresponding lists provided by Linnaeus or 
Ray, and their description immeasurably more elaborate and detailed. However, one 
might ask: what is the taxonomic benefit of such meticulous description, if it does 
not allow the reader to identify the ‘species’ in question?” We think it proved par-
ticularly useful for Vallsneri himself, as a sort of personal reminder, so he could 
subsequently recognise a species he had previously observed. This might be one 
explanation for these minutely detailed descriptions, which are even greater in num-
ber in the Quaderni than they are in the printed works. However, it seems less likely 
that they could be used to enable readers to identify the species described, due to the 
difficulties already indicated, in addition to the use of generic qualitative adjectives, 
such as “large”, “little”, “long”, “short” etc., lacking any standard reference 
indication.
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In fact, as early as 1713, in Idea nuova d’una Division generale degl’Insetti,3 
Vallisneri had set forth a traditional type of systematic classification which he 
had, admittedly, taken from other contemporary authors (and which, indeed, was 
based on that proposed by John Ray, 3 years earlier, in his Historia Insectorum 
(Ray 1710)), in which identification was based on the number of wings and 
“feet”. This bore an explicit analogy with the botanical systematics of Tournefort 
(Vallisneri 1713, p. 67), who had chosen, amongst all other possible bases, to use 
only the features of the flowers and the seeds to draw up a classification of plants. 
However, this division, which was “methodical” if a bit rough and ready, seems 
to have been proposed only as a form of respect for the new methodical systems 
which were then beginning to arise; Vallisneri thought it should be supported by 
another method, on which he focussed his energies and interest, which would be 
ecological in nature. With a strange turnaround, disregarding the classification 
normally used, perhaps with the aim of diminishing the importance of the 
“methodical” system, he would use ecological features in order to initially sub-
divide the insects into “Classes” (Vallisneri 1713, p.  42). The other method, 
instead, would confine itself to determining the “specific differences” (Vallisneri 
1713, p. 65).
We are now in a position to understand why Vallisneri often seems to treat flies 
and wasps as altogether similar insects. The mere fact that they possess one or two 
pairs of wings - a feature considered to be so important by the majority of zoologists 
who preceded, were contemporaries of or came after Vallisneri -, is instead judged 
by him to be just a “specific difference”; to Vallisneri, the fact that both flies and 
wasps shared a habitat is much more significant, justifying their inclusion in the 
same “Class”. Thus, when Vallisneri finally needed to define the species, he would 
use only a description, set forth in minute detail, of all the morphological features 
of the insect.
However, it is definitely not the ability of Vallisneri and his circle to systematize 
which should attract our attention, as much as the wealth of that finely drawn detail 
in his ecological and behavioural observations, which show the level reached by 
naturalistic observation, at least in regard to insects, towards the end of the seven-
teenth century. This would be what ushered in a great era devoted to the study of the 
behaviour of insects, which would see its crowning achievements with Réamur in 
France.
It could be argued that Vallisneri considered himself to have been responsible for 
the discovery of the phenomena relating to parasitoid wasps (Vallisneri 1710, p. 15), 
apparently not taking into account what other authors had already written about this 
matter before him.
Even if he was aware of what Swammerdam had already written about insects, 
“diversae speciei” of which emerged from caterpillars and chrysalises (Vallisneri 
1710, pp. 13–14), he believed that this author, who reported the phenomenon “ad 
3 See also (Andrietti and Generali 2004, pp. 110–115) for a brief examination of this study.
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quartum mutationis ordo” [“fourth order of metamorphosis”], attributed it to “an 
internal principle” (Vallisneri 1710, p. 14; Swammerdam 1693, p. 131) and not an 
ex ovo origin. Van Lenteren and Godfray (2005, p.  17) opt for a different 
 interpretation: in view of the fact that Swammerdam’s “fourth order of metamor-
phosis” is always based on an egg, they suggest that he viewed parasitoids in the 
same way. In any case, in his next work, “Bybel der Natur”, Swammerdam reports 
the observation (made by Otto Marsilius van Schriek) of a caterpillar being stung by 
a “fly”, which he connects with the immission of eggs by the parasitoid (van 
Lenteren and Godfray 2005, p. 18).
Vallisneri certainly could not have known of this second work by Swammerdam 
(finished in 1679 but only published in 1737–1738) (van Lenteren and Godfray 
2005, p. 17). However, he did not even seem to be informed (or at least he did not 
make any mention) of other researchers which, in the two decades preceding his 
Dialoghi, had already made similar suppositions and, in some cases, actually 
observed the process of parasitoids laying eggs in their host (for a list of various 
researchers who reached similar conclusions before Vallisneri, see van Lenteren and 
Godfray 2005). Before being called by the Università di Padova the sources of 
Vallisneri’s entomological studies were mainly Italian, and his knowledge of 
European literature was quite limited (Generali, Introduzione, in Vallisneri 2004, 
pp. XXVIII-XXXVI), with the exception of Martin Lister, constantly quoted in 
Vallisneri’s Quaderni for his edition and notes to De Insectis of Johannes Goedaert 
(1685). Already in some letters published in the 1670–1671, Lister had suggested 
the possibility that certain insects could lay their eggs inside living caterpillars (van 
Lenteren and Godfray 2005, pp. 18–19). In addition, in his note 4 at page 9 of the 
mentioned work, he writes: “Muscae octoginta duae [observed by Goedaert], hic 
memoratae, fuerunt cuiusdam muscae Ichneumonis progenies, in Erucae corpus 
delata; quo pacto autem illuc deferatur, fateor me adhuc non satis ossequi; sed con-
jecturam facio, illud ab Ichneumone Parente fieri” [“The 82 flies that emerged from 
the pupa are the progeny of an ichneumon fly, which had gotten into the caterpillar 
in a manner that is still not entirely clear to me. In all likelihood they were laid right 
there by the mother fly”] (translation by van Lenteren and Godfray 2005, p. 19).
In this regard, we should recall also Cestoni’s observations of the plant flea men-
tioned above, in which he declared, rather ironically, that the Aphidius “had very 
kindly laid an egg” under its belly. If it is true that his letter is dated 25th July 1698, 
it appears that it was terminated from the year 1692 (Cestoni 1787, note at page 271; 
Tremblay and Masutti 2005, p. 37).
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Chapter 3
Marine Biodiversity Databanks
Anouk Barberousse and Sophie Bary
Abstract This chapter presents the contribution of databanks to the development 
of biodiversity knowledge through the example of marine biodiversity databanks. 
Focusing on the marine field allows us to insist on the imbalance of the unknown vs. 
the better known part. The chapter emphasizes the role of taxonomic and genetic 
databanks as well as the ongoing transformations that databanks are submitted to in 
order to answer pressing demands due to the biodiversity crisis. It aims to analyse 
the requirements biodiversity databanks have to satisfy in order to help both 
researchers and conservationists in their respective endeavors. It begins by pointing 
out the main characteristics and limits of biodiversity knowledge and defend the 
view that databanks are well-suited to overcome these limits as soon as they are 
widely accessible and interoperable. These constraints are analysed as both techni-
cal and scientific. Their dynamic dimension is emphasized as databanks must com-
ply with the rapid evolution of scientific knowledge. We also propose a view on the 
relationships between biodiversity knowledge, assessment, and conservation.
Keywords Databanks · Genetic data · Interoperability · Taxonomy
3.1  Introduction
Assessing biodiversity, according to the comparison developed in the Introduction 
of this volume, is like assessing the state of a patient, that is, trying to infer how bad 
she is from observations. The double aim of this operation is to guess how her state 
will evolve in the future and to design actions to improve it. Assessment is thus 
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future- and action-oriented. It benefits from available scientific knowledge and may 
in turn contribute to its development, but assessment and knowledge do not evolve 
at the same pace as assessment is submitted to the pressure of time. The relationship 
between assessment of biodiversity in a given geographical area and scientific 
knowledge of biodiversity, as built up in evolutionary studies, taxonomy, phyloge-
netics, population genetics, and ecology, is unbalanced since the corpus that has 
been scientifically established is usually far from sufficient for the assessment task. 
The diversity of living beings, of their behaviours and interactions is so huge that 
what is known about it may be compared to ancient maps in which the size of the 
known world is much smaller than the breath of the unknown world. Thus, in most 
cases, currently available knowledge of biodiversity cannot provide but a small con-
tribution to the assessment of biodiversity. However, some parts of this knowledge 
are more readily useful for assessment tasks than others: the knowledge of biodiver-
sity that is contained in databanks can be easily harnessed. But to what extent can 
the data in databanks be treated as knowledge? We discuss this question in the fol-
lowing, and emphasize again that retrieving this knowledge cannot be anything else 
than a small part of the assessment task.
Learning about biodiversity is a complex endeavor. First, because biodiversity 
itself is a complex object of knowledge. Second, because it extends on virtually 
every region of our planet, however small. Third, biodiversity knowledge comes 
from heterogeneous sources: taxonomic, evolutionary (including phylogenetic), 
genetic, and ecological research. This results in a confused picture in need of clari-
fication. However, in the last few decades, biodiversity knowledge has immensely 
benefited from the establishment of international databanks. They play a fundamen-
tal role in the improvement of the current, confused picture of biodiversity because 
they provide scientists with elements from which they can develop knowledge of 
biodiversity at a the global scale.
Our aim in this paper is to examine how biodiversity databanks contribute to 
developing current knowledge of biodiversity. We do so by putting forward an epis-
temological analysis of the structure and functioning of databanks, both at the indi-
vidual and collective (network) level. The epistemological analysis of scientific 
databanks has greatly benefited from Leonelli’s work (2010, 2013a, b, 2016). 
Whereas she focused on various fields within biology, she never addressed the topic 
of biodiversity databanks. With this chapter, we wish to fill this gap and participate 
in her effort to put databanks in their right place in contemporary biological science 
and assessment and conservation policies.
The chapter is focused on marine biodiversity databanks and their role in the 
development of knowledge and assessment of biodiversity. Marine biodiversity is 
even less known than terrestrial biodiversity, thus illustrating the “ancient map fla-
vour” of this domain of scientific knowledge. By describing how marine biodiver-
sity databanks are developed, we show what kind of knowledge they promote and 
how it may be used in assessment and conservation tasks.
We begin by analyzing what it means to know about biodiversity. This question 
is raised because biodiversity is an unusual object of knowledge, crossing spatial 
and temporal scales. It is thus important to explore how a reasonably unified picture 
of biodiversity can be achieved by combining various components. Databanks con-
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tribute to this picture in an important way. We try to uncover which complex pro-
cesses result in the “data” that are included in databanks and available for assessment 
and conservation tasks. We show that these data, far from being “brute data”, are 
pieces of scientific knowledge subject to constant revision. The second part of the 
paper is devoted to the current uses of biodiversity databanks and associated require-
ments for databank designers. Finally, we put forward insights about how to build 
up biodiversity databanks that could improve our current knowledge of 
biodiversity.
3.2  What Does It Mean and What Does It Take to Know 
Biodiversity?
Because biodiversity knowledge involves evolutionary, taxonomic, and ecological 
research, as well as attempts at unifying insights from these three domains, it has to 
face a major conceptual and theoretical challenge. In recent times, this epistemic 
task has been shaped by a major external factor: urgency. Biologists can no more 
consider themselves as free of taking their time: they have to hurry up because of the 
severe crisis biodiversity is currently suffering (Western 1992; Grehan 1993; Takacs 
1996; Olson et al. 2002; Singh 2002). The urgency of designing conservation poli-
cies induces an acceleration of assessment endeavours, which themselves increase 
the pressure on knowledge-building.
In this part, we examine in what sense the biodiversity crisis shapes the way we 
conceive of biodiversity knowledge and of biodiversity itself as an object of scien-
tific knowledge. We first present the main features of the knowledge of biodiversity 
in its current available form and the difficulties it faces (3.2.1). We then review how 
it may be improved by the development of appropriate cyber-infrastructures, by 
examining the question: What are data in biodiversity databanks? (3.2.2) and then 
by giving examples of cyber-infrastructures (3.2.3).
3.2.1  Our Current Knowledge of Biodiversity 
and the Difficulties It Faces
The aim of this section is to describe the main features of the current knowledge of 
biodiversity. We do so by focusing on the position of taxonomic knowledge within 
biodiversity knowledge because the slow pace of its development is a major hin-
drance of assessment and conservation endeavours. We focus on the following ten-
sion: On the one hand, many attempts at biodiversity assessment try to circumvent 
the delays of taxonomic identification, but on the other, taxonomic knowledge 
appears as an indispensable component of biodiversity knowledge. We complete 
our description of the current state of biodiversity knowledge and the difficulties it 
faces by emphasizing how heterogeneous and patchy it is.
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From the point of view of taxonomists, taxonomic knowledge, namely, the asso-
ciation of organisms with species names (or at least with genus names, and maybe 
with variety names), is an indispensable component of biodiversity knowledge and 
assessment as the descriptions of most components and processes of biodiversity 
rely on species identification. For sure, some studies are not taxonomy-dependent, 
like measurements of mass or energy transfer during biological cycles, but taxon-
omy appears as a main gateway to understanding what is going on at the various 
spatial and temporal scales where biological processes take place. As such, taxo-
nomic knowledge may be seen to serve as the ground on which other epistemic 
endeavours within biodiversity studies, including conservation biology, can flour-
ish. To what extent should the taxonomists’ point of view be taken into consider-
ation? In order to answer this question, we present and discuss an example illustrating 
the position of taxonomic knowledge within biodiversity knowledge: the earth 
worm example.
Earth worms are well-known, and for long, because they are ecologically impor-
tant; however, their phylogeny and taxonomic status has long been unclear. Earth 
worms have been briefly described by Linnaeus in the eighteenth century. He gave 
them the species name Lumbricus terrestris. At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, Savigny put forward a taxonomic revision based on the study of morpho-
logical characters (this story is told in James et al. 2010). He hypothesized that the 
organisms that Linnaeus had called Lumbricus terrestris actually form two species 
and introduced the name Enterion herculeus to designate the newly recognized spe-
cies. In 1900, Savigny’s morphological data have been re-interpreted and his revi-
sion rejected (James et al. 2010). At that time, the difference between the two sets 
of characters that Savigny relied upon in favor of taxonomic revision was inter-
preted as intra-specific polymorphism. However, this was not the end of the story: 
in 2009, genetic analysis by Richard et al. (2009) detected two homogeneous genetic 
groups within the set of organisms called Lumbricus terrestris. This led James and 
co-authors (2010) to begin a new, systematic study that included 230 fresh speci-
mens from Europe and North America (belonging to L. terrestris and other species 
in the Lombricus genus) and specimens that had been preserved by Savigny. This 
new study was both genetic and morphological; it took part in the Barcoding earth-
worms programme and its results have been integrated in BoLD and GenBank, 
which are two major international, genetic databanks (see below for more details 
about these databanks). James et al. showed that Savigny was right: there are two 
diverging groups within L. terrestris. A new revision, similar to the one put forward 
by Savigny, thus occurred. We are now left with two species of earth worms: 
Lumbricus terrestris and Enterion herculeus.
What has been the upshot of this history of successive taxonomic revisions? It is 
strikingly different within and outside taxonomy. Within taxonomy, the earthworm 
episode is just another example showing that taxonomic knowledge, as all empirical 
knowledge, is of hypothetical nature and is thus susceptible of being criticized and 
revised as new data are available. For the specialists of the Lumbricus genus, the 
state of knowledge has been upgraded in such a way that there are now two well- 
established species where there used to be only one. Outside taxonomy, the situation 
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is utterly different. Few biologists have realized that the state of taxonomic knowl-
edge has changed within the Lumbricus genus.1 The main reason why this is so is 
worth emphasizing: it is that non-taxonomists do not consider taxonomic knowl-
edge as hypothetical, but rather as established once and for all, which is obviously 
erroneous. This ignorance has negative consequences: they may believe they have 
reached firm, well-established results for Lumbricus terrestris whereas they were 
actually studying Enterion herculeus. Unless they preserved (parts of) the speci-
mens from which they have extracted genetic or physiological materiel, it is impos-
sible to know what species they are talking about in their publications, L. terrestris 
or Enterion herculeus. As a result, their studies are simply pointless as they cannot 
possible lead to any useful conclusion. Imagine the same error about a species of 
mosquitos—the economical and medical consequences would be huge.
The lesson we may draw from the earth worm example is that taxonomic knowl-
edge cannot be ignored by non-taxonomists. When they happen to use outdated 
taxonomic knowledge, their results are threatened. In some cases, the impact of 
taxonomic revisions may only bear on taxonomy itself, but in others, the chain of 
consequences may affect other parts of biology, including conservation biology and 
biodiversity assessment. Thus, with respect to taxonomy, biodiversity knowledge is 
not what it should be, as non-taxonomists do not use it appropriately. This appears 
as a major difficulty facing the development of biodiversity knowledge. It is not the 
only one. In the remaining of this section, we briefly discuss two other features of 
biodiversity knowledge that forbid it to provide us with a clear and unified picture 
of biodiversity, namely its heterogeneity and patchiness.
As it is built up from elements coming from various origins (taxonomy, phyloge-
netic studies, ecology, macro-ecology, biogeography, and evolution studies), biodi-
versity knowledge is dis-unified in such a way that it is unable to provide people in 
charge of assessment or conservation policies with any kind of firm ground. The 
main reason for this lack of unity is that each involved discipline has its own units, 
which are difficult to compare with one another. For instance, in population genet-
ics, a gene may be considered a unit of biodiversity (but as is well-known, a gene in 
population genetics is not exactly the same entity as a gene in molecular biology 
and genetic databanks, which renders things even more complicated (Baetu 2012; 
Carlson 1991; Falk 1986; Fogle 2000; Gerstein et al. 2007; Kitcher 1982; Sterelny 
and Kitcher 1988; Waters 1994). In conservation biology, it is not uncommon to 
count organisms as units of biodiversity. Populations, species, communities, eco-
systems, or even landscapes are also relevant units of biodiversity in ecology and 
conservation biology. But how do these different units compare? There is no general 
theory yet that would be able to precisely connect genes with organisms, or a forti-
1 In order to provide the reader with evidence for this claim, we searched for “earth worm” on cur-
rent search engines and found out that, outside taxonomy, scientific publications about earth 
worms exceptionally mention James et al. 2010 paper and the revision it contains. This suggests 
that non-taxonomists simply do not pay attention to the way scientific knowledge develops and 
changes within taxonomy and that taxonomic revisions are not generally considered mandatory 
elements within their own knowledge of biodiversity, whereas they play a central role within taxo-
nomic knowledge of biodiversity.
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ori with communities or ecosystems. With respect to spatial units, things are not 
better, as fragments of millimeters are as important as regional scales or even the 
whole surface of the Earth. The same is true with temporal units. Even though, from 
the theoretical point of view, all the involved disciplines are somehow unified by the 
theory of evolution, in practice, unification faces many obstacles due to the diversity 
of relevant units.
Besides being heterogeneous, the knowledge of biodiversity is also patchy in 
many ways. First, the conceptual links among taxonomy, phylogenetic studies, ecol-
ogy, macro-ecology, biogeography, and evolution studies are not strong enough to 
provide biodiversity knowledge with firm theoretical structure (see for instance 
Leonelli 2009; Sarkar 2016). For instance, the relationships between ecology and 
evolution studies are notoriously difficult to assess,2 besides other difficulties, like 
differences in temporal scales. Second, a bunch of other difficulties affect the devel-
opment of biodiversity knowledge, like the large diversity of involved spatial and 
temporal scales, the difficulty to access certain zones, like deep sea, and the crude fact 
that certain taxonomic groups, like tunicates (marine invertebrates, sub-group of the 
Chordates), are much less known3 that fish or crustacean decapods (Bouchet 2006).
The upshot of all this is that our knowledge of biodiversity, in its current state, is 
unable to provide biodiversity assessments and conservation policies with the firm 
epistemic ground that they might hope for. Besides being hindered by the awkward 
position of taxonomy among the other disciplines of biology, biodiversity knowl-
edge is heterogeneous and patchy whereas it should be as unified as possible because 
biodiversity is an object of knowledge that extends over the whole planet instead of 
being the object of a series of local, disconnected pieces of knowledge. The latter is 
testified by the very foundation of GBIF, the Global Biodiversity Information 
Facility, as described below. The existence of these difficulties forces biologists and 
conservationists to work at strategies of improvement. In the next section, we pres-
ent how such improvement may be achieved.
3.2.2  Improving Our Knowledge of Biodiversity 
via Cyber-Infrastructures
In order to improve our knowledge of biodiversity, it is first necessary to establish 
what its vehicles are. By “vehicles”, we mean the devices that are used by research-
ers to acquire and develop biodiversity knowledge. Among these vehicles, scientific 
papers play a major role, but they are far from being the only way to build up and 
2 The relationship between the most developed attempt to provide ecology with a theory, namely 
the Neutral Theory of Ecology (Hubbell 2001), illustrates this point: the Neutral Theory is not yet 
unified with evolutionary theory, according to its proponent himself.
3 The fact that knowledge of taxonomic groups is not uniformly spread is a major problem for 
biodiversity assessment and conservation (see e.g. http://www.iucnredlist.org/about/
summary-statistics).
A. Barberousse and S. Bary
61
complement biodiversity knowledge. Expert reports and outcomes of inventories 
and assessment tasks are also among the means that researchers can rely on, as well 
as gene sequences and specimens in natural history collections.
Inventories, gene sequencing, collective scientific expertise, results of assess-
ment endeavours, and collection management are key vehicles of biodiversity 
knowledge. As most of their outcomes are made available as “data” within data-
banks, databanks are indispensable vehicles of biodiversity knowledge as well. The 
“data” they contain are immensely diverse, from gene sequences to species descrip-
tions, taxonomic revisions, geographical localisations, etc. “Data” is thus an ambig-
uous term that has to be further analyzed. We do so at the end of this section. In the 
mean time, we put forward a brief history of biodiversity databanks, which is part 
of the history of cyber-infrastructures Bastow and Leonelli (2010) have analyzed. 
These authors rightly emphasize that “databases and other online resources have 
become a central tool for biological research”. Hereby, we present some historical 
elements relative to biodiversity databanks and emphasize their specific interna-
tional features.
3.2.2.1  A Brief History of Biodiversity Databanks
Less than 10 years after the ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD),4 several databanks were created, whose main objective was to collect geo-
graphic and taxonomic data. Among these, we will focus our discussion on the ones 
relative to the marine field. They are the result of intense collective work during the 
1990s aiming at the standardization and organization of data types. We present the 
development of this collective work in Fig. 3.1. Figure 3.2 shows its results.
The very first databanks have been devoted to taxonomical classification, like the 
Integrated Taxonomic Information System (ITIS), itself derived from the National 
Oceanographic Data Center, a former databank from US NOAA (National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration). The Taxonomic Database 
Working Group (TDWG), which first worked on plants, then had an important role 
in the elaboration of data standards, as well as the bioinformatics working group 
called “Global Initiative Taxonomy” (OECD 1999). The Global Initiative Taxonomy 
was the first step toward the creation of the GBIF databank, a few years later 
(Wieczorek et al. 2012).
Let us now review some outputs of the collective work aimed at the constitution 
of biodiversity databanks. First, it must be emphasized that the taxonomic impedi-
ment (here presented in all its urgent details: https://www.cbd.int/gti/problem.
shtml) is a crucial problem facing the development of biodiversity databanks: tax-
onomists are too few and too slow to cope with the urgency of the biodiversity crisis 
and do not manage to catch up with extinction rates, thus leaving many extinct spe-
cies unnamed and un-described. In the 1990s, in the same period in which standard-
4 https://www.cbd.int/convention/text/ (On the CBD, see also Oksanen and Vuorisalo, Chap. 21, in 
this volume).
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ization of biodiversity data was occurring, Bionet International (https://www.uia.
org/s/or/en/1100052951), a technical cooperative network for taxonomy, was 
launched in order to foster exchanges of taxonomic knowledge among different 
countries and help facing the taxonomic impediment. This was the pre-condition for 
developing unified knowledge by trying to overcome the heterogeneity of taxo-
nomic expertise among countries.
Against this historical background, it is important to emphasize that biodiversity 
knowledge relies on the development of genetic as well as taxonomy-based data-
banks. The most important genetic databank is GenBank (see below). It is com-
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monly used as a resource for biodiversity knowledge and assessment even though 
its primary goal is not biodiversity-oriented.
By contrast, BoLD (Barcoding of Life Databank) focuses on the link between 
genetic sequences and taxonomic practices. It aims at being part of a genetic tool for 
quick species identification. BoLD, and its marine component MarBol, complement 
traditional taxonomy-oriented databanks like Ocean Biogeographic Information 
System (OBIS, http://www.iobis.org/), World Register of Marine Species (WoRMS, 
http://www.marinespecies.org/), and Encyclopedia of Life (EOL, http://eol.org/), 
which is not restricted to marine organisms. These databanks have been fueled by 
data gathered during the Census of Marine Life project (CoML 2000–2010) aimed 
at collecting data and providing researchers with bioinformatics tools. This was an 
international project gathering 2700 scientists who collected taxonomic, geo-
graphic, and ecological data from 540 oceanographic expeditions.
At the beginning, databanks focused on taxonomic classification and upgrading 
thereof, but they soon had to face a new challenge: connecting taxonomic data with 
data coming from other kinds of classifications, like genetic, biological and ecologi-
cal classifications. For instance, biological classifications deliver data like attributes 
of life stages, reproduction, body size, behavior, feeding method, and diet (Costello 
et al. 2015). Establishing easy-to-retrieve connections among taxonomic data and 
biological or ecological traits is an important means to providing conservation biol-
ogists with indicators of the not-well-being of ecosystems (e.g., impact of pollution, 
of fishery, of climate change). To do so, some traits in ecosystems (like reproduction 
rates and features of habitats) must be described and named on a standardized basis. 
This cannot be achieved unless a robust consensus has been reached within the sci-
entific community of both ecologists and taxonomists. Marine Species Traits (http://
www.marinespecies.org/traits/) aims at the generation of these traits from taxo-
nomic (WoRMS) and geographic databanks (OBIS), which requires and important 
work of coordination and terminological standardization, as emphasized by Costello 
et al. (2015). The latter recall that “a rich terminology surrounds descriptions of a 
species biology and ecology, with sometimes different definitions for the same 
terms, synonymous terms, and context dependent (e.g., habitat) terms. This termi-
nology has developed over several hundred years of natural history, in different 
languages, and often terms have multiple meanings in common use.” This requires 
databanks’ designers to perform scientifically-informed terminological regimenta-
tion. The example of Marine Species Traits illustrates how biodiversity databanks, 
first developed by taxonomists, then connected with genetic databanks, now tend to 
diversify in order to account for other aspects of biodiversity. This tendency is how-
ever difficult to implement because elements of knowledge are much less standard-
ized in ecology than they are in taxonomy and in molecular genetics.
3.2.2.2  Biodiversity Cyber-Infrastructures
How do the biodiversity databanks we have mentioned so far play contribute to the 
development of biodiversity knowledge? First, they make data easily accessible. 
Second, they allow for data being interoperable in a sense to be discussed below. 
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More generally, they organize the vast amounts of data that are relevant to biodiver-
sity study. We discuss and illustrate this three aspects in the following.
Let us begin with accessibility of data. As already emphasized by Leonelli 
(2010), accessibility of data through internet-based databanks is a major pre- 
condition for knowledge-building. However, common accessibility, namely, the 
capacity of a piece of data to be easily retrieved at any scientific institution in the 
world, without overcoming outrageous paywalls, is not enough to define a useful 
biodiversity databank. Common accessibility is just the baseline condition of any 
useful scientific databank. We define scientific “usefulness” in this context as the 
capacity of databanks to facilitate and accelerate the work of researchers and 
increase the validity of their results. This cannot only be done by gathering data; 
organizing data of various origins and nature is instrumental. This involves links 
among, not only within databanks. Let us emphasize what organizing data and data 
flows means. Biodiversity databanks, considered collectively, are not as efficient as 
they could be when information is scattered and when data come from heteroge-
neous origins. A good biodiversity databank thus should provide researchers with a 
unique entry to a variety of types of data, e.g., genetic and taxonomic data from vari-
ous geographical zones. We may illustrate this point with sampling-event data 
(https://www.gbif.org/sampling-event-data). They report the presence of an organ-
ism of such or such species (usually rare or endangered, but not always) together 
with its spatiotemporal location. These taxonomic, geographical, and temporal data 
may be provided by amateurs or professional taxonomists. Multiple programmes 
contribute to produce sampling-event data but they do so for different purposes, 
some of which might be related with conservation efforts, others with the develop-
ment of ecological models or the study of migrations and the effects of climate 
change. This heterogeneity of purpose may generate confusion as to how these data 
should be stored and used. A scientifically useful sampling-event databank (in our 
sense) should organize access to information and information flow in such a way as 
to diminish heterogeneity of origin and facilitate integration of data into more struc-
tured pieces of knowledge.
We now turn to interoperability, which can be defined as “the ability of two or 
more systems or components to exchange information and to use the information 
that has been exchanged” (Covitz 2004, quoted by Leonelli 2013a). The increased 
number of databanks involved the ratification of data standards in order to facilitate 
interoperability among databanks. This allows any individual databank to function 
as data provider for other databanks, thus facilitating accessibility. The major 
requirement for interoperability is that databank designers organize data along com-
mon rules: in 2009, the Darwin Core version, which defines minimum standard data 
(with glossary and synonymy) related with biodiversity, has been internationally 
adopted for that purpose.
To sum up, accessibility, organization of information, and interoperability con-
tribute to improving the usefulness of biodiversity databanks.
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3.2.2.3  What Are Data in Biodiversity Databanks?
Databanks are not just (organized) collections of data, but also participate in the 
very definition of what may count as data in the knowledge of biodiversity, a point 
already made by Leonelli (2013b) about the field of plant science. As emphasized 
above, different elements are called “data” in biodiversity databanks, like gene 
sequences, species descriptions, taxonomic revisions, and geographical informa-
tion. What do all these elements have in common? For what reasons can they be 
defined as “data” and qualify for being included in databanks? We shall present and 
discuss the following working hypothesis about data in biodiversity databanks: 
what they have in common is not that they are all basic or fundamental in the same 
sense (this would correspond to a definition of “data” as intrinsically basic pieces of 
information), but that they may play the same epistemic role: they can be relied 
upon in the further steps of a scientific inquiry. This corresponds to a functional 
analysis of data. In the remaining of this section, we argue in favor of this hypoth-
esis by comparing species descriptions and gene sequences when they are both cat-
egorized as “data”.
Let us first indicate easy-to-notice differences between species descriptions and 
gene sequences. On the one hand, the respective situations of species descriptions 
and gene sequences among life sciences are utterly different. Whereas many other 
pieces of biological knowledge depend on species descriptions, the use of gene 
sequences within the process of knowledge production depends on other elements 
of knowledge that may be found in genomics, proteomics, the study of gene regula-
tion, phylogenetic history, etc. However, despite this difference, both species 
descriptions and gene sequences, once they have been validated as bona fide data, 
can be considered a sound floor on which one can step in order to go on and explore 
further research topics. This functional way of understanding data may be con-
trasted, in both cases, with the view according to which data are defined by their 
simplicity or easiness of acquisition. Neither gene sequences nor species descrip-
tions are simple or easy to acquire. They are both issued from complex processes. 
First, a gene sequence is the result of an interpretative judgment with respect to the 
result of a biochemical experience; the judgement is about which nucleotides appear 
in the sequence and their order. Second, when a gene sequence is integrated in a 
databank, for instance in BoLD, where it is associated with a species name (which 
can be temporary), researchers may also provide the file containing information 
about the relevant genetic material, the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) primers 
used to generate the sequenced amplicon, the identifier of the specimen, as well as 
the collection record, i.e., the location of the original specimen in a collection of 
natural history. These items may help other scientists check whether the sequence 
has been associated with the right species name. They illustrate how complex the 
transformation of a gene sequence into useful data is. On the side of species 
 description, it should be emphasized that associating a specimen with a species 
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name is also the result of a complex process of hypothesis assessment. This associa-
tion itself possesses a hypothetical status, as it can be changed (via taxonomic revi-
sion) when a new set of characters is taken into account or when new specimens are 
collected. The information-processing facilities that are currently operated within 
databanks allow databank designers to create links between a specimen and the 
various taxonomic hypotheses (species names) that have been associated with it 
over time. In the marine field, this revision process can be followed in the literature 
and more easily in the WoRMS databank (see below).
The above shows that biodiversity data, the components of biodiversity data-
banks, are not called “data” because of their simplicity or because they are easily 
obtained. They are bona fide data thanks to the robust scientific processes on which 
their production relies. This means that even though some of them require complex 
material devices for their generation or years of scientific education, these processes 
are judged reliable enough to be bracketed as the inquiry develops. To put it in 
another way, the components of biodiversity databanks are so firmly established 
that, even though they do have a hypothetical character, as any item of knowledge 
within empirical science, this hypothetical character can be ignored as far as we 
know. For sure, they do not have the same status as proven mathematical theorems, 
but they are sufficiently well established to count as firm grounds for knowledge 
production.
For all the above-presented reasons: international effort of standardization, 
accessibility, interoperability, robust processes of data production, databanks appear 
as an efficient way to overcome the discrepancy between the reality of biodiversity 
knowledge, which is heterogeneous and patchy, and the hope that it may become 
more and more homogeneous and united. In the next part, we present how existing 
biodiversity databanks are used by scientists in order to make clear in which ways 
the organizational logic of databanks relates to the dynamics of knowledge 
development.
3.3  Uses of Biodiversity Databanks
This section is devoted to studying the various ways scientists, as distinguished 
from conservation practitioners and policy makers, use biodiversity databanks in 
order to develop biodiversity knowledge. We try to disclose the requirements useful 
databanks have to fulfill and how the data they include are operated in the produc-
tion of knowledge. In Sect. 3.3.1, we describe, based on examples, what scientists 
do with the data they retrieve from databanks as well as the quick evolution of this 
scientific practice. In Sect. 3.3.2, we systematically compare catalogs and databanks 
in order to explore the specificities of the relationships between a databank and its 
expected users. At last, we try to show the underlying organizational principles of 
biodiversity databanks and how they may foster the evolution of scientific 
knowledge.
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3.3.1  What Do Scientists Do with the Data They Retrieve 
from Biodiversity Databanks?
As explained above, “data” in biodiversity databanks are already complex units of 
knowledge that are used to work out other types of scientific results, usually more 
general and systematic. These data are used to express general hypotheses that can-
not be formulated unless two important features of data in biodiversity databanks 
are realized: they have (i) to cover large geographical regions or large taxonomic 
groups and (ii) to be valid. Scientists interested in biodiversity study, assessment or 
conservation may be familiar with a taxonomic group or geographical area and have 
personal estimates of species abundance in this group or of biodiversity in this area; 
however, they cannot only rely on their personal experience to put forward general 
hypotheses and submit them to empirical test. Usually, personal experience, how-
ever valuable, is not robust enough to allow for hypothesis testing. By contrast, data 
in databanks possess the quality that personal connection with biodiversity will 
always lack: they have been validated by the scientific community, and as such, as 
explained in Sect. 3.2, they can be relied upon to explore new, more general hypoth-
eses and build up quantitative models.
In order to illustrate, first, how databanks provide researchers with valid pieces 
of knowledge that they can rely upon and second, the quick transformations of this 
practice, we shall now present a recent databank that has been created at the Paris 
Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle. It is called “BasExp”: Databasis for scien-
tific Expeditions (https://expeditions.mnhn.fr/) and has been designed to gather data 
related to a 40-year-long programme of marine expeditions initiated by Paris 
Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle and the Institut de Recherche pour le 
Développement, first called “Musorstom”, then “Tropical Deep Sea Benthos”. 
BasExp collects scientific papers, monographs, and reports issued from this pro-
gramme. It combines information from these papers, books and reports with data 
relative to the collected specimens that are preserved at the Paris Muséum. It also 
collects information about the marine expeditions themselves (not only about the 
scientific information they have contributed to establish), like who was on board, 
the main objectives of the expedition, its location, origin of funding, sampling sites, 
quantity of associated publications, etc. Its main purpose is to allow scientists to 
overcome two major biases affecting the study of biodiversity, the taxon sampling 
bias, and the geographic sampling bias, by allowing researchers to know more about 
the context in which specimens have been sampled. The taxon sampling bias is the 
tendency to focus on a particular group of organisms and ignore organisms from 
other groups. The geographical sampling bias is the tendency to go again and again 
in the same geographical areas to sample specimens instead of exploring other 
areas. For instance, information about the various researchers on board (specialists 
of fish, of crustaceans, etc.) may reveal why some taxa were more extensively col-
lected (and on the contrary, the absence of any specialist of a given taxon on board, 
in a given expedition, may explain why no specimen of this taxon was collected). In 
a similar way, its being funded by the fish industry might explain the 
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 over- representation of fish specimens in another expedition, and so on. There is no 
doubt that it is important to take these factors into account when looking for biodi-
versity patterns. As BasExp provides researchers with key elements of the context 
of sampling, it may be an adequate tool to avoid these common biases.
We now turn to the context in which BasExp has been created. This will shed 
more light on its purpose and potential benefits for researchers. Most first- generation 
biodiversity databanks have emerged as answers to inventory requirements. The 
practice of biodiversity inventory is characterized by its being static in the sense that 
it is blind, by nature, to changes in biodiversity. Inventories may now be considered 
of limited interest for biodiversity knowledge because changes in biodiversity are 
currently a major epistemic challenge, either with respect to conservation or in 
order to assess the effects of climate change. By contrast with inventory-based data-
banks, more up-to-date databanks aim at tracking biodiversity change. The best way 
to do so is by connecting several databanks together in order to be able to follow the 
evolution of spatiotemporal data in as much details as possible. BasExp allows for 
such connections.
Among other changes in biodiversity databanks, another one is worth mention-
ing: they are currently evolving toward less taxa-centered architectures. Many data-
banks, especially those related with natural history museums, are organised along 
taxonomic group divisions: one databank for flowering plants, one for crustaceans, 
etc. However, as emphasized above, there is an increasing need to access a synthetic 
representation of biodiversity that overcomes the intrinsic limits of taxa-oriented 
databanks. As biodiversity has to be captured according to many different aspects 
(geographical, dynamical, taxonomic, genetic, etc.) at once, some databanks offer 
scientists the means to question their data according to several criteria. BasExp 
nicely illustrates this possibility. In particular, as there has been a huge effort within 
BasExp to homogenize geographical data about sampling locations, which were 
difficult to find out and exploit in the past, it provides researchers with a new and 
long-awaited type of ready-to-use information. Outside BaxExp, geographical 
information varies in format and degree of precision from one collection to the next 
within the Paris Muséum. Gathering all information on a given location and stan-
dardizing its format is thus an important advance in itself. Moreover, before the 
establishment of BasExp, each collection databank had its own data system: they 
did not use the exact same names for expeditions and did not have the same degree 
of precision for geographic location. By now, BasExp is the geographical data pro-
vider for all the Paris Muséum’s collection databanks. Because it is not taxa- 
centered, BasExp provides researchers with a synthetic representation of what has 
been studied and what remains to be investigated about deep-sea fauna.
3.3.2  Databanks vs. Catalogs
In this section, we put forward a systematic comparison between library or collec-
tion catalogs and databanks in order to make clear what the specific features of 
databanks are from the users’ point of view. We shall show that far from being 
A. Barberousse and S. Bary
69
improved catalogs, allowing for gain in time, databanks are flexible tools that play 
new roles in the development of biodiversity knowledge.
An important difference between databanks and catalogs is that databanks allow 
for more than one guiding principle with respect to organisation of information. Let 
us first explain what we mean by a “guiding principle” with respect to organization 
of information. In a museum of natural history, catalogs are usually designed 
according to the way specimens’ identifications are produced. By contrast, an 
internet- connected databank may be organised according to several guiding princi-
ples: specimens’ names, geographical localization, gene sequence, date of discov-
ery, name of discoverer, etc. The organisation of information along multiple 
dimensions, all of them of scientific interest, is an efficient way to disclose connec-
tions that remain inaccessible to catalog users. A nice illustration of this important 
feature of databanks is that whereas the absence of a species at some place cannot 
be inferred from consulting a catalog, it may be discovered by cleverly questioning 
relevant databanks. The main reason for that difference is that catalogs based on 
specimen identifications cannot but register the presence of specimens without leav-
ing any opportunity to discover information about absence, whereas a databank 
organised by geographical location may disclose information about absence.
Let us mention another difference between databanks and catalogs, which 
revolves about their users. Usually, the users of a catalog are determined before its 
implementation. For instance, the users of the catalog of a museum’s collection are 
often meant to be people working at the museum, most of them taxonomists: cata-
logs are most devised for local use. By contrast, internet-based databanks are usu-
ally used by different users, even more so when they are inter-connected by means 
of an Information System, namely, a network of devices for the acquisition, organi-
zation, storage, and communication of information that is developed and managed 
by the host institution. The users’ variety forces databanks’ designers to conceive 
the organisation of information in such a way as to push the boundaries of local use. 
The needs and interests of local users of a catalog, e.g., the members of a museum’s 
scientific community, are more easily identified and narrower than the needs and 
interests of external users. Taking the latter into account forces databanks’ designers 
to introduce new possibilities of investigation, e.g., new query types or combina-
tions. This is a very difficult task indeed, as emphasized by Leonelli in the case of 
biomedical databanks: “[i]ncorporating a large variety of possible viewpoints and 
prospective queries has been, and continues to be, the most complex and labour- 
intensive task involved in the development of [the databanks]” (Leonelli 2013a). It 
amounts to try to guess what the new directions of research may be in order to make 
the databank usable and useful in the future. This anticipatory task can be said cen-
tral in the conception and design of biodiversity databanks, whose role in the 
 development of biodiversity knowledge will increase. In Sect. 3.3.3, we further 
explore the implications of the way information is organised within a databank by 
showing how their underlying organisational principles may foster the evolution of 
scientific knowledge.
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3.3.3  Databanks’ Organization and the Dynamics 
of Biodiversity Knowledge
The principles and functioning of databanks are too often ignored by philosophers 
of science, who tend to view them as black boxes, whereas looking inside allows 
one to discover valuable information about the way scientific knowledge is pro-
duced on a daily basis. This is why we aim at opening these black boxes and describe 
their internal functioning in order to show how information is acquired and trans-
formed within them. We will illustrate our claims about the way data are typified 
and organised by a series of examples.
Each databank’s organization obeys a dominant organisational law that is based 
on a specific type of information. For instance, as mentioned above, some databanks 
are centered on taxa whereas others are centered on geographical areas: these are 
examples of types of information. Other types of information include pictures, taxo-
nomic papers presenting taxonomic descriptions, papers presenting taxonomic revi-
sions, or genetic sequences. It is worth emphasizing that the notion of “type of 
information” we introduce here is defined with respect to the organisation of biodi-
versity databanks. For sure, pictures of specimens and taxonomic papers may con-
tain information on the same organisms; however, the information contained in a 
picture will not play the same role in the process of knowledge-production as the 
information contained in a taxonomic paper. The databank user will not use a picture 
in the same way she uses a species description. This is why our notion of type of 
information is not defined with respect to the item in the world that the information 
is about, but with respect to the way the information is used by the databank’s user.
Our notion of type of information allows us to establish a classification of biodi-
versity databanks into taxonomy-oriented, geography-oriented, picture-oriented, 
revision-oriented, etc. databanks. The type of information that associates a given 
databank to a class governs what we call the “organisational law” that defines a 
specific kind of links, within the databank, between the type of information that is 
the most important within it and other types for information. For instance, the 
organisational law of a taxonomy-centered databank relates taxonomic data with 
geographical data, data about endemism, genetic data, etc. The organisational law 
thus sets apart a center and a periphery within the databank. Center and periphery 
are defined relative to types of information, as defined above.
Let us make clear how this center-periphery organisation is implemented in vari-
ous examples.
 (i) We begin with WoRMS, the World Register of Marine Species (http://www.
marinespecies.org/, already mentioned above). The organisational law for 
this databank connects original and current species names. As taxonomic 
revision is at the heart of taxonomic practice, it is highly important to keep 
track of revisions in order to avoid collective oversight, which would have 
devastating consequences. WoRMS contains, for each species name, the list 
of its revisions, dates, and names of associated taxonomists. The use of 
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WoRMS is name-oriented; it delivers information on the sequence of past 
revisions. It is an international databank. Peripheral information is, e.g., the 
geographical distribution of the species.
 (ii) The OBIS geographical databank (Ocean Biogeographic Information System, 
http://www.iobis.org/) is sampling-event and geography-oriented, and spe-
cific to marine species; it also provides physical, chemical and topographic 
information on precise locations where specimens have been observed or 
sampled.
 (iii) GBIF (Global Biodiversity Information Facility, http://www.gbif.org/) is a 
sampling-event databank mapping signalization of species (observation- or 
sample-event) all around the world.
 (iv) By contrast with GBIF, let us mention INPN (Inventaire National du 
Patrimoine Naturel, https://inpn.mnhn.fr/accueil/index), which also maps 
signalization of species (observation- or sample-event) on the French terri-
tory, with an emphasis on landscape preservation.
 (v) BoLD, already mentioned above, combines genetic sequences with informa-
tion on individual specimens. It is important to emphasize the differences 
between BoLD and GenBank, another gene-centered databank (see (vi)). 
Contrary to BoLD, GenBank is centered on the link between genetic 
sequences and scientific publications. There is no link with actual specimens 
within GenBank. By contrast, the users of BoLD look for a genetic sequence 
and the associated species name and may check themselves, by performing 
standardized experiments, whether the stored genetic sequence (1) has been 
correctly established and (2) is associated with the right species name. The 
users of GenBank are not given this possibility because GenBank provides 
them with a link between a genetic sequence and a scientific paper; as a result, 
they cannot but trust the authors of the paper with respect to the validity of the 
gene sequence and associated species name. By contrast, the genetic 
sequences in BoLD may be not published (Ratnasingham and Hebert 2007). 
The difference between BoLD and GenBank illustrates an important division 
among biodiversity databanks: those that provide links to actual specimens, 
allowing data-checking by the users, and those that provide links to publica-
tions or sampling-events, which oblige the users to trust the original informa-
tion providers.
 (vi) The users of GenBank (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/) are looking 
for comparisons between their own organisms of interest and model organ-
isms whose genomes have been sequenced and included in the databank. It 
includes all the sequences that have been published in scientific papers.
 (vii) Let us end this list with two examples from the Paris Muséum National 
d’Histoire Naturelle. COLLECTIONS is the databank of the Muséum’s col-
lections, whose functioning is explained here: http://collections.mnhn.fr/
wiki/Wiki.jsp?page=Publication_Internet_en. Each museum has several col-
lection databanks for fish, mollusks, crustaceans, etc. They are specimen- 
oriented: the users look for a specimen’s number (called “voucher ID”) or a 
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name, in order to get information thereon (nomenclatural status: holotype, 
paratype, etc.; sample site; name).
 (viii) BasExp: As mentioned above, this databank is expedition-oriented: the users 
look for information related with a given expedition. This databank allows for 
both non-taxa-oriented research and a global appraisal of an expedition in 
terms of sampling location, specimens, papers, and reports. It is the reposi-
tory for geographical data related with expeditions.
Whereas each databank has its own organisational logic, many biodiversity data-
banks function collectively by means of a series of networks like GBIF. Networks 
of databanks obey their own laws that govern data flow. Usually, data flow runs 
from the most standardized and best validated data to lesser controlled databanks. 
Data flow is thus a powerful way of enhancing and homogenizing standards because 
downstream databanks, when they happen to become upstream relative to other, 
more local databanks, have to strengthen the reliability and accessibility of their 
data. Establishing a connection between two biodiversity databanks is indeed a 
common way to fill the gaps within each. It also contributes to improve data valida-
tion and warrant traceability: as emphasized by Costello and Vanden Berghe (2006), 
“[g]lobal databases that integrate information on species force the development of 
standard classifications”.
Databank networking has a further important effect at a higher level of knowl-
edge production: it makes clear that some areas of knowledge that had been consid-
ered independent beforehand actually entertain epistemic relationships that are now 
considered as pivotal. For instance, the links between gene sequencing and species 
identification, implemented in BoLD, has only been brought to light recently (com-
pared with the long history of species identification and the less long, but still not so 
recent, history of gene sequencing). Realizing that gene sequencing may facilitate 
species identification has been a side-effect of developing genetic databanks and 
databanks networks. BoLD’s strength, in this context, is to allow data-checking by 
providing links with actual specimens (which do not change over time), whereas 
other databanks depend on taxonomic descriptions, which are hypothetical and sus-
ceptible to be transformed.
Another important tendency in the evolution of the way biodiversity databanks 
get organised is the gradual expansion of the domain of relevant data. Many ele-
ments that were considered irrelevant for biodiversity knowledge are now emerging 
as constitutive, and thus worth collecting, taking care of, and connecting with other 
types of data. For instance, BasExp includes information on the extraction device of 
marine specimens, which it relates with sampling sites as well as with digital pic-
tures illustrating the collected specimens in their substrate. The pictures shot during 
the expeditions have long been difficult to access by scientists who were not on 
board; now, their status as vehicles of knowledge has completely changed in the last 
few years as they became easily accessible within databanks and provide irreplace-
able information about either the specimen’s environment or the context of its 
extraction. BasExp thus nicely illustrates a trend that has been identified by Leonelli 
(2013a), who emphasizes that the databanks she examines (The Arabidopsis 
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Information Resource, TAIR and the cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid, caBIG) 
progressively include elements that were not considered important, like archives of 
data provenance (the methods and instruments originally used to generate data) and 
links to biological materials. We cannot but agree with Leonelli’s statement that 
“setting up and updating these resources occupies much of curators’ time and cre-
ative efforts”.
A last point has to be made about the connection between the development of 
biodiversity databanks and the dynamics of biodiversity knowledge. It is about the 
pace of transformation. The different features of biodiversity databanks do not usu-
ally evolve at the same rate, which dictates a mandatory upgrading process. For 
instance, paper catalogs of large natural history museums have usually not been 
computerized at once, but rather step by step. Now, each step in this process of 
computerization took place within its own technological and scientific context, 
involving innovations that the next steps had to catch up with. Evolving biodiversity 
databanks is thus no linear process. Some events had large interfering consequences, 
like the establishment of the BoLD consortium (as described here: http://www.bar-
codeoflife.org/content/about/what-cbol). As soon as Barcoding of Life proved a 
useful and fruitful endeavour, each biodiversity databank had to take this program 
into account, which meant huge adaptive changes. Adapting databanks moreover 
involves satisfying basic requirements of cumulativeness, editability, and interoper-
ability, as these requirements ensure homogeneous development.
In this section, we have presented and discussed the logic governing the organi-
zation of biodiversity databanks by means of examples. We have also emphasized 
the importance of their interconnection into networks and the interplay between 
their evolution and the changes within biodiversity knowledge. As transformation is 
pivotal in any reflection on databanks, we now turn briefly to the ways biodiversity 
databanks may improve in the future.
3.4  On the Properties of Useful Biodiversity Databanks: 
Concluding Remarks
Let us recall that, in this paper, we call a biodiversity databank “useful” when it 
provides scientists, managers of assessment programmes, and conservationists with 
the means to successfully achieve their aims. In this section, we present two types 
of requirements a biodiversity databank has to satisfy in order to be useful in this 
sense. The first type is more on the technical side (although it is not content-inde-
pendent) whereas the second is linked to the distinguishing features of biodiversity 
knowledge.
As mentioned above, a few basic requirements have to be met in any databank 
that is meant to be used by scientists. First, data have to be standardized. 
Standardization involves defining different data types (i.e., building up a glossary) 
in order to optimize interoperability among databanks. We can now bring to light 
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the peculiar difficulties raised by this operation by coming back to the example of 
the integration of non-taxonomic data in a biodiversity databank, namely, data com-
ing from biological and ecological descriptions (cf. Sect. 3.2.2). In order to include 
biological and ecological traits within a databank for marine species, the main chal-
lenge is to identify which traits are (1) useful and (2) available to researchers and 
conservationists. This is the first step of data standardization, which obliges data-
bank designers to struggle with linguistic subtleties:
For example, “littoral” habitat can be the marine zone between the low and high tide marks, 
extend to the continental shelf and include coastal river catchments, and refer to the edge of 
freshwater lakes. The lack of standard use of terms can compromise the bringing together 
of this knowledge from different sources. (Costello et al. 2015).
We see in this example that standardization forces databank designers to formu-
late precise definitions of the terms they choose to use within the databank, as well 
as to determine measurement units. This is a crucial, non-trivial step in the elabora-
tion of the databank. It is based on the previous identification of the set of terms that 
are used in other databanks and in the relevant literature. Standardization is not 
always possible, however: when the way data are produced remains unknown, i.e., 
when the databank designer does not know whether they are primarily found in 
scientific papers, reports, other databanks, or unpublished sources, they cannot pos-
sibly be standardized because standardization involves checking the validity of data. 
However, when data are from unknown origin, their validity cannot be properly 
checked. That is the reason why working groups for data standardization must 
involve scientists: standardization is knowledge production.
The most important requirement to build up a useful databank is that data have 
to be validated: they must be submitted to a process that provides scientists with the 
same kind of warrant as the peer review process so that they can trust the elements 
they retrieve from databanks. When checking the validity of data, users are assisted 
by the meta-data that provide them with contextual information allowing them to 
both evaluate reliability and quality of data. Meta-data are sets of data that accom-
pany the constitutive data of a databank: for instance, in a taxonomy-oriented data-
bank, the constitutive data may be species descriptions and associated meta-data 
geographical information, gene sequences, pictures, location of holo- and para- 
types, etc. When links to actual specimens are provided, databank users can more-
over check themselves the validity of the data they are interested in. These links are 
thus an important way to enhance the collective process of data validation, and, as a 
result, the overall scientific quality of biodiversity data and databanks.
The usefulness of a databank is conditioned by the basic requirements so far 
illustrated and by the definition of possible queries. By listing the words or 
 expressions that constitute well-defined queries, databank designers identify and 
delineate the possible uses of the tool. As mentioned above, the databank designers’ 
role is to guess the future uses of the databank and to anticipate the developmental 
paths of biodiversity knowledge. This can only be done by people in close contact 
with on- going research, assessment, and conservation practices: even though it may 
not always result in the publication of scientific papers, databank design and main-
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tenance is genuine scientific work because it implies being well aware of the scien-
tific state of the art at a given time, of how the relevant scientific community assesses 
the various scientific hypotheses at stake, and of the emerging links among different 
fields of research.
Even though biodiversity databanks already have a history, they are recent tools 
compared to the old practice of publication of papers and monographs. A major 
challenge for biodiversity databanks is to become a part in a set of older practices 
that themselves transform at a quick pace. This means that biodiversity databanks 
should connect their contents with other, older epistemic practices. More precisely, 
they should complement, rather than replace, more traditional reservoirs of biodi-
versity knowledge, like collections of natural history, because reliable biodiversity 
knowledge requires links with actual specimens. This is an important and difficult 
task for databanks designers and associated computer scientists and engineers.
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Chapter 4
Problems and Questions Posed by Cryptic 
Species. A Framework to Guide Future 
Studies
Anne Chenuil, Abigail E. Cahill, Numa Délémontey,  
Elrick Du Salliant du Luc, and Hadrien Fanton
Abstract Species are the currency of biology and important units of biodiversity, 
thus errors in species delimitations potentially have important consequences. During 
the last decades, owing to the use of genetic markers, many nominal species appeared 
to consist of several reproductively isolated entities called cryptic species (hereafter 
CS). In this chapter we explain why CS are important for practical reasons related 
to community and ecosystem monitoring, and for biological knowledge, particu-
larly for understanding ecological and evolutionary processes. To find solutions to 
practical problems and to correct biological errors, a thorough analysis of the dis-
tinct types of CS reported in the literature is necessary and some general rules have 
to be identified. Here we explain how to identify CS, and we propose a rational and 
practical classification of CS (and putative CS), based on the crossing of distinct 
levels of genetic isolation with distinct levels of morphological differentiation. We 
also explain how to identify likely explanations for a given CS (either inherent to 
taxonomic processes or related to taxon biology, ecology and geography) and how 
to build a comprehensive database aimed at answering these practical and theoreti-
cal questions. Our pilot review of the literature in marine animals established that 
half of the reported cases are not CS sensu stricto (i.e. where morphology cannot 
distinguish the entities) and just need taxonomic revision. It also revealed significant 
associations between CS features, such as a higher proportion of diagnostic mor-
phological differences in sympatric than in allopatric CS and more  frequent ecologi-
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cal differentiation between sympatric than allopatric CS, both observations 
supporting the competitive exclusion theory, thus suggesting that ignoring CS 
causes not only species diversity but also functional diversity underestimation.
4.1  Introduction
Quoting Agapow et al. (2004) “species are the currency of biology”. Long before 
the term “biodiversity” was coined and became widespread, the category of species 
was used as a major unit or category, not only to classify living things, but also to 
study ecological interactions and to assess the composition, resilience, evolution 
and risk of collapse of ecosystems (Gotelli and Colwell 2001). Nearly all descrip-
tors of community assemblages and ecosystems - and their derived ecosystem func-
tioning descriptors  - require counting and separating species. The data used may 
contain variable amounts of information: (i) species richness (i.e. simply the num-
ber of distinct species), (ii) abundances of each species, (iii) relatedness among 
species and/or (iv) functional traits of species (Beauchard et al. 2017). The formal 
system naming the distinct species, established by Linnaeus in the eighteenth cen-
tury, is the binomial nomenclature. The entities in the binominal nomenclature are 
called “nominal species” and are identified by a pair of Latin names, the first one 
corresponding to the genus to which the species belongs (e.g. Homo sapiens). 
Nominal species were described and defined exclusively from morphological char-
acters until very recently, and are therefore sometimes called “morphospecies”. 
Nominal species (or groups of nominal species) were the entities considered in all 
the inventories of multicellular life until only a few years ago. During the last 
decades however, numerous nominal species appeared to be composed of separate 
entities which could not interbreed (Fig. 4.1), i.e. genetically isolated units. Genetic 
isolation for a group of individuals is the inability of its members to breed success-
fully with individuals from another group due to geographical, behavioral, physio-
logical, or genetic barriers or differences. When genetic isolation is not the mere 
consequence of an external constraint such as geographic separation, but inherent to 
behavioral or genomic incompatibilities, such units constitute, by definition, dis-
tinct biological species (Mayr 1942). The expression “cryptic species” (hereafter 
CS) designates the distinct biological species that belong to one given nominal spe-
cies and which were overlooked by the taxonomists who described the species ini-
tially (Knowlton 1993). This is generally, though not always, due to the absence of 
conspicuous diagnostic morphological differences (i.e. characters whose states 
allow unambiguous discrimination between species). In this chapter, “cryptic spe-
cies sensu lato” correspond to distinct biological species within a nominal species, 
whatever the morphological differences or knowledge thereof. We define cryptic 
species sensu stricto as those CS where the absence of diagnostic morphological 
characters has been verified (and below we further explain the need to distinguish 
more categories of CS or putative CS). Similarly to CS (ss and sl), but less restrict-
edly, we define cryptic genetically isolated units (CGI) (ss and sl) as entities that 
appear to be reproductively isolated in fact but which may potentially interbreed 
following range extension or after the disappearance of a geographical barrier 
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(Table 4.1). CS are particular cases of CGI but the problems and questions posed by 
CS and by the CGI that are only extrinsically isolated are essentially identical. 
Many reported CS (or putative CS) in the literature are indeed CGI (or putative 
CGI). We also consider putative CS and putative CGI, which are cases where the 
proof of genetic isolation is lacking although data suggest it may exist, because such 
cases are numerous and, generally, genetic isolation is confirmed when genetic 
information is supplemented with other types of data (cf. Sect. 4.3).
Putative CGI are being identified at an increasing rate owing to the development 
of genetic tools (Bickford et al. 2007; Fišer et al. 2018; Pfenninger and Schwenk 
2007). Particularly in the marine realm, CS (a fortiori CGI) may be the rule rather 
than the exception ((Knowlton 1993); a seminal paper cited about 1000 times and 
(Nygren 2014)). One of the first marine species for which a whole genome 
was  sequenced, the ascidian Ciona intestinalis, is indeed a complex of cryptic 
 species (Nydam and Harrison 2011; Roux et  al. 2013) that diverged particularly 
anciently (more than 10  Ma) and coexist in various regions of their distribution 
ranges. Interestingly, the fact that there were CS in this nominal species was ignored 
during the genome sequencing project and for many years despite the fact that this 
species was already the subject of numerous costly investigations. Our goal in this 
Fig. 4.1 One nominal species composed of two cryptic species: 12 individuals are represented by 
identical black stars (to illustrate their belonging to the same nominal species). Thin blue lines join 
all pairs of individuals that could potentially reproduce together and which thus belong to the same 
biological species. The curved dashed line joins two reproductively incompatible individuals (not 
all such cases are represented for clarity). Since there are two biological species, the nominal spe-
cies is indeed a complex of two cryptic species (until a taxonomic revision eventually creates two 
nominal species). In parentheses are the individual genotypes at a codominant diagnostic locus (cf 
Sect. 4.3)
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chapter is not to participate in the debate about species concepts but to highlight 
problems (practical) and questions (theoretical) raised by the existence of CGI, with 
a particular effort to clarify the variety of causes generating CGI and CS and the 
features of CGI and CS that are useful to identify in order to explain their origins.
We will thus explain (i) why it is important to take CGI (and in particular CS) 
into account (identifying practical problems related to the assessment of biodiver-
sity and ecosystem functioning, and theoretical problems for the understanding of 
community dynamics, biological evolution, etc.), (ii) how to detect CS or CGI 
(which is a dual task, implying both the distinction of biological species or 
 genetically isolated entities and the characterization of morphological differentia-
tion), (iii) how to correct inferences that are faulty due to CGI, and how to predict 
CGI occurrences and characteristics, which are similar questions that both require 
understanding of the factors responsible for the occurrence of CGI. These factors 
Table 4.1 Classification of types of CGI (including putative cases) based on available knowledge 
and crossing the genetic isolation (GI) criteria (rows) and the morphological differentiation (MD) 
criteria (columns). The lower and isolated row does not belong to the classification itself but 
illustrates the possible causes of the origin of CGI. “BS” stands for biological species
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include human factors related to science history, and biological factors, such as the 
geographical distribution, habitat and life history traits of the species. Finally, we 
will present the results of a preliminary survey of the literature on marine species.
4.2  Why It Is Important to Recognize Cryptic Species
CGI and particularly CS challenge biodiversity estimations and, potentially, biodi-
versity management in several important ways. Figure 4.2 illustrates some of the 
consequences of (ignoring) CS on fundamental biodiversity parameters. What mat-
ters is that when these parameters are erroneous, the estimation of vulnerability (of 
Fig. 4.2 Ignoring CGI has consequences on both assemblage parameters (e.g. species richness) 
and biological parameters (e.g. abundance, geographical range or ecological niche) defined for a 
given species. The figure represents hypothetical distributions and abundances of 3 nominal spe-
cies, “nominal species 1” being a complex of two cryptic species (biological species 1 and 2). (*): 
The two separate zones (A and B) in which the individuals are distributed may represent either 
distinct geographic areas or distinct environments (i.e. habitats or ecological niches). We repre-
sented a situation where CGI have allopatric distributions or differentiated niches because these are 
the problematic cases, but there are situations where the CGI of a given species complex have the 
same geographic range or ecological niche. “NS” stands for nominal species
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a species or an ecosystem) is wrong, and management measures based on these 
parameters may be inefficient or even deleterious.
The most conspicuous consequence of ignoring CGI  is an underestimation of 
species number in a community or in an ecosystem because one nominal species is 
composed of several biological species. From a common biodiversity conservation 
point of view, this error would result in being more pessimistic than we should be 
about species richness in an area, species richness often being considered as a proxy 
of good ecological status or as a parameter to maximize. A direct corollary of the 
underestimation of species numbers is the overestimation of the abundance for indi-
vidual species (by comparison to the nominal species abundance). In this case, the 
bias is toward undue optimism about a species’ conservation status. If, instead of 
having one species with 2 N individuals, there are two separate entities of N indi-
viduals, the global risk of extinction at the level of the nominal species (i.e. pooling 
the two biological species) may change, depending on the vulnerability component 
considered (e.g. genetic diversity, or inbreeding rate), for the following reason. The 
probability of adaptation to a change in environment is proportional to the genetic 
diversity within the species or the population. It is well known from population 
genetics theory that a metric of genetic diversity, namely nucleotide diversity (aver-
age number of nucleotide differences between two random individuals or gametes), 
is proportional to effective size (which, everything else being equal, is proportional 
to census size). Thus, in our hypothetical situation, each CGI has half the nucleotide 
diversity of the nominal species as a consequence of having half the number of 
individuals compared to the nominal species (we emphasize that this is totally com-
patible with the fact that most alleles at most loci may be shared among CGI). Since 
there are two CGI, there may be no consequences of ignoring CGI: each CGI has 
twice the risk of going extinct by lack of adaptive nucleotide diversity but there are 
two species, so globally the probability of losing the whole species complex is the 
same as would be estimated ignoring CGI. However, there are other components of 
vulnerability where small population sizes are not compensated by the number of 
species, such as inbreeding. In hypothetical populations of N and 2 N individuals, 
the probabilities of self-reproduction are respectively (1/N)2 and (1/2 N)2, the latter 
equaling ¼ (1/N)2, which is a quarter of the former. Each CGI in this example there-
fore has a selfing probability four-fold higher than believed when ignoring that the 
nominal species is split in two, thus the vulnerability component is multiplied by 
four for each CGI which is not compensated by the presence of two (not four) CGI. 
Another frequent consequence of ignoring CGI is an overestimation of the geo-
graphical range of a species: instead of a widespread (even cosmopolitan) species, 
there may be several geographically restricted species, allopatrically distributed or 
displaying partial sympatry (Egea et al. 2016; Eme et al. 2018). Again, this results 
in a systematic underestimation of the vulnerability of a species, particularly from a 
regional point of view because species with smaller geographical ranges are more 
vulnerable to environmental change and more threatened by extinction.
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CGI may also lead to confounding numerous specialized species as a single gen-
eralist species (Morard et al. 2016), which is typically less sensitive to environmen-
tal change (Büchi and Vuilleumier 2014). More generally, functional diversity 
estimates may be affected depending on niche differentiation between CS: the com-
petitive exclusion theory implies that sympatric CS may have diverged in the way 
they exploit limiting resources (otherwise one species would have eliminated the 
other by outcompeting it), with the consequence that the average niche widths of 
these CS may be overestimated (Van Campenhout et al. 2014) and as a result, vul-
nerability to perturbations would be underestimated. However, non-equilibrium 
situations, or more generally the neutralist theory of biodiversity, supported by 
many empirical studies (Hubbell 2001), prevent us from taking for granted that the 
ecological niches of all sympatric CS of a given complex have diverged. However, 
when CS share the same niche, there are also mistakes in assessing functional diver-
sity because functional redundancy -the fact that several species ensure the same 
function in the ecosystem and may compensate one another in case one of them is 
going extinct- is underestimated when CS are ignored.
Another important element for bioconservation is the connectivity pattern of spe-
cies’ populations (i.e. the exchange of migrants able to reproduce with local indi-
viduals among distinct populations). The realized connectivity among populations, 
inferred by population genetics studies, is a key piece of information guiding the 
design of networks of protected areas. Inferred connectivity patterns may be errone-
ous when CS are ignored (Pante et al. 2015): for instance, if in two sympatric CS, 
samples from one area contain, by chance, only individuals of one species, and 
samples from another area individuals from the other species, genetic differentia-
tion may appear very high, even if individuals migrate extensively and reproduce 
randomly among those areas (panmixia).
Thus far we have taken the viewpoint of community ecology, but biases induced 
by CGI also impact stock management of exploited species (population and range 
size overestimations, realized connectivity underestimations). Lastly, numerous 
parasites (including human parasites) are complexes of CS which may affect the 
efficiency of treatments (Tibayrenc 1996). CGI therefore strongly impact scientific 
data used by biodiversity managers and medicine.
Obviously, basic biological understanding also is challenged by CGI. Without 
accurate taxonomy, distributional and diversity patterns can become obscured 
(Paulay and Meyer 2006), and variation in taxonomic opinion can be an important 
source of confusion in diversification analyses (Faurby et al. 2016). For instance, 
ignored CGI may result in incorrectly indicating that rates of speciation have 
decreased toward the present (Cusimano and Renner 2010), causing false inferences 
of major ecological and evolutionary processes.
Beyond the erroneous inferences caused by CGI, numerous CGI are not taxo-
nomical artefacts (i.e. morphological diagnostic differences among CGI are actually 
absent, not just overlooked) but they result from a significant decoupling of mor-
phological and genetic divergence (cf below) which calls for an explanation involv-
ing evolutionary forces. Such CGI thus deserve to be studied as an important 
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fundamental research question, not just for practical reasons (e.g. correcting biodi-
versity estimates).
For all these reasons, it is necessary to undertake a thorough study of the phe-
nomenon. Various factors may cause the presence of CGI, including human factors 
(e.g. the particular way in which taxonomists happened to describe and delimit the 
nominal species) and the habitat, biogeography and biological traits of the species. 
Understanding how these factors determine (i) the probability of having a CGI com-
plex, (ii) the structure of morphological diversity in the species complex, (iii) the 
average number of CGI per nominal species, (iv) the probability that the CGI are 
ecologically differentiated or not and (v) their respective geographical ranges 
requires a compilation of case studies and their in-depth analysis. In Sect. 4.4, we 
will explain the role such factors may have in theory. Since different causes lead to 
different patterns of CGI, it is important to classify CGI in a relevant way. 
Furthermore, there are many cases of putative CGI in the literature but not as many 
confirmed cases; it is thus important to explain how to identify them reliably (Sect. 
4.3: how to detect and classify CGI).
4.3  How to Detect and Classify Cryptic Species
There are two components in the notion of cryptic species. The first and most impor-
tant component is that of genetic isolation, i.e. the presence, in a nominal species, of 
reproductively separated entities (though this isolation may be partial), which may 
correspond to distinct biological species sensu Mayr. The first part of this Sect. 4.3.1 
presents the different levels of genetic isolation  or levels of evidence of  genetic 
isolation. In the absence of any degree of genetic isolation within a nominal species, 
there are no CGI, even in the wide sense (sensu lato). The second component is 
morphology (Sect. 4.3.2). Although CGI are sometimes defined as distinct biologi-
cal species with similar morphology, we decided to consider as CGI (but sensu lato) 
the cases where biological species are indeed differentiated morphologically, while 
having the same Latin name. This choice was motivated by the fact that CGIsl as 
defined above pose many of the practical problems posed by CGI sensu stricto 
(where the distinct genetic entities have no diagnostic morphological differences). 
To avoid confusion about definitions, Table  4.1 displays our nomenclature in a 
2-dimensional classification of CGI.
4.3.1  Identification of Genetic Isolation and Biological Species
The following explanations naturally only hold for taxa where “reproductive isola-
tion” has a meaning (i.e. taxa in which there is sexual reproduction) and which also 
have a diploid life stage (with two copies for each marker/gene).
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The most direct way to assess genetic isolation between two groups of individuals 
is to perform controlled crosses. However, in “non-model” species, in case of repro-
ductive failure it is often impossible to determine whether genetic isolation or exper-
imental conditions are responsible for the absence of offspring (or even mating). 
Moreover, when one does not know how to define the groups of individuals (typi-
cally the case of CGIss, due to the lack of conspicuous morphological differences), 
the problem has no solution. This explains why CGIss have always been discovered 
using genetic markers (characterized in a sufficient number of individuals).
Genetic markers may come from the nuclear genome. Since the nuclear genome 
is diploid, individuals have two copies for each nuclear marker, inherited from the 
two gametes that fused to form their first cell. There are also genetic markers that 
come from organellar genomes (chloroplastic or mitochondrial) which are transmit-
ted to the (diploid) individual from a single gamete, generally the maternal gamete 
(oocyte) for animal mitochondrial genome, and often the paternal (pollen) for chlo-
roplastic genomes.
When two groups are fully reproductively isolated, no genetic material is 
exchanged across groups (except viruses or mobile elements). There are necessarily 
some genetic differences among groups (otherwise they could exchange genes, if 
they were in contact). Diagnostic markers are those for which no allele is shared 
between group 1 and group 2 (yet there can be several alleles per group): if you 
know the allele, you can assign the organism to one of the two groups precisely. 
Semi-diagnostic markers are markers for which at least one allele is private to a 
group (absent from the other groups).
Two main types of genetic markers account for most CGI discoveries. Historically, 
the first type of markers which demonstrated genetic isolation within many nominal 
species were codominant markers, which are nuclear markers that reflect the state 
of both the maternal and the paternal allele of an individual. Most studies reported 
in the seminal review of Knowlton (1993) demonstrated CGI using such markers, in 
particular allozymes. By contrast, a dominant marker only provides two possible 
phenotypes (either presence or absence of the variant): when the variant is detected, 
which is often symbolized by [1], one cannot determine whether the genotype is 
homozygous (11) or heterozygous (10); when the phenotype is not observed [0], the 
genotype is necessarily (00).
A given diagnostic and codominant marker is a powerful tool to detect genetic 
isolation. For instance, imagine a scientist characterized 200 individuals with a 
marker with three alleles that are diagnostic of two biological species (alleles A and 
B for species 1, allele C for species 2). If the sample contains individuals from spe-
cies 1 and 2, the scientist may find 4 genotypes, namely AA, AB, BB and CC. A 
possible distribution of the individual genotypes could be 25 individual (AA), 50 
(AB), 25 (BB), and 100 (CC). Genotypes AC and BC do not exist because no genetic 
exchange is possible between species 1 and 2. Missing genotypes can only be 
explained by genetic isolation. However, to establish that the alleles are diagnostic 
in such a case, sample size and relative frequency among species (and also relative 
allele frequencies within species) matter: if only 10 individuals had been genotyped, 
the absence of AC and BC genotypes could have resulted by chance alone (as a 
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result of random sampling). If species 2 was very rare in the global sample (say 7 
individuals) the absence of AC and BC would not be considered evidence of genetic 
isolation. So conclusions are not always straightforward and require population 
genetic approaches where many individuals are genotyped and analyzed using rel-
evant (basic) statistical tests. Note that semi-diagnostic markers also produce miss-
ing genotypes which may reveal the presence of genetic isolation, but they do not 
allow precise species delimitation based on genotypic data because some genotypes 
(those composed of shared alleles) can belong to both species. With dominant mark-
ers, it is not possible to identify missing genotypes (i.e. the absence of combination 
of some variants in a given individual from the whole population).
During the 1990’s, the use of allozymes declined in favor of approaches based on 
DNA. These allow field collection without refrigeration and DNA characterization 
was greatly facilitated by the PCR technology (Avise 1994). However, at this time, 
current technology did not allow routine sequencing of both alleles of many diploid 
individuals and the commonest data produced thus became dominant markers or 
sequence data from a haploid genome (mitochondrial, chloroplastic) which is rep-
resented by a single gene per individual. The distribution of haploid genotypes such 
as (A), (B) or (C) among individuals does not reveal anything about isolated groups, 
in the absence of independent information, whatever their frequencies (and what-
ever the divergence among these alleles). In codominant markers (example just 
above), genetic isolation is simply deduced by the fact that some combinations of 
alleles are never found associated within the same individuals, which obviously 
cannot be assessed with haploid markers. Among such haploid markers, however, 
some contributed much to the detection of putative CGI. These are the markers in 
which the alleles were characterized by their DNA sequences, or more generally 
those for which it was possible to characterize distances among alleles. Imagine 
now that alleles A and B are very closely related DNA sequences (differing only by 
one out of 500 positions), and C is very different from A and B (by 20 positions) (Fig. 
4.3). The temptation is great to infer that A and B belong to one species, and C to 
another one. In numerous studies, alternative explanations were not even considered 
and the presence of CGI was inferred by such patterns. But there are alternative 
explanations for the observation of highly divergent alleles within a single species, 
even when intermediate alleles are absent. For instance, a past bottleneck in the 
effective size of a species (high mortality events) can lead to loss of various alleles, 
with only a few divergent alleles remaining (for instance 2 alleles, which may differ 
by 10 nucleotide positions out of 500). Then, with time, new alleles arise by muta-
tions, which differ from their parental allele by a single mutation, leading to the 
presence of various (e.g. 10–15) very closely related alleles (differing by a single 
mutation from their parental allele, because mutations rarely hit the same nucleotide 
position at short time intervals) for each of the two surviving ancient alleles. The 
typical pattern arising from this is shown in Fig. 4.3. Note that selective sweeps, i.e. 
the removal of genetic diversity due to spread in the species of an advantageous 
allele, within a single biological species can also produce similar patterns. It looks 
exactly the same as the result of divergence of distinct biological species. Therefore, 
when a pattern like Fig. 4.3 is observed, the confirmation that there are distinct bio-
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logical species requires obtaining independent evidence supporting the genetic par-
tition displayed by the single haploid marker, i.e. a polymorphic trait whose states 
appear to be linked to the marker’s states. This can come from any other genetic or 
phenotypic (in the widest sense) marker, provided this marker is not constrained by 
its nature to remain tightly linked to the first marker.
As an example with genetic markers if individuals with sequences A or B (at 
marker 1) always have the allele X (at marker 2), and individuals with sequences C 
(at marker 1) have the allele Y at the independent locus (at marker 2), and if the two 
markers are not physically linked in the genome (which means that at each repro-
duction event, these two loci segregate independently and their respective alleles do 
not remain linked), it establishes that genes are not exchanged among groups of 
individuals (the first group bearing alleles A, B, and X and the other group bearing 
C and Y). This situation (when applied to genetic markers) corresponds to an 
extreme case of linkage disequilibrium. Linkage disequilibrium is defined as the 
non-random association between alleles at distinct loci within individuals in a popu-
lation. Linkage disequilibrium, even when it is not extreme (for instance when all 
possible allele combinations are observed) is useful because it can detect the pres-
ence of two genetic entities (such as CGI) in a sample even when there is 
 hybridization between them. Indeed, there are many studies reporting occasional 
hybridizations among distinct biological species. If such hybrids were as fertile as 
“pure” individuals, the two species would fuse together and after a number of gen-
erations there would be a single species. However, in most cases after long term 
isolation between incipient species, some incompatibility has arisen and hybrids are 
either sterile or less fertile. In such cases, reproductive isolation is partial, but the 
presence of rare hybrids does not refute the presence of reproductively isolated enti-
Fig. 4.3 Phylogeny of alleles may erroneously suggest the presence of several biological species. 
Time T0: Representation of a hypothetical allele phylogeny in a population of constant size, at 
mutation-drift equilibrium. At time T1 a severe decrease in population size (bottleneck) causes the 
loss of many alleles (dashed lines). At T2, the population has recovered its size and mutations cre-
ated new alleles closely related to the survivor alleles. The allele phylogeny mimics a pattern with 
3 distinct biological species
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ties that remain genetically distinct in the long term. Even in such cases, population 
genetics can reveal the presence of partially isolated populations (or hybridizing 
species) in a sample of individuals by the detection of linkage disequilibrium 
between loci that are physically unlinked.
Karyotypes (shape and numbers of chromosomes), ecological characters (habi-
tats, phenology, diet… (Johannesson 2003)) and behavior are typical phenotypic 
traits which can distinguish reproductively isolated units. The great majority of 
putative CGI detected by DNA sequences in animals were detected by mitochon-
drial DNA markers (haploid); thus markers from the nuclear genome (which segre-
gates independently from the mitochondrial genome) are ideal candidates to check 
whether the putative biological species are true biological species (Chenuil 2012; 
Chenuil et al. 2010; Egea et al. 2016) as well as any phenotype not determined by 
the mitochondrial genome (probably more than 99.9% of phenotypes). What we 
called putative CGI (and putative CS), being often identified by a single molecular 
marker, are similar to the “Primary Species Hypotheses” of previous authors 
(Castelin et al. 2016; Pante et al. 2015) that need to be confirmed by independent 
markers or by an integrative taxonomy approach.
Apart from direct methods that are clear cut and based on a small number of 
markers, there is a variety of recent methods to identify and validate species delimi-
tations using information from several independent genetic markers. Some do not 
require codominant markers but use DNA sequence information (Yang and Rannala 
2010). For their success, some alleles must have diverged between species as a 
result of mutations, not only genetic drift. Other methods do not use DNA sequences 
but codominant markers, and can have good results even when genetic markers are 
not diagnostic (i.e. some alleles are shared among CGI) (Huelsenbeck et al. 2011; 
Jombart et  al. 2010). Although these clustering methods are rarely used to 
assess genetic isolation, they may be the only solution for recently diverged CGI 
that retain ancestral shared genetic polymorphism (Weber et  al. 2019). Recent 
methods still account for a negligible number of CGI reports.
We have thus shown how to determine genetic isolation with genetic markers and 
other traits recorded in samples of sufficiently numerous individuals: either using 
codominant markers or using distinct markers (that may be dominant) that are not 
inherited in a linked manner, so that their statistical association (linkage) in indi-
viduals proves that they are genetically isolated.
Let us come back to the distinction between CGI and CS (CS being particular 
cases of CGI). Genetic isolation may be caused by geographical isolation among 
groups whose genomes remain intrinsically compatible: in such cases, if individuals 
were put into contact (for instance by human intervention), they may be able to 
produce fertile offspring (thus they belong to the same biological species). We thus 
considered as CGI all cases where genetic isolation was established but intrinsic 
incompatibility was not proven. Using genetic markers exclusively, it is not possible 
to know whether allopatric groups are still interfertile: such groups may display 
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diagnostic markers as a result of genetic drift and mutation because they evolved 
separately for many generations. By contrast, in some (numerous) cases, genetically 
isolated groups detected by genetic markers are sympatric and completely inter-
mixed in the field (Boissin et al. 2008a, b; Egea et al. 2016; Weber et al. 2014), so 
their reproductive incompatibility is not questioned and they deserve the status of 
cryptic (biological) species (CS). When the genetically isolated groups are allopat-
ric, whether or not they kept the possibility to interbreed has few consequences for 
biodiversity characterization at the community level since most consequences high-
lighted in Sect. 4.2 still hold (e.g. range overestimation). However, the distinction is 
important for practical aspects of bio-conservation: in a case of strong bottlenecks 
endangering one geographical group, artificial introduction of individuals can be 
envisaged (to help restoring population size) from the other geographical group 
only when transplanted individual are able to reproduce with indigenous ones, thus 
not for actual CS.
To conclude, a practical way to classify the type of structuration within a nomi-
nal species according to genetic isolation is the following one:
Level A (biological species): True genetic isolation  is shown by markers and 
intrinsic incompatibility is confirmed between entities (either by the observa-
tion of the genetically isolated entities in sympatry, or by controlled crosses).
Level B (genetic isolation, putative biological species): genetic isolation is con-
firmed (either established by a single codominant genetic marker or by an asso-
ciation of a genetic marker with another independent “marker”, which could be 
genetic, morphological, ecological or behavioral) but it distinguishes groups that 
are in allopatry, so the status of biological species sensu (Mayr 1942) requiring 
intrinsic incompatibility (and see Wheeler and Meier (2000)) cannot be 
confirmed.
Level C (Putative genetic isolation): putative genetic isolation that needs con-
firmation. These cases correspond to a high divergence among alleles in haploid 
or dominant markers (cf. Fig. 4.3) which has not been confirmed by any indepen-
dent marker.
Level D (No genetic isolation evidence): Absence of any significant genetic dif-
ferentiation within the nominal species with available genetic markers (or pheno-
typic characters). This does not allow rejecting the hypothesis that there are some 
biological species within the nominal species; we simply have no indication that 
there are some which need to be delimited.
This classification is a practical one which reflects available knowledge on a 
given nominal species. For instance, a nominal species classified as level D for 
genetic isolation may indeed correspond to true biological species but we lack data 
to confirm it. This classification will be useful when reviewing literature published 
on CGI because many studies report “cryptic species” while evidence of genetic 
isolation does not go beyond level C (i.e. genetic isolation needs to be confirmed by 
an independent marker, genetic or not).
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4.3.2  Morphological Differentiation
Independently of the level of genetic differentiation among some groups within a 
nominal species, their morphological variation can be studied using various types of 
characters: some studies consider only very conspicuous external characters, others 
focus on the characters traditionally used to diagnose the species in the genus or 
family to which the nominal species belongs, while other ones endeavor to seek any 
possible character in order to find some characters corroborating groups revealed by 
genetic markers. For a given sample of a given nominal species, morphological dif-
ferentiation and polymorphism depend on the (set of) character(s) used.
For instance, in spatangoid sea urchins, species are described and diagnosed by 
morphological indices from the test (i.e. the skeleton). Egea et al. (2016) revealed 
CS in Echinocardium cordatum using morphological indices from test shape: they 
did not find a single diagnostic character (despite the fact that morphological dif-
ferentiation among CS was highly significant statistically), although sperm mor-
phology (requiring microscopic observations) would probably reveal diagnostic 
differences (Drozdov and Vinnikova 2010). For taxonomists, fidelity in considering 
a set of characters has some justification: for example, in sea urchins, using test 
shape permits analyses combining extant and fossil specimens. Sperm morphology 
cannot be used on fossils because sperm lack hard and fossilizable structures (and 
also because of their microscopic size).
We propose the following classification to characterize morphological variation 
and differentiation among groups in a nominal species. What we name “groups” are 
entities which were necessarily defined independently of morphology, generally 
from genetic markers. This classification considers both morphological variability 
within groups and morphological differentiation among groups because both are 
relevant to interpret the nature of the evolutionary forces impinging on the evolu-
tionary trajectory followed by the nominal species under study. As for genetic mark-
ers, the notion of diagnosticity for a morphological marker is crucial. It is useful to 
distinguish a situation with statistically significant morphological differentiation 
among groups, in the absence of diagnostic characters. For example, multivariate 
analyses using a set of morphological characters correctly assign more than 97% of 
the specimens to their genetic CS in E. cordatum, yet for each of the 20 morphologi-
cal indices, values overlap among CS (Egea et al. 2016).
Level 0: No morphological polymorphism for this character in the nominal species, 
thus no differentiation among groups.
Level 1: Presence of morphological polymorphism but no differentiation among 
groups (not even a statistical differentiation).
Level 2: Significant morphological differentiation among groups, but no diagnostic 
character among groups (e.g. character values overlap for quantitative 
characters).
Level 3: Diagnostic morphological differences among groups.
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Here again, as for the genetic component, sample sizes are crucial: it is not pos-
sible to determine if a marker is diagnostic when it was characterized in too few 
individuals. Beyond sample size, sample variety is important; in fact, given that 
individuals from a field sample may be close relatives, it is desirable to collect sev-
eral field samples from reasonably distant locations. For instance, a morphological 
character (radial shield) appeared diagnostic of two brittle-star CS in Crete and was 
supported by large sample sizes (Weber et al. 2014) although this was not the case 
in other regions (Stohr et al. 2009).
Crossing the genetic and the morphological differentiation components, using the 
levels defined above, we obtain a table which provides a bi-dimensional classifica-
tion of nominal species regarding the phenomenon of “cryptic species” (or CGI) 
(Table 4.1). Further considerations based on the different cells (or ranges of cells) 
from Table 4.1 rely on the assumption that the morphological differentiation status 
reported corresponds to the most discriminating morphological marker available in 
the nominal species and that such characters were investigated seriously enough. 
This condition is very constraining when performing a review of the literature: as 
shown by our preliminary survey, many studies lack sufficient detail regarding which 
characters were looked at and many of them do not even name any morphological 
character, yet conclude the absence of morphological differences among species. 
Therefore, rigorously establishing the absence of morphological differentiation (or 
diagnostic differences) within a nominal species may be impossible in the absolute: 
it is rarely possible to rule out the objections that other characters (microscopic ones, 
or from transitory life stages) which could have revealed stronger differentiation 
were dismissed/overlooked. But what is relevant for an evolutionary biology under-
standing of morphological evolution is to establish that the ratio of “morphological 
differentiation/genetic differentiation” is significantly different in the studied species 
than in other closely related taxa. The ideal approach to establish the morphological 
differentiation status in a nominal species thus requires morphological analyses of 
both numerous specimens from the studied nominal species as well as that of some 
specimens from at least one other, closely related, nominal species. This was done in 
(Egea et al. 2016): genetic distances between CS of the sea urchin E. cordatum are 
greater than those observed between two nominal species of another spatangoid sea 
urchin genus, namely Spatagus purpureus and S. multispinus.
The right-hand column in Table 4.1 (MD_3) corresponds to cases with diagnos-
tic morphological differences. When diagnostic morphological differences confirm 
biological species, the possibility of having CS sensu stricto is ruled out, but we call 
such cases CS sensu lato because there are biological species lacking the taxonomi-
cal status of nominal species. The nominal species and its component CS are thus in 
need of taxonomic revision. There can be no cases in category C3 (putative genetic 
isolation) because, as explained above, a morphological difference diagnostic of the 
genetic groups (assuming this morphological character is not encoded by genes 
linked to the genetic marker) automatically confirms genetic isolation: this corre-
sponds to the B3 category, in which genetic isolation is established but genetic 
analyses were not performed on sympatric samples so that the possibility of inter-
breeding, if individuals were in contact, cannot be discarded. When genetic groups 
are in allopatry, B2 cases correspond to sub-species.
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Columns MD_0, 1 and 2 are cases without diagnostic morphological differences: 
these cases, when the presence of distinct biological species is confirmed (i.e. in the 
first row, GI_A) correspond to CS sensu stricto because a traditional taxonomical 
diagnosis of morphological species is not possible, due to lack of diagnostic mor-
phological characters. Lower rows may also be CSss but genetic evidence is lacking 
to establish the presence of biological species. GI_B cases (proven genetic isolation, 
possible biological species), in the absence of diagnostic morphological differentia-
tion, can be called “cryptic genetically isolated entities” (category B0 or B1). For 
many questions regarding biological evolution, these cases are equivalent to estab-
lished biological species and should be included in meta-analyses aimed at testing 
hypotheses regarding the coupling of morphological and genetic divergence. Like 
for (C3), there are no cases in category (C2) because significant morphological dif-
ferentiation among genetic groups constitutes evidence of a certain degree of genetic 
isolation that may only be partial (as for instance when hybridization is possible and 
hybrids have a lower fitness).
Two cells with putative genetic isolation and no significant morphological dif-
ferentiation (C0 and C1) may be CSss but are not confirmed. Since the literature on 
animal CS contains many such cases, mostly from mitochondrial DNA markers, 
and since, when independent markers are available in addition to mitochondrial 
markers, they confirm genetic isolation  rather frequently, we consider that such 
cases are worth being reported and analyzed in meta-analyses, provided their lower 
level of evidence of genetic isolation is recorded.
When no polymorphism at all is observed within the nominal species for the 
morphological character considered (left column of Table 4.1) one may just con-
sider that information is lacking and interpretations are not possible. However, 
when the morphological character(s) considered is typically one that usually dis-
plays a certain amount of variability within species or that differentiates species in 
other, closely related nominal species, the absence of polymorphism itself can be 
considered informative. This leads us to part 4, where we discuss possible causes 
generating CGI.
4.4  Identifying the Multiple Causes of Cryptic Species
The causes of the presence of CS or CGI may be related to our taxonomic activities 
or to the species themselves. In the first case, they are somehow inherent to the taxo-
nomic process (i.e. the human process of delimiting nominal species, which how-
ever may in some cases be affected by features of the species or their habitats). In the 
second case either they correspond to recent (young) divergences or they reflect a 
slow-down in the accumulation of diagnostic differences or a slow-down in morpho-
logical divergence relative to genetic divergence. After explaining possible causes 
and explaining how biological or habitat factors may trigger such phenomena, we 
explain how to determine if each of these causes is likely to explain a CS or a 
CGI case. The different causes and their hierarchy are summarized in Box 4.1.
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4.4.1  Taxonomic Process
There are two distinct cases where taxonomic processes (i.e. the way species were 
delimited) are responsible for the presence of CGI. In the first case, cryptic species 
sensu lato (or CGIsl) do indeed display diagnostic morphological differences cor-
responding to biological species (or to units displaying genetic isolation). These 
cases are thus just in need of a formal description of the morphological biological 
species or an upgrade to the status of nominal species (or the status of sub-species, 
for CGI which are not CS). A second situation corresponds to cases where taxon-
omy failed to reveal diagnostic or differentiated morphological characters in true 
biological species or in CGI for various reasons discussed below which are inherent 
to: (1) technology available for observation when the nominal species was described, 
(2) prevailing theories of nature and species origins when the nominal species was 
Box 4.1: Classification of the Main Causes of CS
 1. Taxonomic work is needed
 1.1. Formal description of new nominal species is needed (for CSsl only)
 1.2. Other taxonomic cause (character choice/availability, lack of 
samples)
 1.2.1. Technology available for observation when the nominal spe-
cies was described
 1.2.2. Prevailing theories of nature and species origins when the 
nominal species was described
 1.2.3. Accessibility of habitats when nominal species was described
 1.2.4. Availability, quality and nature (natural selection targets / 
selectively neutral) of morphological characters in the group 
studied
 2. Other causes than taxonomic process
 2.1. Recent divergence
 2.1.1. low dispersal
 2.1.2. fragmented habitat or active landscape dynamics
 2.2. True slow-down of ratio Morphological divergence/Genetic 
divergence
 2.2.1. natural selection
 2.2.1.1. stabilizing (in narrow niches)
 2.2.1.2. diversifying (in generalists, broadcasters…)
 2.2.2. selective neutrality of morphology (high Ne)
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described, (3) accessibility of habitats when nominal species was described and (4) 
availability, quality and nature (natural selection targets/selectively neutral) of mor-
phological characters in the group studied.
 1. Technology available for observation at time of description may explain many 
CGI cases. Species that were described in times when (or in countries where) 
microscopes were not available may not have the same range of characters at 
their disposal to delimit morphological species. Indeed, the year in which a spe-
cies was described represents a rich source of information to investigate the 
effects of science history in general on the presence of CGI (e.g. (Strand and 
Panova 2015)).
 2. Nominal species of multicellular organisms correspond to the so-called “mor-
phological species” or “morphospecies” (in more than 99.99% of nominal spe-
cies) and morphological species may not correspond to biological species. Such 
discrepancies may lead to the presence of cryptic species sensu stricto but also 
to the opposite phenomenon (e.g. males and females, or young stages and adults, 
have been erroneously described as distinct species in various groups (Johnson 
et al. 2009)). Indeed, different species concepts may delimit species in different 
ways (Agapow et al. 2004). Depending on the groups, the morphological char-
acters used to diagnose the species (and define species boundaries) may have 
benefitted from a cladistics approach (Hennig 1950), in which case they are 
more likely to reflect phylogenetic species (and also, to a lesser extent, biologi-
cal species). Although the “phylogenetic species concept” includes a wide spec-
trum of definitions (Agapow et al. 2004; Wheeler and Meier 2000), in practice, 
it is often invoked (explicitly or not) to claim the presence of (cryptic) species on 
the basis of a phylogenetic tree inferred from a single molecular marker. Single-
marker- phylogenetic-species boundaries may not delimit genetically isolated 
entities (cf 3–1 and Fig. 4.3), thus disagreeing with the “biological species con-
cept”. In our Fig. 4.3 example, some widely used automatic methods of species 
delimitation such as the ABGD (Puillandre et al. 2012) may erroneously indicate 
the presence of 3 putative species. However, the formal/official description of 
nominal species based on molecular markers is very rare in multicellular organ-
isms and in such cases, care is taken to use several markers (Meyer-Wachsmuth 
et  al. 2014). Indeed, using single marker phylogenies potentially causes false 
reports of CGI.
 3. Accessibility to an environment might limit the number of samples available for 
morphological analyses or cause specimen damage. Such accessibility limita-
tions may contribute to the abundance of CGI in some environments (e.g. deep 
sea organism destruction by strong decrease in pressure when collected (Vacelet, 
2006). This may help to explain the high frequency of CGI in the marine envi-
ronment (Barberousse and Bary 2015; Luttikhuizen et al. 2011).
 4. Depending on the taxon under consideration, the morphological characters used 
for species diagnosis are more or less reliable. For instance, some characters 
may be the targets of natural selection, thus may fail to distinguish entities that 
have a similar niche component as a result of evolutionary convergence or stabi-
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lizing selection: beak shapes in a group of birds having a similar diet may not 
allow species distinction, because natural selection constrains beak shapes to 
remain adapted to collect and grind their food. Because humans use visual infor-
mation for nominal species delimitation, animals that use visual cues for mate 
recognition (such as vertebrates) are also much less likely to form CGI than 
animals that rely entirely on chemical cues for mating, such as marine inverte-
brates  (e.g. spawning is generally triggered by chemical signals, and gametes 
from both sexes themselves are attracted by chemical signals (Weber et  al. 
2017)). Tiny organisms provide fewer characters that can be used for diagnosis, 
parasites often have lost many morphological characters with respect to their 
free-living relatives, because their bodies are simplified, having lost some major 
functions, etc.
4.4.2  Other Causes Besides the Taxonomic Process
Some CS or CGI are not explained by weaknesses of the taxonomic process. These 
are necessarily CSss or CGIss, where diagnostic characters are lacking to distin-
guish completely or partially genetically isolated entities.
4.4.2.1  Recent Divergence
One possible explanation for the existence of CSss (or CGIss) is the young age of 
divergence. Recently diverged species are more likely when speciation rates are 
high. Thus, factors promoting allopatric speciation may be frequently associated 
with CSss and more generally CGIss. Low dispersal as well as habitat fragmenta-
tion are the most conspicuous candidate factors. Thus, a review of CGIss may report 
dispersal ability as well as the habitat fragmentation for all cases.
4.4.2.2  Deceleration in the Accumulation of Diagnostic Morphological 
Differences or in Morphological Divergence Relative to Genetic 
Divergence
When divergence is not recent and a poor taxonomy is not involved, CSss or CGIss 
thus reflect an actual slow-down in the ratio of morphological over genetic diversity 
or divergence that persisted long enough to produce the observed pattern.
Natural selection on morphological characters may be responsible for the absence 
of diagnostic characters among species. (1) The cause which is most often invoked to 
explain such cases is stabilizing selection (Charlesworth et al. 1982; Lee and Frost 
2002). When morphology is strongly constrained by natural selection, morphological 
variation is very low within species and following speciation, daughter species are 
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similarly monomorphic and do not diverge in their shapes (Fig. 4.4). (2) Paradoxically, 
an opposite pattern of morphological diversity may also lead to CS. This pattern is 
that of a high morphological polymorphism within species, which is selectively 
advantageous for species submitted to strong spatio-temporal fluctuations (Egea 
et al. 2016). Morphological polymorphism may be achieved by two different mecha-
nisms: environmental phenotypic plasticity (a single genotype may lead to a variety 
of morphologies) or presence of a variety of genes determining morphology (i.e. 
presence in the species of distinct alleles, or genetic variants, also called genetic 
polymorphism). Both mechanisms prevent the appearance of diagnostic morphologi-
cal differences between species because, as a result of character polymorphism, the 
range of possible character states overlaps between sister- species (Fig. 4.4).
Recently, it has been suggested that neutral (i.e., non-adaptive) processes, may 
also lead to absence of diagnostic morphological differences among genetically iso-
lated entities (Egea et al. 2016). Higher polymorphism at neutral loci is expected for 
taxa with larger effective population sizes. When such taxa speciate, ancestral poly-
morphism remains shared among daughter species for a higher number of 
T0
T1
a b c
Fig. 4.4 Different patterns of morphological differentiation between genetically isolated entities. 
Individuals from the two entities are represented by filled or empty stars. Their relative position in 
the plane reflects their morphological similarity (e.g. horizontal and vertical coordinates may repre-
sent values for two continuous morphological characters). For a given divergence time (from T0 
before divergence to T1 after several generations), the distribution of morphological variation within 
and among the two genetically isolated entities may correspond to one of three main patterns result-
ing from four main processes. (a) The absence of (or negligible) morphological diversity within 
species, probably resulting from stabilizing selection, impedes their divergence. (b) A standard situ-
ation without CGI sensu stricto. There is morphological variation within species and the genetically 
isolated entities diverged morphologically so there is no overlap between them (the character repre-
sented by the horizontal coordinate is diagnostic) that are therefore not CGI sensu stricto. (c) There 
is a higher level of diversity within species compared to case b, so despite identical divergence times 
compared to case b (represented by the same distance separating the barycenters represented by red 
dots as in case b), the morphological spaces of both species overlap and thus no diagnostic character 
distinguishes the species. Diversity may result from high effective sizes, or from natural selection 
favouring high morphological diversity (see text). We emphasize that pattern (a) could not be 
caused by low effective sizes: in such a case genetic drift would be high and lead to divergence at 
T1 (length between the two barycenters would be higher than in b, instead of null)
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 generations than in taxa with lower effective sizes. When the phenotypic traits used 
to diagnose species are selectively neutral this leads to an absence of diagnostic 
characters for longer temporal periods in the taxon with higher effective sizes, mak-
ing the occurrence of CS more likely (because the taxonomists delimiting species 
cannot identify any diagnostic character). This novel neutral theory of morphologi-
cal evolution provides a null model for the existence of CS, and may help to explain 
the abundance of marine CS because in the marine realm many species have high 
fecundities, abundances and range sizes.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the distribution of morphological diversity between two 
sister biological species corresponding to the above cases and compared to a species 
pair displaying diagnostic characters.
To summarize this section, five major types of causes correspond to the distinct 
levels of morphological differentiation of our classification (i.e. Table 4.1 columns): 
stabilizing selection for MD0, recent divergence for MD1, high effective sizes or 
advantageous morphological polymorphism for MD2, and poor taxonomy for MD3 
(not excluding that various factors may interact).
4.4.3  How to Determine If a Cause Is Likely to Explain 
a CGI Case
Not all causes are possible for a given category of putative CGI (i.e. for a given cell 
or cell range in Table 4.1). The possible causes identified above are compiled in 
Table 4.2. For each cause, the “cell range” column displays the putative CGI cate-
gory that can be explained by this cause, and which traits or factors are useful to 
assess the validity of the cause. Most causes can be assessed at two levels: for indi-
vidual putative CGI or at a global level, in a higher order taxon. For instance, one 
may test whether the cryptic species observed in the species complex Echinocardium 
cordatum can be explained by stabilizing selection or not (Egea et al. 2016), but also 
whether CGI in the phylum Echinodermata are explained by stabilizing selection 
more often than expected at random. Testing the importance of a possible process 
globally (i.e. in generating CGI in a given higher-rank taxon) requires including in 
the (meta-) analysis not only the taxa for which CGI have been reported or sug-
gested in the literature, but also all nominal species of the taxon for which genetic 
data have been published.
At this step of the analysis, we can list the different data fields that appear useful 
to include in a database aimed at studying the CS phenomenon. They should include 
both information enabling CGI characterization (both GI and morphological dif-
ferentiation levels; Table  4.1) and information useful to determine the possible 
causes of the CS (Table 4.2; acknowledging the fact that most cases lack informa-
tion in some fields). Potentially useful data fields include: (1) genetic marker type 
(haploid/diploid, codominant or not, number of markers), genetic structure (sample 
sizes, significant differentiation among groups, genetic diversity within  populations/
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species and comparison with closely related taxa external to the nominal species if 
possible), (2) reproductive isolation among groups if tested by crosses, (3) ecologi-
cal differentiation among groups, (4) any phenotypic differentiation (in the wide 
sense) that corresponds to genetic differentiation to confirm GI, (5) morphological 
variability within and among groups (and sample sizes), and also, when possible, in 
closely related pairs of sister species, (6) year and place of nominal species descrip-
tion, (7) nature of morphological characters analyzed, (8) habitat (physical frag-
mentation, accessibility), (9) biogeographical distribution (allopatry, sympatry 
among CGI, size of species range) and (10) life history and other biological traits 
(dispersal ability, fecundity, reproductive success variance, parasite or not, use of 
visual cues for mating).
Table 4.2 Possible causes (column 1) for different types of (putative) CGI (column 2) and traits 
or factors to check (column 3) to evaluate the validity of the hypothetical cause (rather than an 
exhaustive list, we proposed examples of the most relevant ones)
Cause or 
hypothetical process
Type of CGI (cell 
range in Table 4.1) Traits or factors to check
T1 available 
technology
A-C x 0–3 Year (+place) of NS description
Material needed for diagnosis (microscope, …)
T2 history of science A-C x 0–3 Year (+place) of NS description
Higher order taxon name
T3 accessibility A-C x 0–3 Habitat of species
T4 morphological 
character
A-C x 0–3 Organism size
Mode of life (endosymbiotic)
Selective neutrality of character
Variability of character in higher rank taxon
Recent divergence A-C x 0–2 Genetic divergence (CS of the NS + at least 1 pair 
of closely related sister species)
Biogeography (CS sympatry/allopatry)
Low dispersal A-C x 0–2 Life traits related to dispersal ability (but also to 
effective size: fecundity, reproduction mode)
High fragmentation A-C x 0–2 Habitat of species
Stabilizing selection A-C x 0 Morphological variability within BS
Spatio-temporal variability of environment
Diversifying 
selection
A-C x 1–2 Same as above
Check knowledge on species plasticity
Neutral (high Ne) A-C x (1)-2 Morphological variability within BS
Genetic diversity within populations/BS
Life history traits (fecundity, reproduction 
variance)
Size of geographic species range
“NS” stands for “nominal species” and “BS” stands for “biological species”
A. Chenuil et al.
99
4.5  Preliminary Results
A pilot study by undergraduate students (Délémontey et al. 2014) compiled articles 
reporting cryptic species in the marine realm and recorded information relative to 
some of these fields. This study collected useful data about the relative proportions 
of different cases of CS in the literature and revealed some associations among CS 
features, phyla, habitat and biological traits. For the pilot study, successive groups of 
search terms were used in Web of Science. We detail the different steps of the first 
search. The first step using « cryptic species » OR « sibling species » provided 
11,416 papers (this was done in 2014). After adding «morpho* OR phenotyp*» (sec-
ond step) 4417 articles remained, after adding «genetic OR molecular OR mitochon-
drial» (third step) we had 3055 papers, and with «marine OR sea OR ocean» (fourth 
step) 647 articles. To limit the number of papers while increasing the proportion of 
cases corresponding to validated CGI, we added the terms «nuclear marker* OR 
microsatellite* OR allozyme* OR intron OR ribosomal» (fifth step) to favor studies 
combining several molecular markers. This resulted in 222 articles. We carried out a 
second search identical to this one except that we replaced the fourth step (marine or 
sea or ocean) by the title of scientific journals dealing with marine biology («ANNU 
REV MAR SCI» OR «DEEP SEA RES» OR «ESTUAR COAST SHELF S» OR 
«HELGOLAND MAR RES» OR «ICES J MAR SCI» OR «J OCEANOGR» OR «J 
PLANKTON RES» OR «LIMNOL OCEANOGR» OR «MAR ECOL PROG SER» 
OR «OCEANOGR MAR BIOL» OR «CORAL REEFS» OR «MAR ECOL-EVOL 
PERSP» OR «MAR BIOL» OR «CAN J FISH AQUAT SCI» OR «J EXP MAR 
BIOL ECOL» OR « J FISH BIOL»). This second search provided 41 papers. For the 
last search we changed, again, the fourth step to select taxon names («Echinoderm*» 
OR « Echinoid*» OR «Asteroid*» OR «ophiuroid*» OR «bivalv*» OR «mollus*» 
OR «fish*» OR «sponge*» OR «porifera*» OR «cnidaria*» OR «coral*» OR «bryo-
zoan*» OR « ascidia*» OR «mysidac*» OR «nematod*» OR «gastropod*» OR 
«copepod*» OR «amphipod*) which led to 264 articles. The fusion of the three 
searches provided 402 different articles. After abstract reading, we discarded papers 
that dealt with plants and algae, terrestrial and freshwater animals, endoparasites, 
protists and foraminiferans, and papers reporting new species but not CGI. These 
studies corresponded to 126 nominal species (556 CGI) from 86 families, 55 orders, 
25 classes and 11 phyla. For all nominal species, putative CGI were defined based 
on genetic markers; for three nominal species controlled crosses were performed to 
determine CS; in 14 nominal species, there were some differences between CGI for 
at least one factor among ecology, reproduction, nutrition, hosts, gamete morphol-
ogy, color and in 3 nominal species, CGI had distinct karyotypes. This preliminary 
survey confirmed that CS were present in a diversity of animal phyla and established 
an average of 4.41 CGI per nominal species (Fig. 4.5).
Out of 126 nominal species cases, 70 (56%) had been the subject of a morpho-
logical study: 37 of these display diagnostic differences among CGI (53%, thus they 
are not CGI sensu stricto), 16 display statistical morphological differences among 
CGI (23%), and 17 do not display morphological differences among CGI (24%). 
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This highlights that among reported CGI complexes, about half are just in need of 
taxonomic revision and may not correspond to any phenomenon of deceleration of 
morphological evolution. Among the 33 CGI complexes that may be CGIss, half 
display statistical differences in morphology and half do not display any morpho-
logical differentiation among genetic entities. These proportions are helpful to plan 
studies aimed at testing various hypotheses regarding the CS phenomenon. Among 
the hundreds of studies reporting CGI, about half may just need taxonomic revision, 
a quarter may be good candidates for testing hypotheses regarding natural selection, 
effective sizes, etc. Indeed, the categories of our classification based on crossed 
genetic isolation and morphological differentiation levels (Table  4.1) seem rela-
tively well balanced. However, proportions of “diagnostic/statistically significant/
not significant” morphological differences among CGI vary among phyla (these 
differences are statistically very significant) (Fig. 4.6).
We investigated the relative geographical distribution of CGI and their ecological 
differentiation and found that (i) 50% of cases have exclusively allopatric sibling- 
species, (ii) the ratio of cases displaying “strict allopatry” versus “sympatry” varies 
among phyla (this result is statistically significant), (iii) there is a higher proportion 
of diagnostic morphological differences in “sympatric” than in “strictly allopatric” 
CGI (statistically significant result), (iv) ecological differentiation within CGI is 
more frequent in sympatric than in allopatric CGI, supporting the competitive 
exclusion theory (highly significant result) which stipulates that sympatric species 
cannot coexist stably if they have the same niche: either they evolve distinct niches 
or one eliminates the other. Returning to our first section on the practical importance 
of CGI, this suggests that ignoring CGI leads to underestimating not only species 
diversity but also local functional diversity.
Fig. 4.5 Number of nominal species and CGI per phylum in our pilot study of 402 articles
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To rapidly infer the ratio of morphological to genetic divergence (indirectly) we 
looked at (or computed) molecular phylogenies and divergences; we found that: (i) 
sibling species diverged more than some nominal species of the same group in 2/3 
of the cases, ruling out a “recent speciation” explanation for morphological simi-
larity and confirming decoupling between morphological and genetic divergence 
for these CGI, (ii) molecular divergence within CGI was higher for wider habitat 
ranges (statistically significant), and (iii) there were more diagnostic morphological 
differences in high dispersal taxa (statistically significant). No straightforward 
explanations were found for the former results. A much greater survey, also limited 
to marine metazoans and excluding parasites, has been carried out and its thorough 
analysis is ongoing (Cahill and Chenuil, unpublished). It selected 1209 studies com-
piled from more than 4000 titles, of which 55% report CGI, from which another 
55% have morphological data, and 12% report ecological comparisons among 
CGI. As many studies are expected for macrophytes, perhaps more from parasites, 
and many additional ones would be found in terrestrial taxa. Based on these propor-
tions, there is no doubt that scientists will be able to test many of the hypotheses 
raised above about factors favoring the presence of CGI in numerous phyla.
4.6  Concluding Remarks on the Use of Morphospecies 
for Biodiversity Assessment
Since the task is huge, one may argue that it would be more efficient to consider 
alternative approaches to replace the morphological identification of species in 
future studies of biological communities, ecosystem monitoring and conservation 
actions. Taxonomic sufficiency approaches, focusing on higher taxa (instead of the 
species level), may appear less affected by CGI.  However, by lumping related 
Fig. 4.6 Distribution of studies reporting CGI per phylum according to the status of morphologi-
cal differentiation among CGI. Abbreviations correspondence: D diagnostic differences, S statisti-
cally significant differences, NS non-significant differences
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species together they often lose or bias the functionality signal (Thiault et al. 2015) 
which consists of the variability of ecological functions, because even closely 
related species frequently have distinct functional traits. Parataxonomy is another 
approach that eliminates the requirement of rigorous taxonomic identification: it 
consists of sorting samples to recognizable taxonomic units (RTU). However, the 
error in this approach is not predictable and depends on the sorter (Krell 2004), 
precluding comparisons of datasets processed by distinct persons, a big problem for 
monitoring programs. Neither taxonomic sufficiency nor parataxonomy allow using 
putative functional knowledge we may have on the entities (not necessarily “spe-
cies”) recorded.
Barcoding and its derived method, metabarcoding, enable the automatic identifi-
cation of species based on their DNA sequence at a given marker for which there is 
a huge database containing species names and their corresponding DNA sequence. 
Diversity estimates based on barcoding are less sensitive to CGI but have other 
drawbacks (Bucklin et al. 2011; Krishnamurthy and Francis 2012). Typical barcod-
ing or metabarcoding was based on a single marker until now. The largest database 
is probably the 18S rDNA (and its homologous database, the 16S rDNA, for pro-
karyotes), which can be used in virtually all eukaryote phyla, but which sequences 
are not variable enough to distinguish related species within a genus and often 
within a family. For animals, the well-recognized “barcoding molecule” COI is 
much more useful than 18S due to its high variability (Chenuil 2006). Fungi and 
plants also have their own barcoding databases in BOLDSYSTEM (barcoding of 
life data system) (Ratnasingham and Hebert 2013). As explained above (Sect. 4.3), 
single marker data cannot establish genetic isolation. When at least another marker 
will have a sufficiently large database to be used in conjunction with the marker 
currently used for barcoding in the three main groups of living things, the identifica-
tion of biological species (or GI entities) not requiring morphological identification 
will be possible. Another limitation of metabarcoding is its very poor 
 representativeness of species biomass or abundances which may not be completely 
overcome by the use of various markers. But even with improved barcoding, under-
standing the discrepancy between morphological, phylogenetic, and biological spe-
cies will remain necessary to validate fossil data and properly analyze the 
consequences of past environmental changes. This is particularly important because 
inferring past changes may help to predict future biodiversity responses to climate 
change (Condamine et al. 2013).
Once a database compiling putative CGI and containing information on GI lev-
els, morphological differentiation, life history traits, biogeographical distribution 
and habitat is available, several practical questions related to bioconservation may 
be answered. (1) Is the error on biodiversity estimators caused by ignored CGI 
important or do the different errors and biases compensate each other? (2) Do bar-
coding approaches based on a single sequence marker represent a good solution to 
correct the CGI problem in common biodiversity estimates? (3) Would barcoding 
approaches based on two independent sequence markers (or more) improve biodi-
versity estimates? (4) Can we propose correction equations (based on meta- analysis) 
to solve the problem?
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This study provides a robust framework to tackle the very complex question of 
CGI, by providing a bi-dimensional classification system, and identifying fields to 
be filled in a database reporting CGI cases. Our application of such a method on a 
pilot dataset provided promising results since the proportions of the distinct types of 
CGI appeared well balanced, potentially allowing the testing of all hypotheses 
raised in this study. Furthermore, it revealed meaningful significant associations 
among CGI features.
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Chapter 5
The Importance of Scaling in Biodiversity
Luís Borda-de-Água
Abstract Our main tenet is that biodiversity should be studied as a function of 
scale. The epitome of a similar approach was that of Mandelbrot in his studies on 
fractals. Although biodiversity patterns may not necessarily follow the mathematical 
description of fractals, we argue that much can be learnt if we adopt the perspective 
of studying biodiversity across scales. A case where the concept of scaling is 
routinely applied in ecology is the species-area relationship, a relationship describing 
how the number of species (species richness) changes, i.e. scales, as a function of 
area. However, the importance of scaling is often neglected in ecology. For instance, 
it is seldomly applied to another component of diversity, the relative abundances of 
species, being the latter often described using the proportion of individuals of each 
species. We exemplify the application of scaling to the species relative abundance 
with our own work. One of the advantages of studying biodiversity under the 
framework of scaling is that patterns tend to emerge. These patterns emerge from a 
myriad of processes and their respective interactions. However, understanding the 
role of each process individually, or quantifying its role in the community 
functioning, may be empirically impossible. Thus, we argue from theoretical and 
practical perspectives, including approaches to conservation problems, that we 
should concentrate our endeavours on the quantitative description of known patterns, 
as it is often done in other basic and applied sciences, even if that implies temporarily 
relegating to a secondary position the detailed analyses of the underlying 
mechanisms.
Keywords Biodiversity · Patterns · Scaling · Species abundance distributions · 
Species-area relationship
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5.1  Introduction
Among the several environmental challenges faced by humankind, biodiversity loss 
looms in the background, with the magnitude of its consequences wrapped in 
uncertainty. It is then natural that society looks for scientific basis, guidance and 
solutions in ecology to the present biodiversity crisis. However, ecology is a recently 
born science (e.g. Worster 1994) and the tools to understand biodiversity at a 
planetary scale are only now becoming available. In fact, despite the important 
strides in the nineteenth century by biogeographers such as Humboldt, Darwin or 
Wallace, the description of biodiversity and biogeography is still very much a 
piecemeal approach, mainly consisting of data sets of “small” size; “small” is in 
quotation marks because, though species data sets are indeed small samples of 
larger communities, they tend to require a tremendous sampling effort in terms of 
labour and financial costs, as is the case with the censuses of 50 ha plots on tropical 
tree species regularly undertaken by the Smithsonian Institution (Condit 1998).
Only now one starts to glimpse the possibility of using methodologies enabling 
sampling at large scales, such as remote sensing (e.g. Asner et al. 2017). But whether 
these new methods will be sufficiently developed in time to help solve the 
biodiversity crisis remains doubtful. Moreover, it is not clear if humankind, as a 
whole, is determined to put a concerted effort to understand biodiversity at a global 
scale. As S. P. Hubbell (personal communication) has put it, it seems to be easier to 
raise money to fund astronomy projects than to finance ecology ones, though the 
latter deal with problems closer to our daily concerns.
Besides the practical aspects faced by ecologists, there are also entrenched atti-
tudes that may hinder progress in ecology. In particular, the tendency to scorn at the 
“mere” mathematical handling of quantitative patterns when the underlying mecha-
nisms are not fully understood. I contend that this attitude is to be avoided and that 
much can be learnt from a proper mathematical description of patterns and their 
interrelationships. Of course, we should not ignore the need to explore the underly-
ing mechanisms, though practical considerations may sometimes require postpon-
ing such endeavours.1
I devote this chapter to the importance of scaling in ecology, and when dealing 
with scaling patterns often emerge. In particular, we will be interested in biodiversity 
patterns across spatial scales. When one mentions biodiversity, we tend to think 
solely of the number of species. Such vision, however, does not fully describe the 
diversity of life on Earth. Indeed, the notion of biodiversity is far more encompassing. 
For instance, a common definition by the United Nations Environment Programme 
Convention on Biological Diversity (UNEP 1992) states that biodiversity
means the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, ter-
restrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they 
are part: this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.
1 This point is also emphasised in Casetta et al., Chap. 1, in this volume.
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Similarly, but specifying more clearly the different levels of diversity within a spe-
cies, it is the definition given by Wilcox (1984) and adapted by the IUCN:
the variety of life forms, the ecological roles they perform and the genetic diversity they 
contain... at all levels of biological systems (i.e., molecular, organismic, population, species 
and ecosystem)…
Notice that the latter definition includes also the roles performed by the species in 
the community, which I identify by what is now referred as functional diversity (e.g. 
Cernansky 2017). As we will see, when studying communities, ecologists also 
define diversity not only in terms of number of species (species richness), but also 
in terms of their relative abundance (e.g. Magurran  1988). This distinction is 
important. Species richness takes into account only the presence of species; thus, 
each time an individual of a species not yet recorded is found, the number of species 
is raised by one, but subsequent individuals of the same species are ignored since 
that species has already been identified. On the other hand, when collecting 
information on species abundance all individuals (or some equivalent measure) of a 
given species have to be recorded since we want to know not simply which species 
are present but also their relative abundance.
The above definitions imply that we have information on all organisms on Earth. 
Even at the species level, and disregarding the difficulties of defining “species” 
(e.g., Coyne and Orr 2004 or Futuyma 2005), quantifying the total number of 
species is manifestly impossible with our present means. Perhaps for some groups, 
such as the cetaceans or primates, which have a relatively small number of species 
and tend to attract a large public and academic interest, it may be possible to identify 
all the species, but for other groups, such as insects, this is at present completely 
impossible. This impossibility arises mainly from practical reasons, such as the 
required labour intensive procedures that it entails or the economic costs involved, 
not to mention the negative impacts that gathering the data could have on the 
habitats. Naturally, ecologists have for long devised procedures to circumvent these 
problems by resorting to carefully devised sampling schemes and by taking 
advantage of well known patterns (e.g. May 1990). Patterns play a particularly 
important role in this chapter, as we will now see.
Patterns, by which we mean “regularities in what we observe in nature; that is, 
[…] ‘widely observable tendencies’” (Lawton 1999), are essential to estimating 
biodiversity, especially those patterns concerned with how biodiversity scales as a 
function of a given variable. Because the notion of “scaling” is essential to us, we 
should try to give it a more precise meaning. In general, I will refer to the properties 
of how a quantity changes as its scaling properties or, simply, “scaling”. A similar 
definition is that of Storch et al. (2007) according to whom scaling means “the effort 
to discover and explain how some state variable or dynamic parameter changes with 
some other variable”. The relationship between the number of species and area, 
called the species-area relationship, a mathematical expression that relates how the 
number of species changes as a function of the size of the area sampled, is one of 
the best known scaling relationships in ecology (Rosenzweig 1995). Although the 
exact quantitative formulation of the scaling properties is often disputed (e.g., see 
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Rosenzweig 1995), my main tenet is that their existence is a fundamental component 
of studies on biodiversity. Therefore, I argue that the characterization of biodiversity 
should include not only the quantification of certain variables at one given scale, 
e.g. the number of species, but also the scaling properties associated with them. In 
other words, the scaling properties of biodiversity should be seen as an integral part 
of the biodiversity patterns.
In the previous paragraph, we used the species-area relationship, “one of the 
boldest and most robust patterns in ecology” as Lawton (1996) put it, as a typical 
example of a biodiversity scaling pattern. In fact, its application is common practice 
in theoretical and applied ecological studies. However, most other components of 
diversity tend to be studied at one single scale, for instance, the relative abundance 
of species (McGill 2003; Volkov et  al. 2003), hence the ideas (and advantages) 
underlying the concept of scaling are not always explored. This chapter discusses a 
case study based on my own work concerning the relative abundance of species. 
Although there are several ways of measuring species abundances, for simplicity we 
assume that it is measured by the number of individuals.
To realize why it is important to take into account the relative abundance of spe-
cies, imagine two communities with exactly the same number of species but with 
very different relative abundances. In one community the individuals are evenly 
distributed among species (a circumstance that is unlikely to be observed in nature) 
while in the other community individuals are unevenly distributed among species, 
with a few species having a large number of individuals and the majority being rare 
(a circumstance often observed in nature). Given the way individuals are distributed 
among species, these imagined communities are likely to exhibit very different 
temporal population dynamics, including the local risk of species extinction, and 
pose considerably different problems from a conservation perspective.
The relative abundance of individuals is often depicted using histograms called 
“species abundance distributions”. However, while studies on the species-area 
relationship emphasize the rate of accumulation of species as area increases, studies 
on species abundance distributions usually concentrate on a single spatial scale, and 
efforts are directed towards determining which theoretical statistical distribution 
provides the best fitting to the empirically distribution. Implicit in this approach is 
that finding a theoretical distribution that would fit a large number, if not all, of the 
observed species abundance distributions will provide a pattern that could be used 
for evaluating theories of species diversity. Although fitting the abundance data at 
one spatial scale is a worthy endeavour, what has become clear from our studies is 
that the shape of the distributions depends on the scale at which it is sampled. Here 
too, as we will see, the concept of scaling may provide a unifying way of describing 
how the distributions change and reveal possible patterns.
In this chapter I shall argue for the importance of considering questions associ-
ated with scaling when dealing with biodiversity issues and associated patterns. But 
the chapter is in a sense anecdotal, because it deals with my own work on the scaling 
properties of species abundance distributions, which I use mainly to provide an 
instance of scaling in biodiversity, and in no way exhausts the topic; for a more 
complete role of scaling in biodiversity see Storch et al. (2007). But before dwelling 
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into biodiversity proper, we discuss an example of scaling that has become a classic 
in fractal studies and that enshrines the basic ideas underlying our approach to the 
study of biodiversity.
5.2  An Example from Fractals
Richardson (1961) asked what the lengths of the borders between several countries 
were. Surprisingly, he found that the lengths were considerably different depending 
on the source of information he looked at. For example, Portuguese sources claimed 
that the border between Portugal and Spain was 1214  km while Spanish ones 
specified only a length of 987 km, a 23% difference! A likely explanation for such 
discrepancy was the size of the “ruler”, that is, the scale, used to estimate the length 
of the border, as pictured in Fig 5.1a. For reasons that we will not speculate about, 
the Portuguese used a ruler that was smaller, probably half the size, of that used by 
the Spanish. As we can see from Fig. 5.1a, if we use the “blue” ruler we will obtain 
an estimate, if we use the “red” ruler, and because its smaller size allows it to follow 
better the shape of the border, we are likely to obtain a larger estimate. Naturally, we 
can imagine an even smaller ruler, that will give an even better fit to the border. 
Since smaller rulers give a better fit, one may be tempted to keep reducing the size 
of the ruler in the hope that the length would converge to its true value. Such strategy, 
however, would be self-defeating because the “roughness” of the border, with all its 
creases, leads to an estimate that keeps changing with the size of the ruler, as we 
exemplify in Fig. 5.1. Of course, at some subatomic level we would eventually find 
the true size of the border, but for all practical purposes the border’s length is 
undefined since it is a function of the ruler’s size (Mandelbrot 1967, 1982). In other 
words, for borders, and other objects that are fractals, the size is only meaningful 
when the scale at which it was measured (the size of the ruler, in our example) is 
also specified. Therefore, it would also not be appropriate to say that the border’s 
length obtained by the Portuguese is more “correct” than that obtained by the 
Spanish, since the border does not have a defined length.
For those who seek concrete answers, the question of finding the border’s size 
may look helpless because there is no numerical invariant characteristic associated 
with the length; in other words, the length keeps changing. However, if we draw in a 
double logarithmic plot the length of the border as a function of the ruler’s size, we 
will see that the points fall approximately on a straight line, as shown in Fig. 5.1b. 
Because we will make use of logarithms often, a brief digression about its 
significance is in order. Logarithms are often used when one needs to depict a wide 
range of values in a single plot. For instance, while in an axis in a linear scale the 
distance between 1 and 2, 2 and 3, et seq., are equal, in a logarithmic axis of base 
10, the “distance” between 1 and 10 is equal to the “distance” between 10 and 100, 
and then between 100 and 1000, et seq. The latter happens because logarithms 
calculated the power at each a certain base needs to be raised to obtained the 
observed value. For instance, in base 10, the logarithm of 100 is 2 because 100 = 102, 
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and the one of 1000 is 3; or, in typical mathematical notation log10(100) = 2 and 
log10(1000) = 3. The implication is that logarithms compress the largest values in 
the axis of a graphic, with the advantage that the smallest ones are then visually 
better represented. Importantly, double logarithmic scales are used when one wants 
to identify power laws, and these play a very important role in ecology, as well as, 
in several scientific disciplines. Power laws are easily identified in double logarithmic 
plots because in these plots a power law becomes a straight line. To see this, take the 
general form of a power law, y = axb, where a and b are constants. If one takes the 
logarithms on both sides of this equation, we obtain log(y) = log(a) + b log(x). This 
means that if we plot log(y) as a function of log(x), which is what a plot with double 
logarithm scales does, we observe a straight line with slope b and intercept log(a).
Fig. 5.1 A schematic representation of a “border” (black line) being fitted with rulers of two dif-
ferent sizes (blue and red “sticks”), plot a, and the hypothetical straight line that would have been 
obtained after fitting the “lengths” estimated with rulers of different sizes, plot b
L. Borda-de-Água
113
Returning to the question of the length of the border, we can see from Fig. 5.1b 
that, although the length of the border changes as a function of the ruler’s size, the 
estimated lengths define a straight line. Therefore, what is invariant, at least for a 
very large range of ruler’s sizes (scales), is the slope of the (approximately) straight 
line defined by the points; incidentally, the slope is related to what Mandelbrot 
called the fractal dimension. Observe that, although we could not find any obvious 
patterns when we measured the borders with different ruler’s sizes, a pattern 
consisting of a straight line emerges when we plot the measurements in a double 
logarithmic plot. It is now the slope of this line that provides an invariant characteristic 
that allows a succinct description of the length as a function of the ruler’s size. This 
example shows that, first, it is not enough to study the length of the border at one 
single scale, since what is relevant is to study how the length changes as a function 
of the ruler’s size, that is, its scaling properties, and, second, a pattern emerges when 
we display the measurements on a double logarithmic scale plot.
5.3  Scaling and the Species-Area Relationship
The above issues associated with the scaling of the borders’ length are easily trans-
lated into biodiversity studies. Imagine we sample individuals of a given taxon in 
areas of different size using a nested sampling scheme, that is, a larger area includes 
smaller ones. When one plots the number of species as a function of the area size, a 
typical pattern emerges. At the beginning, for small area sizes, the number of spe-
cies increases fast, but then the rate of accumulation of new species decreases until 
it reaches an apparent plateau. This is not surprising: first we observe a large number 
of new species but when the sample size increases, most individuals belong to spe-
cies already identified, thus the rate of increase of new species progressively 
decreases. What is surprising is that if we plot the number of species as a function 
of the area in a double logarithmic plot, the points will fall on an almost straight 
line, not very differently from what we depicted in Fig. 5.1b but with a positive 
slope (e.g., Rosenzweig 1995). Because the points follow a linear relationship in a 
double logarithmic plot, this implies that the number of species scales with area as 
a power law, S = cAz, where S is the number of species, A is the area, and c and z are 
constants. Interestingly, a power law species-area relationship is a rather robust pat-
tern since it also arises under other sampling schemes. For instance, if we estimate 
the number of species in the islands of an archipelago and plot it in a double loga-
rithmic plot as a function of the area of the islands, we will observe that the points 
fall approximately on a straight line.
The species-area relationship example is important because it represents a biodi-
versity pattern that exhibits a clear scaling property, with a clear quantitative rela-
tionship: a power law S = cAz. Accordingly, ecologist have concentrated on studying 
the range of the parameter z, the one that controls the rate of increase of the number 
of species, and how it can be interpreted (e.g. Rosenzweig 1995). In fact, under-
standing how species change as a function of area has played an essential role in 
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conservation biology because it (or related relationships) can be used to estimate 
species extinction due to habitat loss. The basic idea is that if we know how the 
number of species varies with area, then if part of the original habitat decreases, due 
to some natural or man-made destructive event, the number of species should also 
be reduced in accordance with the formula S = cAz. Although simple, this method is 
not without problems. For instance, Pereira and Daily (2006) pointed out that 
destroying a habitat and converting it into another, for example, forests into pastures, 
does not necessarily leads to the extinction of all the species present in the original 
habitat, since some may still survive in the new one. On the other hand, He and 
Hubbell (2011) pointed out that the methods to assemble a species-area curve 
depend on finding the first individual of a new species, while extinction requires 
finding the very last individual, procedures that are not always equivalent (see also 
Pereira et al. 2012). In both cases, the consequence is that the number of predicted 
extinctions is larger than the ones really observed.
5.4  Scaling and Species Abundance Distributions
Species abundance distributions describe not only how many species can be found 
in a sample but also how the individuals (or other measure of abundance) are 
distributed among species. Typically, a species abundance distribution is depicted as 
a histogram where in the y-axis is the number of species and in the x-axis is the 
number of individuals, usually in a logarithmic scale of base 2. A logarithmic scale 
of base 2 is used because it is integer base that allows the best discrimination of the 
species abundances, in particular, it ensures that species with a small number of 
individuals are well represented in the histograms. Typically, the x-axis corresponds 
to classes of the logarithm of the number of individuals as follows: 1 individual, 2–3 
individuals, 4–7 individuals, et seq., that is, the bins are obtaining by doubling the 
number of individuals, hence it is called often an octave scale. Accordingly, these 
histograms contain information on the number of species with a given number of 
individuals; see Fig.  5.2, for some examples. Although species abundance and 
species richness are related concepts, the way species abundance distributions have 
been studied contrasts with that of the species-area relationship. In fact, as we 
mentioned before, while studies on species area relationships emphasize how 
species richness change as a function of area, studies on species abundance 
distributions are often carried at one single spatial scale.
This was not always the case. Some of the original studies on species abundance 
distributions did focus on how they changed as a function of sample size (Preston 
1948, 1962); notice that very often the size of a sample is proportional to the size of 
the area sampled, therefore in the remainder of this chapter I will use “area size” or 
“sample size” interchangeably. Preston introduced the concept of the veil line, a line 
that would move to the left of the distribution as more data are gathered, progressively 
revealing more species and the full shape of the distribution. In particular, using data 
on birds, Preston showed that, once enough data had been collected, a maximum 
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appeared for intermediate abundance classes (like in Fig. 5.2b–d), in contrast with 
the distribution observed for small sample sizes that were monotonically decreasing 
functions (like in Fig. 5.2a). The latter shape had been previously reported by Fisher 
et al. (1943) for data on Lepidoptera (moths and butterflies) who fitted the distribution 
using a logseries distribution. Because the histograms observed by Preston for large 
samples had a bell shape when plotted in a logarithmic scale, Preston suggested that 
a lognormal distribution rightly described the data. We now know that the concept 
of the veil line is not appropriate (Dewdney 1998; Green and Plotkin 2007) and 
computer simulations and empirical work suggest that the lognormal is not the 
distribution for very large sample sizes (ter Steege et al. 2006; Borda-de-Água et al. 
2007).
While Preston did pay attention to scale, some of the most recent studies on spe-
cies abundance distributions have focused on determining which theoretical distri-
Fig. 5.2 The species abundance distribution for four different sizes of area within the BCI 50 ha 
plot. The x-axis corresponds to classes of the logarithm of the number of individuals as follows: 1 
individual, 2–3 individuals, 4–7 individuals, et seq.
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bution gives the best fit to an empirical observed distribution at a specific scale 
(Hubbell 2001; McGill 2003; Volkov et  al. 2003). (I suspect this approach may 
partially reflect Preston’s attempt to describe species abundances by assuming the 
lognormal to be the limiting distribution.) The problem with this approach is that the 
shape of the distributions keeps changing for a wide range of scales (cf. Fig. 5.2), 
and reaching a sample size that is representative of the community may not be 
practical or economically feasible; for example, collecting data for the first census 
on tree species in a 50 ha plot in Barro Colorado Island, Panama, (the data used to 
draw Fig. 5.2) took approximately 2 years (S. P. Hubbell, personal communication) 
but of course this is a very small part of the entire forest of which the plot is part of. 
Moreover, not only the shape of the distributions changes considerably, even for 
shapes that are visually similar, given the stochasticity inherent to any natural 
process and sampling procedure, it is very likely that a theoretical distribution that 
gives the best fitting at one scale may not give the best fitting at another.
Although it is undeniable that for a ecological community a specific instant in 
time there is a species abundance distribution, our experience based on empirical 
and computer simulations has shown that from a practical perspective all we can 
aim for is to understand how the species abundance distribution changes as a 
function of area. Therefore, we have developed an approach that, instead of 
analysing the species abundance distribution at one single scale, describes how the 
distributions change as a function of a given scale (typically the area size) using 
non-parametric descriptors, namely, the moments of the distributions (Borda-de- 
Água 2012, 2017).2 The important finding was that, though the original motivation 
was partially due to impracticalities of obtaining large samples on large areas, there 
is also relevant information on the description of how the distributions change as a 
function of a scale, that is, on the patterns associated with the scaling properties of 
the distributions. Such information can be used in two ways, first, it provides 
patterns that can be used to checked whether theoretical models of species diversity 
predict the scaling for the species abundance distributions, as those empirically 
observed, and, second, the same patterns can be used to predict the species abundance 
distributions for larger scales.
The technical aspects of describing the change in the distributions by using their 
moments are easy. If a species i has Xi individuals, and we call the logarithm (usually 
of base 2) of this quantity xi = log2(Xi), then the nth moment, Mn, is calculated using 
the formula M
S
xn
i
i
n
S
= å
=
1
1
, where S is the number of species; when n = 1, the previ-
ous expression is simply the formula of the mean. Thus, in order to describe the 
change in the distributions, we calculate several moments (e.g. the first 10) for each 
area and then plot each of the moments as a function of area. For instance, assume 
that we have information on the location of the individuals of all tree species in a 
given area, then we can apply the moments’ formula for several sub-areas of differ-
ent sizes and plot the result as a function of area. This is what was done to obtain 
Fig. 5.3, that shows the evolution of the moments as a function of area size for the 
2 For a complete description of diversity indices see Crupi, Chap. 6, in this volume.
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tree species in a 50 ha plot in Barro Colorado Island, Panama. An important result 
of this exercise is that the moments are approximately linear in a double logarithmic 
plot; a point to which we will return soon.
Our approach to deal with the scaling of species abundance distributions is simi-
lar to the one underlying the species-area relationship. The species-area relationship 
describes how the number of species change as a function of the area, and, accord-
ingly, it is a single curve. On the other hand, being a distribution, the information on 
the species abundance cannot be summarized in a single number. Although some-
times we use a single descriptor, such as the mean, the variance, the skewness or the 
kurtosis (which are in fact related to the moments), each of these reveals only one 
aspect of the distribution (e.g. Press et al. 1996). To fully describe a distribution we 
need all these descriptors (and in fact more). In the same way, we need several 
Fig. 5.3 The logarithm of moments from order 1 up to order 11 as a function of the logarithm of 
areas between 1 and 50 ha using data on tropical tree species from the 50ha plot in Barro Colorado 
Island, Panama, using all stems with diameter at breast height larger or equal to 10 cm. The order 
of the moments increases when we go from the bottom to the top lines. The dashed lines added to 
each moment are the curves of best fit obtained from linear regressions of the logarithm of the 
moments versus the logarithm of the area between 8 and 50 ha
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moments of the species abundance distribution. As a consequence, for a given area, 
instead of a single point (the number of species), we have several points (the 
moments). Therefore, to describe the scaling properties of the species abundance we 
need several curves, one for each moment. Nevertheless, besides the multiplicity of 
curves, this approach is essentially the same as that of the species- area 
relationship.
One of the advantages of using the moments of the distributions is the possibility 
of extrapolating the species abundance distributions for larger areas (Borda-de- 
Água et  al. 2012). Naturally, to extrapolate the species abundance distributions 
several assumptions need to be met, in particular, it is implicit that the extrapolation 
is being performed to a habitat that is not too dissimilar from the habitat where the 
data were collected. However, instead of dwelling into technical details, I prefer to 
emphasise the importance of having observed what seems to be a general pattern 
relating the moments with area size. In fact, the linear behaviour of the moments 
observed in Fig. 5.3 for tropical tree species was also observed for arthropods from 
the Azorean archipelago (Borda-de-Água et  al. 2017). This observation suggests 
that the scaling properties of the moments of the species abundance distributions 
may be a general property for several taxa and, that being the case, there is the 
prospect that this is a biodiversity pattern. Of course, more studies are required to 
assert the generality of this observation.
5.5  Final Remarks
The existence of unchanging properties is not given much weight by most statisticians. But 
they are beloved of physicists and mathematicians, like myself, who call them invariances 
and are happiest with models that present an attractive invariance property (Mandelbrot 
1999).
I do not think it is fair to say that biologists fit the above quote (or statisticians, for 
that matter). After all, biology has one of the great examples of generalizations in 
science: Darwin and Wallace’s theory of evolution by natural selection. However, I 
personally find easy to marvel over the diversity of species, and study diversity for 
its own sake, without looking for the underlying patterns or processes. As Lawton 
(1999) put it, there is “an almost suicidal tendency for many ecologists to celebrate 
complexity and detail at the expense of bold, first-order phenomena.” I also agree 
with Lawton (1996) when he stated “[w]ithout bold, regular patterns in nature, 
ecologists do not have anything interesting to explain.” However, it is my impression 
that often patterns, or attempts to identify them, are not given their due importance 
(see also Lawton 1992). For instance, we often hear that patterns are important but 
explaining the underlying mechanisms is what really matters. I am sympathetic with 
this view; in fact, it merely expresses natural curiosity and the desire to have a 
deeper understanding of the observed phenomena. However, patterns may emerge 
from a myriad of causes and have several equally valid explanations. Often, all these 
causes translate into a simple formula, like the species-area relationship, that 
combines the action of multiple inextricable causes. These causes occur at different 
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levels of organization in the community, whose effects we can only hope to describe 
(at least at the moment) from an upper (macro) level of description, and by ignoring 
the subtle (micro) details occurring at the lower levels.
The existence of theories at different levels of complexity is common in other 
fields, such as physics, as it is illustrated by thermodynamics and statistical 
mechanics. The former deals only with macroscopic variables, such as pressure, 
temperature and volume, while the latter explicitly acknowledges the existence of 
atoms and tries to derive the laws of thermodynamics from considerations of the 
statistical properties arriving from a large number of particles (e.g. Reif 1983). For 
instance, Boyle’s law merely states that the product of the pressure and volume of a 
gas, at a given temperature and (low) density, is constant. This law was obtained 
based solely on experimental observations, and in itself did not provide any 
explanation for why that should be the case. Later on, the kinetic theory of ideal 
gases provided an explanation based on the idealization of a gas as a set of particles 
with specific (idealized) properties (e.g. Resnick et al. 2001). However, this new 
development did not remove the practical importance of Boyle’s law, but it helped 
understand its underlying mechanisms and, importantly, its limitations. From a 
historical perspective we can now realize that having ignored Boyle’s law, because 
it lacked an underlying explanation, would have probably been rather detrimental 
by hindering a pattern and, hence, the motivation to develop the kinetic theory of 
gases, and could have delayed the development of practical applications. 
Furthermore, although we may have the mechanisms that connect the different 
scales from the microscopic (statistical mechanics) to the macroscopic level 
(thermodynamics), in some applications researchers and engineers may operate 
solely within the realm of thermodynamics without need to resort to a more 
complicated description based on statistical mechanics.
I would like to reiterate with another example the importance of being practical, 
that is, using what has been firmly experimentally established even if there is not a 
deeper knowledge of the concerned phenomena. The development of the 
electromagnetic theory may be the epitome of this approach (e.g. Kraus 1984). 
Indeed, Maxwell’s equations, that still provide the theoretical foundations for 
electromagnetism, were introduced in the second half of nineteenth century when 
there was not even the concept of the electron. Still, relevant technological 
developments in electrical engineering, such as those by Edison and Tesla on the 
production and transmission of DC and AC currents, were largely independent of 
the developments in physics that led to the discovery of the electron (for an 
interesting account of the developing of electrical engineering see Bodanis (2006) 
or Meyer (1971)). Physicists did not stop at Maxwell’s equation and further 
discoveries on more basic aspects of the structure of matter led to the quantum 
theory that now provides a model for how electric currents operate. But notice that 
these latter achievements in physics were often obtained thanks to the parallel 
developments in electrical engineering that experimentalists used to construct their 
apparatus. Interestingly, and as a final note, the difference between the models first 
idealized by physicists and engineers and the physical reality that was later 
uncovered led to a peculiar convention still in use today. Modelling the electric 
current as due to the displacement of electrons with their negative charge within a 
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metal was not something that the first physicists and engineers knew, therefore it is 
no wonder that current was modelled as a fluid moving from the positive to the 
negative potentials, which is a perfectly natural model if one thinks of the electric 
current as the flow of a liquid, such as water, that moves from regions of higher to 
lower potentials. The convention of the electric current flowing from the positive to 
the negative potentials is the one still in use, because from a practical perspective it 
does not really matter, but, I suspect, it is unlikely to have been adopted had the 
researchers been aware of the negative charge of the electrons.
The important point is: we should not think less of a science because it lacks at 
present a deeper knowledge of its established patterns, nor shall we ignore these 
patterns because we do not have a clear understanding of their mechanisms. 
Ignoring, as a first approximation, the details of all ecological interactions was our 
approach to the study of species abundance distributions. In fact, we did not dwell 
into the explanations of the patterns observed, although in some cases they may 
have a simple interpretation in terms of dispersal ability or habitat diversity. Instead, 
we focused on strategies to obtain the patterns, and the advantages that may result 
from their identification; for instance, the possibility of forecasting species 
abundance distributions to hitherto unsampled areas.
Finally, our approach may have seemed unambitious. The reader did not find 
explanations or attempts to develop explanatory theories. Instead, I discussed only 
patterns that arose from our studies. This is because I think that patterns are the 
building blocks of the natural sciences and, as such, I believe that revealing patterns 
is a first step towards developing or testing theories, as in the previous examples 
from physics. The analysis of the scaling properties of the species abundance 
distribution described in this chapter fits in this general scheme, by suggesting a 
new biodiversity pattern associated with the scaling properties of the moments of 
species abundance distributions. In this regard two consequences of having detected 
a scaling pattern are important. First, and  from a theoretical perspective, having 
detected a scaling pattern can be used as a benchmark criterion for evaluating the 
performance of the models that attempt to recreate patterns of relative species 
abundance. Second, and from a practical perspective, the pattern associated with the 
moments can be used to forecast species abundance distributions for areas that are 
too large to be sampled with our present technology; with obvious applications 
whenever the knowledge of the species abundance is required, such as in conservation 
studies. In summary, uncovering another pattern is important because enable us to 
take action in situations that cannot be postponed, even if the “microscopic” details 
are not fully understood. Such approach has worked well in physics and engineering, 
as the examples above illustrated; it remains to be seen if it works equally well in 
ecology and its practical applications.
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Chapter 6
Measures of Biological Diversity: Overview 
and Unified Framework
Vincenzo Crupi
Abstract A variety of statistical measures of diversity have been employed across 
biology and ecology, including Shannon entropy, the Gini-Simpson index, so-called 
effective numbers of species (aka Hill’s measures), and more besides. I will review 
several major options and then present a comprehensive formalism in which all 
these can be embedded as special cases, depending on the setting of two parameters, 
labelled degree and order. This mathematical framework is adapted from general-
ized information theory. A discussion of the theoretical meaning of the parameters 
in biological applications provides insight into the conceptual features and limita-
tions of current approaches. The unified framework described also allows for the 
development of a tailored solution for the measurement of biological diversity that 
jointly satisfies otherwise divergent desiderata put forward in the literature.
Keywords Diversity · Richness · Evenness · Entropy · Information theory
Suppose that four different species, X, Y, W, and Z, are present in a given environ-
ment at a certain time, counting exactly 50, 25, 15, and 10 organisms each, respec-
tively. At the same time in a different location (alternatively: at a later moment in the 
same area) the numbers are 40, 30, 30, and 0, respectively. In which of these two 
situations one deals with a more diverse community?
This example, although drastically simplified, illustrates a rather general prob-
lem. With minor variations, X, Y, W, and Z might just as well be the firms operating 
in a sector of the economy (see, e.g., Chakravarty and Eichhorn 1991), the lan-
guages spoken in a region (see, e.g., Greenberg 1956), the types of television chan-
nels in a country (see, e.g., Aslama et al. 2004), or the parties in a political system 
(see, e.g., Golosov 2010) characterized by their shares of market, speakers, overall 
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broadcasting, or parliamentary seats. In each of these domains, and still others, 
measuring diversity (or, conversely, concentration) has been a significant scientific 
issue. In biology and ecology, tracking diversity over space and time is of course a 
key topic for environmental concerns, but biological diversity also plays a relevant 
theoretical role for its connections with other variables of interest, such as stability, 
predation pressure, and so on.
In this chapter, I will review a variety of measures of biological diversity that 
have been employed and discussed across the scientific literature. Relying on a few 
intuitive illustrations, I will carry out an assessment of the strengths and limitations 
of some major options, including Shannon entropy, the Gini-Simpson index, so- 
called effective numbers of species, and more besides. I will also highlight the 
appeal of one specific measure, which might have not received adequate attention so 
far. Finally, I will describe a comprehensive formalism and point out how all diver-
sity measures previously considered can be conveniently embedded in it as special 
cases, depending on the setting of two parameters, labelled order and degree. This 
unified mathematical framework is adapted from generalized information theory 
(Aczél 1984). As we will see, it provides insight into the conceptual features of cur-
rent approaches and can allow for tailored technical solutions for the measurement 
of biological diversity.
6.1  Richness
For our current purposes, measuring diversity has to do with how a given quan-
tity is distributed among some well defined categories.1 In biological applica-
tions, it is typical (although by no means necessary) that such categories amount 
to distinct species characterized by their relative abundance. The latter quantity, 
in turn, is often simply measured by the proportion of organisms of that species 
in the overall target population (but biomass can be employed as well, for 
instance). In what follows, we will denote diversity as D(p1, …, pn), where n 
species—s1, …, sn—are involved and pi is the relative abundance of the i-th spe-
cies, si. With this bit of formal notation, we can thus represent our initial example 
with categories X, Y, W, and Z as concerning the comparison between D(0.5, 
0.25, 0.15, 0.10) and D(0.40, 0.30, 0.30, 0). Note that, as a direct consequence of 
our definition, p1, …, pn will always be positive numbers summing to 1, so that 
(p1, …, pn) actually represents a probability distribution. In our canonical 
1 Our use of the term category here is very general: essentially, categories in our current sense 
are the elements of any partition of interest. This terminology is thus not constrained by the 
more technical and specific distinction between “species category” and “species taxon” 
(e.g., Bock 2004). In particular, a set of different taxa can be treated as a partition of categories 
in our terms.
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interpretation, pi equals the probability that a randomly selected individual from 
the target population belongs to species si.
The simplest way to measure diversity, and a useful starting point for discussion, 
is to just count out the number of species with non-zero relative abundance. This 
straightforward approach relies on what is usually labelled richness, namely, how 
many different species are represented in an environment. In our formalism, it can 
be computed as follows (with the convenient convention that 00 = 0):
 
Richness p p pn
i
i
n
1
1
0, ,¼( ) = å
=  
As pi0 = 1 whenever pi > 0, Richness always takes an integer value corresponding to 
how many ps are strictly positive, i.e., how many species are effectively instantiated 
by some organism. In order to satisfy the appealing constraint that diversity is null 
(rather than 1) in the extreme case when only one species is present, the following 
minor variation is sometimes employed (Patil and Taille 1982, p. 551):
 
Richness p p pn
i
n
i
*
=
¼( ) = å -1
1
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As austere as it may seem as a measure of diversity, Richness yields “an intuitive 
property that is implicit in much biological reasoning about diversity” (Chao and 
Jost 2012, p. 204). A basic illustration of such property (aka the replication princi-
ple, see Jost 2009, p. 927) is conveyed by the following example.
Test Case 1 (Jost 2006, p. 363). Let us consider communities consisting of n 
equally common species, like (1/5, …, 1/5) (with n = 5) and (1/10, …, 1/10) 
(with n = 10). Arguably, diversity in the latter case should just be twice as in the 
former. A compelling measure of diversity should recover such assessment. 
Richness clearly does, because Richness(1/10, …, 1/10) = 10 and Richness(1/5, 
…, 1/5) = 5.
The richness measure is of course completely transparent in its interpretation, but it 
is also simplistic in a fairly obvious way: it is entirely insensitive to how even/
uneven the distribution is. Here is a second test case to clarify the point.
Test Case 2 (evenness sensitivity, see Pielou 1975, p. 7). For a given number of 
species n, a compelling measure of diversity should assign maximum value to a 
completely even distribution (with p1 = … = pn = 1/n), and a strictly lower value 
to a distribution which is much more skewed. Richness, however, clearly fails 
this condition. For instance, one has Richness(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 
0.25) = 4 = Richness(0.97, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01).
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6.2  Entropies and Diversity
One traditional approach to meet the requirement underlying Test case 2 is to ana-
lyze biological diversity on the basis of entropy measures developed in information 
theory (Csizár 2008). By far the most widely known such measure is Shannon’s 
(Shannon 1948). In our current notation, it amounts to the following2:
 
D p p p
pShannon n i
n
i
i
1
1
1
, ,¼( ) = å æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
=
log
 
How can this measure be interpreted in the biological context? The quantity 
log
1
pi
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷  can be seen as representing potential surprise, to wit, how surprising it 
would be to find out that a randomly selected individual from the target population 
belongs to species si. In fact, such index of surprise is null in the extreme case when 
the outcome is already known for sure (so that pi = 1, and log(1) = 0) and it is 
increasingly and indefinetely large as pi approches 0. As a consequence, 
DShannon(p1,  …  , pn) quantifies the average (expected) surprise should one get to 
know the species to which a randomly sampled element will belong. Appropriately, 
such expected surprise will be low when a very uneven distribution—such as (0.97, 
0.01, 0.01, 0.01)—implies a low level of uncertainty about the outcome, because 
one species is (or few of them are) very likely to be instantiated in a random draw. 
On the other hand, expected surprise gets its maximum value (for given n) when a 
completely even distribution—namely, (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)—implies the high-
est level of uncertainty, because each species is equally likely to be instantiated in 
a random draw. In fact, the Shannon index of diversity gets Test case 2 just right: in 
particular, DShannon(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)  =  1.386  >  0.168  =  DShannon(0.97, 0.01, 
0.01, 0.01).
Another very popular index of diversity which is appropriately sensitive to the 
unevenness of the abundance distribution is quadratic entropy (Vajda and Zvárová 
2007), also widely known as the Gini or the Gini-Simpson index (after Gini 1912 
and Simpson 1949):
 
D p p pGini n
i
n
i1
1
21, ,¼( ) = - å
=  
DGini, too, can be given a convenient interpretation. It amounts to 1 minus the prob-
ability that two random draws (with replacement) from the background population 
instantiate the same category (in fact, the latter probability is pi × pi, for each species 
2 The choice of a base for the logarithm is a matter of conventionally setting a unit of measurement. 
Usual options include 2, 10, and e. We will adopt the latter throughout our discussion, thus employ-
ing the natural logarithm in subsequent calculations.
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si). For this reason, in biological and ecological applications, DGini is often seen as 
the probability of interspecific encounter (see Patil and Taille 1982, pp. 548–550), 
to wit, the probability that two random draws do not instantiate the same species. 
Also, 1—pi can be taken as a natural measure of the rarity of species si in the target 
environment. Then, DGini(p1, …, pn) computes the average (expected) rarity of the 
species to which a (randomly sampled) individual would belong, as emphasized by 
the following equivalent rendition:
 
D p p p pGini n
i
n
i i1
1
1, ,¼( ) = å -( )
=  
Expected rarity will be low when a very uneven distribution—such as (0.97, 0.01, 
0.01, 0.01)—implies that one very common species is (or few of them are) likely to 
be instantiated in a random draw. On the other hand, expected rarity gets its maxi-
mum value (for given n) when a completely even distribution—namely, (0.25, 0.25, 
0.25, 0.25)—implies that the species instantiated in a random draw will always have 
the same, and substantial, degree of rarity. Accordingly, the Gini index of diversity 
also gets Test case 2 right: DGini(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) = 0.75 > 0.06 = DGini(0.97, 
0.01, 0.01, 0.01).
One important and well-known feature of both the Shannon and the Gini index 
of diversity is that they are concave functions. The formal definition of concavity 
involves the notion of a mixture M p p p pP P n na a a a a
, , ,
*
= + -( ) ¼ + -( )( )* *1 11 1  of 
two distributions of relative abundance P = (p1, … , pn) and P p pn
* * *= ¼( )1 , , , where 
α ∈ [0,1] determines the relative weights of the distributions combined. As a plain 
illustration, if P  =  (0.9, 0.1), P*  =  (0.7, 0.3), and α  =  0.5, then the mixture is 
MP Pa
, *  = (0.8, 0.2). A measure of diversity D is then said to be concave if and only 
if, for any P, P*, and any α ∈ [0,1], one has a a aD P D P D MP P( ) + -( ) ( ) £ ( )* *1 , . 
Concavity is sometimes advocated for measures of biological diversity as convey-
ing the idea that, if one pools together two distinct populations X and Y composed 
by possibly different abundance distributions (P vs. P*) of the same list of n species, 
then the aggregate should have a diversity that is at least as great as the average of 
the initial diversities of X and Y. Whether or not such condition is meant to be com-
pelling in general, one significant implication of concavity is involved in the follow-
ing example.
Test Case 3 Consider three subsequent moments in time t1, t2, and t3, with 
corresponding relative abundace distributions of a population with n = 10, as 
follows.
t1: (0.1,   0.1,   0.1,   0.1,   0.1,   0.1,   0.1,   0.1,   0.1,   0.1)
t2: (0.5,  0.1,  0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05)
t3: (0.9,  0.1,  0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0)
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Quite clearly, a drop in diversity occurred from t1 to t2. But, arguably, the loss of 
diversity was even greater from t2 to t3, essentially because most of the species (in 
fact, 80% of them) disappeared altogether. A compelling measure of diversity 
should recover such assessment, and concave measures such as DShannon and DGini 
do. DShannon takes values 2.303 at t1, 1.775 at t2, and then drops to 0.325 at t3. With 
DGini, we have 0.90, 0.72, and 0.18, respectively.
As we already know, because it lacks evenness sensitivity entirely, the Richness 
measure fails our Test case 2 above. Concerning Test case 3, Richness gets the main 
point right, namely that a larger drop in diversity occurs from t2 to t3 (although, 
again because of evenness insensitivity, it fails to detect any change in diversity 
from t1 to t2). Noting that DShannon and DGini do well in both cases 2 and 3, one might 
conclude that diversity should be quantified by these measures. And yet, the asses-
ment of biological diversity on the basis of entropy measures such as DShannon and 
DGini has been forcefully questioned because such measures do not fulfil the replica-
tion principle, and in fact fail as basic a benchmark as Test case 1. As it turns out, 
DShannon(1/10, …, 1/10) = 2.303, which is definitely less than twice DShannon(1/5, …, 
1/5) = 1.609, and DGini(1/10, …, 1/10) = 0.9, which is definitely less than twice 
DGini(1/5, …, 1/5) = 0.8. To emphasize the troubling consequences of these failures, 
Jost (2009, p.  926) put forward a variation that is even more extreme (notation 
slightly adapted):
Biologists frequently use measures of diversity to detect changes in the environment due to 
pollution, climate change, or other factors. […] Suppose a continent has a million equally 
common species, and a meteor impact kills 999,900 of the species, leaving 100 species 
untouched. Any biologist, if asked, would say that this meteor impact caused a large abso-
lute and relative drop in diversity. Yet DGini only decreases from 0.999999 to 0.99, a drop of 
less than 1%. Evidently, the metric of this measure does not match the intuitive concept of 
diversity as used by biologists, and ecologists relying on DGini will often misjudge the mag-
nitude of ecosystem change. This same problem arises when DShannon is equated with 
diversity.
6.3  Effective Numbers
Consider Jost’s meteor illustration above. According to the replication principle 
(which Jost 2009 strongly advocates), diversity should be 10.000 times lower 
after the impact than it was before (1.000.000/100). Is it possible to define a 
 measure such that (as it happens with richness but not with entropy) the replica-
tion  principle is retained and at the same time (as it happens with entropy but not 
richness) the (un)evenness of the distribution is also integrated in the assessment 
of diversity?
A crucial step in this direction was made in classical work by MacArthur (1965) 
and Hill (1973). To introduce their proposal, consider an entropy measure such as 
DGini, and take one specific example such as DGini(0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1), which amounts 
to 0.7. We now ask: how many species should a completely even population include 
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in order for its diversity to be just the same (i.e., 0.7) according to DGini itself? Note 
that, for a completely even population of n species, DGini equals å -
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ = -
=i
n
n n n1
1
1
1
1
1
. 
For such a hypothetical population of equally abundant species to have DGini- 
diversity of 0.7, it should then hold that 1
1
-
n
  =  0.7, by which we compute 
n =
-
1
1 0 7.
, and thus n = 3.333… So a hypothetical completely even population of 
3.333… species would have the same DGini-diversity as our initial population with 
actual distribution (0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1). Given a canonical diversity index such as 
DGini, this number of corresponding equally abundant categories is usually called the 
effective number of species (relative to the index at issue, DGini in this case). As our 
illustration shows, the effective number of species is a theoretical construct: often it 
will not be an integer. Generalizing from our computation above, one can see that 
the effective number corresponding to DGini is as follows:
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In this case, too, in order to have null diversity (rather than 1) in the extreme case 
when only one species is present, a minor variation can be employed:
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An effective number measure like DGini-EN meets the requirement of combining the 
replication principle and evenness sensitivity. Indeed, it can be shown that DGini- EN 
(p1, …, pn) = Richness(p1, …, pn) whenever the abundance distribution is uniform, so 
that, for instance, DGini-EN(1/10, …, 1/10) = 10 and DGini-EN(1/5, …, 1/5) = 5 (see Test 
case 1 above). On the other hand, DGini-EN is a smooth and strictly increasing function 
of DGini, thus it retains the evenness sensitivity of the latter when distributions are not 
uniform: for instance, DGini-EN(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) = 4 while DGini- EN(0.97, 0.01, 
0.01, 0.01) = 1.064 (see Test case 2 above). To achieve the same results, one can 
alternatively generate an effective number measure from yet another evenness sensi-
tive index of diversity, such as Shannon entropy. The general method is the same: 
take the actual value of DShannon  (p1, … , pn), equate it to D
n nShannon
1 1
, ,¼æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ , which 
amounts to log(1/n), then solve for n. The resulting measure is 
D p p eShannon EN n
D p pShannon n
-
¼( )¼( ) =1 1, , , ,  (see, e.g., Jost 2006, p. 364–365).
According to some authors, using an effective number measure is the one right 
way to quantify true diversity in biological and ecological applications (see Hoffmann 
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and Hoffmann 2008, and again Jost 2009, for a debate). Following Hill (1973, 
pp. 429–430) and Ricotta (2003, pp. 191–192), one can highlight another attractive 
consequence of the replication principle, which is implied by all effective number 
measures. If a diversity measure D(p1, …, pn) satisfies the replication principle, then 
one can define a measure of evenness in a very natural way, as Evenness(p1, …, 
pn) = D(p1, …, pn)/n. A simple and compelling property of such a measure of evenness 
is that it equates a fixed maximum value of 1 (i.e., n/n) whenever the distribution P is 
uniform, regardless of the value of n. And a straightforward implication is that diver-
sity can then be neatly factorized into richness and evenness as distinct and indepen-
dent components, for instance as follows:
 
D p p Richness p p Evenness p pGini EN n n Gini EN n- -¼( ) = ¼( )´ ¼1 1 1, , , , , ,( )  
One should note, however, that effective number measures do not retain the concav-
ity of their generating indexes. For instance, the concavity of DGini is not retained in 
DGini-EN (and the same applies to DShannon and DShannon-EN). One disturbing consequence 
is that Test case 3 above is not addressed in a convincing way. To illustrate, accord-
ing to DGini-EN, diversity decreases from DGini-EN(0.1, …, 0.1) = 10 to DGini-EN(0.5, 0.1, 
0.05, …, 0.05) = 3.57 between t1 and t2, but the drop is smaller from t2 to t3, with 
DGini-EN(0.9, 0.1, 0, …, 0) = 1.22. As pointed out above, intuition clearly goes in the 
opposite direction, given that from time t2 to t3 eight out of ten species have disap-
peared entirely.
Table 6.1 summarizes our results so far. On inspection, it naturally suggests the 
question whether there exist a measure of diversity yielding a satisfactory response 
to all of our test cases above. As a final remark in our comparative discussion, I 
would like to point out that this can be done. One effective way is to adopt the 
 following as a measure of diversity (see Arimoto 1971, p. 186, for an earlier occur-
rence in the information theory literature):
 
D p p pRoot n
i
n
i1
1
2
, ,¼( ) = åæ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
=  
Table 6.1 Some properties of alternative ways to quantify biological diversity. 
Test case 1  
(replication principle)
Test case 2  
(evenness sensitivity)
Test case 3 
(concavity)
Richness Yes No Yes
Entropy (DGini) No Yes Yes
Effective number 
(DGini-EN)
Yes Yes No
Test cases are explained in the text, and associated to formally relevant mathematical conditions 
(in parenthesis). “Yes” / “no”: the diversity measure (in row) yields/does not yield an intuitively 
adequate result in the test case at issue (in column)
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Once again, a – 1 correction can be employed to yield D p pRoot n
* ¼( )1, , , with null 
diversity (rather than 1) in the extreme case when only one species is present.3 DRoot 
is demonstrably evenness sensitive (see Crupi et al. 2018). It is also concave and it 
satisfies the replication principle (see below for this). It addresses Test case 1 appro-
priately, because (according to the replication principle), DRoot(1/10, …, 1/10) = 10 
and DRoot(1/5, …, 1/5) = 5. Moreover, it gets Test case 2 right, because (according to 
evenness sensitivity), DRoot(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) = 4 > 1.651 = DRoot(0.97, 0.01, 
0.01, 0.01). And finally, in virtue of concavity, it also accommodates Test case 3, 
implying a moderate decrease in diversity between t1 and t2—from DRoot(0.1, …, 
0.1) = 10 to DRoot(0.5, 0.1, 0.05, …, 0.05) = 7.908—and a much larger drop between 
t2 and t3—from DRoot(0.5, 0.1., 0.05, …, 0.05)  =  7.908 to DRoot(0.9, 0.1, 0, …, 
0) = 1.6.
6.4  Parametric Measures of Diversity
The discussion above suggests that statistical measure of diversity DRoot combines a 
number of appealing features, and it is good news, I submit, that such a measure 
exists. In general, however, the plurality of non-identical ways to quantify biologi-
cal diversity needs not be a reason for concern or skepticism, like in Hurlbert’s 
(1971, p. 585) complaint that “diversity per se does not exists”. As noted by Patil 
and Taille (1982, p. 551), the plurality of measures is a very mundane phenomenon 
in various domains: in statistics, for instance, mean and median are non-equivalent 
measures of “central tendency”; variance, mean absolute variation, and range are 
non-equivalent measures of “spread”, and so on. In fact, once their main distinctive 
properties become well understood, it is natural to think that different measures may 
be most useful relative to varying purposes or contexts. For this reason, several 
authors have put forward a comprehensive approach, based on parametric families 
of diversity measures. In the final part of this contribution, I would like to point out 
that all of the specific measures mentioned in the foregoing discussion can be 
embedded as special cases in a unified formalism taken from generalized informa-
tion theory (Sharma and Mittal 1975; Hoffmann 2008), namely:
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Parameters r and t of the Sharma and Mittal (1975) family of measures are usually 
taken to be non-negative (r,t ≥ 0), while for r → 1 and t → 1 D p pSharma Mittal
r t
n-
( ) ¼( ), , ,1  
is known to yield the classical Shannon formula, DShannon(p1, … , pn) in our notation 
3 As pointed out by Arimoto (1971, p. 186), it also turns out that D p p p pRoot n
i
n
j j i
n
i j
*
= = ¹
¼( ) = å å1
1 1
, ,
,
. 
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(see Crupi et  al. 2018). Accordingly, it is costumary to just posit 
D p p D p pSharma Mittal n Shannon n-
( ) ¼( ) = ¼( )1 1 1 1, , , , , . Other settings of parameters r, t 
(known as order and degree, respectively, in the information theory literature) gen-
erate all diversity measures mentioned above, as illustrated in Table 6.2.
What is the meaning of the order (r) and degree (t) parameters in the Sharma- 
Mittal formalism when employed in the measurement of biological diversity?
The order parameter r is an index of the insensitivity to less abundant species. In 
fact, as r increases, diversity gets closer and closer to a simple (decreasing) function 
of one single element p* in the distribution (p1, …, pn), that is, the relative abun-
dance of the most common species. As an illustration, on the basis of the limit for 
r → ∞ when t = 2, one has D p p pSharma Mittal n-
¥( ) *¼( ) = -, , ,2 1 1  (see Crupi et al. 2018). 
When r = 0, on the contrary, diversity becomes a (increasing) function of the plain 
number of species with non-null relative abundance. The simplest illustration here 
is just D p p Richness p pSharma Mittal n n-
( ) *¼( ) = ¼( )0 0 1 1, , , , ,  (see Table 6.2 and Fig. 6.1). 
This shows that the order parameter r indicates how much a diversity measure dis-
regards relatively rare species. For order-0 measures, the actual distribution of rela-
tive abundance is neglected: non-zero abundance species are just counted, as if they 
were all equally important. For order-∞ measures, on the other hand, only the most 
abundant species matters, and all others are neglected altogether. The higher [lower] 
r is, the more [less] the common species are regarded and the rare species are dis-
counted in the measurement of diversity.
Importantly, for extreme values of the order parameter, an otherwise natural idea 
of continuity fails in the measurement of diversity: when r goes to either zero or 
infinity, it is not the case that small (large) changes in the abundance distribution 
produce comparably small (large) changes in diversity. To illustrate, all order-0 
Table 6.2 Some important special cases of the Sharma-Mittal framework for statistical measures 
of diversity
(r,t)-setting Diversity measure
r = 0
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i
n
i
*
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¼( ) = å -1
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entropies remain entirely invariant upon as large a change as that from, say, (1/3, 
1/3, 1/3) to (0.98, 0.01, 0.01), while they yield clearly different values for as small 
a change as that from (0.98, 0.01, 0.01) to (0.99, 0.01, 0). Order-∞ entropies, in 
turn, remain entirely invariant upon as large a change as that from, say, (0.50, 0.25, 
0.25) to (0.50, 0.50, 0), yet they still yield distinct values for as small a change as 
that from (0.50, 0.25, 0.25) to (0.52, 0.24, 0.24).
The role of the degree parameter t is somewhat more technical: it affects a few 
important metric properties. To appreciate this, it is useful to consider that all spe-
cific measures we considered earlier lie either (i) on the x-axis or (ii) on the diagonal 
line in Fig. 6.1. This is not by chance. Let us conclude our discussion by briefly 
considering cases (i) and (ii) in turn.
4
3
quadratic (Gini)
Ts
all
is
Shannon
Richness*
Root* Shannon-EN* Gini-EN*
effective numbers (Hill)
2
1
0 1 2
order (r )
de
gr
ee
 (
t)
3 4
Fig. 6.1 The Sharma-Mittal family of diversity measures is represented in a Cartesian quadrant 
with values of the order parameter r and of the degree parameter t lying on the x– and y–axis, 
respectively. Each point in the quadrant corresponds to a specific measure. A line corresponds to a 
distinct one-parameter generalized diversity function. Several special cases are highlighted. A 
point in the plane represents a concave diversity measure unless it lies strictly below the dotted line 
where t = 2–1/r
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 (i) Measures lying on the x-axis are obtained by positing t = 0, thus yielding:
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For a diversity measure in the Sharma-Mittal family, having degree 0 (t  =  0) is 
known to be a necessary and sufficient condition to satisfy the replication principle. 
In fact, this was a major reason for Hill (1973) to advocate this formalism as a one- 
parameter generalized approach to measure diversity. More precisely, the replica-
tion principle is satisfied by D p pSharma Mittal
r
n-
( ) ¼( ) +, , ,0 1 1  (for any r) (see Hoffmann 
2008, pp. 20–21), and that is equivant to the formula originally employed by Hill 
(1973, p.  428). The comprehensive approach presented here reveals one striking 
aspect of Hill’s measures: for any Sharma-Mittal measure of a specified order r 
(regardless of the concurrent value of the degree parameter t!) D p pSharma Mittal
r
n-
( ) ¼( ) +, , ,0 1 1  
computes the corresponding effective number as defined earlier, i.e., the theoretical 
number of equally abundant categories that would be just as diverse as (p1, …, pn) is 
under that measure (see Crupi et al. 2018).
 (ii) As we have seen with some special cases like D p pGini EN n-
* ¼( )1, , , effective 
number measures of diversity may not be concave functions. Most Sharma- Mittal 
measures are concave, however: D p pSharma Mittal
r t
n-
( ) ¼( ), , ,1  generates a concave func-
tion as long as t ≥ 2–1/r (see Hoffmann 2008 for a proof). This implies, in particular, 
the concavity of all measures lying on the diagonal line in Fig.  6.1, which are 
obtained by positing r = t, thus yielding:
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Measures of this kind are often labelled after Tsallis’s (1988, 2004) work in gen-
eralized thermodynamics. Partly because of the concavity property, the Tsallis 
 one- parameter continuum has been recently advocated as a compelling approach to 
the measurement of biological diversity by Keylock (2005).
The relevance of statistical measures of diversity is an open issue for the theo-
retical biologist and the philosopher addressing the investigation of biodiversity, 
and indeed a matter of much debate (see, e.g., Barrantes and Sandoval 2009 and 
Blandin 2015). In this chapter, no claim has been made to the resolution of diver-
gences in this respect. Consideration of the variety and integration of diversity mea-
sures remains important, however, for the debate to be adequately informed. 
Advocates of the measurement of diversity should of course be aware of the tools 
at their disposal. Opponents and skeptics, on the other hand, should be careful to 
make sure that their legitimate doubts are not inflated by too narrow an outlook on 
the ways in which the notion of biological diversity can be formally unpacked and 
assessed.
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Chapter 7  
Essential Biodiversity Change Indicators 
for Evaluating the Effects of Anthropocene 
in Ecosystems at a Global Scale
Cristina Branquinho, Helena Cristina Serrano, Alice Nunes, Pedro Pinho, 
and Paula Matos
Abstract Understanding and predicting the impact of global change drivers on bio-
diversity, the basis of the delivery of goods and services to humans, is a critical task 
in the Anthropocene Era. This has led to the development of international monitor-
ing networks and frameworks to evaluate changes in biodiversity, the Essential 
Biodiversity Variables, though still somewhat ineffective. Biodiversity drivers have 
changed their relative importance in time and space, e.g. due to policies to combat 
air pollution, the increasing nitrogen pollution or climate change. Hence, to monitor 
their impact on biodiversity in space and time, we need appropriate Biodiversity 
Change Indicators and Surrogates, measured through distinct metrics. In this chap-
ter, we propose a conceptual model to select the most cost-effective metrics of 
biodiversity- change based on both the type and intensity of the drivers that limit or 
impact biodiversity, and the nature of the Essential Biodiversity Variables which 
may be affected in each case. We propose ecophysiology-based metrics for low 
intensity limiting/impacting drivers, affecting organisms’ individual performance; 
trait-based metrics for medium intensity drivers, affecting the ecological perfor-
mance of sensitive species before tolerant ones, changing species abundance and 
community functional traits; taxonomic-based metrics for high driver intensities 
which may culminate in species loss. We further discuss the utility of remote sens-
ing data to measure some of these indicators or surrogates, allowing to upscale and/
or generalize spatial and temporal information.
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7.1  Introduction
7.1.1  The Need for Essential Biodiversity Variables
The establishment of the Convention on Biological Diversity, at the Rio Earth 
Summit in 1992, has put biodiversity at the centre  stage. Since then, several 
agreements have been signed, such as Contracting Parties’ agreement on the 
United Nations Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, and associated Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets. Despite these agreements, biodiversity continued to change 
globally (Butchart et al. 2010; Dornelas et al. 2014; Tittensor et al. 2014), with 
ongoing species loss and/or changes in communities (without species loss), and 
our knowledge is still too small to understand the exact consequences for human’s 
wellbeing and ecosystems resilience, presently and in the future. Hence, moni-
toring biodiversity change is an essential task for the XXI century, not only to 
assure we meet the proposed political goals (Aichi Targets for 2020, Parties to the 
United Nations, Convention on Biological Diversity, and Sustainable Development 
Goals for 2030 of the United Nations), but also to guarantee that the provision of 
basic ecosystem services (MEA 2005) is maintained, securing our survival on 
Planet Earth.
To monitor biodiversity-change at the global scale, harmonized observation sys-
tem and timely data are needed (Pereira et al. 2013; Matos et al. 2017). In an attempt 
to solve this problem and simultaneously trying to answer to the question “what to 
monitor?”, the Group on Earth Observations – Biodiversity Observation Network, 
proposed the concept of “Essential Biodiversity Variables” (Pereira et  al. 2013). 
This process intended to be the basis of monitoring programs worldwide, and was 
inspired by the Essential Climate Variables, that guided the implementation of the 
Global Climate Observing System by the Parties of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (WMO 2010). The Essential Biodiversity Variables 
aim to help biodiversity observation-communities: (i) to harmonize monitoring, by 
identifying how variables should be sampled and measured; (ii) to help prioritize, 
by defining a minimum set of essential measurements to capture major dimensions 
of biodiversity change, complementary to one another and to other environmental 
change observation initiatives; (iii) to facilitate data integration, by providing an 
intermediate abstraction layer between primary observations and indicators (Pereira 
et al. 2013). In short, the Essential Biodiversity Variables framework aims to iden-
tify a minimum set of variables that can be used to inform scientists, managers and 
the public on global biodiversity change.
The Essential Biodiversity Variables framework recognizes three distinct levels 
of biodiversity information: (i) Primary Observations (i.e., raw data); (ii) Essential 
Biodiversity Variables; and (iii) Biodiversity Indicators (Collen et  al. 2009) 
(Fig. 7.1). In a first attempt, the minimum set of Essential Biodiversity Variables 
aggregated candidate variables into six classes: “genetic composition,” “species 
populations,” “species traits,” “community composition,” “ecosystem structure,” 
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and “ecosystem function” (Pereira et al. 2013). The six classes  proposed by Pereira 
et al. (2013) are now widely adopted as part of the essential biodiversity variables 
framework (Geijzendorffer et al. 2016; Chandler et al. 2017; Turak et al. 2017).
7.1.2  The Challenges of Biodiversity Change Indicators
Putting into practice a global monitoring network to track biodiversity change is far 
from being an easy endeavour. The Essential Biodiversity Variables framework will 
undoubtedly help global consistent reporting of changes in the state of biodiversity, 
but it is unlikely to contribute much to halt biodiversity decline, unless it can be 
effectively applied at scales relevant to decision-making regarding conservation 
(Henle et  al. 2014). The complexity of biodiversity (different taxa, considerable 
species diversity within each, complex ecological interactions, numerous pressures 
interacting synergistically to impact multiple aspects of biodiversity, etc.) arises as 
a major obstacle, turning this purpose of tracking the trends and the state of biodi-
versity, in face of controllable and easily achievable conservation goals, a herculean 
task (Noss 1990; Brooks et al. 2014). In addition, major scientific challenges are 
faced when distilling biodiversity into a limited number of essential variables. These 
include: (i) identification of the taxa to be measured among the several that are 
important for biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services delivery; (ii) identi-
fication of a single variable for a critical aspect of biodiversity; (iii) the translation 
of information between different biological and geographical realms (e.g. terrestrial 
and marine); (iv) the heterogeneity of methods and data used for measuring and 
recording different components of biodiversity; and (v) the selection of appropriate 
metrics (units and scales) of measurement to ensure comparability between Essential 
raw data
essential 
biodiversity
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Fig. 7.1 Conceptual framework for “Monitoring Biodiversity Change” and for the selection of the 
metrics of indicators and surrogates that might reflect biodiversity change at the global scale
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Biodiversity Variables (Brummitt et al. 2017). Altogether, these barriers make it dif-
ficult to consistently aggregate variables across time, space and taxa (Turak et al. 
2017). Documenting and quantifying global biodiversity change, remains a huge 
challenge due to sparse or biased data and a general lack of agreed international data 
standards.
Nearly 100 indicators have been proposed for the 2020 Convention on 
Biological Diversity targets (UNCBD 2011), but without significant advances on 
the indicator’s practical application. The mid-term assessment of the Aichi Targets 
(Tittensor et  al. 2014), suggested that while actions to counteract the decline of 
biodiversity have increased, so too have driver’s intensity, resulting in a further dete-
rioration in the state and trends of biodiversity. Meaning that to succeed, actions 
towards the Aichi targets will have to be supported by updated information on 
regional and global patterns of biodiversity change, on drivers of biodiversity 
change, and on the effectiveness of conservation policies (Pereira and Cooper 2006; 
Scholes et al. 2012; Tittensor et al. 2014; Proença et al. 2017).
A successful example was attained with typical ecological indicators, the epi-
phytic lichens (Matos et al. 2017). Since the industrial revolution (sulphur dioxide) 
to the present (nitrogen, land use, climate change), lichens have been used to track 
the major drivers of global change. Yet, currently the challenge is to harmonize 
methodologies, so they can be used at the global scale. Two protocols are applied at 
the continental scale, the United States and the European (Fig.  7.2). This work 
developed a framework to help bridge existing long-term monitoring data sets, 
investigating the compatibility of the interpretation of their outcomes using broadly 
accepted biodiversity metrics. This work showed that both methodologies generate 
similar interpretation trends. The framework developed incorporates measures of 
species richness, community shits and functional trait metrics. This enabled the use 
of available data and new data together in jointly analysis under a biodiversity 
change perspective, giving information on the drivers of change and on the effec-
tiveness of conservation policies at the global scale.
However, very few biodiversity data sets of sufficient quality, across broad taxo-
nomic, temporal and spatial scales are available for official reporting, all of which 
result in a reduced ability to reliably detect biodiversity change. This leads to infor-
mation gaps and geographical, temporal and taxonomic biases in reporting efforts 
worldwide; for example, most data come from less biodiverse areas such as North 
America and Europe rather than biodiversity-rich areas (Collen et al. 2008; Mora 
et al. 2008; Pereira et al. 2012). Similarly, vertebrates are much better covered than 
other taxa (Pereira et al. 2012). In global assessments such as the Global Biodiversity 
Outlook 4 (CBD 2014), this leads to the predominant use of bird data for many 
biodiversity indicators (Pereira et al. 2012), undermining the comprehensiveness of 
the effects of global change on biodiversity and biasing also policy responses based 
on these reports. Information gaps and biases can originate from the indicator set 
used or from a lack of robust and reliable data. These constitute practical barriers 
that require increased efforts before biodiversity data can be used in assessments. 
Concerning the gaps in data, mobilization of existing data and the collection of new 
data could help fill current information gaps (Kot et al. 2010). The potential for 
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Fig. 7.2 Successful example of a harmonized monitoring framework to be included in the global 
monitoring network to  track biodiversity change. This framework refers to the use of epiphytic 
lichen diversity collected with the most widely applied methodologies, the United States and 
European. (Adapted from Matos et al. 2017)
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data mobilization is internationally recognized, and several long-term initiatives 
have focused on mobilizing biodiversity data and metadata (e.g. the Global 
Biodiversity Information Facility – GBIF, and the Long-Term Ecological Research 
Network – LTER).
7.1.3  The Need for Surrogates of Biodiversity Change
Most species have not yet been described and even for those that are known, data on 
spatial distributions are sparse and often unreliable. Given the inability to properly 
and comprehensively cover all taxa, planning for biodiversity conservation requires 
surrogates of biodiversity. In an environmental context, a “surrogate” is a compo-
nent of the system of concern that one can more easily measure or manage than 
others, and that is used as an indicator of the attribute/trait/characteristic/quality of 
that system (Mellin et al. 2011). The use of surrogates is important and often neces-
sary because resource constraints in monitoring and management require cost- 
effective yet useful ways to assess ecosystem responses and key ecological processes 
(Lindenmayer et al. 2015).
Surrogates can be roughly divided into taxonomic and environmental catego-
ries. Taxonomic surrogates are predominantly based on biological data and nor-
mally include known taxonomic groups, focal species, umbrella species, species 
assemblages, and various ecological classifications (Grantham et  al. 2010; 
Lindenmayer et al. 2015; Hunter et al. 2016). Environmental surrogates are usually 
based on a mix of physical and biological data, subdivided into two types: those 
based on discrete classes (ecological classifications or land types) and surrogates 
where continuous data are analysed directly in the selection of areas. They can 
reflect drivers known to be important in determining the distribution of species and, 
modelled with species data, can be mapped more consistently, quickly, and inex-
pensively across large areas (Fig. 7.3). The choice of the drivers is determined also 
by data availability, spatial scale, choice of data merging techniques, biogeography, 
and perceptions about the importance of specific variables in shaping biological 
distributions.
There are four important common steps in the development of ecological surro-
gates: (i) identify well-developed goals for the use of ecological surrogates 
(McGeoch 1998; Collen and Nicholson 2014); (ii) develop a robust conceptual 
model of the system in question to then guide the identification of appropriate sur-
rogates (Niemeijer and de Groot 2008); (iii) rigorously test the ecological surro-
gates (Bockstaller and Girardin 2003); and (iv) overcome widespread problems of 
translating the scientific knowledge on ecological surrogates in a way that effec-
tively informs managers and decision-makers, or even the wider public (Halpern 
et al. 2012; Westgate et al. 2014) (Fig. 7.3).
Recently, Lindenmayer and co-workers (2015) developed a new conceptual 
Adaptive Surrogacy Framework to explicitly address five trade-offs: (i) whether it is 
better to employ surrogates or address (e.g. measure) an entity directly; (ii) the 
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accuracy versus generality of a surrogate; (iii) the temporal stability of a surrogate 
versus its ability to detect change over time; (iv) simple communication value ver-
sus communication complexity associated with caveats and details of methodology; 
and, (v) cost-effectiveness versus certainty.
7.1.4  The Importance of Drivers Limiting or Impacting 
Biodiversity Change
The preliminary analysis of biodiversity indicators showed that it requires addi-
tional information on non-biodiversity variables, i.e. the drivers limiting or 
impacting biodiversity in some way (Tittensor et al. 2014). These are essential to 
inform a specific objective of a policy target (e.g. progress in policy implementa-
tion, public awareness, and policy and management responses, such as the change 
in global surface temperature) and to provide an interpretation of the detected 
changes in biodiversity (e.g. driven by pollution or climate change), so that actions 
can be taken to address that problem. A driver is any natural or human induced 
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pressure factor that directly or indirectly causes a change in an ecosystem. 
Whereas a direct driver unequivocally influences ecosystem processes, an indirect 
driver operates more diffusely, by altering one or more direct drivers. Some 
important anthropic direct drivers affecting biodiversity are habitat change, cli-
mate change, invasive species, eutrophication, overexploitation, and pollution 
(MEA 2005).
Changes in biodiversity are almost always caused by multiple interacting drivers 
working in space and over time, that can occur intermittently (such as droughts) or 
permanently (such as land-use) (MEA 2005). Though some drivers are global, the 
actual set of interactions that brings about an ecosystem change is more or less spe-
cific to a particular place (Ribeiro et al. 2013). The strength of a driver effect, how-
ever, is determined by a range of location-specific factors (MEA 2005). Therefore, 
it is crucial to identify and evaluate the intensity of the driver limiting or impacting 
biodiversity (recognized threats and pressures), and the actual positive or negative 
effects on physiological and ecological performance of individuals, species, com-
munities, habitats and ecosystems. These non-biodiversity variables are not covered 
by the Essential Biodiversity Variables list (Pereira et al. 2013). Yet, comprehensive 
interpretation of biodiversity trends clearly requires the integration of other data, 
notably on drivers and pressures for biodiversity. This is crucial to decide which 
type of metric of biodiversity change indicator/surrogate should be selected for each 
Essential Biodiversity Variable.
7.1.5  The Nature and Intensity of the Drivers from the Past 
to the Future
Direct drivers vary in their importance within and among systems and in the extent 
to which they are increasing their impact. Historically, habitat and land use change 
have had the biggest impact on biodiversity across biomes. Overexploitation and 
invasive species have been important as well, and continue to be major drivers of 
change (MEA 2005). Pollution, in the past by metals and sulphur dioxide, and 
more recently the deposition of nitrogen and phosphorus, is expected to increase 
its impact, leading to declines in biodiversity across biomes. Climate change is 
projected to increasingly affect all aspects of biodiversity, from individual organ-
isms, through populations and species, to ecosystem composition and function 
(MEA 2005).
Due to human activities and to climate change, ecosystems are experiencing 
changes from the local to the global scale (MEA 2005; Canadell et al. 2007). The 
impacts are of such magnitude that have led to the consideration of a new era – the 
Anthropocene (Zalasiewicz et al. 2010). Since the first warning by The Limits to 
Growth (Meadows et al. 1972), scientists have been trying to quantify the environ-
mental, economic, and social limits to human activities on Earth. In a context of 
global change, Rockström et al. (2009), and more recently Steffen and co-workers 
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(2015) analysed the safety of nine planetary systems (with  great importance for 
human habitability on Earth) and concluded that the rate of biodiversity loss, cli-
mate change and eutrophication have already crossed the safety borders of the ter-
restrial system. On the other hand, they show that chemical pollution, although 
undeniably important, had not yet been quantified. All these changes in the plane-
tary systems impact the structure and functioning of ecosystems and the consequent 
delivery of goods and services they provide. Managing and understanding complex 
systems such as our society or ecosystems, requires simplification. It is therefore 
essential the construction of a simple image with a limited set of relevant factors: 
the “Indicators & Surrogates of Biodiversity Change”.
7.2  Objective and Rationale
In the Era of Anthropocene and under the framework of the Essential Biodiversity 
Variables, the main aim of this work is to call attention for the need to develop 
Biodiversity Change Indicators and Surrogates to monitor biodiversity changes. 
These can only be interpreted and applied after knowing their relationship with the 
drivers that limit or impact biodiversity. We propose a conceptual model to select 
the most cost-effective metrics of biodiversity change, based on both the nature and 
the intensity of the drivers that limit or impact biodiversity. During the Anthropocene 
Era we expect most ecosystems to be affected by at least one anthropic driver 
(whether it is global or local). Some drivers, such as some pollutants (e.g. DDT) 
never existed in nature and others existed in much lower amounts or intensity than 
today (carbon dioxide or ammonia). Ecosystems are currently affected by drivers 
which limit or impact biodiversity with different intensities. In this work, we use the 
term ‘Driver Intensity’ to convey not only the amount but also the toxicity of the 
drivers affecting biodiversity. Additionally, driver’s intensity changes over time. In 
the past, biodiversity was mostly affected by air pollution (e.g. sulphur dioxide and 
metals), while nowadays nitrogen pollution is the driver with stronger effects on 
biodiversity, particularly in rural areas. In the future, we expect changes in climate 
patterns due to climate change to become the most important driver. Sulphur diox-
ide in the atmosphere increased almost ten-fold during the industrial revolution 
(with its maximum in the 70s), whereas ammonia emissions increased more recently 
and with an intensity of approximately four-fold. Climate change effects on biodi-
versity are mostly related to changes in the deviation from average climatic vari-
ables, such as the case of global surface temperature (Fig.  7.4). Due to this, 
significant changes were only recently detected, and its intensity is still low in com-
parison with the magnitude of the previous drivers. Our conceptual model will be 
based on the selection of the most cost-effective biodiversity change metric having 
in mind the nature and intensity of drivers, and the nature of the Essential Biodiversity 
Variables.
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7.3  How to Choose Biodiversity Change Metrics in Relation 
to Driver’s Intensity
7.3.1  Low Intensity Drivers may Change Biodiversity Metrics 
from Genetic Composition to Species Populations
When the limiting or impacting drivers are of low intensity (due to both nature or 
magnitude), we expect them to interfere with individuals’ performance, but not to 
the point of jeopardizing their existence. Individuals physiological performance 
might be different due to differences in their genetic pool and on acclimation condi-
tions (plasticity). When a population is subject to limiting or impacting drivers, the 
most  sensitive individuals tend to have a lower physiological performance (e.g. 
lower growth) in comparison with the most tolerant ones, that are not affected for 
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the same driver intensity (Fig. 7.5). The amplitude of driver’s intensity where sensi-
tive and tolerant individuals grow determines their realised niche width (Fig. 7.5).
In the beginning there was the gene: one unit, more or less filled with variability 
(alleles) and prone to mutations that might expand biodiversity and drive evolution. 
An individual is a complex interaction of genes, with differences enough from the 
next to make it unique, but also limited within a common pool. Taxonomy studies 
these genetic pools, mostly by looking at the phenotypes, the physical expression of 
genes together with the environment, characterizing groups of similar individuals as 
a species, genus or phylum (e.g.). The more biodiverse a gene is (different alleles), 
the higher the chances for the outcome to be a more plastic phenotype, capable to 
withstand environmental variation (Fusco and Minelli 2010).
The fundamental niche concept is deeply connected with that of genetic pool: 
genes determine the limitations and plasticity ranges an individual can outstand. 
This concept of fundamental niche (theoretically, the widest range of abiotic condi-
tions where a species can maintain a sustainable population (Hutchinson 1957)) can 
be considered one of the bases for biodiversity: different sets of abiotic conditions 
will encompass different performances for different individuals with different 
genetic backgrounds (Hutchinson 1991). Phylogeny intends to go a bit further than 
taxonomy, relating the species current taxonomic position to time and evolution. 
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Fig. 7.5 Effect of the driver’s intensity on Essential Biodiversity Variables, for individuals’ per-
formance. The decrease in physiological performance (dotted lines) of sensitive individuals is 
more abrupt than that of tolerant ones, though they show similar fundamental niches. Different 
starting points (genetic or phenotypic variability) of individual performance would also produce 
different ending points. The ecological performance (realised niche; double arrows) of the sensi-
tive and tolerant individuals indicates their niche width and would be reflected in the biodiversity 
of the species population
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Both taxonomy and phylogeny are measures of biodiversity that are dependent on 
the definition of species. With time and environmental drivers in action, the gene 
pool might be reduced or modified to a point of no return (speciation or extinction).
To add complexity to these interactions, single individual’s performance depends 
not only on their genetic pool, but also on the interaction with the community (other 
individuals of the same and of different species) and with limiting (soil, water, light, 
temperature) or impacting drivers (pollution, eutrophication, etc.). The fitness of the 
several single individuals (their physiological performance) determines the overall 
performance of the population. Thus, the fitness of the several populations, which 
all together make the species (ecological) performance, is a proxy for the species 
realised niche, the part of the fundamental niche that is in fact occupied by the spe-
cies in natural conditions (Colwell and Rangel 2009). An ecosystem is thus, the 
combination of a specific community, in a particular set of abiotic conditionings 
(limiting drivers), that make it unique. A change in community composition or in 
limiting (edaphoclimatic factors) or impact drivers (e.g. climate change; pollution) 
will eventually result in a change in biodiversity and the ecosystem status.
In water and nutrients rich ecosystems, and without other abiotic stress drivers, 
the main limiting drivers for the establishment of an individual should be its disper-
sion ability to more empty areas and tolerance to interactions with other species 
(e.g. pathogens, parasites, herbivores). As more individuals occupy those empty 
spaces, competition arises (intra or interspecific), mostly for light in the case of 
primary producers, for example. On the other extreme, in poor and hostile ecosys-
tems, low resource availability implies a stronger competitive drive between nearby 
individuals. Biodiversity here, is shaped by the width of the realised niches, more or 
less reduced from the fundamental niche width, according to competitive ability to 
reach or occupy the areas with more resources (Colwell and Rangel 2009; Hortal 
et al. 2015).
In the case of strong competition (intra or interspecific), the strongest competitor 
will occupy the areas with more resources, while the weakest one will be pushed to 
areas with higher abiotic stress, where it doesn’t perform so well physiologically 
(Colwell and Fuentes 1975). In this case, for the weak competitors, the areas of 
higher ecological performance (abundance) will not be the areas of higher physio-
logical fitness, against what common sense would dictate (McGill 2012). 
Biodiversity in these communities can change dramatically, if the established eco-
system equilibrium is disrupted by strong drivers, like changes in community com-
position (e.g. introduction of exotic species) or abiotic factors (e.g. climate change), 
see Fig. 7.6 for an example. Therefore, at the community level (individuals or even 
species), the measure of physiological performance vs. ecological performance, 
would integrate the local biodiversity drivers that affect it, from genes, to individu-
als, to community, reflected in the niche width. Thus, individual physiological per-
formance of the population can be a good Biodiversity Change Metric that respond 
to low intensity drivers.
Consider two drivers affecting a community: biotic – competition (intra or inter-
specific); and environmental – a particular stress. The response of the individuals in 
the community to those local drivers will determine its biodiversity (Fig. 7.6).
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Fig. 7.6 Effect of the biodiversity change drivers in the physiological and ecological performance 
of two species with different characteristics
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7.3.2  Intermediate Intensity Drivers May Change Biodiversity 
Metrics from Species Traits to Community’s Composition
The capacity of an ecosystem to withstand disturbances without shifting to an alter-
native ecosystem state, losing functions and services, defines ecosystem resilience 
(Holling 1973; Scheffer et al. 2001), and is tightly dependent on the ecosystems’ 
biodiversity in all its facets (Pollock et al. 2017). Depending on the nature and inten-
sity of the driver, these different facets may be hierarchically affected, from indi-
vidual organism’s performance to changes at the community level (de Bello et al. 
2013). The selection of the appropriate Metrics to measure Biodiversity Change 
should, therefore, depend on the type or intensity of the driver. For that reason, and 
as suggested by this book title, assessing and conserving biodiversity to face the 
challenges posed by global change implies moving beyond a mere individual spe-
cies approach.
As discussed in Sect. 7.3.1, when the drivers act on ecosystems at low intensity, 
they are expected to affect firstly the physiological performance of biological organ-
isms (at the individual level), which in turn affect their fitness, e.g. growth, repro-
duction success. Only then, changes in the performance of populations or species 
may lead to changes in their abundance, determining a decrease in more sensitive 
species and/or an increase in the most tolerant ones (Cornwell and Ackerly 2009) 
(Fig. 7.7). This may be seen as a response of species ecological performance that, as 
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Fig. 7.7 Effect of the driver’s intensity on Essential Biodiversity Variables at the individual and 
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mentioned in Sect. 7.3.1, may be due not only to the pressure drivers but also to 
biotic interactions (de Bello et al. 2012). If the pressure driver persists in time or 
increases its intensity, changes in ecological performance may culminate in species 
extinction or their substitution by others with specific traits that make them more 
tolerant to the pressure driver (Grime and Díaz 2006). Those less tolerant species 
may be filtered out of the community, affecting species composition and, ultimately, 
species richness (Fig. 7.8).
7.3.2.1  Intraspecific Trait Variation
It is known that species response to environmental drivers and their effect on eco-
system functioning depend on their characteristics, namely on their functional traits 
(Hooper et al. 2005; de Bello et al. 2010). For that reason, functional trait-based 
metrics are emerging as better indicators to quantify changes in ecosystems in 
response to global change drivers (Díaz and Cabido 1997; Díaz et al. 2007; Lavorel 
et al. 2011; Mouillot et al. 2013). Functional traits are species attributes, measurable 
at the individual level, that influence their responses to environmental conditions 
(by affecting their fitness), or determine their influence on ecosystem properties 
(Lavorel and Garnier 2002; Hooper et al. 2005). This approach can quantify compo-
sitional shifts accounting for species functional redundancy or uniqueness, and has 
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Fig. 7.8 Effect of the driver’s intensity on Essential Biodiversity Variables, from individuals’ per-
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the potential to be both universal and applicable at broad spatial scales (to compare 
very distinct communities), unlike some taxonomic diversity metrics, because it is 
not linked to species identity per se. Thus, in a case where compositional shifts 
occur, these metrics enable us to identify which group of species declines (i.e. sensi-
tive species) and which remains (Fig. 7.7).
When studies are focused on the turnover of species (and their traits) in commu-
nities and compared across space or over time, the most frequent procedure is to use 
one mean trait value per species, ignoring trait variation within species. The trait 
value of each species (mean, range or categories) is then “weighted” by their abun-
dance, to obtain trait-based metrics at the community level. However, some traits 
are more plastic than others, and may show a high intraspecific variation along 
environmental gradients (e.g. plant specific leaf area). In general, intraspecific trait 
variability should be also considered: (i) for more ubiquitous species showing high 
plasticity along environmental gradients; (ii) in communities with a low turnover in 
species composition; or (iii) in studies addressing trait variations at finer spatial 
scales.
Plant trait data may be obtained locally, using standard methodologies (Pérez- 
Harguindeguy et al. 2013), or retrieved from scientific literature or trait databases 
(Kattge et al. 2011). The first approach is considered crucial in the study of pro-
cesses acting at the plot-scale (e.g. niche partitioning), while the use of database 
values is considered acceptable for studies at the site-level or at broader scales 
(Albert et al. 2011; Cordlandwehr et al. 2013; Shipley et al. 2016). Given that mea-
suring species traits is often laborious and time consuming, and not always possible, 
trait databases are expected to support the change in paradigm from species to trait- 
based ecology at the global scale. However, trait data available in databases is still 
insufficient, and lacks large geographical coverage (Kattge et al. 2011). Trait data 
gaps are more pronounced, for instance, in northern and central Africa, parts of 
South America, southern and western Asia (Kattge et al. 2011). Thus, trait-based 
studies should contribute to fulfil trait data gaps as much as possible.
7.3.2.2  Functional Trait Metrics
Trait-based metrics may be described by several metrics comprising either the mean 
of functional traits, often called functional structure, or their range or dissimilarity, 
i.e. functional diversity (Díaz et al. 2007; Lavorel et al. 2008). Both were reported 
to respond to major environmental drivers or biotic interactions, and to affect major 
ecosystem processes like primary production or decomposition rates (de Bello et al. 
2010; Mouillot et al. 2011, 2013; Valencia et al. 2015). The most widely used metric 
to measure functional structure at the community-level is the community-weighted 
mean (CWM) (Garnier et  al. 2007). This metric reflects the dominant traits in a 
community, and derives from the “mass ratio hypothesis”, according to which the 
effects of communities on ecosystem processes are largely determined by the traits 
of the dominant species (Grime 1998). CWM enables the quantification of commu-
nity shifts in mean trait values due to environmental selection for certain traits, 
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associated to changes in the abundance of dominant species (Mouillot et al. 2013). 
For instance, CWM metrics of epiphytic lichen traits and vascular plants were 
shown to be related to aridity, having the potential to work as indicators of its effects 
in drylands (Matos et al. 2015; Nunes et al. 2017).
Functional diversity (FD) shows the degree of functional dissimilarity within the 
community and can be expressed through various indices (Mason et  al. 2005; 
Villeger et al. 2008; Laliberte and Legendre 2010). FD may be used to quantify the 
decrease or increase in trait dissimilarity in response to driver’s intensity compared 
to a random expectation (i.e. trait convergence or divergence, respectively). For 
instance, some drivers may act as abiotic filters on communities, selecting for spe-
cies with similar “more adapted” trait values, i.e., causing trait convergence. This 
has been found in vascular plant traits of Mediterranean dryland communities, as a 
response to increasing aridity (Nunes et al. 2017). Following the “niche comple-
mentarity hypothesis”, a higher FD is thought to reflect an increase in complemen-
tarity in resource use between species, and thus an increase in ecosystem functioning 
(Tilman et al. 1997). Similarly to taxonomic diversity, FD may be divided into three 
components namely, functional richness, functional evenness, and functional dis-
persion (Mason et al. 2005). Functional dispersion, which considers trait abundance 
in addition to richness, has shown a better predictive ability than, for instance, func-
tional richness (Schleuter et al. 2010; Mouillot et al. 2011). Functional diversity also 
allows the assessment of ecosystems’ resilience towards disturbance drivers. The 
greater the presence of functionally similar species (higher functional redundancy), 
the higher the probability that disturbance-induced local extinctions of species will 
be compensated by the presence of similar species, ensuring higher ecosystem resil-
ience (Pillar et al. 2013).
In short, functional trait-based metrics enable a universal and mechanistic under-
standing of species response to environmental drivers (Mason and de Bello 2013) 
and may improve predictions of the effect of global change drivers on biodiversity 
and on ecosystem functioning if drivers have an intermediate intensity (Suding et al. 
2008).
7.3.2.3  Multi-trait Metrics
Over the last decade, several multi-trait metrics have been developed with the aim 
of resuming the functional diversity of multiple traits into a single FD value, esti-
mating the “functional trait space” occupied by a community (Villeger et al. 2008; 
Laliberte and Legendre 2010; Schleuter et al. 2010). However, the integration of 
multiple traits into one metric has to take into account single-trait trends and their 
possible co-variation, to avoid misinterpretation (Butterfield and Suding 2013). 
Different traits may show divergent responses to environmental variation due, for 
instance, to trade-offs among species strategies. Another point to consider is that 
different traits may be redundant, i.e. convey the same information. Thus, joining 
them in a single FD value may overestimate their importance in relation to other 
traits. Two solutions may be adopted to avoid redundancy. The first one is to 
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condense the information of single-traits FD into main axes of functional special-
ization, with techniques that reduce trait data dimensionality in the most informa-
tive variation axis, e.g. multivariate methods such as principal components analysis. 
Alternatively, and considering that correlated traits may not give exactly the same 
information, one may include all traits in a composite metric, giving a lower weight 
to correlated traits. However, in either case, it is important to start by checking for 
each particular context whether the considered traits co-vary or not, as species may 
show different combinations of traits under different environments, to maximize 
their performance (Maire et al. 2013; Volis and Bohrer 2013).
7.3.2.4  Taxonomic Diversity Metrics
Assessing biodiversity changes has largely relied on species richness metrics (i.e. a 
biodiversity-based taxonomy metrics) (Cadotte et al. 2011; Pereira et al. 2013). This 
was done firstly because this metric directly addresses biodiversity loss, enabling an 
assessment of the state of biodiversity change in relation to systematic loss. For 
several years, this metrics revealed highly effective in quantifying biodiversity 
changes in relation to drivers of great intensity (e.g. sulphur dioxide pollution), 
revealing trends of declining biodiversity (Cardinale et  al. 2012; Hooper et  al. 
2012). In taxonomic diversity metrics, this is considered the α biodiversity compo-
nent, which measures the diversity of spatially defined units (Magurran 2013).
Though undeniably useful to measure species loss, this metrics application has 
revealed some limitations. At the global scale, more than a sharp trend of systematic 
species loss over time, we seem to be witnessing consistent compositional shifts 
(Dornelas et al. 2014). These compositional shifts depict the β component of biodi-
versity that measures spatial or temporal differences in composition between com-
munities. The intensity and time of action of the drivers may be responsible for this. 
The most important drivers in the recent past (Fig. 7.4) have declined its intensity, 
while the new emerging ones have lower intensities at present, so only in a few 
years-time, with their continuous action, we will start to observe consistent declines 
(see Sects. 7.1.2 and 7.1.3). The adoption of measures to control industrial and 
urban pollutants emissions (e.g. sulphur dioxide or lead) has successfully reduced 
their levels in the atmosphere (Fenger 2009), since they peaked in late 1970s 
(Fig.  7.4). Since then, other drivers such as nitrogen pollution or even climate 
change, became more important (Fig.  7.4). Nonetheless, given their character, 
intensity, or still short time of action, they seem to trigger compositional shifts more 
than species loss (Balmford et al. 2003; Dornelas et al. 2014). This happens because 
species richness may not only be unresponsive, but it may also respond idiosyncrati-
cally or peak at intermediate levels of disturbance, potentially showing no signal of 
change (Mouillot et al. 2013). However, contemplating only metrics of the β com-
ponent of taxonomic diversity may also reveal insufficient from an ecosystem view-
point. They are unable to account for species functional redundancy or uniqueness 
in the ecosystems when such compositional shifts occur, disregarding species func-
tional role in the ecosystems (Petchey and Gaston 2006; Cadotte et al. 2011). For 
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example, in a recent work, while a decreasing trend was found for functional diver-
sity of several plant traits along a spatial climatic gradient in Mediterranean  drylands, 
no pattern was observed for species richness (Nunes 2017; Nunes et  al. 2017). 
Accordingly, other metrics that maximize tracking changes with a lowest effort 
should be considered in this context.
Thus, under intermediate driver’s intensity a trait-based analysis should perform 
better, whereas under a strong driver’s intensity a taxonomic analysis may be more 
cost-effective (Fig. 7.8).
7.3.3  Surrogates of Ecosystem Structure and Functioning 
Change from Remote Sensing
Making decisions regarding the conservation of biodiversity and the maintenance of 
ecosystem services, fostered the need to study indicators and/or surrogates that 
reflect the structure of ecosystems in a more in-depth way. Ecosystems are complex 
systems of energy and matter exchange, where a series of ecological processes oper-
ate at different scales and with different impacts on their functioning, dependent on 
their biodiversity. In turn, these processes respond to several drivers that can act 
simultaneously and interact, often in a non-linear way. This complicates how we 
can assess the integrity of ecosystems and the state of its processes.
Many of the indicators and/or surrogates used to measure the state of ecosystems 
do not consider the different effects that drivers have on the ecosystem they act 
upon, and on their degree of resilience. Measuring the impact on ecosystems is 
much more complex than measuring the drivers limiting or impacting them. 
Ecological indicators or surrogates are used to measure the effects of the drivers on 
the structure and functioning of ecosystems. They are used to communicate envi-
ronmental data to stakeholders by helping describe them in a simpler and more 
concise way, more easily understood and used by non-scientists to make manage-
ment decisions (Lindenmayer et  al. 2015). Ecological indicators can be used to 
diagnose the cause of an environmental problem, to assess the effects of environ-
mental conditions on ecosystem functioning or to provide an early warning signal 
in the event of changes in the environment. However, ecological indicators are 
expensive to use at the global scale, being commonly replaced by surrogates based 
on remote sensing. Before its use, the relationship between the ecological indicators 
and the surrogates must first be modelled (Fig. 7.3).
Of the six components of the Essential Biodiversity Variables, two can be com-
prehensively assessed by remote sensing, namely those related to ecosystem struc-
ture and ecosystem functioning (Pereira et al. 2013). Common examples include the 
use of NDVI – normalized difference vegetation index, as a surrogate of vegetation 
vigour (Gaitan et al. 2013), or the use of other wavelengths to infer measures of 
vegetation physiological status (Nestola et al. 2018). Remote sensing is also used to 
directly monitor species and populations, although this remains dependent on the 
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size of such species and populations (Vihervaara et al. 2017). Remote sensing mea-
sures, offer a major advantage over ground measurements of species and  populations 
in field assessments: they allow upscaling and/or generalizing spatial and temporal 
cover, which ground measures cannot provide. It also gives us the ability to look to 
ecosystems with a holistic perspective, for example allowing to look for critical 
thresholds resulting from multiple non-linear interactions (Scheffer et al. 2009), or 
to search for emergent properties, i.e., ecosystem properties that do not occur when 
ecosystems are considered isolated. The importance of remote sensing led to the 
development of the concept of the Satellite Remote Sensing – Essential Biodiversity 
Variables by the Group on Earth Observations – Biodiversity Observation Network 
(Pettorelli et al. 2016). Those are, within the Essential Biodiversity Variables, the 
ones that need remote sensing to be quantified.
Besides structure and functioning, the effects of many drivers related with biodi-
versity change can also be measured by remote sensing, including global change 
drivers like land-use change (Steffen et  al. 2015). However, the link that relates 
ecosystem structure and functioning surrogates to its drivers is still missing. As in 
Sect. 7.3.2 dealing with species and communities, it is important to use the response 
to drivers to select the most appropriate remote sensing surrogates of ecosystem 
structure and functioning. This link would not only allow a better selection of the 
most appropriate surrogates of ecosystem structure and functioning, but also to 
upscale the knowledge obtained through a modelling approach.
Modelling approaches can be more direct (e.g. modelling changes in vegetation 
density by NDVI caused by frequency of wildfires) or more mechanistic (e.g. mod-
elling the response of tree vitality to drought induced by climate change and medi-
ated by insect’s outbreaks). In either case, models’ contribution would highly 
support the use of remote sensing in estimating ecosystem structure and functioning 
as surrogates of Essential Biodiversity Variables. The inclusion of explicit links to 
drivers in these models provides a much needed generalization capacity, and the 
possibility to track change over time and space at larger geographical scales. More 
specifically, that link would support the GEO-BON Global Biodiversity Change 
Indicators “Species distribution in habitats” and “Biodiversity loss by habitat degra-
dation” (GEO BON 2015).
7.4  Final Remarks
There is a strong need for measuring biodiversity change and/or loss at the global 
scale and over time, to comply with all national and international conventions that 
protect species, habitats and ecosystems. Despite this, our main objective should be, 
at least, to live on Earth in a sustainable way, assuring the delivery of provision, 
cultural and regulation ecosystem services that allow our well-being. Measuring all 
forms of biodiversity everywhere and over time is an impossible task. That’s why 
the framework of Essential Biodiversity Variables was developed, reducing the 
forms of biodiversity to six types (“genetic composition,” “species populations,” 
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“species traits,” “community composition,” “ecosystem structure,” and “ecosystem 
function” (Pereira et al. 2013)). However, even reducing it to six forms of biodiver-
sity, it is not possible to measure all taxa relevant for the maintenance of the delivery 
of ecosystem services. Thus, we need to find good surrogates that can work as 
Biodiversity Change Metrics of the Essential Biodiversity Variables.
In this work, we expect biodiversity in the Anthropocene to be changed, in its 
different facets, by limiting and impacting drivers. We propose that a driver’s inten-
sity is determinant to the response of the different biodiversity change metrics. We 
expect low intensity drivers to influence the response of individual’s physiological 
performance, and propose  that Biodiversity Change Metrics should be 
ecophysiological- based in that case. At intermediate levels of driver’s intensity, we 
expect the most cost-effective Biodiversity Change Metrics to be trait-based. Finally, 
in situations of strong driver’s intensity we expect decreases in abundance and spe-
cies loss, proposing a taxonomic-based approach as the most cost-effective to detect 
biodiversity changes. We further discuss the use of remote sensing data to measure 
changes in some of these indicators or surrogates of Essential Biodiversity Variables, 
particularly those reflecting ecosystem structure and functioning, allowing to 
upscale and/or generalize spatial and temporal information.
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Chapter 8
Are Species Good Units for Biodiversity 
Studies and Conservation Efforts?
Thomas A. C. Reydon
Abstract While species have long been seen as the principal units of biodiversity, 
with prominent roles in biodiversity research and conservation practice, the long- 
standing debate on the nature of species deeply problematizes their suitability as 
such units. Not only do the metaphysical questions remain unresolved what kinds of 
things species are, and whether species are at all real, there also is considerable 
disagreement on how to define the notion of species for use in practice. Moreover, 
it seems that different organism groups are best classified using different definitions 
of ‘species’, such that species of organisms in very different domains of biodiversity 
are not generally comparable units. In this chapter I will defend and elaborate the 
claim that species are not good units of biodiversity, focusing in the issue of species 
realism. I will sketch a pragmatic notion of ‘species’ that can be used as an epis-
temic tool in the context of biodiversity studies, without however involving a view 
of species as basic units of biodiversity or as the focal, real entities in biodiversity 
conservation.
Keywords Species · Species concepts · Species problem · Units of biodiversity
8.1  Introduction
Biodiversity studies and conservation biology are rapidly growing fields of work, 
aimed, among other things, at mapping the diversity of life on our planet, studying 
its origins, assessing how humanity benefits from its presence, and achieving clarity 
about possible ways of preserving it (Ehrlich and Wilson 1991).1 The growth of both 
1 Conservation biology is a well-defined discipline with its own textbooks, journals, scientific soci-
eties, and so on. Biodiversity studies, in contrast, is a loose collection of disciplines (or perhaps 
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fields is fueled by a number of factors, one of which is the realization that still only 
a small fraction of the Earth’s extant biological diversity is known, and that many 
organism groups  – most importantly local populations and entire species  – are 
threatened with extinction, such that there is an urgency to map out our planet’s 
biological diversity and undertake appropriate conservation efforts before these 
have disappeared forever (e.g., Wheeler et al. 2012).
Studying and conserving biodiversity is not merely a matter of the disinterested 
acquisition of knowledge about the world we live in, though, nor is it a matter of 
simply wanting to preserve the world as we find it. The importance of mapping, 
studying and conserving biodiversity is related foremost to the availability of natu-
ral resources that are crucial to human survival and well-being, i.e., to the availabil-
ity of ecosystem services (Costanza et al. 1997; Dirzo and Raven 2003; Mace 2015; 
Hunter and Gibbs 2007: 348–349; Mace et al. 2012). Ecosystem services include 
resources such as clean water, clean air, arable land, fuel, building materials, and so 
on, as well as natural environments that can be used for recreative and aesthetic 
purposes. In addition, potential resources that as yet unexplored organism groups 
could provide for the production of new medicinal products, better foodstuffs, etc. 
constitute potential ecosystem services that support the value of biodiversity studies 
and conservation efforts (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008: 5–6). In sum, studying and 
conserving biodiversity is important because human survival and well-being 
depends on it.
Yet, notwithstanding the importance and rapid growth of biodiversity studies and 
conservation biology as academic fields as well as areas of activism and engage-
ment, they are faced with profound challenges. As highlighted in the Introduction to 
this volume, while the many practical challenges (due, among other things, to politi-
cal and economic interests making it difficult to achieve conservation targets) are 
widely recognized, conceptual challenges are much less widely discussed. As 
Casetta et al. rightly point out, “[w]hen biodiversity conservation is at issue, theo-
retical and practical matters go hand in hand, and practical challenges are inter-
twined with conceptual ones”.2 This chapter addresses such a conceptual challenge 
concerning the notion of ‘species’, and aims to resolve some conceptual difficulties 
to obtain a notion that is better suited for application in biodiversity studies and 
conservation biology. Considering that these fields are practice-oriented areas of 
work, it is surprisingly hard to pin down the meanings of many of their core 
concepts – a state of affairs that makes conceptual work a crucial prerequisite for 
practical interventions.
rather an interdisciplinary field of work) that are in some way or other concerned with earthbound 
biodiversity. The term ‘biodiversity studies’ is common in the literature (Ehrlich and Wilson 1991; 
Agapow et al. 2004; Raczkowski and Wenzel 2007), but is not used to denote a well-delimited set 
of disciplines. Ehrlich and Wilson (1991) conceive of biodiversity studies as combining elements 
of evolutionary biology, ecology, applied areas of biology (such as forestry, agriculture, and medi-
cine) and public policy, and see conservation biology as a subdiscipline of biodiversity studies. For 
the purposes of the present chapter, I think the term does not need to be specified in more detail 
beyond the meaning of “any area of work that studies biodiversity”.
2 Casetta, Marques da Silva & Vecchi, this volume.
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Consider for instance the notion of biodiversity itself. It is notoriously hard to 
define and is the topic of ongoing debate among philosophers of biology as well as 
biologists themselves (e.g., Purvis and Hector 2000; Hamilton 2005; Colwell 2009; 
Santana 2014, 2018; Faith 2016; Odenbaugh 2016; Burch-Brown and Archer 
2017).3 In its broadest sense, biodiversity simply means the diversity of living enti-
ties, of their parts, and of systems composed of them, at all levels of organization, 
from the genetic level all the way up to the ecosystem level (Hunter and Gibbs 2007: 
22; Odenbaugh 2016: Section 1). A simple definition of the term ‘biodiversity’ thus 
would be “the variety of all forms of life, from genes to species, through to the broad 
scale of ecosystems” (Faith 2016). In addition to the various levels of organization 
in the living world, biodiversity is studied with respect to a number of different 
aspects of living systems, such as the roles organisms play as parts of ecosystems 
or food webs (functional diversity), the specific morphological or behavioral 
properties shared by organisms of particular groups (trait diversity), their lines of 
descent (phylogenetic diversity), and so on. Colwell (2009: 257), for example, 
explains the notion of biodiversity as encompassing “the variety of life, at all levels 
of organization, classified both by evolutionary (phylogenetic) and ecological (func-
tional) criteria” and Dirzo and Raven (2003: 138) explain it as “the sum total of all 
of the plants, animals, fungi, and microorganisms on Earth; their genetic and phe-
notypic variation; and the communities and ecosystems of which they are a part.” 
Accordingly, there are various ways of conceiving of biodiversity that differ from 
one another in regard to the specific levels of organization and the specific aspects 
of living systems one is interested in. Biodiversity can be thought of as the genetic 
diversity in a local population, the species richness of a local community or region, 
the diversity of functional groups (such as primary producers, herbivores, etc.) in a 
particular ecosystem, the diversity of habitats making up an ecosystem, and so on. 
As a result, researchers often focus on only one or a few aspects of biodiversity, 
rather than assessing the biodiversity of a particular area as such. Note that this 
multidimensionality of the concept is precisely the reason for which some authors 
are skeptical about the concept’s scientific value: generally, it does not make much 
sense to talk about the biodiversity of a particular region or the biodiversity of planet 
Earth, because there are too many distinct aspects to consider and a region can be 
very diverse in some aspects and much less diverse in others (Santana 2014, 2018).
While ‘biodiversity’ thus is a multifaceted concept and the interests that guide 
work in biodiversity studies differ from those in conservation biology – the former 
being more aimed at producing scientific knowledge and the letter more oriented 
towards intervention and activism –,4 both fields use largely the same basic units to 
individuate groups of organisms and living systems of interest. Many studies and 
3 See also, in this volume, Toepfer, Chap. 18; Sarkar, Chap. 18; and Santana, Chap. 19.
4 Indeed, conservation biology is often conceived of as a “mission-driven discipline” and as “the 
applied science of maintaining the earth’s biological diversity” (Hunter and Gibbs 2007: 14; see 
also Soulé 1985: 727; Meine et al. 2006: 631; Odenbaugh 2016). The mission of the discipline is 
sometimes framed in terms of “healing” an ailing patient (Casetta, Marques da Silva, and Vecchi, 
Chap. 1, in this volume).
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interventions are aimed at a particular level of the taxonomic hierarchy, namely the 
species level. In the same way as species serve as the basic taxonomic units and as 
such constitute the basic kinds of organisms studied by biologists, they also count 
among the basic units of biodiversity and constitute targets of many conservation 
efforts. In this chapter, however, I want to argue that species are not good units of 
biodiversity and conservation, while at the same time trying to develop a pragmatic 
notion of ‘species’ that can be used in the context of biodiversity studies while 
avoiding the problems highlighted in this chapter. To do so, I will examine the main 
aspects of the role of species in biodiversity studies and conservation efforts from 
an epistemological and a metaphysical perspective. Section 8.2 sketches the central 
role of species in biodiversity studies and conservation efforts. In Sect. 8.3, I will 
look at relevant debates in the philosophy of biology as well as in biology itself to 
highlight epistemological and in particular metaphysical problems (connected to 
the reality of species) that confront the notion of species in these contexts. In Sect. 
8.4, I will suggest an alternative interpretation of the notion of species based on 
Darwin’s views that might better fit the role the notion of species plays in biodiver-
sity studies and conservation biology. Section 8.5 concludes.
8.2  Species as the Units of Biodiversity and Conservation
While biodiversity can be studied at a variety of levels of organization and with 
respect to a variety of aspects of living systems, one or more units of biodiversity 
are needed as a basis for comparisons between different areas of work and different 
studies. Without a common “currency”, the notion of biodiversity is meaningless. A 
number of biodiversity measures are currently in use, many of which (including 
species richness, species diversity, and species evenness) focus on species as basic 
units of biodiversity (Purvis and Hector 2000; Faith 2016: Section 2).5 Hamilton 
(2005: 90), for example, writes:
There are currently many definitions of biodiversity and most are vague, which probably 
reflects the uncertainty of the concept. Some consider it to be synonymous with species 
richness […], others see it as species diversity […], whereas many propound a much 
broader definition such as the ‘full variety of life on Earth’ […]. NRE [the Department of 
Natural Resources and Environment, State of Victoria, Australia] distinguish between 
native and introduced species, and others have put extra emphasis on threatened species 
[…].
Sometimes species are even considered to be the most important or the most funda-
mental units of biodiversity (e.g., Claridge et  al. 1997; Mace et  al. 2012: 20; 
Hohenegger 2014). Given the centrality of species as the basic taxonomic units for 
the whole of the life sciences as well as in the context of public representations of 
organismal diversity (in natural history museums, science centers, zoos, botanical 
gardens, etc.), putting species central seems an appropriate choice.
5 See also Crupi, Chap. 6, and Branquinho et al., Chap. 7, in this volume.
T. A. C. Reydon
171
Closely connected to their role as units of biodiversity is the central position that 
species occupy in conservation efforts. Similar to biodiversity studies, conservation 
biology is concerned with living entities and systems on all levels of organization 
from the genetic level up to the ecosystem level, and conservation efforts can be 
directed at the genetic diversity of a particular area or taxon, at taxa themselves, at 
communities or ecosystems, and so on. Even though “conservation biology […] 
does not yet have a general and coherent account of what should be conserved and 
why” (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008: 26) and the field has since the 1990’s been 
moving away somewhat from its earlier focus on species towards a focus on interac-
tions between people and their environments (Mace 2015: 1558–1559), species are 
still among the principal entities in focus. In part this is for historical reasons. One 
of the main factors that contributed to both the establishment of conservation biol-
ogy and the coining of the term ‘biodiversity’ in the 1980s was the realization that 
species extinction currently proceeds at a much higher rate than the natural extinc-
tion rate, and that this increased extinction rate is very probably due to the impact of 
the human population on the planet. Discussions of the causes of current biodiver-
sity loss (often referred to as the “sixth mass extinction”  – e.g., Barnosky et  al. 
2011; Ceballos et al. 2015, 2017) and of possible countermeasures tended to revolve 
around the extinction and conservation of local populations as representatives of a 
particular species in particular areas, as well as entire species (Soulé 1985; Meine 
et al. 2006: 637). Perhaps the best-known example of the ongoing centrality of spe-
cies in conservation efforts is the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species that catego-
rizes species according to the level at which they are threatened with extinction 
(Mace and Lande 1991; Mace et al. 2008; http://www.iucnredlist.org) and is widely 
used by researchers, NGOs, governments, politicians and the general public as a 
basis for conservation efforts. Another well-known example of the keystone role of 
species is the Convention on Biodiversity, which is aimed at facilitating biodiversity 
conservation and specifies that biodiversity “includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems” (see www.cbd.int, Article 2; emphasis added).
In addition to the historical focus on species in conservation biology, species also 
are sometimes highlighted in environmental ethics as morally relevant entities. In 
discussions on the normative aspects of human interactions with nature and the 
normative principles that could underwrite conservation efforts, several authors 
have argued that we have a moral obligation to preserve species, have attributed 
intrinsic value to species, or have argued that species should be counted among the 
entities toward which humans can have duties and obligations (e.g., Soulé 1985, and 
most famously Rolston 1975, 1985, 1995). Soulé (1985: 731), for example, writes: 
“Species have value in themselves, a value neither conferred nor revocable, but 
springing from a species’ long evolutionary heritage and potential or even from the 
mere fact of its existence.” Ignoring for the moment the question whether it makes 
sense at all to attribute intrinsic values to natural entities, such as individual organisms, 
species or ecosystems, it is clear that species are among the basic natural  entities 
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(along with individual organisms) that at least sometimes are seen as bearers of 
value in conservation contexts.6
Species, then, have long been among the principal units of biodiversity studies as 
well as one of the principal kinds of focal entities in conservation efforts. This role 
entails a number of epistemological and metaphysical requirements. For one, it 
seems that to be able to serve as units in biodiversity estimates of a particular area 
or as the subjects of biodiversity conservation efforts species must be real entities – 
at least it seems that for species to be entities that can become extinct or can be 
kept in existence by human efforts, or for them to be bearers of intrinsic value, they 
cannot be purely conventional or instrumental units and a minimal level of realism 
with respect to species is required. But if species are real entities, what exactly are 
they? This is the core issue in the long-standing debate on the nature of species, and 
it deeply problematizes the suitability of species as units of biodiversity.
In addition, not only do the questions what kinds of things species are and 
whether species are at all real entities remain highly controversial metaphysical 
issues, there also is considerable epistemological disagreement on how to best 
define the notion of species for use in practice. For practical purposes in biodiversity 
inventories and conservation contexts, species should possess an unequivocal and 
generally agreed upon epistemic status as well-delimited and recognizable groups 
of organisms that, by being groups at the same level of the biological hierarchy, are 
comparable throughout the whole of earthbound biodiversity. A species of fruit 
fly should be a similar kind of unit as a species of flowering plant, or a species of 
fungus – they all are species, after all, and not groups at higher or lower taxonomic 
levels. However, it seems that different organism groups are best classified using 
different definitions of ‘species’, such that species of organisms in very different 
domains of biodiversity are not generally comparable units.
The preceding issues suggest that species are not good units of biodiversity, that 
is, units that meet the various epistemological and metaphysical requirements for 
performing the roles assigned to them in biodiversity research and conservation 
practice. In what follows, I will explore this suggestion in more detail.
8.3  Why Species Are Not Good Units of Biodiversity 
and Conservation
A number of aspects of the role species play in biodiversity studies and conservation 
efforts are philosophically controversial. In this section, I will highlight four such 
aspects: the reality of species (and the connected issue of the naturalness of 
species), the role that species play as counting units, the idea that species should be 
targets of conservation efforts because they are repositories of genetic information, 
and the relation between species and ecosystem services.
6 I am sceptical about using notions of intrinsic value in general and in the context of environmental 
ethics in particular. This is an issue for another paper, though.
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A first issue that needs to be addressed is the reality and naturalness of species. 
If species are the sort of things that can come into existence in speciation events and 
go extinct, that can be attributed an intrinsic value, or can be counted in biodiversity 
surveys of particular areas, then surely they must be real things.7 If species are 
purely conventional units without any basis in nature, then what exactly are we 
counting in biodiversity inventories?8 The concept of species richness, for example, 
is the simple idea of the number of species in a particular area or system: “[E]cosystem 
A is easily recognized as more diverse than B or C because it has four species 
instead of three. This characteristic is called species richness or just richness, and it 
is a simple, commonly used measure of diversity” (Hunter and Gibbs 2007: 25).9 
For comparisons between ecosystems with respect to species richness to make 
sense, species counts must be counting real features of ecosystems – or at least 
features that are not purely conventional.
Accordingly, the view that species must be real entities is widespread among 
biologists. Cracraft, for example, writes:
Unless species concepts are used to individuate real, discrete entities in nature, they will 
have little or no relevance for advancing our understanding of the structure and function of 
biological phenomena involving those things we call species. […] If species are not consid-
ered to be discrete real entities […] then it implies that evolutionary and systematic biology 
would be based largely on units that are fictitious, whose boundaries, if drawn, are done so 
arbitrarily. It would also mean that most, if not all, of the processes that we ascribe to spe-
cies are concoctions of the mind and have no objective reality. Entities of postulated pro-
cesses must be real and discrete if those processes are to have much meaning. […] Unless 
a species concept can be used to individuate real-world entities, that concept will have 
limited utility for systematists getting on with their task of sorting out and understanding 
biological diversity. (Cracraft 1997: 327–328; emphasis added).
In a similar vein, Wilson writes:
Not to have a natural unit such as the species would be to abandon a large part of biology 
into free fall, all the way from the ecosystem down to the organism. It would be to concede 
the idea of amorphous variation and arbitrary limits for such intuitively obvious entities as 
American elms (species: Ulmus americana), cabbage white butterflies (Pieris rapae), and 
human beings (Homo sapiens). Without natural species, ecosystems could be analyzed only 
in the broadest terms, using crude and shifting descriptions of the organisms that compose 
them. Biologists would find it difficult to compare results from one study to the next. How 
might we access, for example, the thousands of research papers on the fruit fly, which form 
much of the foundation of modern genetics, if no one could tell one kind of fruit fly from 
another? (Wilson 1992: 38; emphases added).
7 Note that is not the case that only real things can be attributed a value. Here, however, species are 
thought to have intrinsic value, i.e., values that a species are supposed to have in and of themselves, 
and it is difficult to see how non-real things could be the bearers of such intrinsic values.
8 An additional problem is the following. If there indeed are too many different aspects of biodiver-
sity such that studying the biodiversity of a region does not make sense (see Sect. 8.1; Santana 
2014, 2018), a question is what species as units of biodiversity are supposed to represent. They 
cannot represent biodiversity as such, but only one or a few aspects of it. So, species could not be 
units of biodiversity without further qualification. At most, they could be units of some aspect(s) 
of biodiversity.
9 The authors make reference to a table in their book in which ecosystem A consists of four species, 
and ecosystems B and C three.
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And, as a final example, Mace expresses a strong view of the reality of species that 
involves the idea of objectivity: “the species rank is unique in the taxonomic hierar-
chy in that it has claim to objective reality, since gene flow is largely restricted 
within species […]. Almost all of the many variants on a species definition agree at 
least that species are real and distinct entities in nature […]” (Mace 2004: 711; 
emphasis added).
And there are empirical patterns that support this view. For example, the gener-
ality of the species-area curve, that plots species richness against area size, 
strengthens the suggestion that species are real things. The number of species in a 
particular area or ecosystem tends to be larger for larger areas or ecosystems. 
However, the number of species does not simply rise proportionally to the area, 
habitat or ecosystem size, but flattens out in a way that in island biogeography (and 
other contexts in which the areas are clearly delimited) is described by the equation 
S = cAz or log10(S) = log10(c) + zlog10(A), where S is the number of species and A 
the area.10 The corresponding species-area curve has the general form pictured in 
Fig. 8.1 and Fig. 8.2: it is a curve that for S plotted against A rises sharply near the 
intersection of both axes and smoothly flattens out with increasing area, and a 
straight line for logS plotted against logA. This is a semi-universal pattern – not 
one that holds up without exception and as a strict law of nature, but a pattern that 
10 The equation was first developed by Arrhenius (1921) and modified by Gleason (1922). See 
Connor and McCoy (1979: 794).
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holds up pretty well nonetheless.11 The species-area relationship “is often referred 
to as the closest thing to a rule in ecology” (Lomolino 2000: 17), and “one of the 
most general, best- documented patterns in nature” (Lomolino et  al. 2017: 449). 
Some authors even call it “one of community ecology’s few genuine laws” 
(Schoener, cited in McGuinness 1984: 423; Lomolino et al. 2017: 449).
For a pattern such as this to hold up so well, an epistemological requirement is 
that species must be uniquely countable (it must be possible to obtain clear species 
counts for areas and ecosystems) and comparable (species counts of different areas 
and ecosystems must have the same meaning).12 Metaphysically this implies a mini-
mal realism about species. With ‘minimal realism’ I mean the view that species are 
not completely artificial units, that is, units constructed by us without having any 
grounding in nature. Examples of such completely artificial units that are often 
mentioned in philosophical discussions are the group of all items that happen to be 
on my desk as I am writing this, or, for a biological example, the grouping of whales 
and fish together in one kind because they look very similar and live in water. 
Nothing prevents us from grouping things in this way or from referring to these 
groups in everyday or even scientific contexts if we feel this serves some purpose. 
But we cannot think of them as real groupings in nature – we could just as easily 
have grouped things differently (taking all items on the left half of my desk as one 
group and all items on the right half as another, or grouping whales with fish larger 
than a particular size and taking smaller fish as a distinct group), and in the case of 
whales and fish there are clear scientific reasons to deny the reality of the grouping. 
11 Although the pattern is strong, depending on sampling methods (e.g., how the sampling area is 
determined) and the model used to produce a species-area relationship on the basis of the data, 
different types of curves exist (see Scheiner 2003; Tjørve 2003, 2009).
12 Note that this does not necessarily entail that species counts must be comparable for all species 
throughout the living world and for all kinds of areas, habitats and ecosystems. But at the very 
least, comparability must be guaranteed for counts of, say, mammalian species in forests or avian 
species on islands. Comparability is affected greatly by sampling methods and the possibility of 
uniquely delimiting the areas in which species are sampled (see footnote 5), but here I will only 
address the issue of species.
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They are groups by convention, not because they represent some aspect of a natural 
order. For species-area curves to have scientific meaning, species cannot be artificial 
or conventional units in this sense, but must have at least some reality in nature.13
Indeed, the reality of species has long been a topic of discussion among philoso-
phers of biology as well as biologists (e.g., Rolston 1995; Cracraft 1997; Mishler 
1999, 2010; Bachmann 2001; Wilkins 2009; Claridge 2010; Richards 2010: 
Chapters 1 & 4; Kunz 2012; Slater 2013). As remarked above, there is a strong 
motivation for considering species to be real entities. Since the origins of biology as 
a science, species of organisms have been among the focal entities of research. They 
play an important role in nature conservation efforts. They are the basic constituents 
of the tree (or bush, or network) of life, as it is often presented in natural history 
museums. Species come into being in speciation events, participate in evolutionary 
processes, and go extinct. How could species not be real? But notwithstanding these 
strong motivations for assuming the reality of species, there are good reasons to 
doubt their reality. Perhaps the most important such reason is the persistent failure 
of biologists and philosophers of biology to agree what, exactly, species are. This is 
the metaphysical question at the heart of what has come to be known as “the species 
problem” (e.g., Mayr 1957; Stamos 2003; Reydon 2004, 2005; Wilkins 2009; 
Richards 2010). The problem has been a topic of debate at least since the publication 
of Darwin’s Origin of Species, and Darwin himself addressed it in the book 
(Ereshefsky 2010, 2011, 2014).
The problem has turned out surprisingly difficult and at present there exists a 
massive volume of literature on the topic, most of which is concerned with the 
plurality of species concepts that have been proposed over the years and are currently 
used in biological science. There are around two dozen competing explanatory 
definitions of the term ‘species’ (so-called species concepts) available in the lit-
erature (Mayden 1997, 1999; Wilkins 2009; Mallet 2013).14 Metaphysically, these 
definitions provide different views of what kind of things species are – populations 
or metapopulations, lineages, monophyletic groups of lineage segments, groups of 
morphologically and behaviorally similar organisms, groups of genetically similar 
organisms, groups of organisms that inhabit the same niche, or some combination 
of these characterizations – that roughly fall into the two main metaphysical catego-
ries of kinds and individuals. But none of the available definitions has gained 
 acceptance as the one, correct definition and the nature of species remains elusive. 
13 This brings us to the highly difficult metaphysical issue of what it means for something to be real. 
For reasons of space, I have tried to avoid delving into this discussion and I am assuming that it is 
intuitively clear what it means for something to be minimally real in the sense discussed here: to 
be minimally real means to have some foundation in the world as it is independently of us.
14 The exact number of species concepts (or definitions) proposed in the literature is unclear, and 
much depends on how one counts. Wilkins (2011) counts seven definitions and 27 variations and 
mixtures of those seven definitions, Mayden (1997, 1999) lists 22 definitions, and Lherminer and 
Solignac (2000) list 92 definitions. In the end, though, what matters is that there are multiple 
distinct and mutually incompatible definitions of the concept of species that are used side by side 
in biological science and yield mutually incompatible groupings of organisms into species (Reydon 
2005).
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The question thus remains what biodiversity inventories are counting and what con-
servation efforts – when successful – are preserving.
At present, the debate (that has been going on for more than 150 years) seems to 
have reached something of an impasse and it looks like we have run out of unex-
plored options that could break the deadlock between the available definitions. As a 
better metaphysical understanding of the nature of species as real entities in nature 
does not seem to be on the horizon, the suspicion is growing that the starting point 
of the quest – the assumption that species are real entities in nature – was wrong-
headed all along and species should be considered conventional, instrumental units 
after all. This latter view – species antirealism – can take two forms. One is the 
denial that species names such as Drosophila melanogaster or Quercus rubra refer 
to real entities – they refer to artificial groupings made by us for particular purposes 
but do not represent real groupings in nature (for an overview of this position, see 
Stamos 2003: Chapter 2; Wilkins 2009: 221ff.). This version of species antirealism 
entails that in nature there is no such things as a species – species are our inventions. 
The other form is the denial that the species category is a real category, while taking 
species names such as Drosophila melanogaster or Quercus rubra as referring to 
real entities.15 On this latter view, the entities referred to by means of species names 
may be real, but they are not members of one ontological category and thus are not 
comparable entities or units. Accordingly, there is nothing special about species: 
Drosophila melanogaster or Quercus rubra may be real entities in nature that are of 
interest in the sciences or in conservation efforts, but not because they are species.
The view that species are artificial groupings and in particular the view that the 
species category is not a real category (while species are real) may well strike many 
as odd. For the purposes of the present chapter, however, the precise ways in which 
one can be a species antirealist are less important than the point that realism about 
species is far from straightforward. The plurality of mutually incompatible explana-
tory definitions of the concept of species and the persistent problem of identifying 
one definition as the correct characterization of species strongly suggest that species 
are not real entities in nature (see Richards 2010: 10ff.). But the central role of spe-
cies in biological science and the existence of patterns such as the species-area 
curve suggest otherwise. What can be made of this situation? At the very least, the 
doubts raised here regarding the reality of species should raise doubts regarding the 
suitability of species as focal units in biodiversity studies and conservation efforts.
These doubts are deepened when looking at practices of species counts. A num-
ber of recent studies have shown that species counts are strongly dependent on the 
definition of ‘species’ that is used, and that large discrepancies can exist between 
species counts based on different species concepts. The number of endemic bird 
species in Mexico, for example, was found to vary between 101 when using the 
Biological Species Concept and 249 when using a version of the Phylogenetic 
Species Concept (Peterson and Navarro-Sigüenza 1999). Similarly, depending on 
the species concept that is used, the whitefly species complex Bemisia tabaci can be 
seen as a single species (using the Morphological Species Concept) or as a complex 
15 Ereshefsky (2010, 2011, 2014) suggested that this was Darwin’s view.
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of 24–28 species when species are identified according to reproductive isolation and 
phylogeny (Liu et al. 2012). In a meta-analysis of 89 studies, Agapow et al. (2004) 
found that using versions of the Phylogenetic Species Concept on average led to an 
increase of more than 48% in species counts as compared to counts based on non- 
phylogenetic species definitions, such as the Biological Species Concept. These 
increases in species counts were accompanied by decreases in population sizes and 
ranges, thus not only yielding more species, but also resulting in those species being 
threatened to a higher degree. Mace summarizes the problem as follows:
Without doubt, species need to be named and identified formally if they are to benefit from 
the conservationists’ sets of legislative and planning tools. Unfortunately, all lists of spe-
cies, and species richness measures generally, are extremely vulnerable to changes in spe-
cies definitions. As the species concept becomes narrower, or species are split for whatever 
reason, the length of the list increases. The units making up the list can also alter radically. 
(Mace 2004: 713).
In the face of such practical difficulties we should be cautious when attributing real-
ity to species in biodiversity studies and conservation contexts. It is crucial to ask 
what species counts mean, and why certain entities rather than others should be in 
focus of conservation efforts.
The problem is intensified by the fact that not only can different species defini-
tions be used to partition organisms of one group into species, but it seems that 
different organism groups are best classified using different species concepts. In 
addition, microbes (which constitute the largest part of biomass on Earth) are cur-
rently classified into species on the basis of a pragmatic definition of ‘species’ based 
on a number of conventions guided by the availability of analytic technologies (such 
as a level of genetic similarity above which organisms should be counted as mem-
bers of the same species), while it remains unclear to what extent (if at all) microbial 
species represent real groups in nature (Roselló-Mora and Amann (2001; Gevers 
et al. 2005; Doolittle and Zhaxybayeva 2009). This means that it is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to compare species groupings, species counts and the conservation 
status of species throughout the whole of biodiversity. If the same group of organ-
isms can be classified into species in different ways, and species of birds are very 
different kinds of groupings from species of, say, flowering plants, then how can we 
be sure that we have assessed the conservation status of species correctly and how 
can we make good decisions on conservation priorities (which involve the compari-
son of species with respect to their conservation status, after all)? Moreover, how 
can we attribute – intrinsic or extrinsic – values to species and use these valuations 
as the basis for conservation efforts, if the species we pick out depend strongly on 
the definition we use and thus seem to lack reality as natural entities? While the 
practical consequences of using different species definitions for biodiversity studies 
and conservation efforts are widely acknowledged in the biological literature, 
authors have proposed diverging view of how the problem should be dealt with 
(e.g., Cracraft 1997; Agapow et al. 2004; Mace 2004; Dillon et al. 2005; George and 
Mayden 2005; Garnett and Christidis 2007; Frankham et  al. 2012; Groves et  al. 
2017).
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Taking a closer look at some of the reasons for which conservation value is 
attributed to natural entities is illuminating in this respect. One such reason is the 
view that species are repositories of genetic information, such that conserving spe-
cies would be a way to conserve valuable genes and genotypes. For example, in the 
proceedings volume of the 1986 National Forum on BioDiversity, where the term 
‘biodiversity’ was coined, E.O. Wilson asserted: “Each species is the repository of 
an immense amount of genetic information. The number of genes range from about 
1,000 in bacteria and 10,000 in some fungi to 400,000 or more in many flowering 
plants and a few animals […]. A typical mammal such as the house mouse (Mus 
musculus) has about 100,000 genes.” (Wilson 1988: 7). For a number of reasons, 
this is a problematic basis for attributing value to species. For one, the view of spe-
cies as genetic repositories involves the assumption that species are real entities in 
which a certain amount of genetic information is stored. Moreover, it involves the 
assumption that the genetic information stored in a species is specific for that spe-
cies – i.e., that each species can be associated with a combination of genes that 
characterizes that species and distinguishes it from other species, such that in order 
to conserve specific genetic information we would need to conserve a particular 
species.
The quotation from Wilson suggests a comparatively simple view of a species’ 
genome as consisting of a countable number of well-individuated units – genes – 
that together constitute the genetic information contained in the species. Recent 
developments in the philosophy of biology as well as in biology itself, however, 
have shown the picture to be much more complex. One aspect of the problem is the 
current debate on what, exactly, genes are. While the notion of ‘gene’ was explicitly 
introduced as a technical term in biology in 1909 by the Danish geneticist Wilhelm 
Johannsen, originally it was a term without any concrete material referent and the 
concept’s meaning has been undergoing considerable change. Weber (2005: 227), 
for example, considered the notion of ‘gene’ a case of what he calls ‘freely floating 
reference’: biologists repeatedly began to use the term to refer to different kinds of 
DNA-segments as new molecular biological techniques became available, such that 
which entities were individuated as genes depended strongly on the investigative 
methods and techniques available, as well as on the specific interests of researchers. 
At present, it remains unclear what, exactly, genes are and how the notion of the 
gene is best conceptualized (Dietrich 2000; Griffiths and Stotz 2006, 2013). 
Thinking of the genetic information stored in a species in terms of the genes con-
tained in the species’ genome, then, is problematic. Thinking of genetic information 
in terms of whole-genome sequences does not constitute a better option. Even 
though colloquially references are often made to the human genome (International 
Human Genome Sequencing Consortium 2001; Venter et al. 2001) or the Arabidopsis 
thaliana genome (The Arabidopsis Genome Initiative 2000), it is clear that there is 
no unique, species-specific amount of genetic information stored in a species’ 
genome. It is a fundamental fact of evolution that the organisms within a species 
always exhibit genetic variation, which is often considerable, while at the same time 
there are widespread genetic similarities between distinct species. This makes it 
unclear to what extent one can think of a species (or “its” genome) as a repository 
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of genetic information. A better view might be to think of genetic information as not 
stored in species as such, but in small local populations in which genetic diversity is 
limited (but for the fundamental reason of intra-populational genetic variation this 
is problematic too).
Similarly problematic is a view of species as providers of ecosystem services – 
one other important reason to value natural entities. Ecosystem services, such as 
clean water, arable land, or recreational landscapes, are provided by entities located 
at higher levels of organization than species. Moreover, the ecosystems providing us 
with ecosystem services are not composed of species as such, but of local popula-
tions that are allocated to species. Local populations, then, seem better suited than 
species as units of biodiversity studies and conservation efforts. For a number of 
reasons, species  – either conceived as real entities in nature or as conventional 
groupings – are not well suited as focal units in these contexts.
8.4  What to Do with the Species Concept?
How can the notion of species continue to play a role in biodiversity studies and 
conservation efforts in the face of the problems highlighted in the preceding sec-
tion? To answer this question, I want to go back to early stages of the debate on the 
concept and draw clues from Darwin’s work.
In the Origin of Species, Darwin seemed to defend a view of species as artificial 
units that did not represent natural groupings. As he famously writes:
In short, we shall have to treat species in the same manner as those naturalists treat genera, 
who admit that genera are merely artificial combinations made for convenience. This may 
not be a cheering prospect; but we shall at least be freed from the vain search for the undis-
covered and undiscoverable essence of the term species. (Darwin 1859: 485; emphasis 
added).
While Darwin indeed seems to propose that species are not real, Ereshefsky (2010, 
2011, 2014) recently suggested that Darwin’s view only was that the species cate-
gory was not real while individual species could be thought of as real entities (see 
also the discussion above). But if this is correct, what should we make of Darwin’s 
use of the term ‘species’ – why did he even use ‘species’ in the title of his book?
Ereshefsky (2010: 409; 2011: 71; 2014: 83) suggested that Darwin used the term 
for mere pragmatic reasons without attributing theoretical meaning to it. In contrast, 
but without entering into detailed Darwin exegesis, I want to suggest that for Darwin 
the notion of species did have a theoretical meaning. In the Origin, about 60 pages 
before the above quotation and in a part of the text in which he refers to the only 
figure in the book (the famous tree or bush of life in Chapter IV of the Origin, 
depicted here in Fig. 8.3), Darwin writes the following:
I believe that the arrangement of the groups within each class […] must be strictly genea-
logical in order to be natural; but that the amount of difference in the several branches or 
groups […] may differ greatly, being due to the different degrees of modification which 
they have undergone; and this is expressed by the forms being ranked under different 
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genera, families, sections, or orders. […] [T]he natural system is genealogical in its arrangement, 
like a pedigree; but the degrees of modification which the different groups have undergone, 
have to be expressed by ranking them under different so-called genera, sub- families, families, 
sections, orders, and classes. (Darwin 1859: 420 & 422; emphasis in original).
Here, Darwin talks about higher taxa and explains that the ordering of species into 
higher taxa represents degrees of modification that distinguish species of different 
higher taxa from each other. While Darwin does not say that the grouping of 
organisms into species can in a similar way be seen as representing degrees of 
modification, I want to suggest that such an interpretation fits Darwin’s views and 
more generally would constitute a plausible way of treating the term ‘species’.
In the figure in the Origin, to which Darwin is referring (Fig. 8.3 here), descent 
with modification is represented by dotted lines fanning out from common origins 
(common ancestor species) indicated with A, B, C, …. The span between two 
horizontal lines, indicated with Roman numerals, represents a distance of 1000 
generations. Darwin explains:
After a thousand generations, species (A) is supposed to have produced two fairly well- 
marked varieties, namely a1 and m1. […] After ten thousand generations, species (A) is 
supposed to have produced three forms, a10, f10, and m10, which, from having diverged in 
character during the successive generations, will have come to differ largely, but perhaps 
unequally, from each other and from their common parent. If we suppose the amount of 
change between each horizontal line in our diagram to be excessively small, these three 
forms may still be only well-marked varieties; or they may have arrived at the doubtful 
category of sub-species; but we have only to suppose the steps in the process of modification 
Fig. 8.3 The descent-with-modification diagram from the Origin of Species. (Darwin 1859)
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to be more numerous or greater in amount, to convert these three forms into well- defined 
species: thus the diagram illustrates the steps by which the small differences distinguishing 
varieties are increased into the larger differences distinguishing species. (Darwin 1859: 117 
& 120).
As is well known, Darwin did not make a fundamental distinction between species 
and varieties. As he stated in a famous passage in the Origin:
I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of 
individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially differ from the 
term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating forms. The term variety, 
again, in comparison with mere individual differences, is also applied arbitrarily, and for 
mere convenience sake. (Darwin 1859: 52).
So, Fig. 8.3 can be interpreted as showing very gradual divergence of forms, where 
smaller divergences are given the status of varieties, larger divergences the status of 
species, still larger divergences that status of genera, and so on. Being attributed the 
status of species, then, means that a group of organisms has achieved a particular 
level of modification in comparison to its ancestor group and to other groups in the 
same time-slice – a level of modification larger than that of a variety but smaller 
than that of a genus. This view of species – as a status that is attributed to a group 
of organisms on the basis of how far it has “evolved away” from its ancestor – fits 
the interpretation that Darwin thought the species category is not real. Species do 
not constitute a separate kind of things that are part of the furniture of the world, as 
for instance electrons or gold atoms, but rather the notion of species refers to a level 
of evolution that groups of organisms can achieve.
While this may be seen as a somewhat peculiar view of what the notion of spe-
cies means – and as a view that is in conflict with much of what biologists say spe-
cies are, as well as with both of the main metaphysical views of species as being 
either natural kinds or individuals – it is a view that can also be found in early work 
in the Modern Synthesis. Dobzhansky, in an early issue of the journal Philosophy of 
Science, puts it thus:
Considered dynamically, the species represents that stage of evolutionary divergence, at 
which the once actually or potentially interbreeding array of forms becomes segregated into 
two or more separate arrays which are physiologically incapable of interbreeding. The fun-
damental importance of this stage is due to the fact that it is only the development of the 
isolating mechanisms that makes possible the coexistence in the same geographic area of 
different discrete groups of organisms. […] [D]evelopment of isolating mechanisms ren-
ders the differences between groups relatively fixed and irreversible, and permits them to 
dwell side by side without losing their differentiating characteristics. This, in turn, opens 
the possibility for the organisms dwelling together to become adapted to different places in 
the general economy of nature. The usage of the term “species” can and should be made to 
reflect the attainment by a group of organisms of this evolutionary stage. (Dobzhansky 
1935: 354; emphasis added).
As Dobzhansky explains in his book, Genetics and the Origin of Species: “[I]n the 
light of the evolution theories […] such concepts as race, species, genus, family, 
etc., have come to be understood as connoting nothing more than degrees of separa-
tion in the process of a gradual phylogenetic divergence.” (Dobzhansky 1937: 309; 
emphasis added). According to Dobzhansky, however, this does not mean that 
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species are arbitrary or purely conventional units, that is, arbitrary divisions of a 
continuum into discrete units: as long as real discontinuities exist in the array of 
living forms, these can be interpreted as the natural boundaries of species as natural 
units (Dobzhansky 1937: 306–307).
The basic idea is that wherever we find stable discontinuities between groups of 
organisms, these natural boundaries can be taken to delimit species. Because in 
sexually reproducing organisms discontinuities between morphological groups are 
supported by reproductive isolation between populations, Dobzhansky suggested to 
define the notion of species in such a way as to link species status to the presence of 
isolating mechanisms. But the main idea is that the term ‘species’ indicates the 
achievement of a particular degree of separation by an evolving group, no matter by 
means of which mechanisms or other causal factors this is achieved. The develop-
ment of reproductive isolating mechanisms by a group of organisms in Dobzhansky’s 
view underlies the achievement of a level of evolutionary independence that allows 
us to individuate species by means of their natural boundaries: “The stage of the 
evolutionary process at which this fixation [of the discontinuity] takes place is 
fundamentally important, and the attainment of this stage by a group of organisms 
signifies the advent of species distinction” (Dobzhansky 1937: 312).16 Note that 
achievement of this stage of evolution is not a yes-or-no matter, but a matter of 
degree: groups of organisms gradually develop isolating mechanisms, and may be 
more or less isolated from other groups. The term ‘species’ for Dobzhansky refers 
to this process stage and not to an ontological category of entities. As he empha-
sizes, his definition “lays emphasis on the dynamic nature of the species concept. 
Species is a stage in a process, not a static unit.” (Dobzhansky 1937: 312).
Drawing inspiration from Darwin and Dobzhansky, I want to suggest to take 
Dobzhansky literally and interpret the term ‘species’ as signifying a particular stage 
of the evolutionary process that evolving groups of organisms can achieve. The spe-
cies stage is characterized by comparative evolutionary independence: attributing 
species status to a population or other group of organisms means that it has reached 
a stage at which it has become sufficiently independent from other parts of the  system 
in which it exists for novel traits (or at least clearly different traits from those of other 
16 While Dobzhansky’s definition of ‘species’ may seem the same as Mayr’s widely used Biological 
Species Concept, there is an important difference between them. On the Biological Species 
Concept, species are a particular kind of breeding populations. That is, on this concept species are 
entities of a particular ontological category, i.e., the species category is a subcategory of the more 
general category of populations. On Dobzhansky’s definition, however, ‘species’ denotes a status 
that may be attributed to populations that have achieved a particular stage in the evolutionary pro-
cess: populations undergo a gradual process of modification in which at some point they may (or 
may not) achieve an evolutionary stage at which they exist as discrete groups next to other groups, 
marked by morphological and genetic discontinuities that are supported by reproductive isolation 
mechanisms. Accordingly, asexually reproducing and obligatory self-fertilizing organisms that do 
not develop reproductive isolating mechanisms also do not form species (Dobzhansky 1937: 321). 
But note that Dobzhansky did not define species as a kind of populations: any sort of group of 
organisms that reaches an evolutionary stage in which it exists as a discrete group can in principle 
be attributed species status (but Dobzhansky did emphasize reproductive isolating mechanisms of 
populations in this context).
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groups) to emerge and to become fixated in the population. As such evolutionary 
independence is a matter of degree and independence never is complete indepen-
dence, the corresponding attribution of species status is a matter of degree too.17
How exactly is this a different view of species from the ones reflected by avail-
able species concepts? While I do not have sufficient space in the present chapter to 
fully articulate the suggestion that a species is a stage in the evolutionary process, I 
want to point to some philosophical aspects of this suggestion by way of clarifica-
tion. Being a species is an accidental property, i.e., a property that a group of organ-
isms can come to have or lose without losing its identity. As was discussed above, 
the view of species as process stages involves a denial that the species category is a 
real category of entities. Much of the debate on the species problem has been fueled 
by the metaphysical question what species are – natural kinds, individuals, or some-
thing else (e.g., Ruse 1987). Accordingly, available species concepts tend to be 
explicative definitions of the metaphysics of species – they tell us what kind of enti-
ties species are, i.e., what kinds of entities constitute the ontological category of 
species. The two principal options in the debate are conceptions of species as a 
particular kind of natural kinds or a particular kind of individuals, but other options 
have been suggested too (for example, that species are processes  – cf. Rieppel 
2009). While one could perhaps think of process stages as real in some way, this 
would at least not be realism about entities of a particular kind. The entities that one 
would be a realist about, after all, are populations, metapopulations, lineages, 
clades, and other sorts of organism groups, i.e., entities of a number of different 
ontological categories. I would go further, though, and say that the attribution of 
species status to a group is an epistemological as well as normative attribution, and 
not a metaphysical one. To say that a group of organisms is a species is to say that it 
is a group – whatever its precise metaphysical nature – that has achieved a stage of 
evolution that is of importance to us in the light of evolutionary theory – it is a stage 
we highlight, because of its explanatory importance – and that we can value accord-
ingly. The claim that a group of organisms is a species thus does not entail anything 
regarding its metaphysics; in particular, it does not entail that it is a natural kind, an 
individual, a historical entity, and so on.
Similar suggestions have been advanced in the recent philosophical literature on 
species and natural kinds. As philosophers of science have increasingly begun to 
examine scientific practices (in the context of what has been called the “practice 
turn” in the philosophy of science  – Kendig 2016a: 3ff.), focus is increasingly 
placed on the question how scientific concepts are used in investigative practices, 
rather than on questions of what in nature these concepts represent. Kendig (2014, 
2016a, b), for example, has proposed that classificatory notions, such as ‘species’, 
‘natural kind’, and ‘homologue’, are best understood as denoting practices of 
17 Organisms always live interdependently in ecosystems, and often populations of organisms 
coevolve. In cases in which two populations coevolve – for instance a particular kind of plant and 
its specific pollinator – the two populations can be treated as independent in the sense of the pres-
ent discussion, as they each evolve their own novelties. Still, as coevolving populations they of 
course are dependent on each other. The notion of evolutionary independence that is in play here 
simply means for a population to have the ability to evolve its own novelties, and should not be 
read in too strong a manner.
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species- making and kind-making, that is, of the grouping of organisms into species, 
and of things more generally into natural kinds, on the basis of various epistemo-
logical and practical considerations. Accordingly, there are multiple ways of group-
ing organisms into species depending on which aspects of speciation, lineage-forming 
processes, inheritance processes, etc. one is interested in (Kendig 2014). Being a 
species, then, means being used by scientists in a particular context as a species. 
Similarly, the notion of natural kind can be understood as consisting principally in 
the making use of certain groups in investigative practices (Kendig 2016a: 6). And 
in a historical study of the notion of homology, Kendig (2016b) showed how the 
notion of homology is best understood as referring to a set of practices of comparing 
organisms and their traits, and how different biologists highlighted certain traits as 
homologous on the basis of different theoretical grounds and investigative interests. 
What happens, in sum, is that scientists make groups of entities, organisms, and 
traits, and attribute some of those groups the status of natural kind, species, or 
homologue on the basis of a variety of theoretical and practical grounds. Different 
grounds yield different, oftentimes incompatible groupings of the same entities, 
while no particular grouping can be said to yield the natural kinds, the species, or 
the homologues in a particular domain of nature.
In a similar fashion, Slater (2013, 2015) recently suggested that we should not 
try to develop a philosophical account of what natural kinds are, but rather should 
think of “natural kindness” as a kind of status that things can have on epistemologi-
cal grounds (Slater 2013: 150; 2015: 378).18 On Slater’s view, rather than thinking 
of natural kinds as an ontological category of entities, we should think of “being a 
natural kind as a sort of status that things or pluralities of things (from various onto-
logical categories) can have” (Slater 2015: 407), where the degree to which some-
thing can be attributed the status of natural kind corresponds to the degree to which 
it supports inferential practices in a particular context. The status of natural kind-
ness, Slater emphasizes, is domain dependent: something may have that status in 
one domain of work but not (or to a lesser degree) in another (Slater 2013: 172). 
Slater thus takes the problem of natural kinds out of the domain of metaphysics and 
puts it squarely into the domain of epistemology: saying that something is a natural 
kind is attributing a particular epistemic status to it to a particular degree. In this 
case the epistemic status is that of being useful as a basis for inferences (where 
groups that are better suitable as bases for inferences have this status to a higher 
degree). The precise metaphysics underlying this status is secondary, and can take 
very different forms in different cases. Some things that we attribute the status of 
natural kind to belong to the ontological category of individuals, while others belong 
to other categories.19
18 Slater (2013: 107 & 150) says that his account is a characterization of natural kindness as an 
adjective rather than of the nature of natural kinds as an ontological category.
19 Note that here I am not endorsing Slater’s account of natural kindness, nor am I claiming that it 
is an adequate interpretation of species as natural kinds. All I want to do is to highlight the similar-
ity between Slater’s approach to the notion of natural kinds and my approach to the notion of 
species.
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The view of species proposed here fits taxonomic practice. Take for example the 
recent discovery of a new species of orangutan (Nater et al. 2017; Reese 2017). In 
the 1930s, explorers reported the existence of a small, isolated population of orang-
utans in the Tapanuli district in North Sumatra. Only after reading the reports in the 
mid-1990s did scientists start to look for the population again and eventually man-
aged to find nests, the remains of a female orangutan and finally in 2013 one male 
that was killed by local inhabitants. On the basis of comparisons of the skull of the 
male specimen with 33 museum specimens of the two already described species of 
orangutans, Pongo pygmaeus (the Bornean orangutan) and Pongo abelii (the 
Sumatran orangutan), as well as genetic comparisons of 37 orangutan specimens, 
biologists identified the population as a new species, Pongo tapanuliensis. As the 
authors write, the species “encompasses a geographically and genetically isolated 
population found in the Batang Toru area at the southernmost range limit of extant 
Sumatran orangutans” (Nater et al. 2017: 3488). The central factor in the individu-
ation of the local population as a new species, rather than a mere morphological 
variety of one of the extant species of the genus Pongo was its evolutionary indepen-
dence from the other groups, as evidenced by morphology and genetics. As the 
authors write: “P. tapanuliensis and P. abelii have been on independent evolutionary 
trajectories at least since the late Pleistocene / early Holocene” (Nater et al. 2017: 
3491–3492). While the researchers found morphological differences with the 
Sumatran orangutan, they also found that P. tapanuliensis is genetically more 
closely related to P. pygmaeus, from which it diverged much later, than to P. abelii. 
P. tapanuliensis thus has its own evolutionary identity in distinction of the group of 
orangutans living on the same island, Sumatra, and due to the geographical separa-
tion of the group of orangutans living on Borneo, it had its own evolutionary iden-
tity in distinction of that group too.20
How does the view of species as evolutionary process stages, and of the attribu-
tion of species status to groups as epistemological and normative attributions rather 
than metaphysical statements, affect biodiversity studies and conservation efforts? 
First, on the view of species suggested here species counts cannot be seen as counts 
of the real entities of a particular kind that exist in that area or ecosystem. Still, spe-
cies counts are meaningful when thinking of them as counts of groups of organisms 
that share an important property, namely comparative evolutionary independence. 
When it comes to counting species in the context of making inventories of an area’s 
or ecosystem’s biodiversity it is crucial to count things that are comparable, and 
while on the view proposed here species cannot be seen as entities of the same kind, 
they still are comparable as entities that we highlight for the same epistemological 
reasons as the units in which evolutionary novelties can arise. For the same reason, 
evolutionary independence is an important basis for attributing conservation value 
20 The newly discovered species has immediately come in focus in conservation efforts. Because of 
its small population size of less than 800 individuals, biologists have expressed concerns for the 
survival of the population, implying an urgent need for conservation measures (Nater et al. 2017: 
3493; Reese 2017).
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to groups of organisms: conserving groups that have a comparative evolutionary 
independence means conserving evolutionary potential.21
In conservation biology, these ideas are sometimes embodied in the – ill-defined – 
concept of Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU). An ESU is a population or other 
group of organisms that stands at the focus of conservation efforts because of its 
evolutionary significance, where evolutionary significance is fleshed out in terms of 
evolutionary heritage (e.g., significant divergence from other groups, or represent-
ing an important aspect of a species’ evolutionary legacy) and evolutionary poten-
tial (Moritz 1994; Crandall et  al. 2000; Casacci et  al. 2013). Waples (1995: 9) 
perhaps expressed the idea of evolutionary sugnificance most clearly in specifying 
that “[t]he evolutionary legacy of a species is the genetic variability that is a product 
of past evolutionary events and that represents the reservoir upon which future 
evolutionary potential depends.” As usually conceived, ESUs are units below the 
species level, even though several authors have pointed out that in principle an ESU 
can coincide with a species (Moritz 1994: 374; Casacci et al. 2013: 183). Ryder, 
who introduced the ESU concept in the literature, for example suggested that rather 
than attempting to conserve all subspecies and varieties of a threatened species 
conservation focus in zoos should be placed on subspecies that represent significant 
adaptive variation and “zoos ought properly to address the conservation of 
evolutionarily significant units (ESUs) within species” (Ryder 1986: 9–10). Ryder 
noted that an alternative for the ESU concept could be the concept of evolutionarily 
significant population (ESP), thus highlighting that ESUs are not themselves 
species, but smaller units. Accordingly, conservation biologists may find that a spe-
cies encompasses multiple ESUs that each should stand at the focus of conservation 
efforts. An example is the case of White Sands pupfish (Cyprinidon tularosa), where 
researchers have argued that two populations constitute distinct ESUs, where “[l]oss 
of either of the two ESUs of White Sands pupfish would result in a substantial loss 
of the evolutionary legacy of this species” (Stockwell et al. 1998: 219).
Dobzhansky’s view of species as groups of organisms that have achieved a par-
ticular stage in the evolutionary process and the ESU concept express similar views 
of why some groups of organisms are highlighted as being of particular interest to 
us. First, species and ESUs do not exist independently of our interests, but rather the 
status of species or ESU is attributed by us to certain groups of organisms on the 
basis of theoretical considerations. Second, these considerations are fundamentally 
connected to evolutionary theory: species and ESUs are of particular importance 
because they represent important aspects of the evolutionary process. And third, 
both Dobzhansky’s view and the ESU concept highlight that species and ESUs are 
important because of their evolutionary (that is, adaptive) potential. Dobzhansky’s 
view and the ESU concept differ, however, by focusing on different taxonomic 
levels.
21 Note that I am not suggesting that this is the only or even the most important basis for attributing 
a conservation value to a group of organisms. It merely is one such basis among many, as we may 
attach value to a group of organisms for a plethora of reasons.
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On the view of species suggested here, then, populations and other groups of 
organisms should not be targets of conservation efforts because they would repre-
sent or instantiate a species that we want to retain in existence.22 Nor should their 
species status be thought of as what we would want to conserve: in general, we do 
not want to retain the species in the evolutionary state in which it happens to be, 
but we want to conserve its potential for future evolution. Summarizing, on the 
view of the meaning of ‘species’ proposed here, what we count in species counts 
and focus on in conservation efforts are entities to which we attribute the same 
epistemological and normative status – the status of species –, even though that 
status may be underwritten metaphysically in very different ways for different 
kinds of organisms.
8.5  Concluding Remarks
I have started out this chapter by noting that species are usually seen as core units in 
biodiversity studies and conservation biology, and asking whether species indeed 
are good units in these contexts. My answer has been negative: the philosophical 
problems regarding the species concept are such that we cannot safely assume that 
species are real entities (entities existing independently of us in nature) or natural 
units. But the notion of species can still be used as a basis for biodiversity invento-
ries and value attributions in conservation biology if the notion of species is inter-
preted differently.
I have suggested an interpretation of the species concept that would fit biodiver-
sity studies and conservation biology better than views of species as constituting a 
particular category of real entities in nature. Contrary to recently advanced views 
but in line with Darwin’s and Dobzhansky’s views of species, I have suggested that 
the species concept does have theoretical significance, even though metaphysically 
one cannot say that the species category is real. Species as such are not real entities 
in nature, but grouping organisms into species is not a matter of mere convention 
either. The meaning of the species concept is connected to evolutionary reality in 
that attributions of species status to evolving populations reflects the achievement of 
populations of a degree of evolutionary independence that allows them to evolve 
their own adaptations and maintain their identity in distinction of other populations. 
22 Let me try to clarify this point. Often, local populations or other local groups of organisms are 
said to represent species (“Species x is represented in five countries by twelve populations.”) or to 
instantiate species (“Species x is instantiated in twelve populations spread over five countries.”). To 
be sure, this is an imprecise way of speaking. The point, though, is that usually species and popula-
tions are seen as two distinct entities between which there can be a relation such as representation, 
instantiation, etc. The species is seen as a larger entity (an abstract kind, a lineage, a collection of 
populations, or something else) than the population “out there” in the field. On the account pro-
posed here, however, ‘species’ is a status attributed to a group of organisms such as a population, 
so there cannot be a relation of representation, instantiation, or otherwise between the group of 
organisms to which we attribute that status and “its” species.
T. A. C. Reydon
189
Whether or not this can be seen as a (weak) realism about species is a question I 
want to leave open here, as my aim is not to defend a particular metaphysical posi-
tion in the species debate. Also, it should be noted that my aim was not to devise an 
overall account of the species concept for the whole of the life sciences: my focus 
was on the meaning of ‘species’ for the purposes of biodiversity studies and conser-
vation biology, and I leave open whether the view proposed here would be appli-
cable throughout the whole of biology. And I have largely ignored core topics in the 
philosophy of biology regarding species, such as the monism-pluralism debate, the 
kinds-individuals debate, and other issues.
Suffice it to say that although there is no category of species as entities in the way 
there is a category of electrons or a category of cells, there are real entities (groups 
of organisms of various metaphysical categories) that can be attributed an epistemo-
logical and normative status on the basis of their having achieved evolutionary inde-
pendence (that is, their having achieved some degree of “speciesness”). Putting 
those entities at the focus of biodiversity studies and conservation efforts (in a simi-
lar way as is suggested by the Evolutionary Significant Unit concept) means putting 
local populations and other groups of organisms as parts of landscapes and ecosys-
tems in the foreground, moving away from the conservation of species as an aim of 
conservation efforts, but retaining the notion of species as a theoretically meaning-
ful notion in biodiversity studies and conservation biology.23
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Chapter 9
Why a Species-Based Approach 
to Biodiversity Is Not Enough. Lessons 
from Multispecies Biofilms
Jorge Marques da Silva and Elena Casetta
Abstract In recent years, we have assisted to an impressive effort to identify and 
catalogue biodiversity at the microbial level across a wide range of environments, 
human bodies included (e.g., skin, oral cavity, intestines). This effort, fostered by 
the decreasing cost of DNA sequencing, highlighted not only the vast diversity at 
the microbial level but also the importance of cells’ social interactions, potentially 
leading to the emergence of novel diversity. In this contribution, we shall argue that 
entities other than species, and in particular multispecies biofilms, might play a 
crucial—and still underestimated—role in increasing biodiversity as well as in con-
serving it. In particular, after having discussed how microbial diversity impacts eco-
systems (Sect. 9.1), we argue (Sect. 9.2) that multispecies biofilms may increase 
biodiversity at both the genetic and phenotypic level. In Sect. 9.3 we discuss the 
possibility that multispecies biofilms, both heterotrophic and autotrophic, are evolu-
tionary individuals, i.e. units of selection. In the conclusion, we highlight a major 
limitation of the traditional species-based approach to biodiversity origination and 
conservation.
Keywords Microbial diversity · Biofilms · Biological individuality
9.1  Microbial Biodiversity and Bacterial Modes of Living
Microbial biodiversity is essential for life and conserving it shall be a primary con-
cern both to sustain human health and ecosystems wellbeing. As a matter of facts, 
microbial biodiversity decisively affects the functioning of ecosystems (Falkowski 
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et al. 2008; van der Heijden et al. 2008), being largely responsible for their metabo-
lism and biomass. Microbes set the level of primary production, drive decomposi-
tion and convert organic matter so that it can be used by plants, and contribute to 
climate regulation. Moreover, microbial biodiversity is fundamental in sustainable 
development, in virtue of its industrial and commercial applications such as, for 
instance, sustainable removal of chemical pollutants from the environment, or the 
employment of bacteria as pesticides (Qaim and Zilberman 2003). In terms of eco-
system services, its value is enormous.
On the basis of FAO’s data, the economic value of microbial functions, once 
converted in terms of the ecosystem services microbial diversity contributes to, 
amounts to 500 billion US$ per year for soil formation on agricultural land; 90 for 
nitrogen fixation for agriculture; 42.5 for pharmaceuticals; 1.3 for the synthesis of 
industrial enzymes (Table  9.1, Bell et  al. 2009: 125). But the involvement of 
microbes in ecosystem functioning, and in every aspect of our life is so pervasive 
and so intimate that it is probably impossible not to underestimate the value—the 
monetary value as well—of microbial diversity.
In spite of its pivotal importance, the role of biodiversity at the microbial level is 
usually ignored in the debates concerning the so-called biodiversity crisis as well as 
by conservation policies and actions, mainly centred on animals and plants. Yet, the 
total biomass of bacteria and archaea has been estimated to equate that of terrestrial 
and marine plants, making microbes the largest unexplored reservoir of biodiversity 
on earth (Whitman et al. 1998). To get an idea, think that each millilitre of water in 
oligotrophic environments, such as deep oceans or deep subsurfaces, contains 
approximately 1  ×  105 bacterial cells, most of them in a dormant starving state 
(Kjelleberg 1993) and that each gram of soil contains between 2000 and 8.3 million 
species of bacteria (Roesch et al. 2007).
Among the reasons for this neglect there is, of course, the fact that microbes are 
far less appealing than charismatic taxa such as the giant panda or the Siberian tiger, 
and policies based on the motto “save the Bacillus thuringiensis” must not sound 
very catchy to a politician looking for votes.1 Besides political reasons, there are 
difficulties connected with the assessment of microbial biodiversity. Firstly, most 
microbial strains are difficult to be cultured in the laboratory. Secondly, microbes 
typically live as interacting communities, and the number of individual bacteria to 
identify is simply too large to permit a proper survey of the composition of the 
 community (think that a poor environment such as drinking water has thousands of 
microbial individuals per millilitre). As a consequence, the diversity of microbial 
communities is still largely unknown (Bell et  al. 2009). Thirdly, the majority of 
microbial communities are multispecies communities, and there is an ongoing con-
troversy in settling how these species should be defined and identified (Doolittle and 
1 And yet, the usefulness of Bacillus thuringiensis is well recognised, since some of its strains, dur-
ing sporulation, produce toxins. These toxins target insects’ larvae, acting as a natural insecticide; 
and they do not target humans, hence being—unlike the majority of artificial pesticides—relatively 
innocuous. (A more controversial matter is, of course, the use of Bacillus thuringiensis genes in 
GM crops, such as Bt corn.)
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Papke 2006; Achtman and Wagner 2008; Ereshefsky 2010; O’Malley 2014).2 
Setting aside the unresolved theoretical aspects of the problem, which are not of our 
concern here, microbial species are normally recognised amongst microbiologists, 
at least for practical purposes, and expressions like “multispecies community” and 
“multispecies biofilm” are commonly used. For instance, a convention is largely 
adopted that two individual microbes are of the same species when they share an 
arbitrary degree of DNA sequence similarity—often, 97% is taken as the threshold 
(Bell et al. 2009: 124).
As said, microorganisms rarely live alone; more typically they live in communi-
ties. When such communities comprise a thin layer of cells irreversibly adhering to 
a (biotic or abiotic) surface or interface and produce a matrix of slime-like extracel-
lular polymeric substances (EPS)  – mainly polysaccharides, proteins and nucleic 
acids – in which they become embedded, they are called “biofilms”. They can include 
microorganisms of just one kind (monospecies biofilms) or they can be composed—
and more often so—of different species of bacteria, or even of different types of 
microorganism, both prokaryotic (bacteria, archaea) and eukaryotic (fungi, protists, 
algae) (Besemer 2015). Biofilms are the major mode of microbial life (Nadell et al. 
2016), and multispecies biofilms are the dominant form in nature (Elias and Banin 
2012). They “might lack the grandeur of a tropical rain-forest, but not their complex-
ity, or their significance in terms of ecosystem function” (Hansen et al. 2007a).
In several cases biofilms are enemies hard to destroy, being more resistant to 
antibiotic treatments than bacteria at the planktonic state (as, for instance, is the case 
for oral biofilms or Pseudomonas aeruginosa biofilms which infect lungs of cystic- 
fibrosis- affected patients). In other cases, they play a crucial role for ecosystem 
functioning, contributing substantially to biogeochemical processes and to the 
maintenance and promotion of biodiversity. To show their role in general ecosystem 
maintenance and in promoting biodiversity—not only at the microbial level but also 
at the macrobial level, such as plants or animals—the example of plants’ biofilms is 
illuminating.
Plant surfaces and the rhizosphere are rich of multispecies biofilms, which grow 
attached to plants’ transport vessels, stems, leaves, and roots, helping maintain bio-
diversity both at the microbial and at the plants’ level. One way they help conserve 
biodiversity at the microbial level is by ensuring the survival of bacteria they are 
made of in harsh environments (Angus and Hirsch 2013; Bogino et al. 2013). In fact, 
bacteria that compound the biofilm are provided by the EPS with a protection that 
they do not have in their planktonic state. EPS protects them against environmental 
stress factors, allowing them to better face fluctuating environmental conditions 
such as desiccation, changes in pH or in temperature, or scarce availability of nutri-
ents, which may derive both from casualties and from human activities, for instance 
2 This is part and parcel of the so-called “species problem” (see for instance Richards 2010), i.e. the 
problem of defining, delimiting, and identifying species. These tasks are particularly controversial 
when asexually reproducing organisms—like a large part of microorganisms—are at issue; parti-
sans of the biological species concept such as Dobzhansky (1937) and Mayr (1970), for instance, 
simply claim that asexually reproducing organisms do not form species at all.
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as a consequence of climate change or deforestation. Biofilms have also effects on 
plants’ health and productivity (of course, depending on the kind of biofilms, these 
effects can be beneficial or detrimental to the host plant). For instance, certain bac-
teria in the EPS matrix seem not only to improve biocontrol—i.e. the protection of 
plants from phytopathogens—but also stimulate plant growth by secreting specific 
hormones and by means of a variety of other mechanisms, hence representing sus-
tainable alternatives to agrochemicals (Bogino et al. 2013; Lugtenberg et al. 2013). 
In short, “biofilms have been shown to enhance not only the fitness of individual 
bacteria but also plant health and productivity as a result of the cumulative selective 
advantage of the individual bacteria” (Bogino et al. 2013, p. 15849).
To generalise, at the ecosystem’s level, a fundamental functional role is played 
by two kinds of multispecies autotrophic biofilms (i.e. multispecies biofilms which 
are able to synthesise their own organic food from inorganic substances – opposite 
to heterotrophic biofilms, which depend on other organisms or on dead organic 
matter for food, since they do not synthesise their own food), namely aquatic pho-
tosynthetic multispecies biofilms and land biological soil crusts (BSCs), which we 
shall discuss in more detail in Sect. 9.3. Photosynthetic biofilms form the basis of 
trophic chains in many aquatic environments, as is the case with diatom (a major 
group of microalgae)-dominated intertidal microphytobenthos (MPB) on estuaries 
(Macintyre et al. 1996). The EPS produced by MPB diatoms promote the aggrega-
tion of sediment particles and therefore crucially impact the stabilisation of estua-
rine intertidal mudflats (Paterson and Black 1999). A similar ecological role in 
terrestrial ecosystems is played by the EPS produced by the cyanobacteria of 
BSCs (Eldridge and Leys 2003; Adessi et al. 2018).
MPB are diatom-dominated communities that cover estuarine mudflats (epipelic 
MPB) and sandbanks (epipsamic MPB). Epipelic MPB is particularly relevant for 
ecosystem functioning, as it is largely responsible for the high primary productivity 
of intertidal mudflats, which in turn are important components of estuarine produc-
tivity (Underwood and Kromkamp 1999 – in Stal and de Brouwer 2003). This inter-
tidal microphytobenthos living on soft-sediment habitats is composed mostly of 
motile diatoms exhibiting rhythmic vertical migrations across the photic zone (i.e. 
the uppermost layer) of the sediment in close synchronisation with tidal and day/
night cycles (Round and Palmer 1966; Paterson 1986). It should also be mentioned 
that the hidden beauty of MPB communities has been praised by biologists (Marques 
da Silva 2015), who referred to them as “the secret gardens” (Macintyre et al. 1996) 
since under the microscope lens they reveal unexpected beauty. In addition to their 
indisputable ecological role then, a further contribution to biodiversity can be high-
lighted for MPB, namely their aesthetic value—an item included amongst ecosys-
tem services (for instance by Costanza et al. 1997, p. 254, who refer to “aesthetic, 
artistic, educational, spiritual, and/or scientific values”).
Diatoms, just like bacteria, excrete EPS which are believed to contribute to the 
cohesion of intertidal mudflats (Paterson and Black 1999). MPB are then biofilms in 
their own right, as cells occupy a thin layer over the surface of a substrate, and they 
are immersed in an EPS matrix produced by them—the two requirements to classify 
a microbial community as a biofilm (as seen  above). They are multispecies, 
eukaryotic- dominated, photosynthetic biofilms.
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A similar ecological role is played, in terrestrial ecosystems, by the EPS pro-
duced by the cyanobacteria of biological soil crusts (Eldridge and Leys 2003). 
Biological soil crusts are complex assemblages of cyanobacteria and other bacteria, 
green algae, mosses, microfungi, lichens. Cyanobacterial filaments and fungal 
hyphae (and sometimes also lichen and moss rhizoids), present on the few top mil-
limetres of soil, stick together loose particles, making a matrix that stabilises and 
protects the soil surface from the erosive forces of wind and rainfall. They also func-
tion as living mulch by retaining soil moisture (Adessi et al. 2018) and discouraging 
annual weed growth. Although compositionally diverse, these crusts occur in all 
arid and semi-arid regions, where they occupy the nutrient-poor zones between veg-
etation clumps in many types of arid-land vegetation. In some plant communities, 
they may constitute up to 70% of the living cover, fixing atmospheric nitrogen and 
significantly contributing to soil’s organic matter. Yet, biological soil crusts have 
only recently been recognised as having a key influence on terrestrial ecosystems. 
Their role on biodiversity is also significant because, in arid and semi-arid commu-
nities, there are often many more species associated with the biological soil crusts 
at a given site than there are vascular plants (Belnap et  al. 2001 and references 
therein). Bare soil is initially colonised by cyanobacteria. Later, if the environmen-
tal conditions are favourable, ecological succession may progress to more structur-
ally complex biological crusts, forming a rough, uneven carpet or skin of low stature 
(1–10 cm in height) dominated by bryophytes (i.e. non-vascular land plants). Here 
we will focus mainly on cyanobacteria-dominated BSCs, common on early succes-
sional stages of soil colonisation. Although rarely defined as biofilms, these crusts 
meet the criteria for being biofilms: they exist as a thin layer at the interface between 
soil and air and are embedded in a matrix formed by the cyanobacteria-produced 
EPS.
9.2  How Multispecies Biofilms Increase Phenotypic 
and Genetic Diversity
Besides contributing to the maintenance of biodiversity at macrobial levels of bio-
logical organisation, there are several ways in which multispecies biofilms increase 
biodiversity at the microbial level and help maintain it. In this section, we shall see 
how they increase phenotypic and genetic diversity. Then, in Sect. 9.3, we are going 
to argue that, in virtue of being putative evolutionary individuals they, first, prompt 
a general reflection on the processes originating biodiversity and, secondly, high-
light some limits of the species-based approach to biodiversity conservation.
Phenotypic diversity is the diversity of phenotypes in a population. Biofilms pro-
mote the emergence of new microbial phenotypes, increasing, as we are going to 
show, biodiversity both at the level of the monospecies colony and at the biofilm 
level. Being related to different fitness values in a population, phenotypic diversity 
is crucial for the survival and possible evolution of a species. According to some, 
“phenotypic diversity is the most important aspect of biodiversity, at least in terms 
of evolution by natural selection of organisms” (Woods 2000, p. 44ff). To under-
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stand how and why biofilms promote phenotypic diversity, we need to briefly illus-
trate how they form.
Biofilm formation is a complex process typically including 5 phases. The first 
phase is primary adhesion, namely the initial—and reversible—attachment of cells 
to a surface or an interface. It is worth noting that because of the small size of bacte-
rial cells, gravity plays a negligible role, and the approach of cells to substrates is 
mostly due to their motility. When cells come close to the substrate, the balance 
between attraction and repulsion forces will dictate the occurrence of primary adhe-
sion. In primary adhesion, binding is still reversible. The second phase is irreversible 
adhesion. If cells come closer to the substrate (1.5 nm), ionic, covalent and hydrogen 
bonds come into play and cells enter secondary adhesion; the binding becomes per-
manent. It is at this stage that the production of extracellular polymeric substances 
increases. EPS, strengthening the link between cells and substrate, provides the bio-
film with a structural support (in a way that may remind us of animals’ and plants’ 
extracellular matrix). In the third and fourth phase, the architecture of the biofilm 
develops and the biofilm reaches maturity. Biofilm maturation changes the condi-
tions within the environment that surrounds the microorganisms in terms of cell 
population density, pH, oxygen and the presence of micronutrients. In turn, micro-
environment diversity causes local environmental adaptation, producing physiologi-
cal heterogeneity in the biofilm. It has been shown that in Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
biofilms, the cells at the top had high mRNA abundance for genes involved in gen-
eral metabolic functions, whereas the cells at the bottom had low mRNA abundance 
for housekeeping genes. Accordingly, cells at the top were actively dividing, whereas 
cells at the bottom showed a low division rate, possibly due to a long-term exposi-
tion to a totally depleted level of oxygen (Williamson et al. 2012). Vlamakis et al. 
(2008) showed that in Bacillus subtilis biofilms, motile, matrix-producing, and spor-
ulating cells are located at distinct regions, and that the localisation and frequency of 
the different cell types are dynamic throughout the development of the biofilm. It 
has been suggested that sporulation is a culminating feature of biofilm formation, 
and that spore formation is coupled with the formation of an architecturally complex 
community of cells. Therefore, as a consequence of the heterogeneity of the micro-
environment, a difference between reproductive and metabolic cells may arise 
(Cabarkapa et al. 2013; Kaplan 2010). The mature biofilm is a multicellular entity 
endowed with a complex internal structure, metabolism, and division of labour 
among its part. The structural adaptations and relations it shows “are made possible 
by the expressions of sets of genes that result in phenotypes that differ profoundly 
from those of planktonically grown cells of the same species” (Stoodley et al. 2002, 
p. 187). Gene regulation during biofilm development controls the switch from the 
planktonic state of cells to their biofilm state, making possible the growth of the 
biofilm itself (changes in phenotypic expression in response to growth strategies 
have been documented, see Stoodley et al. 2002). The fifth phase is detachment, e.g. 
the release of individual cells or clumps of cells from the biofilm.
As said, living in a biofilm promotes the emergence of new microbial pheno-
types. For instance, in a study on Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Sauer et  al. (2002) 
concluded that during biofilm development, P. aeruginosa cells display at least 
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three different phenotypes: planktonic, mature biofilm, and dispersion (and the 
dispersion- phenotype looks more similar to the planktonic one than to the mature 
biofilm one), with different regulation of motility, production of alginate (a princi-
pal component of the EPS), and quorum sensing (i.e. a chemical communication 
system that “measures” population density and regulates gene expression 
accordingly).
Let us substantiate our claim by considering another concrete example that 
shows the emergence of a new phenotype in the monospecies colony in the biofilm, 
as well as in the whole multispecies biofilm. Hansen et al. (2007a, b) performed an 
experiment on Acinetobacter (widely-distributed in nature and commonly occur-
ring in soil and water) and Pseudomonas putida (a soil bacterium that feeds on dead 
organic matter). When the two bacteria live in an environment where the only source 
of carbon is benzyl alcohol, they stay in a sort of host-commensal relation, since P. 
putida depends on Acinetobacter’s partitioning benzyl alcohol in benzoate, that P. 
putida can metabolise. The experiment compared the behaviour of the bacteria first 
in a spatially unstructured chemostat environment (an apparatus to grow bacterial 
cultures at a constant rate), then on a glass surface within a biofilm flow chamber (a 
structure that allows direct microscopic investigation of biofilm formation; biofilms 
in flow chambers grow under hydrodynamic conditions, and the environment can be 
carefully controlled and easily changed). In the chemostat unstructured environ-
ment (i.e. at the planktonic state), the two species coexisted, but only at benzyl 
alcohol concentrations above 430 mM. On the glass surface, they coexisted at ben-
zyl alcohol concentrations as low as about 130  mM.  In other words, the spatial 
structure of the formed biofilm extended the range of resource concentrations over 
which the two species may survive. Looking at the biofilm’s formation, Hansen 
et al. (2007a) observed that the structure of the biofilm after 24 h was characterised 
by discrete colonies of Acinetobacter surrounded by loose assemblages of P. putida 
and that the two species were spatially separated. But after 5 days the association 
changed: at separate focal points, P. putida grew in intimate contact with 
Acinetobacter, and after 5 further days, Acinetobacter colonies were covered by a 
layer of P. putida.
During the course of the biofilm’s development, a rough phenotypic variant of P. 
putida colony (VP) emerged and was selected over the ancestral (wild-type) P. 
putida. While the new phenotype is a property of P. putida’s cells, the ensuing varia-
tion determines the emergence of a new biofilm phenotype. To show this, we shall 
consider three differences between the two biofilm phenotypes: persistency, bio-
mass, fitness. When compared to the phenotype of the biofilm with the P. putida 
wild-type (WTP), the phenotype of the biofilm with the P. putida variant (VP) dis-
plays (i) more persistency; (ii) more biomass (ecological productivity); (iii) a differ-
ent fitness.
 (i) More persistency
Because of the extensive consumption of oxygen to metabolise benzyl alcohol, 
the presence of oxygen in the biofilm environment decreases, and the “mantle” of 
the P. putida variant acts as a shield, preventing Acinetobacter—which is covered 
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by it—from reaching oxygen. This stressful environment induces the P. putida new 
variant to produce a more resistant, cellulose-like polymer (EPS) that prevents the 
biofilm from dispersing. Hansen et al. (2007b) tested the response to oxygen starva-
tion by inducing oxygen downshift (near to zero), with the result that, while the 
VP showed no dispersal, in the WTP’s case the first signs of detachment appeared 
within minutes and almost the whole biofilm detached after 25 min. The proposed 
explanation for the difference is that thanks, at least in part, to the more resistant 
EPS, the rough variant sticks robustly to Acinetobacter microcolonies (which, in 
turn, serve as an anchor point) ensuring them close access to the secreted benzoate. 
The production of EPS, progressively thickening over the days and securing the 
robustness of the biofilm, prevents the biofilm from dispersing in spite of the 
increased competition for oxygen.
 (ii) More biomass
Hansen et al. (2007a, p. 534) noticed that “The productivity of the derived com-
munity was significantly greater than that of both the ancestral community and 
Acinetobacter alone …. This effect was attributable to enhanced productivity of P. 
putida and occurred despite a deleterious effect of P. putida on Acinetobacter—the 
species on which P. putida is reliant.” Accordingly, even though the variation occurred 
in P. putida, not only P. putida biomass, but also the biofilm’s biomass was increased.
 (iii) Different fitness
There is no unique way to understand—and calculate—biofilms’ fitness. In the 
literature, at least two different ways can be found. One way is to understand fitness 
as evolutionary fitness (i.e. differential reproductive success). In biofilms, evolu-
tionary fitness may, in turn, be understood in two different ways: as a function of the 
fitness of the separate clonal lineages comprising the biofilm (O’Malley 2014, 
p. 112); or as the ability of a biofilm to seed new patches, which is expected to 
increase with its rate of dispersal. Another way is to understand biofilms’ fitness as 
persistence, i.e. as the increase or decrease in the propensity to persist in response 
to pressures of the selective environment (Bouchard 2014). In the case under con-
sideration, no matter how biofilms’ fitness is understood, WTP and VP show dif-
ferential fitness (in particular, WTP’s fitness is higher than VP’s fitness if understood 
as evolutionary fitness, while it is lower when understood as persistence).
Moving from phenotypic diversity to genetic diversity, it should be highlighted 
that the P. putida variant phenotype has been proved to be heritable and, when 
inoculated together with Acinetobacter into fresh biofilm flow chambers, the 
 structure of the resulting community was similar to the newly formed one, VP, (and 
not to the ancestral one). Two independent mutations, responsible for the mantle-
like phenotype, were identified in wapH (PP4943)—a gene involved in lipopolysac-
charide biosynthesis. Accordingly, it may be argued that living in a biofilm also 
increased genetic biodiversity, both at the colony and the biofilm level, providing a 
new double-mutant genotype. It is normally assumed that this genetic variability 
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occurred by random mutation processes, supplemented through natural selection in 
the local environment of the biofilm (Gross et al. 2012).
9.3  Multispecies Biofilms as Drivers of Evolution
“Evolutionary biologists often study the origin of biodiversity through the identifi-
cation of the units at which evolution operates” (Bapteste et al. 2012, p. 18266). 
Throughout the history of evolutionary biology, bacteria have been often thought to 
follow different evolutionary rules not in line with those emphasised by the Modern 
Synthesis, which was modelled on the evolution of plants and animals, and accord-
ing to which species or populations are considered to be the units of evolution and 
speciation the main process producing diversity. The peculiarity of prokaryotes was 
thought to be due mainly to their asexuality, that would prevent genuine speciation, 
to their hereditary mechanism not relying on specialised germ cells, and to the loca-
tion of their genome, which is not in a cell nucleus. However, since prokaryotes 
have genes, display mutations, and show a process of vertical transmission, it is now 
commonly accepted that they fit the Modern Synthesis view of evolution (O’Malley 
2014, Chap. 4). Yet, the genetic and phenotypic diversity we examined in the previ-
ous section cannot be accounted for in terms of species and speciation. Some recent 
works (see, in particular, Bapteste et  al. 2012) have shown that many other pro-
cesses rather than vertical descent contribute to generating diversity, namely pro-
cesses that use genetic material from multiple sources, such as recombination, 
lateral gene transfer, and symbiosis. These processes produce evolutionary out-
comes at different hierarchical levels, think for instance to the multiple symbiotic 
evolutionary origin of chloroplasts (Whatley and Whatley 1981). In the remaining 
we shall focus on the possibility of multispecies entities being units of selection 
along with “standard” organisms. If so, species, at least at the microbial level, 
might – quite unsurprisingly – prove not to be the most relevant units of biodiver-
sity, and therefore speciation might not be the only process to be taken into account. 
Accordingly, on the one hand, a satisfactory account of biodiversity generation 
would ideally require to consider a much more varied set of evolutionary processes 
than just speciation; on the other hand, as we are going to suggest in the conclusion, 
species might sometimes not be the best targets of conservation actions. To put it in 
other words: if—as Huxley thought (1942: 126)—“… bacteria have their own evo-
lutionary rules”, we may outline two main theoretical possibilities: either these rules 
set them apart from the Modern Synthesis’ framework, requiring the existence of 
two different “modes” of evolution; or these rules enforce a better understanding, as 
well as an inclusion, in the modern synthesis’ framework. We shall take this second 
stance, suggesting, moreover, that this would have positive consequences not only 
in our understanding of the processes producing biodiversity but also in shaping 
conservation actions.
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9.3.1  The Origin of Biodiversity
Those entities which are able to produce diversity, i.e. those entities capable of ran-
dom heritable variations that eventually might increase fitness in the context of 
changing environments, are units of selection or evolutionary individuals, i.e. the 
objects that undergo the conditions identified by Darwin and formalised by Lewontin 
in his classic 1970 article (Lewontin 1970), namely phenotypic variation, differen-
tial fitness, heritability of fitness.
Lewontin was speaking of variation among individual organisms of a population 
or a species. Different individual organisms have different phenotypes, which have 
different rates of survival and reproduction. This difference in fitness must be some-
how (notwithstanding the nature of the mechanism) heritable. When these three 
principles hold, a population or a species will undergo evolutionary change. 
Lewontin also pointed out that the logical skeleton of the Darwinian argument 
“turns out to be a powerful predictive system for changes at all levels of biological 
organization … any entities in nature that have variation, reproduction, and herita-
bility may evolve”, provided that they satisfy the three principles. In compliance 
with Lewontin’s suggestion, several entities have been proposed as possible “evolu-
tionary individuals” in addition to individual organisms, both at lower (e.g. alleles) 
and higher (e.g. groups) levels of the hierarchy.3 Might some multispecies entities, 
and multispecies biofilms in particular, be evolutionary individuals?
Recently, this question caught the attention of philosophers of biology working 
on biological individuality (see Bouchard and Huneman 2013). This is because 
multispecies biofilms may be thought to show several characteristics that could 
make them similar to multicellular organisms such as us or other animals, i.e. the 
paradigmatic units of selection. Accordingly, it may be asked whether, by analogy, 
multispecies biofilms are amongst the units of selection, i.e. whether they are evo-
lutionary individuals. According to Ereshefsly and Pedroso, the answer is positive, 
at least for some biofilms. They concede that evolutionary individuality can be a 
matter of degree and that not all biofilms are promising candidates to be evolution-
ary individuals: “the fact that some biofilms and other multispecies consortia exhibit 
more internal competition than others implies that some biofilms are more individ-
ual-like than other biofilms” (Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2015, p. 10131). According 
to these authors, there are 7 conditions a biological entity must meet to be said an 
evolutionary individual: (1) Having a high internal integration and being delineated 
from the environment; (2) Presenting division of labour and, relatedly, (3) coordina-
tion between the parts, and cooperation; (4) Bearing adaptations; (5) Transmitting 
traits between generations; (6) Having a reproductive bottleneck; and, relatedly, (7) 
Genetic homogeneity. In the next section, we will analyse these criteria in more 
detail with the aim of evaluating whether in comparison with heterotrophic bacterial 
3 Notice that while entities at a lower level (e.g. alleles) are more likely to satisfy the three condi-
tions, whether there are evolutionary individuals at a higher level (groups, species, clades…) 
remains a matter of debate. The controversy concerns, in particular, reproduction—and, relat-
edly—heritability of fitness.
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biofilms, two kinds of multispecies autotrophic biofilms (i.e.  microphytobenthos 
and biological soil crusts) meet the above criteria.
9.3.2  Are MPB and BSCs Evolutionary Individuals?
In this section, we go through the seven criteria for biofilms’ evolutionary individu-
ality (as they have been put forward by Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2015) to see whether 
they are fulfilled by MPB and BSCs, in comparison to paradigmatic bacterial bio-
films, namely heterotrophic biofilms.
(1) High internal integration and delineation from the environment. This crite-
rion is met by heterotrophic bacterial biofilms, since bacteria within a biofilm “act” 
as a whole, they communicate (for instance through quorum sensing) and exchange 
genes (more than planktonic bacteria). This is so mainly in virtue of the EPS, which 
packs them and keeps their parts together, contributing both to internal integration 
and delineation from the outside.
Also in MPB, the basic element of internal integrity is the EPS matrix that keeps 
cells together. The EPS matrix has been demonstrated to help congregate sediment 
particles, decrease erosion (Paterson and Black 1999) and probably facilitate the 
flux of carbon between other constituents of the biofilm, including embedded meio-
fauna (Middelburg et al. 2000). Likewise, in BSCs the EPS matrix plays a pivotal 
role in favouring the internal integration of the biofilm and its delineation from the 
environment. The integration is possibly more complex than in MPB and heterotro-
phic bacterial biofilms, due to the greater diversity which characterises BSCs. BSCs 
are usually constituted of cells coming from different higher-level taxa too, even in 
the early successional stages dominated by cyanobacteria, which may include green 
algae, heterotrophic bacteria, microfungi (Belnap et al. 2001 and references therein), 
and archaea (Soule et  al. 2009). In later successional stages (e.g. bryophyte or 
lichen-dominated BSCs), integration will be looser as the intrusion of the macro-
scopic rooting structures of these organisms into the cyanobacterial biofilm is 
expected.
(2) Division of labour, and, relatedly, (3) Coordination and cooperation amongst 
parts. Functional specialisation, or division of labour, is common in most multi- 
cellular, colonial and social organisms, but it is far from ubiquitous (Simpson 2012). 
Quorum sensing is probably the main way bacteria coordinate; for instance, it regu-
lates the amount of extracellular DNA that bacteria produce for their EPS, regulates 
gene expression, and triggers dispersal of the cells of biofilm. Eukaryotes are also 
known to utilise quorum sensing, as is the case with many fungal species and even 
social insects (Amin et al. 2012 and references therein). However, quorum sensing 
systems sensu stricto are not described for diatoms, albeit some mechanisms under-
lying diatom cell signalling have been discovered (Falciatore and Bowler 2002), 
and have been described in epilithic – i.e., colonizing bedrocks – cyanobacterial 
communities (Sharif et al. 2008), even though not in BSCs. However, it should be 
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noticed that the studies of quorum sensing-like mechanisms in non-bacteria lag sig-
nificantly behind those concerning bacteria.
Thanks to quorum sensing and analogous mechanisms, a division of labour can 
be frequently observed in heterotrophic bacterial biofilms, and it is often dependent 
on biofilms’ internal architecture. For instance, there exist biofilms in which surface 
bacteria consume oxygen, intermediary bacteria convert sulphide into hydrogen sul-
fate, and bacteria living at greater depth cycles convert sulphate into sulphide. A 
further mark of individuality is cooperation among the parts (accompanied by low 
internal competition). It has been shown that bacteria within biofilms often excrete 
public goods (Czárán and Hoekstra 2009), i.e. exoproducts that are costly to pro-
duce but enhance the fitness of other cells, such as EPS or anti-biotic degradation 
compounds. This production is regulated through quorum sensing, and cheating is a 
phenomenon that frequently occurs (there are mutants which do not participate in 
the production of common goods while exploiting producers; or “liars”, who pro-
duce the quorum sensing signal but not the exoproduct). Yet, cheaters are kept in 
check by “honest cooperators” through a variety of strategies (for instance, lateral 
gene transfer of genetic elements that infect non-cooperative mutants inducing them 
to produce the public good).
May division of labour and coordination and cooperation amongst parts be found 
in MPB and BSCs as well? In MPB, photosynthesis is mostly performed by dia-
toms, albeit cyanobacteria might contribute in a variable proportion (Vieira et al. 
2013a). Transmission of organic carbon from diatoms to heterotrophic bacteria 
occurs in a short time (Middelburg et al. 2000). On the other hand, diatoms may 
benefit from the respiratory inorganic carbon released from sub-surface bacteria 
(Marques da Silva et al. 2017; Vieira et al. 2016). The relationship between these 
organisms, however, has been poorly characterised. Bacteria benefit from this rela-
tionship by gaining a source of readily available organic metabolites and a constant 
source of materials. Diatoms may gain specific organic compounds such as vitamins 
or growth factors from bacteria (Trick et al. 1984), but almost no evidence exists for 
the transfer of organic compounds from bacteria to phytoplankton.4 Recent research 
has underlined that obliged bacterial mutualism is a widespread phenomenon in 
nature (Morris et al. 2013). Therefore, it might be expected to be present also in the 
bacterial/diatom populations of microphytobenthos.
Putative division of labour on the diatom fraction of microphytobenthos may be 
related to the different cells’ sizes of diatom species (Vieira et al. 2013b). Small 
cells present higher photosynthetic rates and therefore are better nutrient scavengers 
(Geider et al. 1986). On the other hand, large cell diatoms may be better adapted to 
variable environments (as is the case with intertidal mudflats) because of the 
increased capacity to store nutrients (Turpin and Harrison 1980).
As MPB, also BSCs comprise autotrophic (e.g. cyanobacteria and green algae) 
and heterotrophic (e.g. microfungi and archaea) organisms. Therefore, at this broad 
4 The recent controversy on the dependency of marine diatoms on symbiotic marine bacteria for the 
supply of vitamin B12 (a metabolite that diatoms do not synthesise, but which is essential for their 
metabolism, Croft et al. 2005; Droop 2007) highlights the complexity of this issue.
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level, a metabolic division of labour is present. In cyanobacterial mats (a different 
type of cyanobacteria-dominated communities), the supply of organic nitrogen is 
produced by a type of filamentous cyanobacteria. Filamentous cyanobacteria are 
also common in BSCs and therefore a similar role may be envisaged. To our knowl-
edge, no further empirical evidence concerning division of labour in BSCs may be 
found in the literature. However, recent work (Kim et al. 2016) is likely to show that 
division of labour is a widespread phenomenon that rapidly emerges in bacterial 
communities.
(4) Bearing adaptations. Heterotrophic bacterial biofilms seem to meet also this 
criterion. Working with microphytobenthos, Jesus et al. (2009) showed that diatom- 
dominated biofilms adapt to sediment conditions and tidal height. Sandy sediments 
exhibit photosynthetic pigments characteristic of a mixed cyanobacteria/diatom 
assemblage, showing an alternate seasonality, with cyanobacteria increasing in the 
summer and diatoms dominating in the spring. Furthermore, epipsammic (inhabit-
ing sand) diatoms were smaller than epipelic (inhabiting mud) diatoms, suggesting 
an adaptation of the biofilm to the substrate, since these epipsammic non-motile 
diatoms live in close attachment to individual sand grains (Barnett et  al. 2015). 
Also, epipelic biofilms showed evidence of being low light-acclimated and photo- 
regulating by vertical migration movements, whereas epipsammic biofilms showed 
no vertical migration rhythms. Thus, the two types of diatom biofilms have distinct 
strategies to adapt to light intensity: epipelic diatoms use vertical migration to posi-
tion themselves at the sediment depth of optimum light conditions, and epipsammic 
diatoms use specific photosynthetic and photoprotective pigments to photo- regulate. 
Cartaxana et al. (2015) found that elevated temperature led to an increase of cyano-
bacteria and a change in the relative abundance of major benthic diatom species 
present in the MPB community. On the contrary, no significant effect of elevated 
CO2 was detected on the relative abundance of cyanobacteria and major groups of 
benthic diatom species.
To our knowledge, direct experimental evidence for adaptation is absent for 
BSCs, but the wide variety of biological crusts covering ecologically different dry 
lands suggest considerable adaptability.
Thus, there is little doubt that criteria (1-2-3-4) are met by heterotrophic bacterial 
biofilms, even by multispecies biofilms (where internal competition is expected to 
be higher, even though it has been shown that quorum sensing works also interspe-
cifically – Federle and Bassler 2003). Although less information is available, MPB 
biofilms, and even BSCs, are likely to meet these criteria. It is with heritability—
and hence reproduction—that things become more controversial. In a nutshell, the 
problem is that, even though biofilms have what may be called, metaphorically, a 
life-cycle by analogy with “standard” multicellular organisms like us, it is not clear 
to what extent the analogy can be stretched. Clarke (2016), for instance, objected 
that biofilms do not exhibit genuine life cycles, since the claims about life cycle 
stages can be conceptualised equally well in terms of ecological succession or 
changes in community structure. The colonisation of a new territory by founder spe-
cies would correspond to phase 1, their modification of the environment and the 
consequent secondary colonisation to phase 3 and 4, seeding to phase 5, etc. 
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However, we do not find the objection entirely compelling, since it underestimates 
the role of the EPS (phase 2) for the cohesion and internal integrity of the entities 
under scrutiny. Yet we agree with Clarke that the issue is not an (entirely) empirical 
matter. Even though more data need to be collected, certain theoretical issues need 
to be settled in order to give a proper answer: can dispersion be seen as a form of 
reproduction? Do biofilms form lineages? Do they transmit faithfully acquired 
mutations to their “heirs”? The three further criteria help us tackle this sort of ques-
tions. Establishing whether biofilms, or more generally “multilineages clubs”,5 can 
be counted amongst evolutionary individuals is, in part, a theoretical matter (which 
notion of reproduction—and which notion of inheritance—should we endorse?), 
and in part a matter of collecting empirical evidence—concerning reproduction, 
maintenance mechanisms, and fitness—which is still lacking.
(5) Transmitting traits between generations. This criterion has to do with 
Lewontin’s heritability of fitness, i.e. the transmission of those biofilm-level traits 
that confer differential fitness to biofilms. We have discussed biofilms’ fitness in the 
previous section, arguing that, at least in the case study that we considered, biofilms 
may have differential fitness and that the related trait can be transmitted. More gen-
erally, Ereshefsky and Pedroso (2015) report that specific genes within bacteria 
have been identified that transmit traits such as quorum sensing, the capacity to 
engage in specific metabolic interactions, aggregation patterns, cooperative behav-
iours, and the mechanisms underlying lateral gene transfer, as well as those for the 
production of EPS. No empirical data are available for microphytobenthos and bio-
logical soil crusts. Notice that the fulfillment of criterion 5 depends on availability 
of relevant empirical evidence, but also on which notion of reproduction is adopted. 
If a strict notion of reproduction—based on how we and other paradigmatic evolu-
tionary individuals reproduce—is advocated, this and the two further criteria are 
unlikely to be met by biofilms.
(6) Reproductive bottleneck and, relatedly, (7) Genetic homogeneity. An indi-
vidual has a reproductive bottleneck when its life cycle begins as a single cell (or a 
few cells) and that cell is replicated to form the cells of an individual. A reproductive 
bottleneck reduces competition among the cells of an individual (being the cells 
generated from the germline cells genetically homogeneous), and it favours the evo-
lution of new traits allowing small mutational changes in the germline to have major 
effects on the descendants of the organism. Biofilms “reproducing” by dispersion/
aggregation and exchanging gene laterally lack a reproductive bottleneck sensu 
stricto, even though it might be argued that the same results of reproductive bottle-
neck may be obtained in other ways, for instance through an ecological bottleneck 
in which the size of the population decreases following environmental factors such 
as antimicrobial treatments. In this way, an ecological bottleneck reduces competi-
tion amongst the cells, increasing genetic relatedness (Ereshefsky and Pedroso 
2015). As for genetic homogeneity, multispecies biofilms clearly lack it, being made 
5 Multilineages clubs are defined as “coalitions of entities that replicate in separate events and 
exploit some common genetic material that does not trace back to a single locus in a single last 
common ancestor of all the members” (Bapteste et al. 2012: 18268).
J. Marques da Silva and E. Casetta
209
of distinct lineages and being lateral gene transfer extremely common. 
Microphytobenthos and biological soil crusts, being multi-kingdom biofilms, are 
even less genetically homogeneous than biofilms made of bacteria only.
It is clear from this analysis, summarised in Table 9.1, that the possibility that not 
only multispecies heterotrophic bacterial biofilms but also MPB and BSCs are evo-
lutionary individuals cannot be ruled out in principle. On the one hand, in order to 
provide a definite answer, further studies and more empirical data are needed (see 
for instance Van Colen et al. 2014). On the other hand, a theoretical reflection on the 
traditional (Modern-synthetic) way of conceiving the notions of reproduction and 
inheritance might be required. What matters for the purpose of the present contribu-
Table 9.1 Criteria for biofilms’ evolutionary individuality applied to two autotrophic biofilms and 
to a paradigmatic (heterotrophic) bacterial biofilm
Heterotrophic bacterial 
biofilms MPB BSCs
Internal 
integrity
EPS matrix EPS matrix EPS matrix
Division of 
labour
Depth-dependent metabolic 
specialisation / production of 
public goods
Producers/consumers/specific 
metabolite synthesis/
carbohydrate
Producers/
consumers
Synthesis vs. storage Putative 
cyanobacterial 
N2 fixing
Coordination 
amongst parts
Quorum sensing; lateral gene 
transfer
Putative quorum sensing 
analogs (pheromones, nitric 
oxide)
Putative 
quorum sensing
Bearer of 
adaptations
Antibiotic 
resistance / metabolic 
interactions / sequential 
aggregation
Adaptation to sediment 
granulometry, tidal height 
and temperature and 
dissolved inorganic carbon 
(changes in population 
structure – in diatom species 
composition/size classes and 
in diatom/cyanobacteria 
ratio)
No direct 
empirical data 
available
Heritable 
adaptive traits
Sensu lato possibly met, but 
not sensu stricto; putative 
specific genes transmitting 
traits such as quorum sensing, 
metabolic integration, 
aggregation patterns, 
cooperative behaviors, lateral 
gene transfer, and production 
of EPS
No empirical data available No empirical 
data available
Reproductive 
bottleneck
Missing sensu stricto; but 
possible “ecological 
bottleneck”
No empirical data available No empirical 
data available
Genetic 
homogeneity
No No No
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tion is that if they were discovered to be evolutionary individuals, they would be 
discovered to contribute to biodiversity in an even more fundamental way than by 
providing ecosystem services and genetic and phenotypic diversity, namely by 
being amongst the units at which evolution by natural selection operates.
9.4  Conclusions
In 1996, 10  years after the emerging of the term “biodiversity”, a book entitled 
Species. The Units of Biodiversity appeared which has now become a reference for 
whoever aims at approaching the species problem (Claridge et al. 1997). The first 
line of the abstract of the first chapter, written by the editors of the book, i.e. 
M.F. Claridge, H.A. Dawah and M.R. Wilson, states that “From a practical view-
point species are generally the units of biodiversity”. The truth of the claim is taken 
for granted along all the chapter, where it is also stated that “species are normally 
the units of biodiversity and conservation”, and it is added that the growing recogni-
tion of the importance of biodiversity, connected to its crisis, confers to the wrangle 
over the nature of species a wider significance. We believe that, also in the light of 
contemporary biological knowledge, our evolutionary understanding has partially 
changed, and that the claim that species are the units of biodiversity and conserva-
tion6 is not so plain as it was thought and has partially changed since then. In par-
ticular, we think that entities such as multispecies biofilms may teach us some 
lessons, both from an evolutionary and a conservationist point of view.
Before looking at the lessons, let us “unpack” the claim that species are the units 
of biodiversity. This can be interpreted in at least three ways. The first is that species 
are important units of classification, i.e. that they are taxonomic units. The second is 
that species are important evolutionary units, i.e. they undergo evolutionary change. 
The third is that species are targets of conservation, i.e. they are conservation units.
First lesson, concerning species as taxonomic units. If understood in this way, 
the claim that species are the units of biodiversity is questionable at the microbial 
level because it is not clear whether species indeed exist when their constituent 
organisms reproduce asexually, as many microbes do (as already discussed in 
Claridge et al. 1997). As shown in Sect. 9.1, for instance, Ernst Mayr simply claimed 
that asexual organisms do not form species at all. Under the biological species con-
cept, species are considered as quasi-discrete gene packages: organisms belonging 
to a species exchange genes amongst them but not with organisms belonging to 
other species. This is not the case for microbes, which exchange genes laterally 
across small and large phylogenetic distance. We have also seen that, at least opera-
tionally, the microbial world can be partitioned into species as well. However, this 
does not by any means guarantee that such operational taxonomic units correspond 
to “natural joints” as they might just be conventional categories made up by taxono-
mists, and it could be that, at least at the microbial level, other joints are more natu-
6 See also Reydon, Chap. 8 in this volume.
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ral than species. As said, it is a fact that multispecies biofilms are the main mode of 
organisation of microbial life, and it is another fact that multispecies biofilms do 
exhibit new diversity, both at the genetic and at the phenotypic level.
Second lesson, concerning species as units of evolution (and organisms as evo-
lutionary individuals, or units of selection). Traditionally species have been consid-
ered the units of biodiversity in evolutionary biology. The reason is simple: variation 
and selection range over various levels (macromolecules, cells, organisms…), 
resulting in evolution at higher levels, typically populations or species. In other 
words, (and taking a realistic stance towards species), species speciate, originating 
new species, i.e. increasing diversity and conferring the tree of life its shape. In the 
Modern-synthetic view, which is modelled on animals and plants, species are made 
of organisms, each of which belongs to its species and not to another, in an 
Aristotelian fashion. Organisms, the interactors, are the bearers of variations that—
when inheritable—are transmitted through vertical descent. This picture has been 
questioned: there is growing evidence that vertical descent is not the only pattern of 
inheritance. Bapteste and his colleagues (2012), for instance, focus on what they 
call “introgressive descent”, i.e. the process through which the genetic material of 
an evolutionary individual “propagates into different host structures and is repli-
cated within these host structures” (Bapteste et al. 2012: 18266). On the basis of 
what we have discussed in this contribution, phenotypic variation and molecular 
change can arise in response to selection in multispecies entities, i.e. in entities 
which, by definition, do not belong to any species or belong to more than one spe-
cies. Moreover, we have argued that the possibility that multispecies biofilms, both 
autotrophic and heterotrophic, are themselves units of selection cannot be ruled out. 
A question then arises, which requires further reflection: if multispecies biofilms, or 
other multilineages consortia, may be units of selection, which are the “correspond-
ing” units of evolution?
Third lesson, concerning species as units of conservation. The centrality of spe-
cies characterises a quite traditional approach to biodiversity conservation, which 
involves the maintenance of viable populations of certain species, such as, for 
instance, indicator species—those species that are thought to indicate the state of 
biodiversity of a certain area—or endangered species—such as the ones listed in the 
IUCN red list. Several criticisms have been moved to this approach. In particular, a 
discrepancy between theory and practice has been highlighted: although “most con-
servationists claim to protect ‘species’, the conservation unit actually and practi-
cally managed is the individual population” (Casacci et  al. 2013). Ideally, all 
individual populations of all species should be conserved; but conservation actions 
have to take into account our epistemic limits and economic constraints, and criteria 
for prioritisation are needed.
A way to proceed is to let evolutionary considerations indicate the direction in 
selecting targets for conservation actions. Notice that putting together biodiversity 
conservation and evolution strangely generates a sort of paradox: evolution implies 
change, and conservation implies keeping things as they are, or even bringing them 
back to their previous, allegedly pristine, state. However, conservation should also 
be understood in terms of preserving those ecological and evolutionary mechanisms 
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necessary to promote natural dynamics (see Smith et al. 1993, and Vecchi and Mills, 
Chap. 12  in this volume), and it has been recognised that practical conservation 
decisions should be based on evolutionary considerations (Höglund 2009, Chap. 
8.3; Eizaguirre and Baltazar-Soares 2014). The paradox dissolves through the dis-
tinction between two kinds of biodiversity conservation (Sarkar 2002). One is the 
analogue of ameliorative medicine and is practiced when we allow a species to 
decline and then try to recover it (the extreme case is the “emergency room”, when 
we intervene only when a species is on the brink of extinction). The second kind is 
the analogue of preventive medicine, and it mainly consists in putting forward man-
agement procedures for the survival of the units of interest. What are such units? 
Sarkar (2002) suggested that conservationists should prioritise places. Places, in 
Sarkar’s view, are individual places, specific regions on Earth “filled with the par-
ticular results of [their] individual story”. More precisely, “preventive” conservation 
would consist in prioritisation of places for biodiversity value, whereas measuring 
biodiversity value would require the choice of surrogates. A different proposal is to 
focus on the Evolutionarily Significant Units (ESUs). The key idea of the ESUs- 
based approach is that, rather than preserving all phenotypic variants, it would be 
worthwhile to preserve those populations which “shows evidence of being geneti-
cally separate from other populations, and contributes substantially to the ecologi-
cal or genetic diversity found within the species taxon as a whole” (Hey et al. 2003: 
600). The premise is that as long as evolutionary processes are able to operate, their 
products, in particular specific adaptive phenotypes, can be replaced or recreated 
(Casetta and Marques da Silva 2015a).
Notwithstanding its merits (Casacci et al. 2013), the ESU-based approach is still 
conceptually species-centred (populations are population of species), i.e. it does not 
take into account multispecies entities. Yet, at the microbial level (and we have seen 
the importance of microbial biodiversity not only per se but also for general ecosys-
tem functioning, in particular as far as biological soil crusts and microphytobentos 
are concerned), species might not be the most important units of biodiversity. 
Accordingly, an ESU-based approach would have the same limits as a species-based 
one.
However, we think that the idea of letting evolutionary consideration indicate the 
direction is worth following. In particular, we argued elsewhere (Casetta and 
Marques da Silva 2015a, b) that the species-based approach should be integrated by 
considering as (more) worthy of protection those entities that have evolutionary 
potential7 (an indicator of the population’s capacity to respond to environmental 
change, linking in this way environmental change and evolutionary dynamics). That 
suggestion makes even more sense in the case of the microbial world. In fact, we 
argued throughout our chapter that multispecies collectives such as biofilms might 
possess a certain propensity to evolve in response to environmental changes. We 
suggest that they should be recognised in biodiversity conservation accordingly and 
that, in conserving places, and in the perspective of preventive conservation actions, 
a priority should be given to those entities endowed with evolutionary potential. 
7 See also Minelli, Chap. 11, and Vecchi and Mills, Chap. 12, in this volume.
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Such entities are traditionally thought to be species and populations, but, on the 
basis of what we have discussed, evolutionary potential might be a property of mul-
tispecies communities as well.
In sum, evolutionary potential is a crucial feature to be taken into account in 
conservation actions once that conservation is understood not only as ameliorative 
medicine but also as preventive medicine. Taking into account evolutionary poten-
tial would enlarge the focus of conservation actions from species to a larger number 
of entities (i.e. certain species and populations, certain multispecies communities, 
and possibly certain ecosystems as well), and it might meet the need of prioritisa-
tion that economic constraints dictate to biodiversity conservation practice while 
going beyond a mere species-based or population-based approach.
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Chapter 10  
Considering Intra-individual Genetic 
Heterogeneity to Understand Biodiversity
Eva Boon
Abstract In this chapter, I am concerned with the concept of Intra-individual 
Genetic Hetereogeneity (IGH) and its potential influence on biodiversity estimates. 
Definitions of biological individuality are often indirectly dependent on genetic 
sampling -and vice versa. Genetic sampling typically focuses on a particular locus 
or set of loci, found in the the mitochondrial, chloroplast or nuclear genome. If eco-
logical function or evolutionary individuality can be defined on the level of multiple 
divergent genomes, as I shall argue is the case in IGH, our current genetic sampling 
strategies and analytic approaches may miss out on relevant biodiversity. Now that 
more and more examples of IGH are available, it is becoming possible to investigate 
the positive and negative effects of IGH on the functioning and evolution of multi-
cellular individuals more systematically. I consider some examples and argue that 
studying diversity through the lens of IGH facilitates thinking not in terms of units, 
but in terms of interactions between biological entities. This, in turn, enables a fresh 
take on the ecological and evolutionary significance of biological diversity.
10.1  Introduction to Intra-individual Genetic Heterogeneity
These days we have become beguiled with diversity: how animals, such as insects, and 
plants, such as angiosperms, have produced so incredibly many species. In the origins of 
multicellularity we see a most primitive example of diversification. In some ways, it is 
almost an ideal case because we can make an argument for its basis. (Bonner 1998)
Intra-individual genetic heterogeneity (IGH for short) is a characterisation that 
applies to multicellular biological entities. Simply put, it describes a state in which 
the cells of the biological entity under consideration contain divergent genomes. 
Some have argued that (similarity in) genome structure and content can give indica-
tions about the expected balance between cooperation and conflict between and 
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even within the cells (Queller and Strassmann 2009, 2016; Strassmann and Queller 
2010) – in other words, about ecological interactions between genomes. This idea is 
a major rationale behind investigating biodiversity in the light of IGH.
Another rationale is that IGH highlights the fundamental elusiveness of some 
key concepts included in definitions of biodiversity. For example, the UN Convention 
on Biological Diversity defines biodiversity as “the variability among living organ-
isms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic eco-
systems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity 
within species, between species and of ecosystems”.1 The introduction to this vol-
ume already mentioned that the ambiguity surrounding terms such as “organisms”, 
“species” and “ecosystems” has already been discussed for a longer time. 
Technological advances now enable philosophers of biology and biologists to con-
sider in detail how actual patterns of genetic diversity match or clash with these 
concepts. Studying IGH is part of this effort, in the sense that patterns of genetic 
diversity within and between biological entities do not always coincide with our 
perception of these entities as biological, ecological or evolutionary units. To stay 
with the analogy of diagnosing and treating a patient, as was elaborated in the intro-
duction, understanding IGH is important to better diagnose a patient. The conse-
quences for treatment will be discussed at the end of this chapter.
Here, I am concerned with how the concept of IGH can influence our perception 
of biodiversity, considering that in biodiversity studies, our definition of biological 
individuality is often dependent on genetic sampling -and vice versa. Genetic sam-
pling is often concentrated on a particular genome, such as the mitochondrial, chlo-
roplast of nucelar genomes. However, if ecological function or evolutionary 
individuality can play out on the level of multiple divergent genomes, as I shall 
argue is the case in IGH, our current genetic sampling strategies may miss out on 
relevant biodiversity.
I will proceed as follows. As more and more examples of IGH become available, 
it is becoming possible to investigate the positive and negative effects of IGH on the 
functioning of a multicellular individual (sect. 10.2). I argue that considering diver-
sity through IGH facilitates thinking not in terms of units, but in terms of interac-
tions between biological entities (sect. 10.3). This, in turn, may enable a fresh take 
on the ecological and evolutionary significance of diversity. From the examples 
proposed in this chapter, we can consider how IGH as an unexplored dimension of 
biodiversity may help us understand what diversity is relevant to our research goals.
10.2  Examples of IGH
To make the concept of IGH more concrete, I will start off with a number of familiar 
and possibly less familiar examples of IGH. Common resolutions to genetic conflict 
within the organism, such as  the separation of germline and soma and genetic 
1 https://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf
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bottlenecks, are only applicable to a narrow range of multicellular organisms 
-mostly metazoans. Organisms that consist of easily regenerating parts (plants, 
algae) or hyphal networks (fungi) seem often more genetically heterogeneous. In 
this context, it is interesting to note that metazoans that regenerate from body frag-
ments (medusa, sponges, urochordates) are also more often reported to be geneti-
cally heterogeneous (Rinkevich 2004, 2005).
Cases of intra-individual genetic heterogeneity can be divided in chimeras and 
mosaicisms (Pineda-Krch and Lehtila 2004a; Santelices 2004a), of which examples 
will be discussed separately below. In the case of mosaic entities, genomes are 
divergent but homologous in the sense that they share a recent common ancestor. In 
the case of chimeras, the genetic heterogeneity is nonhomologous: cells may have 
originated from evolutionary highly divergent lineages. From this definition, it 
becomes apparent that the distinction between a mosaic and a chimeric biological 
entitity is ultimately a judgment on evolutionary divergence, which in itself is often 
based on genome similarity.
10.2.1  Mosaic Individuals
What kinds of individuals are mosaic? As mentioned above, genetic differentiation 
between somatic cells is often found within plants, animals and fungi that propagate 
by cloning of body parts. The prevalence of mosaicism in clonally reproducing 
plants and animals is easy to explain if mosaicism correlates with mutation rate and 
longevity (Gill et al. 1995). Of course, the mosaic state will be cut short when a 
single cell bottleneck occurs in the reproductive cycle. Still, this does not seem to 
stop mosaicism from occurring in multicellular entites that pass through a single 
cell bottleneck, i.e. metazoans such as fish (Matos et  al. 2011) and corals 
(Schweinsberg et al. 2015).
Mosaicism in humans is a burgeoning field, since much of present-day cancer 
research relies on assessing genetic heterogeneity between tumor cells, which in 
turn determines (in some cancers) much of the treatment and prognosis. This 
approach relies on the argument that the genetic heterogeneity in the tumor is gov-
erned by different evolutionary dynamics as the rest of the body (see for example 
Jacobs et al. 2012; Laurie et al. 2012; Vijg 2014 and references therein). Mosaicism 
can also have much less dramatic influences in humans, and increasing reports on 
mosaicism in humans (Youssoufian and Pyeritz 2002; Erickson 2014; Spinner and 
Conlin 2014) and even the germline (Samuels and Friedman 2015; Jónsson et al. 
2017) seem to underline the varying evolutionary outcomes for IGH in a multicel-
lular individual: positive, negative or neutral.
Another example demonstrates how mosaicism can be deeply integrated in the 
life history of a biological entity. Arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi (AMF) are an 
ancient phylum of heterotrophs that form symbioses with the majority of land plants 
(Wang and Qiu 2006). AMF were reported to contain hundreds or thousands of 
genetically differentiated nuclei within the same cytoplasm (Kuhn et al. 2001; Hijri 
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and Sanders 2005; Boon et al. 2010, 2013b, 2015). The exact number of genetically 
differentiated nuclei is not clear, since genetic variation has never been exhaustively 
sampled for any locus in these fungi. No sexual stage has been observed, although 
possible recombination has been reported in AMF (see Riley et al. 2016 and refer-
ences therein).2
It is possible that a single nucleus is not a viable entity in AMF –only populations 
of nuclei are (see Boon et al. 2015; Wyss et al. 2016 and references therein). For 
example, spores of Rhizophagus irregularis do not germinate under a certain vol-
ume, which is positively correlated with the number of nuclei within the spore 
(Marleau et  al. 2011). Some authors have proposed that genetic differentiation 
between nuclei within the AMF cytoplasm is maintained through the fusion of 
related hyphae, or anastomosis (Giovannetti et al. 2015 and references therein), and 
is lost at sporulation (Boon et al. 2013b). This means that AMF are both mosaic 
individuals in the sense that their nuclei share the same genealogy, and chimeras in 
the sense that at least some of this variation is the result of hyphal fusion between 
related hyphal systems.
The positive correlation between anastomosis rates and level of relatedness 
between hyphae supports the view that AMF do form genetically delineable entities 
–although maybe not on a genome level, but on that of the genome population or 
pangenome. This has also been suggested by Boon et al. (2015). The propensity to 
fuse within cultures of the same strain seems diminished by drift (Cárdenas-Flores 
et al. 2010). This may indicate that the nuclei within an AMF hyphal system show 
self-nonself recognition as a population. Finally the composition of the genome 
population has an influence on the genotype: a change in nuclear population through 
anastomosis changes the (symbiotic) properties of a strain (Sanders and Rodriguez 
2016 and references therein).
To summarise this example, the AMF phenotype seems determined by not a 
single, but multiple coexisting genomes. Anastomosis, or a lack thereof, can change 
the AMF phenotype, which is in turn selected upon by its environment (Roger et al. 
2013b, a; Angelard et al. 2014; Wyss et al. 2016; Sanders and Rodriguez 2016). 
AMF form symbioses with almost all land plants (Wang and Qiu 2006), and the age 
of their evolutionary lineage (an estimated 500 million years, coinciding with the 
rise of land plants (Corradi and Bonfante 2012)) testifies to the potential ecological 
impact and longevity of IGH as an evolutionary strategy. The presence of mycor-
rhiza in the soil confers a inestimable fitness advantage to plant communities: most 
plant taxa form symbioses with AMF in which posphorus is exchanged for plant- 
produced sugars, thus stimulating plant growth and overall community biodiversity 
(van der Heijden et al. 2016)
In this example on AMF, IGH seems to be an essential to understand AMF life 
history, ecology and evolution. At the same time, the precise effects of IGH on AMF 
life history are hard to estimate since this IGH is often not taken into account in 
experimental setups and field studies due to technical and conceptual challenges 
(Sanders and Rodriguez 2016). Still, we can add yet another layer of complexity. If 
2 Note that some recombination estimates may not be reliable if Glomus is indeed multigenomic.
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we consider that AMF are obligate plant symbionts and themselves are associated 
with particular microbial communities, a picture emerges of another set of interac-
tions. AMF are functionally dependent on their plant hosts, and probably gain major 
fitness benefits from their associated microbial communities (Bonfante and Anca 
2009; Herman et al. 2011). Thus, since the ecological function and evolutionary lon-
gevity of the mosaic AMF is dependent on nonhomologous lineages (i.e. plants and 
microbes), we may also consider AMF and their associated plants and microbes as 
chimeras. This is not only theoretically relevant: the growth benefits that AMF confer 
to their plant hosts can potentially confer huge benefits to sustainable agriculture.
10.2.2  Chimeric Individuals
As in the AMF example above, most mutualisms can also be considered chimeras. 
This depends on the criteria for individuality that are being used, and to some extent 
on the degree of genetic divergence one is willing to accept between the component 
genomes of the chimera. For example, in the case of lichen and corals the mutualism 
is so tight that the historical and most intuitive view is to see the chimera as a single 
entity. Only with the advent of molecular techniques have scientists started to dis-
tinguish different genomes and consider the partners as separate ‘individuals’. With 
the following two examples, I would like to illustrate how broad the definition of 
‘chimera’ can be, and highlight how considering IGH has consequences for ecologi-
cal and evolutionary inference in these examples.
My first case is chimerism in macroalgae, which is a nonmonophyletic group 
that encompasses brown, green and red algae (Santelices 2004b). Here, I will focus 
on red algae or Rhodophyta, since IGH in this taxon has been most extensively 
documented. The algae germinate from a disk, which can originate from multiple 
spores. These spores may fuse, or form individual cell walls that are subsequently 
surrounded by a thickened common wall. This process, called coalescence, occurs 
often in red algae (Santelices et  al. 1999) but not between different species 
(Santelices et al. 2003). Coalescing disks, or crusts, may or may not fuse with each 
other or with new algal sporelings. Various fitness advantages were demonstrated 
for coalescencing disks compared to unitary disks (which have originated from a 
single spore). Fusion decreases the probability of mortality in early growth 
(Santelices and Alvarado 2008), improves erect axis formation and growth 
(Santelices et al. 2010) and confers an advantage later in the life cycle through dif-
ferences in branching and fertility (Santelices et al. 2011). Coalescence and a fitness 
advantage for coalescing disks have also been reported, although less extensively, in 
brown (Wernberg 2005) and green (Gonzalez and Santelices 2008) algae.
Thus, like in AMF, we encounter a population of genotypes (from multiple hap-
loid spores) which together creates a polyploid phenotype that is selected upon as a 
single entity (Monro and Poore 2004). In red algae, these polyploids break up again 
at sporulation. Possibly, selection (for cooperation) between haploid genomes 
occurs at the formation of the disk. How this selection takes place is unclear. It 
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seems reasonable to suppose that selection occurs for compatibility between par-
ticular loci or even entire genomes. It is important to note that, like in the previous 
AMF example, it is not possible to associate the phenotype of a red alga with a 
particular unchanging set of spore haplotypes. The phenotype of interest, i..e the 
disk and the thalli that grow from it, is based on a varying population of multiple 
haploid nuclear genomes. Therefore, the phenotype of the macroalga cannot be 
reduced to its component genomes. It is in the interaction between these varying 
genomes that a unique phenotype is established.
The ecological and evolutionary consequences of the chimeric state in macroal-
gae are not easy to disentangle, even more so because seaweeds can reproduce clon-
ally as well (Fagerström and Poore 2000; Collado-Vides 2001). Nevertheless, the 
above description makes clear that the life history and evolutionary constraints of 
coalescing red algae cannot be described accurately without taking chimerism into 
account. Again, in the light of the ecological and agricultural importance red algae 
this is not a merely academic preoccupation. For example, multisporic coalescing 
recruits have higher survival rates (Santelices and Aedo 2006). Thus, IGH as a state 
can be manipulated by farmers to increase higher yields.
My second example of chimerism is the case of microbial multi-species consortia 
or communities. With the advance of molecular techniques it has become possible to 
study microbial communities in more detail than ever before, even though passing 
from the fase of amassing vast quantities of data to that of interpreting them has proven 
to be a challenge. Here, I would like to highlight a few patterns that have emerged with 
respect to microbial diversity and function and that are relevant to the concept of 
IGH. The following three points are discussed in more detail in Boon et al. (2013a).
First, microbial taxa are hard to circumscribe precisely, for a number of well- 
described ontological and epistemological reasons.3 For the purposes of this chapter, it 
suffices to state that microbial taxonomy is heavily dependent on the molecular biol-
ogy toolbox. This toolbox, although indispensible, has a number of limitations. The 
most relevant limitation for my point is that especially early conceptions of microbial 
taxa heavily relied on the assumption of genome stability. And there’s the rub: in many 
microorganisms, genomes can change rapidly through gene loss, gene duplication, 
and the acquisition of genes from distant lineages via lateral gene transfer (LGT).
A second pattern is that taxonomic or phylogenetic thresholds (e.g. 3% genetic 
differentiation) for taxon delineation fail to adequately delineate ecologically cohe-
sive units. Even though a unifying species concept is not strictly needed for ecologi-
cal analysis, also a pluralist stance needs a sound rationale and consistent approach 
(or set of approaches) to define ‘units’. Unfortunately, microbial diversity and com-
munity function do not always correlate. Microbes rarely act alone and are often 
interdependent. It is possible that less than 1% of all known microbes can be 
 successfully cultured on their own (Staley and Konopka 1985), an observation also 
known as ‘Great Plate Count Anomaly’. It is now clear that many microbes depend 
on the activity of other microbes to successfully grow and reproduce via mecha-
3 Doolittle (2013) has written an extensive review on the history and challenges of microbial ontol-
ogy and of course O’Malley (2014) is an invaluable resource here as well.
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nisms including acquisition and exchange of metabolites (references in Boon et al. 
2013a).
A final tendency is that microbial function may be a property of communities as 
well as of cells. Particular metabolic capacities might not be encoded within a single 
microbial cell, or even within a single type of microbial cell. Instead, there is 
increasing evidence that many microbial functions are encoded by gene networks in 
which genes may be easily replaced by functionally equivalent but phylogentically 
distant alternatives. These gene networks may be found in varying sets of microbial 
taxa, without a single taxa being characterised by a particular set of genes or func-
tions. We face the same situation as in the previous examples, in which no single 
community genotype codes for a single community phenotype.
If microbial communities can be understood as ‘chimeras’, it might not be pos-
sible to lead a community function (for example, a particular metabolic product or 
process) back to a single taxonomic group (but see Inkpen et al. 2017). The diversity 
of microbes is now being explored using surveys that draw on hundreds or thou-
sands of samples and controlled experiments, with rapid genetic assessment tech-
niques providing much of the evidence for taxonomic and functional diversity. 
Since microbial interactions span all taxonomic ranks, from strain to superkingdom, 
understanding microbial diversity then seems to necessitate a community-centric 
approach (Zarraonaindia et al. 2013).
Mechanisms for the evolution of interdependence within microbial communities 
have been proposed in the form of a Public Goods Hypothesis ((McInerney et al. 
2011) and the Black Queen Hypothesis (Morris et  al. 2012). The authors of the 
ITSNTS model (‘It’s the song, not the singer’) even propose ‘casting metabolic and 
developmental interaction patterns, rather than the taxa responsible for them, as 
units of selection’ (Doolittle and Booth 2016): in other words, microbial interaction 
patterns are stabler units of selection than the microbial cells that produce these pat-
terns. For a more in-depth discussion of the evolutionary and ecological implica-
tions of seeing microbial communities such as biofilms as evolutionary individuals, 
see Boon (in preparation).
10.2.3  Mosaic vs. Chimeric Individuals
The reader might wonder by now whether the distinction between mosaic and chime-
ric individuals is at all relevant. Is the difference between the two not just a matter of 
degree of relatedness between individuals, rather than a difference in kind of individ-
ual? The answer to this ontological question is not at all straightforward. However, 
from an epistemic point of view, the differences between these two types of intra-
individual genetic heterogeneity are relevant to the practise of evolutionary inference.
For example, fitness calculations between mosaic entities and chimeras are per-
formed differently. If genetically differentiated but related cell lines work together, 
as in mosaic individuals, a case could be made for a special sort of kin selection. 
After all, there is a considerable chance that gene variants between related lineages 
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are shared. However, if unrelated cell lines become integrated in a single entity, the 
balance of costs and benefits that ultimately decides between competition and coop-
eration cannot be explained by a more than average chance to transfer one’s own 
genes as present in the other.
Some might disagree that there is even an epistemic difference between chimeras 
and mosaic biological entites. Multilevel selection theory (see Okasha 2006 and ref-
erences therein) stresses that kin selection is really just a special case of group selec-
tion. Interestingly, this discussion is also highly relevant within microbial community 
ecology and evolution, in which the question whether microbial communities can 
evolve is a hot topic of debate. Boiled down to its essence, this question is really 
about whether entities that are composed of nonhomologous lineages can evolve as 
a single unit–and whether is this is a useful question to ask (Boon in preparation).
10.3  The Importance of IGH in Ecology and Evolution
Above examples lead me to two main themes for the relevance of IGH in biodiver-
sity research. The first is that multiple varying genotypes can lead to a single phe-
notype. Since the phenotype is the actual set of traits that is selected upon, or that is 
ecologically relevant, extreme caution should then be exercised when a single 
genome (or genotype, or even a simple barcode) is taken as a proxy for the pheno-
type. If the more complicated genotype-phenotype relationship that is implied by 
IGH is ignored and genotypes that are associated with a particular phenotype are 
inadequately sampled, it will be difficult if not impossible to find reproducible pat-
terns and predict community composition or ecosystem function. Second, if one of 
the aims of measuring biodiversity is to predict or at least understand ecosystem 
function, it is vital to note that while community ecology considers interactions 
among entities, the inference of these interactions depends critically on the level at 
which entities are defined.
These two themes may be made more concrete with an example: while it may be 
possible to describe a microbial community as performing a single ecosystem func-
tion, it may not be possible to find a specific genotype or even set of genotypes 
stable enough (i.e. reoccurring consistently) to characterise this functional unit. 
Instead, one may want to consider whether instead particular interactions between 
units, such as a particular exchange of metabolites or another shared fitness benefit, 
may be the most stable component of the interaction.4
This situation is a radical departure from a more traditional view, in which a one- 
to- one relation is assumed between genotype and phenotype. In other words, once 
we look away from our metazoan bias it may no longer be possible to explain phe-
notype and its ecological role by measuring the genotype, since this genotype, even 
as an amalgation of multiple component genotypes, is simply not stable enough.
4 See also the ITSNTS argument of Doolittle and Booth (2016).
E. Boon
227
10.3.1  The Metazoan Bias
The examples in the previous section might seem “atypical” in the context of biodi-
versity. In fact, when speaking of biodiversity there is often a bias towards species 
that are relatively easy to identify and delineate, such as animal species. Yet vast 
diversity, however measured, can be found in groups such as algae, fungi, and the 
many phylae of microbes and virusses, which are often at the basis of ecosystem 
function (e.g. Wagg et al. 2014).
Still, one should wonder whether it makes sense to describe above examples as 
instances of IGH. In other words, how permissive can a definition of biological or 
evolutionary individuality be without losing its use? The term ‘Intra-individual 
genetic heterogeneity’ ultimately pivots on the definition of the ‘individual’. To 
determine an ecological function or identify an evolutionary process, one needs to 
distinguish the entities that perform these functions or processes.
The discussion on biological delineation and individuation has been conducted 
in different contexts already and has taken a central place in recent philosophy of 
biology discussions (see for example Queller and Strassmann 2016; Clarke 2016; 
Pradeu 2016 and references therein). It becomes clear from these recent consider-
ations that there are valid reasons to consider biological organisation from many 
different viewpoints. In other words, different research goals justify the use of diver-
gent concepts of biological or evolutionary individuality and thus warrant a pluralist 
approach.
In this context, it does make sense to describe different kinds of biological enti-
ties as instances of IGH. For example, when we consider a system with AMF, we 
could choose to look at a single AMF nucleus, at a population of nuclei, or at an 
entire hyphal system. Enlarging our scope even more, we could choose to include 
the plant partners as well as the surrounding microbial communities. I propose that 
it is in this choice that the real point of discussion lies: how to decide on the relevant 
unit of diversity?
10.3.2  Biological Organization, Hierarchy and Relevance
A genotype, or even the entire genome, is often for practical purposes employed as 
a unique identifier for ‘the biological individual’. Of course, this biological indi-
vidual cannot be fully described by only its genetic code. If this were so, we would 
consider human identical twins to be one and the same biological individual. 
However, although the individual is not defined by a unique genome, a unique 
genome seems to havebeen a convincing criterion for assigning individuality. Why?
One possible reason is that the organization of biological diversity is considered 
to be hierarchical. In this view, DNA is organized in cells, cells in bodies, bodies in 
populations and populations in species. It is implied that without cells competing or 
cooperating, the body would not exist, and without bodies competing or cooperating, 
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a population would not exist, and so forth. Leo Buss, for example, stated that “[An] 
explicitly hierarchical perspective on evolution predicts that the myriad complexi-
ties of ontogeny, cell biology and molecular genetics are ultimately penetrable in 
the context of an interplay of synergisms and conflicts between different units of 
selection” (Buss 1987).
This idea of hierarchy is also prominent in the literature on major transitions in 
evolution. Maynard Smith and Szathmáry proposed that complexity in evolution 
increases with time, which is achieved through a series of major transitions. They 
also described this complexity as mostly hierarchical (Maynard Smith and 
Szathmáry 1995). Others have continued or varied on this view of evolution of life 
on earth, yet all agree that cooperation and competition takes place at definable 
‘levels’ (Clarke 2016 and references therein). A formalisation of this view can be 
found in multilevel selection theory. Proponents of this theory aim to develop and 
formalize the tools we need to describe and quantify the relative importance of dif-
ferent levels of selection (e.g. Wilson and Sober 1994). Ultimately, the interactions 
between these levels are proposed to lead to the diversity we observe among bio-
logical entities.
Much discussion in the major transitions literature is then about finding out how 
conflict at a particular level of organization is resolved, in order to explain the evolu-
tion and diversity of another level of biological organization. In this manner, a hier-
archical view on biological diversity can offer a perspective with the scope to 
explain a large number of observations. However, it can also lead to misleading 
assumptions or obscure similarities. For example, the link of genome homogeneity 
with the delineation of the biological individual is based on the assumption that IGH 
leads to conflict within that individual (Michod and Roze 2001; Strassmann and 
Queller 2004). Yet it is not clear whether genome heterogeneity always leads to 
conflict. It is possible that there are cases where IGH can actually confer an advan-
tage to the multicellular community it is part of. Some of these examples were 
already discussed above. The question then becomes more nuanced: when is IGH 
relevant?
The simple answer may be: when there is a significant effect of IGH on the pos-
sible evolutionary trajectories (sometimes referred to as ‘evolvability’) and ecologi-
cal range that a biological unit can follow or occupy as a result of its IGH. These 
latter two concepts are exactly what is at stake in many biodiversity investigations. 
Moreover, some of the ways in which biodiversity is understood are based on taxo-
nomic or ecologic hierarchies (e.g. Sarkar 2002). Red algae and arbuscular mycor-
rhizal fungi are two fairly well-documented organisms in which intra-individual 
heterogeneity plays an important role in understanding of both evolvability and 
 ecological range. Furthermore, even though IGH is sparsely documented, reviews 
are available with more examples (Santelices 1999; Pineda-Krch and Lehtila 2004b, 
a), as well as a range of suggestions on how IGH could affect life history (Pineda-
Krch and Lehtila 2004b; Folse 2011; Folse and Roughgarden 2012). Finally, the 
importance and relevance of IGH should be decided on a case-by-case basis –with-
out assuming or dismissing its potential role off-hand.
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10.4  Conclusions
I argued that the shortcut one genome-one individual has closed our eyes to the pos-
sible importance of IGH in evolution and evolution –and thus to its role in for bio-
diversity estimates. Arguing from the examples in this chapter, I propose that IGH 
can help us understand what diversity is relevant to our research goals. To maintain 
the analogy from the introduction: which characteristics of the patient and her 
symptoms are relevant to a diagnosis and treatment?
By expanding our practical and conceptual tools to facilitate the study of genetic 
heterogeneity at many different levels of biological organisation, we can start to 
understand diversity by focusing on interactions between entities –however defined.
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Chapter 11  
Biodiversity, Disparity and Evolvability
Alessandro Minelli
Abstract A key problem in conservation biology is how to measure biological 
diversity. Taxic diversity (the number of species in a community or in a local biota) 
is not necessarily the most important aspect, if what most matters is to evaluate how 
the loss of the different species may impact on the future of the surviving species 
and communities. Alternative approaches focus on functional diversity (a measure 
of the distribution of the species among the different ‘jobs’ in the ecosystem), others 
on morphological disparity, still others on phylogenetic diversity. There are three 
major reasons to prioritize the survival of species which provide the largest 
contributions to the overall phylogenetic diversity. First, evolutionarily isolated 
lineages are frequently characterized by unique traits. Second, conserving 
phylogenetically diverse sets of taxa is valuable because it conserves some sort of 
trait diversity, itself important in so far as it helps maintain ecosystem functioning, 
although a strict relationships between phylogenetic diversity and functional 
diversity cannot be taken for granted. Third, in this way we maximize the 
“evolutionary potential” depending on the evolvability of the survivors. This 
suggests an approach to conservation problems focussed on evolvability, robustness 
and phenotypic plasticity of developmental systems in the face of natural selection: 
in other terms, an approach based on evolutionary developmental biology.
Keywords Evolvability · Functional diversity · Morphological disparity · 
Phenotypic plasticity · Phylogenetic diversity
11.1  A Concern for Biodiversity: Evolution’s Products 
at Risk
A key problem in conservation biology is how to measure the biological diversity at 
risk of loss, or already lost at the global scale or in a given area or habitat.
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The origin of the concept of biodiversity from within ecology (Wilson 1988) 
explains why biological diversity is primarily described and measured in terms of 
the number of species in a community, or in a local biota. However, when describing 
the ongoing extinction of the Anthropocene, the total number of species involved is 
not necessarily the most important issue. What matters in the end is what has been 
lost or may be lost with them, and how this loss may impact on the future of both 
species and communities.
What we eventually prioritize is often heavily biased by our emotional prefer-
ence for a few kinds of organisms and also for selected areas or habitats. Vertebrates 
are given much more attention than nematodes, big cats quite more than rodents. 
Whole biotas of particular sites are cause of special concern, for example those of 
remote oceanic islands like the Hawaii or the Galápagos. In other instances, indi-
vidual species become the target of dedicated conservation efforts because of the 
peculiar role they play in the ecosystem, for example (in the case of bees and other 
insects) as pollinators or (in the case of corals) as builders of reefs on which the 
existence of many other marine species depends. Other reasons for identifying a 
species as worth of special conservation effort are less obvious and perhaps, prima 
facie, just academic or antiquarian – as for example, when we decide that a given 
species is worth of special conservation effort only because it is the only member or 
the last survivor of a peculiar evolutionary lineage.
11.1.1  Beyond Species Number
The latter example deserves closer scrutiny. Low species number is not necessarily 
a sign of scarce success of the whole lineage, or of impending risk of extinction: in 
several instances, it is a consequence of ecological marginality, that is, of adaptation 
to infrequent habitats, or to habitats confined to very small corners of the planet’s 
surface. Ricklefs (2005) demonstrated that this is indeed the case for a number of 
tribes and even families of passerine birds. In this huge group (about 6000 extant 
species), one to five species belonging to each of these small subgroups are 
morphologically quite unusual and this correlates with their adaptation to marginal 
habitats. For example, these birds have unusually long legs and elongated bills 
facilitating feeding when the birds are perching or forage on hard substrates such as 
bark or rock. Within each of these small groups, genetic distances among the few 
extant species are generally large, indicating old divergence and, by inference, low 
speciation rate – opposite to the trend prevailing in species-rich, successful groups 
inhabiting more widely distributed habitats. The fact that these groups are still 
around in spite of a low speciation rate suggests that in these groups also the rate of 
extinction is lower than the average.
Clearly, estimates of biological diversity limited to counting species number in a 
community or in the fauna or flora of a given area fail to capture all the information 
we need to obtain a satisfactory assessment of possible criticalities and, as a 
consequence, to formulate sensible conservation measures that might be eventually 
adopted.
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Indeed, a number of metrics of biological diversity have been proposed (sum-
marized in Erwin 2008) other than those that measure just taxic diversity, i.e. the 
number of species or of lower (e.g., subspecies) or higher (e.g., genera or families) 
classificatory units. Some alternative approaches focus instead on functional diver-
sity (a measure of the distribution of the species among the different ‘jobs’ in the 
ecosystem), others on morphological disparity, still others on phylogenetic diver-
sity. All these approaches (which should be intended as complementary rather than 
alternative, although their usefulness is likely to be uneven in different instances) 
result in estimates of biodiversity to which all species in the community or biota 
contribute, although not necessarily to the same extent. In the next paragraphs I will 
briefly comment on these metrics, before moving to a less conventional approach to 
conservation problems, largely based on intrinsic properties of the individual 
species.
11.1.2  Disparity vs. Diversity
In terms of species number, birds are more diverse than mammals (some 10,000 vs. 
ca. 5600 extant species worldwide), but are instead quite more uniform in terms of 
morphology, reproductive biology and developmental schedules. Even including 
less conventional kinds such as the flightless penguins and ratites (ostrich and 
relatives), the range of bird structural types is much narrower than the range of 
structural types of mammals, which include humans and whales, bats and giraffes, 
moles and armadillos. All birds are oviparous, whereas in mammals there are a 
handful of oviparous species alongside a vast majority of viviparous species. Among 
the latter, some, like kangaroos, are borne at a developmental stage that deserves be 
called a larva, whereas others develop in their mother’s wombs up to a much more 
advanced stage and are often capable to feed for themselves in the very day in which 
they are born. In technical terms, the disparity of mammals is much higher than the 
disparity of birds.
The choice of characters we can consider to evaluate a group’s disparity is arbi-
trary, but morphological traits are usually given priority, often exclusive (Foote 
1997; McGhee 1999; Wills 2001; Erwin 2007), because these aspects are the most 
readily accessible to quantification. As noted by Gerber et al. (2008), the concept of 
morphological disparity (Gould 1989, 1991; Foote 1997) has proved to be an 
invaluable source of information, both in palaeontology (e.g., Foote 1993, 1995, 
1997; Wills et al. 1994; Dommergues et al. 1996; Roy and Foote 1997) and in the 
study of extant organisms (e.g., Ricklefs and Miles 1994; Ricklefs 2005).
In some lineages, the level of disparity goes together with the success as mea-
sured in terms of species diversity. Examples are some huge animal and plant gen-
era among whose representatives disparate body plans or life styles have evolved in 
a relatively short time. Examples include Megaselia (a genus of phorid flies of 
which 1559 species have been described, but these are probably a minor subset of 
those existing on Earth, and their morphological and ecological disparity are enor-
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mous); among the flowering plants, genera combining high diversity and high dis-
parity include Euphorbia (2150 species, ranging from tiny herbs to quite large trees, 
and also including a number of succulents) and Lobelia (417 species, among which 
are small herbaceous plants alongside woody giants). However, there are also many 
large animal and plant genera within which the morphological differences are minor 
(low disparity), and vice versa (Minelli 2016). An example of low diversity combined 
with high disparity is the phylum Ctenophora, with 165 species described thus far, 
classified in 27 families, ten of which include only one species each.
11.1.3  Functional Diversity
By measuring disparity rather than simply counting species, we move a step in the 
direction of acknowledging the different functional roles the individual species play 
in respect to their biotic and abiotic environment. This aspects has been addressed 
in a more direct way by a number of approaches to biodiversity which try to capture 
the so-called functional diversity, the component of diversity that influences 
ecosystem dynamics, stability, productivity, nutrient balance, and other aspect of 
ecosystem functioning (Tilman 2001) through targeted descriptors and the 
calculation of corresponding indices (e.g., Mason et  al. 2005; Bremner 2008; 
Villéger et al. 2008; Laliberté and Legendre 2010; Schleuter et al. 2010; Mouillot 
et  al. 2013; Gagic et  al. 2015; Gusmao-Junior and Lana 2015). Estimates of 
functional diversity are based, for example, on the number and kinds of trophic 
groups (e.g., primary producers, primary consumers, predators, parasites) and the 
number and relative abundance of species belonging to each group.
11.1.4  Phylogeny vs. Function
Phylogeny, and evolution at large, feature prominently in assessments of biological 
diversity and disparity, but it is not always obvious why. Of course, evolution is 
responsible both for the origin of the species whose number is the most popular 
measure of biodiversity, and for their structural and functional disparity, the two 
aspects mirroring the two main facets of evolutionary process  – the splitting of 
lineages (cladogenesis) and the steady changes accumulating along each lineage 
(anagenesis), respectively. However, the frequent focus on phylogenetic diversity as 
an estimate of biodiversity and a criterion for ranking species to establish 
conservation priorities (Buckley 2016), deserves some explanation.
Several algorithms have been proposed to calculate phylogenetic diversity, 
based on the cladistic relations among the taxa (more often species, but also 
infraspecific units) (e.g., Vanewright et al. 1991; Faith 1992; Crozier 1997; Moritz 
2002; Tucker et al. 2017).
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Following the work of Vane-Wright et al. (1991), Faith (1992) and later authors 
(summarized in Mazel et al. 2017), there are three major reasons to prioritize the 
survival of species representing species-poor lineages only distantly related to the 
others in the sample and thus providing the largest contributions to the overall 
phylogenetic diversity.
First, in this way we conserve the greatest amount of evolutionary history (Vane- 
Wright et al. 1991), an ill-defined concept at the core of which, however, there is a 
sensible notion: evolutionarily isolated lineages, often represented by only one or 
very few extant species, are frequently characterized by unique traits, such as the 
two continuously growing leaves of Welwitschia or the egg-laying habit of the 
monotremes, strongly contrasting with the viviparity of all other mammals (Rosauer 
and Mooers 2013).
Second, conserving phylogenetically diverse sets of taxa is valuable because it 
conserves some sort of trait diversity (e.g., Mazel et  al. 2017) This is the most 
popular among the arguments advocated in favour of using phylogenetic diversity 
as a basis on which to determine priorities for conservation. Trait diversity is 
considered important in so far as it helps maintain ecosystem functioning (e.g., 
Cadotte et al. 2008; Best et al. 2013; Winter et al. 2013; Gross et al. 2017).
Unfortunately, a strict relationships between phylogenetic diversity and func-
tional diversity cannot be taken for granted. Through an elegant set of mathematical 
simulations, Mazel et al. (2017) were able to demonstrate that basing on estimates 
of phylogenetic diversity a strategy for conserving functional diversity is not neces-
sarily a good strategy: the relationships between these two aspects of diversity 
depend on the shape of the tree depicting the phylogenetic relationships among the 
species involved and also on the model according to which their traits evolve across 
the generations. Therefore, generalizations are unwarranted. Still worse, Mazel 
et al. (2017) found that under plausible scenarios of evolution and ecology, prioritiz-
ing species conservation based on phylogenetic diversity can actually lead to levels 
of functional diversity lower than those obtained by conservation priorities deter-
mined by a random listing of the same species.
The third reason often advocated to explain why conservation priorities should 
be based on phylogenetic diversity is that in this way we maximize the “evolutionary 
potential” of the surviving biota (Faith 1992; Forest et al. 2007). As explained in a 
later section of this article, this vague term acquires a precise meaning and content 
when approached from the point of view of evolutionary developmental biology.
11.1.5  Antiquarian Sensibility
We value some human artefacts because of their current usefulness or at least 
because of the aesthetic pleasure we obtain by looking at them; but we also value 
other artefacts, even if devoid of any practical use and aesthetic qualities, simply 
because of their age. Museums are full of nondescript pieces of metal, bone or stone, 
witnesses of the human presence in particular sites at particular and often remote 
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times, and of the cultural evolution of our ancestors. Similarly, a plant or animal 
lineage is often regarded as one of singular conservation value just because of the 
very long time since it split away from its closest living relatives. Monotremes (of 
which the platypus and the echidnas are the only living representatives) are an 
obvious example: the last common ancestor they share with the other living mammals 
lived between 162.9 and 191.1  million years ago (dos Reis et  al. 2012). This 
circumstance, together with the strong unbalance in species richness (5 species only 
in the monotremes, compared to more than thousand times as many in the sister 
branch–the Theria, that is marsupials plus placentals) provides a good argument for 
regarding the platypus and the echidnas as a group of mammals we should not risk 
to bring to extinction. Another example is the tuatara, a reptile quite similar to a 
large lizard, but anatomically peculiar enough to deserve being placed in a distinct 
order, the Rhynchocephalia, of which it is the only survivor, confined to about 30 
small islands off the North Island of New Zealand. This group separated from the 
Squamata (lizards, snakes and allies) about 228 million years ago or earlier (Hipsley 
et al. 2009).
Sometimes we realize too late the amount of history that is cancelled with the 
extinction of the last survivor(s) of a plant or animal group. This happened for 
example with the nesophontids, small mammals of which eight different species 
inhabited Cuba, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico and the Cayman Islands until their recent 
extinction, probably caused by the introduction of black rats by European sailors ca. 
500 years ago. The nesophontids are classified with the insectivores and their closest 
relatives are the solenodontids, also confined in the Caribbean area. The two living 
species of the latter family, however, are poor substitutes for the loss of the 
nesophontids, not simply because they are themselves on the verge of extinction, 
but especially because the split between the two families (Nesophontidae and 
Solenodontidae) is very old, more than 50 million years (Brace et al. 2016) – longer, 
for example, than the age of the split between the New Worlds monkeys (the 
platyrrhines) and the Old World monkeys, including apes and humans (the 
catarrhines), and broadly the same age as the split between the ruminants and the 
lineage including hippos, whales and dolphins (O’Leary et al. 2013).
11.2  Conserving Evolutionary Processes
As noted by Buckley (2016), “by conserving genetic or phylogenetic diversity, we 
are facilitating the ability of lineages to adapt to future environmental changes.” 
Since the early times of what eventually became conservation biology, far-seeing 
scientists have remarked that strategies for the long-term survival of wild species 
must take into account the continuing evolution of populations: as a consequence, 
policies should be based on adequate understanding of the population-genetics 
principles of conservation (Frankel 1974) about which quite little was known at the 
time. Twenty years later, progress in this direction was still insufficient, witness the 
plea of Smith et  al. (1993, p.  164) who stressed that “If we are to conserve 
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biodiversity the ecological and evolutionary mechanisms generating genetic 
diversity and the isolating mechanisms critical for speciation must also be preserved.” 
Things have not changed much in the following years, and Moritz (2002) still 
lamented that “Less progress has been made on how to prioritize habitats, species, 
or populations in relation to persistence, that is, ensuring that the processes that 
sustain current and future diversity are protected.”
Some authors (e.g., Gillson 2015) have remarked the paradox of conservation: 
we seek to preserve systems that are incessantly in flux, because of a number of 
processes running at different spatial and temporal scale, partly driven by extrinsic 
factors such as climate change and human disturbancy, partly expressing the 
organisms’ evolutionary dynamics that would be innatural to contrast, if ever it 
would prove possible. Thus, if we can try to contrast the current biodiversity crisis 
by limiting the human impact on the environment, and even try to reduce, at least in 
some areas, the disruptive effect of rapid climate change, we may better help the 
survival of living species and lineages by devising conservation policies based on a 
sound understanding of evolvability.
11.3  Evo-Devo: Evolvability, Robustness, Plasticity
What is evolvability? Unfortunately, this is one of those technical terms for which 
too many definitions have been proposed (Pigliucci 2008; Brookfield 2009; Minelli 
2017). Most of these, however, agree on regarding evolvability as the ability of 
populations to generate heritable phenotypic variation (Brigandt 2007; Kirschner 
and Gerhart 1998; G.  P. Wagner and Altenberg 1996), but some are quite more 
specific, e.g. in focussing on the capacity to evolve new adaptations (Bedau and 
Packard 1992). Eventually, I prefer the definition proposed by Masel and Trotter 
(2010, p. 406), according to which evolvability is “the capacity of a population to 
produce heritable phenotypic variation of a kind that is not unconditionally 
deleterious. This definition includes both evolution from standing variation and the 
ability of the population to produce new variants.”
According to Hendrikse et al. (2007), focussing on evolvability is the most char-
acteristic feature of the research programme of evolutionary developmental biology 
(also called evo-devo). This young branch of the life sciences has much to offer to 
conservation (Campbell et al. 2017). Up to now, conservation efforts based on the 
preservation of genetic variation have followed the approach to intraspecific diver-
sity characteristic of population genetics. But this is too limiting: as remarked long 
ago by Waddington (1957), the expression of genetic variation is structured by 
development. And this is exactly where evo-devo operates, in a systematic effort to 
unravel the complex relationships between genotype and phenotype (the so-called 
genotype→phenotype map; cf. Alberch 1991; Wagner and Altenberg 1996; Pigliucci 
2001; West-Eberhard 2003; Draghi and Wagner 2008).
Indeed, to understand evolvability, we must acknowledge that the path leading 
from genotype to phenotype is complex and not necessarily predictable (Minelli 
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2017). On the one hand, due to environmental influences but also to stochastic 
impredictability, different phenotypes can be produced by developing organisms that 
share identical genotypes; reciprocally, identical phenotypes can be produced by 
developmental systems with different genotypes. Elaborating upon Waddington’s 
insight, students of evo-devo have demonstrated that the expression of genetic 
variation is largely dependent on the structure and robustness of the developing 
system (Hansen 2006; Kirschner and Gerhart 1998; Wagner 2005; Wagner and 
Altenberg 1996).
Together with evolvability, robustness plays a central role in evolutionary devel-
opmental biology. The robustness of a phenotypic trait can be operationally defined 
as the absence of variation in the face of environmental or genetic perturbations 
(Félix and Barkoulas 2015). According to some authors, robustness constrains and 
contrasts evolvability, with negative effects on biodiversity: the rationale is that, if 
mutations and environmental changes have little effect, there is not much variation 
on which selection can act. Others (e.g., Kitano 2004; Wagner 2008; Masel and 
Trotter 2010; Melzer and Theißen 2016; Theißen and Melzer 2016) regard this view 
as simplistic and even contend that robustness may promote evolvability, i.e. the 
ability to produce heritable phenotypic variation (Pigliucci 2008). To explain how, 
we must first distinguish between two aspects of robustness, genetic vs. 
developmental.
Genetic robustness is “robustness to perturbations both in the form of new muta-
tions and in the form of the creation of new combinations of existing alleles by 
recombination” (Masel and Trotter 2010, p.  407), without visible effects on the 
phenotype. In this way, in the absence of exposure to novel selective challenges, 
populations accumulate genetic diversity on the base of which they gain easier 
access to a greater range of novel genotypes, some of which may eventually prove 
to be advantageous (A. Wagner 2005, 2008, 2011).
A similar relationships between robustness and evolvability is found in the case 
of developmental robustness (also known as canalization, a term coined by 
Waddington (1942)) that is, the production of the same phenotype irrespective of 
genetic differences (and external perturbations). This also corresponds to the fact 
that populations harbour amounts of unexpressed genetic variation (cryptic genetic 
variation) that is not expressed in the phenotype unless revealed by environmental 
change or by modification in the overall genetic background (e.g., Badyaev 2005; 
Flatt 2005; Gibson and Dworkin 2004; Moczek 2007; Rieseberg et  al. 2003; 
Schlichting 2008). This cryptic variation represents a standing potential for 
evolvability. Exposure to novel selective pressures can be dramatically accelerated 
by the human impact on the environment. In other terms, environmental change 
does not just alter the selective regime to which a population is exposed, but can also 
induce novel developmental responses even in the absence of genetic change. This 
property of the genotype→phenotype map is known as phenotypic plasticity (Fusco 
and Minelli 2010).
Phenotypic plasticity should not be regarded as an alternative to natural selec-
tion. On the one hand, the emergence of a novel phenotype by plasticity, following 
exposure to previously unexperienced environmental conditions creates a new target 
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on which selection will operate; on the other, plasticity itself is subjected to selection, 
being favoured in fluctuating environments (Price et al. 2003; West-Eberhard 2003; 
Pfennig et al. 2010). As noted by Campbell et al. (2017), this is a situation likely 
experienced by a population introduced in a new area or living in habitats fragmented 
or otherwise damaged by man.
One might argue that phenotypic plasticity, although responsible for the emer-
gence of new phenotypes, offers no warranty of their conservation, on the long term 
at least. But this would be a short-sighted perspective. An environmentally con-
trolled phenotype can eventually fall under strict genetic control. The functional 
divide to be crossed is sometimes a very narrow one, as demonstrated by the control 
of wing development in the pea aphid, Acyrtosiphum pisum. In this little insect, 
some adults (males as well as females) are winged, while the others are wingless. In 
the male sex, the coexistence of these two alternative phenotypes is under genetic 
control, while in the females wing development is controlled by the exposure to 
different day-lengths in a critical phase of development. In technical terms, males 
exhibit genetic polymorphism for this trait, while females exhibit an environmentally 
controlled polyphenism, ie the outcome of phenotypic plasticity. This contrast, 
however, rests on minor mechanistic differences, because the developmental effect 
of day-length on wing development in the females is mediated by the gene product 
of the same gene whose alternative alleles are responsible for the wing polymorphism 
in the male (Braendle et  al. 2005a, b). This circumstance suggests how easily a 
polyphenism can evolve into a genetic polymorphism, eventually allowing long- 
term conservation of phenotypes.
11.4  A Lesson from Past Mass Extinctions?
Irrespective of the different causes involved in these events, the mass extinctions of 
the past should be studied very carefully by researchers interested in conservation 
biology, but not so much to analyze the differential tribute paid by organisms 
belonging to different lineages, as to look for any possible explanation of the 
differential success of the survivors in the post-crisis recovery. Palaeobiologists 
have generally focussed on the ecological determinants of this process; that is, they 
have regarded the ecological space left empty by extinctions as the main determinant 
of the renewed occupation of morphospace. To some extent, the morphological 
disparity often expanded into dimensions other than those that were occupied prior 
to the mass extinction. However, no really new body plan emerged. This was, in a 
sense, a large-scale test demonstrating the developmental robustness of the main 
traits of body architecture of the survivors, the innovations being limited to 
secondary, evolutionarily plastic aspects (Erwin 2008).
Confronted with this (admittedly, only incompletely documented) evidence, it 
seems legitimate to rethink the evolutionary criteria in the light of which biodiversity 
and its ongoing loss are currently evaluated. It is hard to imagine a positive 
correlation between the phylogenetic relationships among the survivors and the 
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possible outcome of their long-term evolution in a post-crisis recovery. Million 
years ago, by preferring to save a marsupial and a placental mammal rather than two 
placentals, because of the larger phylogenetic distance between the first two, we 
would not have been able to predict that at least two different subterranean lineages 
would have eventually evolved in any case: today there are indeed marsupial moles 
(Notoryctes) among the marsupials and moles (Talpa) and mole-rats (Spalax) 
among the placentals. More than because of the history of their lineage, survivors 
may be differentially important for the future of biodiversity as a function of their 
intrinsic qualities, particularly those expressed by the parameters on which evo- 
devo focuses – as said, robustness and evolvability.
Acknowledgements I am grateful to Elena Casetta and Davide Vecchi for their invitation to con-
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Chapter 12
Probing the Process-Based Approach 
to Biodiversity: Can Plasticity Lead 
to the Emergence of Novel Units 
of Biodiversity?
Davide Vecchi and Rob Mills
Abstract The history of biology has been characterised by a strong emphasis on 
the identification of entities (e.g., macromolecules, cells, organisms, species) as 
fundamental units of our classificatory system. The biological hierarchy can be 
divided into a series of compositional levels complementing the physical and chem-
ical hierarchy. Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that biodiversity studies 
have focused on a “holy trinity” of entities, namely genes, species and ecosystems. 
In this chapter, we endorse the view that a process-based approach should integrate 
an entity-based one. The rationale of our endorsement is that a focus on entities does 
not address whether biological processes have the capacity to create novel, salient 
units of biodiversity. This alternative focus might therefore have implications for 
conservation biology. In order to show the relevance of process-based approaches to 
biodiversity, in this chapter we shall focus on a particular process: phenotypic plas-
ticity. Specifically, we shall describe a model of plasticity that might have implica-
tions for how we conceptualise biodiversity units. The hypothesis we want to test is 
whether plastic subpopulations that have enhanced evolutionary potential vis a vis 
non-plastic subpopulations make them amenable to evolutionarily significant units 
(i.e., ESU) status. An understanding of the mechanisms that influence organismic 
evolution, particularly when under environmental stress, may shed light on the natu-
ral “conservability” capacities of populations. We use an abstract computational 
model that couples plasticity and genetic mutation to investigate how plasticity pro-
cesses (through the Baldwin effect) can improve the adaptability of a population 
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when faced with novel environmental challenges. We find that there exist circum-
stances under which plasticity improves adaptability, where multi-locus fitness val-
leys exist that are uncrossable by non-plastic populations; and the differences in the 
capacity to adapt between plastic and non-plastic populations become drastic when 
the environment varies at a great enough rate. If plasticity such as learning provides 
not only within-lifetime environmental buffering, but also enhances a population’s 
capacity to adapt to environmental changes, this would, on the one hand, vindicate 
a process-based approach to biodiversity and, on the other, it would suggest a need 
to take into account the processes generating plasticity when considering conserva-
tion efforts.
Keywords Biological hierarchy · Process-approach to conservation · 
Evolutionarily significant unit of conservation (ESU) · Plasticity · Baldwin effect · 
Evolutionary potential
12.1  Entity-Based and Process-Based Approaches Are 
Complementary
Biodiversity conservation poses a set of complex conceptual and practical chal-
lenges. The metaphor of healing and the analogy of nature as a patient serve the 
purpose of discriminating such challenges in three groups.1 The state of nature as a 
patient must be diagnosed and the damage to biodiversity estimated in order to cure 
it via appropriate conservation actions. But in order to do so, we need to be able to 
take care of the patient in the right way. That is, we need to be able to characterise 
nature as a patient appropriately by identifying the relevant targets of treatment and 
conservation action. This contribution deals primarily with this conceptual chal-
lenge by arguing that proper treatment can be achieved not by exclusively targeting 
entities (i.e., units of biodiversity as conservation targets such as species or sites), 
but by concomitantly focusing on the processes generating such entities. In order to 
build our case, let us first explain why science requires endorsing a complementary 
entity-and-process-based approach.
Most people would identify biological entities such as organisms and species as 
paradigmatic. This intuitive knowledge (or folk biology) is often eventually refined, 
encompassing entities that can only be observed through microscopes such as cells 
and macromolecules. Biological knowledge is basically about what these entities do 
and how they develop or evolve. The focus on entities can be justified for at least 
two important reasons. First of all, nature can be thought in hierarchical terms as a 
series of part-whole relationships where the entities-wholes at a higher level of 
organisation are composed of entities-parts at a lower level. Secondly, the epistemo-
logical advantage of this compositional view is that an entity-based ontology can be 
1 The metaphor and analogy are developed in Casetta, Marques da Silva & Vecchi, Chap. 1, in this 
volume.
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upheld despite ignorance of the processes leading to the generation (and, conversely, 
the decomposition) of wholes.2
The basic idea beneath entity-based classification is that nature is stratified into 
hierarchical levels of composition, i.e., “… hierarchical divisions of stuff (paradig-
matically, but not necessarily material stuff) organized by part-whole relations, in 
which wholes at one level function as parts at the next (and at all higher) levels” 
(Wimsatt 2007, p. 201). Consider the physical hierarchy for example; the idea is 
that fundamental particles (e.g., fermions – quarks and leptons – and bosons) com-
pose hadrons (neutrons and protons), which in turn compose atoms, which in turn 
compose molecules, which in turn compose all other solid, liquid and gaseous 
molecular aggregates that we can directly observe at the mesoscopic scale. 
Fundamental particles are the component parts of the hadron wholes; hadrons are 
the component parts of the atom wholes etc. Fundamental particles, hadrons, atoms 
etc. are entities belonging to different compositional levels. Biological hierarchies 
can be analogously divided into a series of compositional levels that complement 
the physical and chemical hierarchies: macromolecular wholes are composed of 
fundamental particles, hadrons, atoms, molecular parts; cellular wholes are com-
posed of macromolecular parts; organismal wholes are composed of cellular parts 
etc. Thus, compositional hierarchies seem to identify “natural” and not purely 
human-dependent ontological components, even though the details of any ontology 
remain revisable in the light of scientific advances. The upshot of all this is that, if 
nature is indeed stratified into hierarchical compositional levels, then, on the one 
hand, all entities in the universe are ultimately composed of fundamental particles 
and, on the other, physical, chemical and biological hierarchies must be composi-
tionally related. The corollary of this view is that compositionality implies some 
kind of physical reductionism because, on the one hand, everything is composed of 
basic physical stuff (e.g., quarks, leptons and bosons) and, on the other, the basic 
physical level of the hierarchy is primitive. This kind of compositional physicalism 
is unproblematic in many respects, even though this does not mean that chemistry 
and biology should straightforwardly be reduced to physics. One reason is that the 
explanation of the behaviour of chemical and biological systems might require ref-
erence to properties that are not ascribable to their physical components. Additionally, 
this kind of compositional physicalism rests on ontological fundamentalism, that is, 
the not so innocent assumption that we can make sense of the idea that a fundamen-
tal physical level exists at all (Schaffer 2003). This view implies the controversial 
hypothesis that quarks, leptons and bosons are not composed of anything at all, that 
they are “atoms” of composition in Democritus’s sense. However, even though 
compositional physicalism is somehow obvious (because all entities are merely 
composed of physical stuff), it is at the same time epistemologically vacuous. Let us 
explain why by making reference exclusively to biology.
2 Of course, there exist also processes leading to the decomposition of wholes. However, the strik-
ing feature of the history of life is that it is a history of “complexification”, of generation of wholes. 
Thanks to Sandro Minelli for suggesting this clarification.
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There are many potential reasons to argue that the compositional physicalism so 
far characterised provides an unsatisfactory account of biological entities. One 
argument is that biological entities are composed of non-physical components, a 
position that might be called vitalism. A somehow different argument states that 
biological entities possess properties that are lacked by their physical parts, a posi-
tion that might be called emergentism. Here we shall focus on another kind of argu-
ment against compositional physicalism. Suppose we were to produce an inventory 
of all the relevant parts and their properties: could we infer the properties of wholes? 
No, because we would also need an understanding of the “rules of composition” 
governing the behaviour of parts in the production of wholes. An entity-based ontol-
ogy cannot provide a satisfactory account of the properties of wholes without pro-
viding information about the nature of the processes governing the interactions 
between their parts. The basic point is that an entity-based ontology would provide 
limited knowledge of nature unless it is complemented with a process-based ontol-
ogy. This is because of two reasons.
The first is that we cannot understand biological entities and their behaviour with-
out knowledge about their structure and functional properties. Take a protein, a 
whole composed of a variety of amino acids with a number of physical (i.e., bio-
physical and biochemical) properties; the conformational properties of proteins are 
dependent on the properties of their component amino-acids but are not properties of 
these components; for instance, the specificity of proteins (i.e., their capacity to bind 
to a particular ligand) is given by their structure, where this structure is generated by 
the functional interaction of the polypeptide chains (themselves composed of amino 
acids) and the environment. The point is that knowledge of the physical properties of 
the macromolecular components of a protein is not enough in order to account for 
the structural and functional properties of proteins and thus to explain and predict 
their behaviour: composition does not account for structure and function. Thus, a 
static entity-based ontology consisting of an inventory of the compositional proper-
ties of parts does not exhaust the relevant biological properties of wholes.
The second reason is that the criteria for the identification of relevant biological 
entities must make reference to processes. For instance, consider organismal devel-
opment: even if the embryo is very different from the adult capable of reproducing, 
they are the same biological individual. The individuality of an organism is not a 
property of its component parts (i.e., cells) but of the whole. Perhaps it would be 
better to say that it is not even a property but a process. Hennig (1966, p. 65) intro-
duced the concept of semaphoront in order to make sense of this constrained 
organismal changeability. The semaphoront corresponds to the individual (e.g., a 
biological organism) in an infinitely small time span of its life history during which 
it remains unchanged. The same concept can probably be applied to any entity, 
physical, chemical or biological alike. But the semaphoront is a fiction, a concep-
tual device that should not be reified in order to vindicate a pure entity-based ontol-
ogy. In this deep sense, it might be argued, biological entities should ultimately be 
thought in terms of dynamical processes: every supposedly static and unchange-
able biological entity should be merely thought of as a portion of its life history 
(Dupré 2012).
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At the same time, even a pure process-based ontology relinquishing any refer-
ence to entities would be epistemically useless: science also strives to classify 
types of entities and to uncover practically useful criteria for entity identification. 
This is clearly the case in biology: we want to be able to say that the embryo is the 
same individual as the adult, that this cell is and always will be eukaryotic during 
its life history, that this organism belongs to a particular species etc. Thus, in a very 
basic sense, an entity-based and a process-based ontology cannot but be 
complementary.
12.2  Entity-Based Approaches to Biodiversity Are Deficient
The intuitive allure and the epistemological advantages of entity-based composi-
tional hierarchies are reflected in the literature on biodiversity. In fact, composi-
tional hierarchies are prominent in biodiversity studies (Angermeier and Karr 1994, 
p. 691). For instance, taxonomic hierarchies stratify biological nature in terms of the 
part-whole relationship between species, genera, families, orders, classes, phyla, 
kingdoms, domains and superdomain. Ecological hierarchies stratify biological 
nature in terms of the part-whole relationship between populations, communities, 
ecosystems, landscapes, biomes and biosphere. Genetic hierarchies stratify biologi-
cal nature in terms of the part-whole relationship between alleles, genes, chromo-
somes, genomes and pangenomes. All these hierarchies capture an aspect of 
biological nature (i.e., taxonomic inclusiveness, ecological nestedness, genetic 
organisation). To each level corresponds an entity type, i.e., a unit of biodiversity. A 
general problem with compositional hierarches of the above kind is that the biodi-
versity units are not immaculately characterisable, in the sense that sometimes it is 
difficult to recognise a biological entity as an entity of a certain type, as a certain 
biodiversity unit. For instance, whether a population of organisms constitutes a cer-
tain species might be open to debate and might depend on which species concept we 
take into account3; biofilms or host-symbiont consortia might be either considered 
organisms or communities depending on which characterisation of organism we 
take into account etc.4 Biology does not provide clear-cut and universally-accepted 
criteria for the identification of a certain biological entity as an entity of a certain 
type because biological entities develop and evolve. But one of the relevant issues 
in conservation biology is whether entity-based compositional hierarchies of the 
above kind provide a satisfactory framework to characterise the units of 
conservation.5 In this section we shall suggest that they do not. In order to do so, we 
shall consider three issues. The first concerns the justification for the choice of 
3 See Reydon, Chap. 8, in this volume, on the debate concerning the nature of species.
4 See Marques da Silva and Casetta, Chap. 9, in this volume, on this issue.
5 This is just one of the many conceptual and practical challenges posed by conserving biodiversity. 
See Casetta, Marques da Silva & Vecchi, Chap. 1, in this volume.
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hierarchy. The second pertains to the justification for the choice of biodiversity 
units. The third concerns the rationale for the exclusive focus on entities. 
12.2.1  The Limits of Conservation Fundamentalism
The taxonomic, ecological and genetic hierarchies are somehow conflicting, even 
though they might be related at some level. One proposal is that they are cleanly 
related at the species-population-genome level because, as Angermeier and Karr 
(1994, p. 691) argued, “… any population has a taxonomic identity (species), which 
is characterized by a distinct genome.” This essentialist proposal is flawed at least 
in the sense that it is assumed that a species-specific genome exists, while what 
exists is a gene-pool (i.e., the totality of the genes of a given species existing at a 
given time, see Mayr 1970, p. 417). The species genome is thus a statistical artefact 
reconstructed with reference to this gene pool and ideally comprising all the 
genomic constituents of all genomes of present (but not past and future) organisms 
belonging to a species. If the species-population-genome relationship were clean, it 
would follow that by saving all present members of one species we would conserve 
all species-specific genomic variation, which is clearly not the case at least in the 
sense that some genomic variants have been surely lost in the course of evolution 
and others will be acquired. Of course, other ways of carving nature might exist and 
other compositional hierarchies, possibly linking the three hierarchies used so far, 
might be devised. Sarkar (2002) has for instance proposed that two compositional 
hierarchies should be used, one spatial (i.e., biological molecules, macromolecules, 
organelles, cells, organisms, populations, meta-populations, communities, ecosys-
tems, biosphere) and one taxonomic (alleles, genes, genotypes, subspecies, species, 
genera, etc. until kingdoms, domain and superdomain). The advantage of this pro-
posal is its parsimony, particularly the merging of the genetic and taxonomic hierar-
chies (which implies that genomic units  – i.e., functional or structural genomic 
components – should be considered taxonomic ones).
Given a multiplicity of hierarchies, is there a possible justification for choosing 
one particular compositional one? For reasons that will be uncovered in this section, 
we strongly doubt it. However, let us suppose for the sake of argument that no hier-
archy can be privileged. The following question is whether some units should be 
chosen as fundamental units of conservation. Clearly, it is practically impossible to 
conserve all diversity at all levels of a hierarchy, as it is practically impossible to 
focus conservation effort on the all-comprehensive top-level unit (i.e., biota and 
biosphere). How should we choose relevant units then? As a matter of fact, conser-
vation practice seems to bypass this foundational question. As Sarkar (2005, p. 182) 
relates, the convention in conservation practice is to choose the “holy trinity” of 
genes, species and ecosystems as units of conservation. Note that these three types 
of entity belong to different hierarchies, however compositional hierarchies are 
characterised. Thus, conservation biologists seem to think that, for instance, 
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 conserving genes is not sufficient to conserve ecosystems and vice versa. Are they 
correct? Let us analyse the holy trinity in detail by starting with genes.
As we have seen in the first section, compositional hierarchies betray a reduc-
tionist bias. Unlike in physics, in the life sciences this bias is not articulated as a 
problem concerning ontological fundamentalism (the idea that a compositional 
level is primitive): obviously no biological compositional level is primitive and 
ontologically fundamental given that all biological entities are made of physical 
stuff. But an analogous problem presents itself nonetheless: is there any reason to 
think that a particular biological compositional level is causally privileged? Usually 
this question is framed in terms of reduction: suppose that biological compositional 
level x is adopted as privileged, would it be possible to reduce all biological phe-
nomena to interactions between entities at that level? Generally, the answer to this 
question has been negative, with few interesting exceptions, for instance in develop-
mental biology (Rosenberg 1997; Wolpert 1994). Nonetheless, a tendency to con-
sider the molecular level as the biologically privileged level is clearly present in 
many branches of biology. The reason is that it is thought that the behaviour of 
biological wholes should, in order to be properly understood, be unpacked in terms 
of molecular interactions. When we move to conservation practice, the related 
reductionist idea seems to be that genes are the fundamental unit of conservation 
because, by conserving all genomic variation, we concomitantly preserve much of 
the phenotypic variation that characterises the populations constituting the species 
and higher taxonomic levels. Sarkar (2002, p. 152) notes that this position can be 
justified only if some form of “global genetic reductionism” (i.e., the thesis accord-
ing to which “all biological features are, in some significant way, reducible to the 
genes”) is vindicated. In a very clear sense, global genetic reductionism is wrong, 
fundamentally because phenogenesis at all levels (from transcription, translation 
and protein folding up to cellular differentiation and morphogenesis) is causally 
influenced by a variety of environmental inputs. Thus, saving all genes would not 
save all possible phenotypic outcomes unless we also conserved all possible devel-
opmental environments, which verges on the impossible.6 Interestingly, note that 
developmental environments (e.g., the folding environments of proteins considered 
in Sect. 12.1) are fundamentally ecosystems. Also note that genes are units of the 
taxonomic hierarchy while developmental ecosystems are units of the spatial or 
ecological one. This explains why a compositional hierarchy cannot be privileged 
over the others and why, as a matter of fact, focusing conservation efforts on units 
of two different hierarchies might turn out to be a necessary rather than an incoher-
ent conservation strategy (for a similar argument, see Sarkar 2002, p. 152).
6 There remains a possible sense in which the conservation of genomic variation goes a long way 
to achieve conservation of all biodiversity: if it were established that speciation (as the epitome of 
a lineage diversification process) completely depends on genomic change, then we would have a 
good argument. The issue concerns the origin of biodiversity: if it turns out that genomic change is 
central, then some diluted form of global genetic  reductionism might be rescued in the face of 
phenotypic plasticity (perhaps the variation produced through plasticity would be ineffectual per 
se for speciation; see West-Eberhard 2003 for an opposite argument).
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As already argued above, the idea that a peculiar genome characterises a biologi-
cal species remains common in biology (despite being generally rejected in philoso-
phy of biology). This seemingly clear link between genetic properties and species 
partly explains why the latter are considered an element of the trinity. After all, 
species are the repositories of all the genomic and phenotypic variation among its 
constituent organisms, where this variation is the raw material on which speciation 
processes work. According to Mayr (1969), species are the most fundamental unit 
of biological organisation. Interestingly, Mayr argued that only sexually reproduc-
ing organisms form species and that the category is not applicable to many unicel-
lular groups of organisms (e.g., bacteria), thus betraying a bias that still characterises 
conservation practice too. Mayr’s (1969, p. 316) argument was that species serve a 
specific biological function because dividing the total genetic variability of nature 
into discrete packages prevents the production of “disharmonious incompatible 
gene combinations”. Conservation efforts that target species could therefore be jus-
tified as we would save all the possible “harmonious genetic combinations”.7 
However, even if we endorse the view that species are important units of biological 
organisation, this would not be enough to justify an exclusive focus on this biotic 
unit in conservation practice. One reason is that estimating biodiversity through spe-
cies count is problematic.8 For instance, species diversity would not account for 
diversity at other levels of the same hierarchy. The fact that there are more terrestrial 
than marine species does not translate into more diversity at the next hierarchical 
level; in fact, there are more marine than terrestrial phyla, i.e., diversity and dispar-
ity clash (Grosberg et al. 2012); hence, by conserving an equal number of marine 
and terrestrial species, we might not conserve equal marine and terrestrial biodiver-
sity at the phylum level. Conversely, species diversity would not account for genetic 
diversity, that is, for diversity at another level of a different hierarchy (or even of the 
same hierarchy if the general taxonomic hierarchy proposed by Sarkar mixing 
genetic and taxonomic units is endorsed); hence, for instance, by choosing to con-
serve indiscriminately either species S1 and S2 of genus G because one of the two 
is functionally redundant (in the sense that they play an equivalent ecological role 
in the ecosystem), we might not be able to conserve equal biodiversity at the genetic 
level; the reason is that one of the species might harbour more genetic diversity (its 
gene pool might be larger); so, supposing chimps and bonobos play equivalent eco-
logical roles in the ecosystems, conserving bonobos with presumably much smaller 
gene pools than chimps (Prado-Martinez et al. 2013) would amount to failing to 
conserve genomic diversity.
Similar arguments apply to exclusive focus on ecosystems as the unit of conser-
vation. This means that it is clearly difficult to justify biodiversity fundamentalism. 
7 By adding the hypothesis that genes are the most important causes of phenogenesis, we end up 
with the strong hypothesis that by conserving the species’ characteristic gene pool (i.e., an aggre-
gate of genomes) we are also conserving the entirety of their possible phenotypic manifestations 
(that is, all protein and cell types as well as all supra-cellular organismal traits), i.e., all genetic and 
phenotypic biodiversity.
8 See Borda-de-Água, Chap. 5 and Crupi, Chap. 6, in this volume on this issue.
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A similar position has been argued for by Angermeier and Karr (1994, p. 691). They 
generalise the failure of biodiversity fundamentalism by also arguing that even a 
focus on a single hierarchy is bound to fail, as it would lead to ignore most biodiver-
sity. Noss (1990, p. 357) has made this point quite succinctly by arguing that “No 
single level of organization (e.g., gene, population, community) is fundamental ….”. 
Of course, the idea of taking into account 3 units of different hierarchies instead of 
one unit is exactly tailored to avoid such problems. But, as Sarkar (2002, p 138) has 
argued, “…even this catholic proposal falls afoul of the diversity of biological phe-
nomena …”. Thus, Sarkar argues, even avoiding biodiversity fundamentalism in 
some of its two forms (either focusing exclusively on a hierarchy or on a unit) would 
not allow accounting for “endangered biological phenomena” that are in principle 
amenable to conservation, such as the synchronous flowering of particular bamboo 
species at a distance. Sarkar argues that in order to save this peculiar phenotypic 
outcome, conservation efforts should neither be directed to conserve the genome of 
the clumps of these bamboo species, nor even conserving the species; rather, what 
should be conserved are the environments in which this behaviour is expressed; 
only by also preserving the habitats and sites where these biological phenomena 
occur we would be able to conserve them. Note that this argument is analogous to 
the one proposed above concerning the conservation of developmental environ-
ments. Developmental environments are, like habitats and sites, entities belonging 
to the spatial compositional hierarchy, that is, a different hierarchy than that to 
which genes and populations belong. We conclude that for all these reasons there is 
no justification for focusing exclusively on one compositional hierarchy in conser-
vation practice. As we have showed, at least one spatial and one taxonomic unit are 
concomitantly needed as conservation units in order to encompass all phenotypic 
biodiversity (e.g., protein conformations and developmental outcomes, genetic and 
phenotypic variants) and all biological phenomena (e.g., synchronous flowering of 
bamboo). The corollary of this conclusion is that no biodiversity unit can be the 
fundamental unit of conservation. Rather, a variety of units are needed to encom-
pass all biodiversity. We shall now suggest that the limits of biodiversity fundamen-
talism (both in its hierarchy and unit variants) and of multi-unit approaches to 
conservation is arguably a symptom of a more general malaise concerning entity- 
based approaches to conservation practice. The fundamental question is thus 
whether a different kind of approach should be favoured. In particular, we ask 
whether there exists a rationale for the exclusive focus on entities.
12.2.2  Towards an Entity and Process-Based Approach 
to Conservation
As we argued in the first section, one limit of compositional hierarchies pertains to 
their lack of structural and functional information. The problem is thus whether 
conservation strategies can be devised in the absence of detailed knowledge con-
cerning the structural properties and functional interactions between the entities 
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constituting the compositional levels of the hierarchy. Structural hierarchies aim to 
represent the organisation (e.g., the topology or network of interactions) between 
the parts of the relevant entity-whole, while functional hierarchies map the pro-
cesses governing the causal interactions between the various parts of the relevant 
entity-wholes. In this sense, a structural characterisation of, for instance, a cell is the 
topology of the network of interactions between its components parts. The struc-
tural characterisation is not merely a list of cellular components (it is not purely 
compositional), but it is an organised list whereby their interactions are identified. A 
structural characterisation is more informative than a compositional one, but is less 
informative than a functional one. From a functional point of view, a cell is literally 
an ecosystem whereby energy and matter acquired from the environment is pro-
cessed internally in such a fashion as to manufacture its component parts (Luisi 
2003). This means that a functional representation of a cell specifies the causal 
nature of the interactions between its sub-cellular components. Consider secondly 
that, given that functional hierarchies aim to represent the causal interactions 
between the elements of a hierarchy, they do not provide merely entity-based ontol-
ogies. For instance, a functional characterisation of the cell makes reference to the 
metabolic interactions between nutrients, constituent proteins and other macromol-
ecules, organelles, membrane receptors etc. In this sense, it does not purely provide 
an entity-based ontology but also a process-based one. The upshot is that the genetic, 
taxonomic and ecological hierarchies for characterising biodiversity in terms of 
genetic organisation, taxonomic inclusiveness and ecological nestedness are, given 
their compositional ethos, insufficient to capture the structural and functional 
aspects of biodiversity (Franklin 1988). It is for this reason that compositional hier-
archies should be complemented with structural and functional hierarchies, as sug-
gested by Noss (1990, p. 359). As soon as we look at functional hierarchies, we 
grasp that the focus is also on processes, not merely on entities.
The crucial question is whether knowledge of functional interactions and process 
is necessary in order to provide a satisfactory characterisation of biodiversity and 
especially of the units of conservation. Consider functional interactions first. Many 
species are involved in complex biological relationships such as predation and pol-
lination. Compositional hierarchies provide information concerning the relata (i.e., 
the entities involved in a relation) of such interactions, but this information is oblivi-
ous to process. Pollination is an ecological function that can be realised in multifari-
ous ways by a variety of species of insects, birds, bats, snails etc. on the one hand 
and flowering plants on the other. Perhaps some species play a fundamental ecologi-
cal role in the pollination process (as keystone species, Sarkar 2005, p. 15) and our 
conservation efforts should be focused on these.9 It is therefore clear that knowledge 
9 The concept of keystone species can be characterised in terms of ecological centrality (when a 
species has many functional relationships with many different species). This characterisation, 
however, seems to imply a lack of specialisation on the part of the species. For instance, pollination 
seems to be realised in large part by highly specialised species (both plants with very few pollina-
tors and animals pollinating very few plants) which do not have, as a consequence, many func-
tional relationships with many different species. We would argue that the ecological centrality of a 
keystone species depends on its specialised functional role: a keystone species would thus be one 
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of this ecological role might inform conservation efforts. However, knowledge of 
this kind is clearly not provided by compositional hierarchies. Consider processes 
now. Generally speaking, two types of processes governing the behaviour of the 
entities identified by compositional hierarchies can be identified. First of all, those 
leading to the differentiation of parts. Secondly, those that, given the differentiated 
parts, govern their combination (i.e., combinogenesis). All natural sciences are 
somehow concerned with understanding the nature of the processes of part differen-
tiation and those governing their combination. Biology certainly strives to under-
stand differentiation and combinogenetic processes: biology is both about 
differentiation of part-entities (e.g., production of genetic variants, new species etc.) 
and about the combinogenesis of whole-entities (i.e., the emergence of new biologi-
cal individuals). For instance, what are the processes that govern allelic, population 
and species differentiation? Theories of genomic change and speciation are part and 
parcel of biology of course. And what are the processes that govern genome and 
ecosystem formation? Equally, theories concerning genome evolution and ecology 
are part and parcel of biology. An entity-based approach to biodiversity is thus para-
sitic on biological theories concerning, among others, genomic and phenotypic 
change as well as biological and ecological theories concerning, among others, 
genome evolution, phenotypic evolution, speciation and ecosystem stability, where 
all these theories make a reference to processes (e.g., mutation, phenotypic plastic-
ity, predation) impinging on a variety of biological entities belonging to various 
levels of various compositional hierarchies. Thus, given that reference to such pro-
cesses remains invisible in compositional hierarchies, they seem by their own nature 
epistemologically deficient. This point is particularly relevant because it influences 
the characterisation of the units of conservation. Does a focus on units of biodiver-
sity, which are biological entities, make sense without a complementary focus on 
their maintenance and generative processes?
12.3  Does a Process-Based Approach to Biodiversity Make 
Sense?
We have argued so far that an entity-based approach ignores the functional relations 
between the elements of the hierarchy. In a nutshell, it ignores the influence of pro-
cesses of differentiation and combination of parts. In conservation science, a 
process- based approach would shift the focus on the processes that originate and 
maintain biodiversity. As we shall relate, the shift from entities to process has been 
advocated by many conservation practitioners. The argument that we shall propose 
does not advocate a switch to exclusive focus on process. More reasonably, we sug-
gest that a process-based approach should integrate an entity-based one (Faith 
performing (almost) exclusively a particular function (e.g., pollination) for other species. See Sect. 
12.3 for a clear example of keystone species (Morris et al. 2012). Thanks to Alessandro Minelli for 
drawing attention to this putative tension.
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2016). After all, what could it mean to conserve a process? Not much. As we already 
argued in Sect. 12.1, if an exclusive entity-based approach to biology does not make 
sense, even an exclusive process-based approach does not. The reason is obvious: 
processes are important because they create and maintain new entities, new units of 
potential conservation. Thus, to use the pollination example again, the issue is not 
whether we should either choose the relata (e.g., the populations) or the relationship 
as units of conservation. We cannot think of any other sensible way of conserving 
relationships and processes than by conserving their relata and their actors (i.e., the 
entities involved in the process). As we shall explain below, the shift to process is 
most prominently a shift in the ways in which we characterise the units of conserva-
tion. Particularly important in the present context is Ryder’s (1986) proposal to 
characterise conservation units as evolutionary significant units (i.e., ESUs), that is, 
as populations of organisms that, for historical and evolutionary reasons, play pecu-
liar causal roles in the processes targets of conservation. From a process-based per-
spective, the ultimate focus of conservation practice is on entities such as ESUs 
(Moritz 1999, p. 223).10 Relatedly, an important issue about the characterisation of 
a process-based approach concerns the kind of processes that should be taken into 
account. Noss (1990) considers as potential targets conservation processes that are 
partially abiotic such as energy cycles. Noss’s is an interesting suggestion. However, 
it should be highlighted that, again, the focus is, ultimately, inevitably on the entities 
that play specific causal roles in processes. For instance, in marine environments 
some bacteria seem to play the role of keystone species as they might exclusively 
perform some specific function. For example, a limited number of bacteria (e.g., of 
the genus Alteromonas) seem to process hydrogen peroxide in the ocean, perform-
ing a crucial metabolic function that benefits the incredibly large communities of 
the cyanobacterium Prochlorococcus (Morris et al. 2012). Without these bacteria, 
the ecosystem would probably suffer. Conservation efforts could thus be directed to 
save this important geochemical process, but inevitably such efforts would focus on 
preserving the important ecological function that Alteromonas bacteria play. We 
thus suggest that the focus should be on the processes that govern what we called 
entity differentiation and combinogenesis in Sect. 12.2.2, that is, most prominently 
the ecological and evolutionary processes that cause the origin of ESUs.
Many inter-linked themes prominent in the conservation literature explain the 
shift towards a complementary entity-process-based approach to conservation. This 
conceptual shift finds its theoretical support in the deeper integration with the evo-
lutionary sciences and with ecology. Most generally, Norton (2001) argues that con-
servation science has experienced a transition from a static to a dynamic view 
focused on evolving systems and ecosystem processes. This interpretive hypothesis 
is probably supported by a shift in the characterisation of the units of conservation 
from static entities – e.g., species characterised essentialistically in terms of species- 
specific genetic and phenotypic features – to historical ones with peculiar historical 
10 Sarkar (2002, note 15, p. 152) has argued that focus on process is aimed to conservation of bio-
logical “integrity” rather than biodiversity. However, if the focus of a process-based approach is on 
entities such as ESUs, it is clearly committed to biodiversity conservation.
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and evolutionary capacities. This transition has been nurtured by the dissatisfaction 
with prominent species approaches to conservation aimed at the maximisation of 
number of species saved per spatial area which are, by definition, fundamentalist 
and entity-biased. Ultimately, the idea is that the conservation focus should be put 
on the evolutionary and ecological causes of biodiversity and the preservation of 
process rather than on their causal effects and on the preservation of pattern. 
Particularly important are the attempts to identify centres of evolutionary diversity 
with the aim of maximising evolutionary heritage on one hand (a consequence of 
the integration of phylogenetic analyses with conservation biology) and the focus 
on the evolutionary (e.g., genetic, cf. Frankel 1974) potential of populations and 
historical lineages. Smith et al. (1993) argue that knowledge of the ecological and 
evolutionary mechanisms generating genetic diversity and of the isolating mecha-
nisms of speciation must be part and parcel of conservation practice. Conservation 
practices that focus on protecting species-rich sites are doomed to fail for reasons 
that parallel those for which the counting-species approach did. First, such focus 
does not necessarily provide information on the frequency of rare species, which 
might not occur in areas of highest species diversity (Smith et al. 1993, p. 164). 
Secondly, it does not necessarily provide any information on the functional role of 
species and on the nature of the community dynamics of the relevant ecosystems 
(Smith et  al. 1993, p. 165). Thirdly, it neither necessarily identifies regions with 
peculiar evolutionary history nor identifies lineages that are phylogenetically unique 
(ibid.). For all these reasons, Smith et al. propose an approach to conservation that 
integrates ecological and molecular information. Related to the third point above, 
Mace et al. (2003) have suggested that, rather than directing conservation efforts to 
save species, these should be directed to saving independent branches of the tree of 
life, that is, distinctive lineages with a long and unique evolutionary history. The 
rationale for this conservation strategy is that phylogenetic information permits to 
distinguish “cradles” of diversity from “museums”. A process-based approach 
informed by phylogenetic information (and hence by knowledge about evolutionary 
history) identifies as priority conservation taxa those that display a unique evolu-
tionary history instead of focusing efforts on conserving patterns of species richness 
(Mace et al. 2003, p. 1709). Along the same lines of integration of molecular data, 
Moritz (1999) has proposed to address conservation problems by focusing on the 
maintenance and restoration of those ecological and evolutionary processes that can 
recreate adaptive phenotypes. In order to conserve such processes, we should aim to 
conserve their “effectors”, i.e., the ESUs or populations with evolutionary potential 
in which they play causal roles. Moritz argues that molecular studies are particu-
larly important to infer evolutionary history. Molecular information will give us 
details about the evolutionary relationships between the populations of conservation 
focus to the extent that, for instance, “… translocations among populations that 
historically exchanged genes would be considered, whereas human-mediated mix-
ing of historically isolated gene pools would be discouraged.” (Moritz 1999, p. 223). 
This approach aims to conserve ESUs through the restoration of connectivity 
between isolated populations in anthropogenically fragmented ecosystems and the 
destruction of “genetic ghettos” (Moritz 1999, p. 224). In synthesis, a process-based 
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approach to conservation might be seen as proposing an integration of varieties of 
ecological and evolutionary information with the aim of identifying relevant ESUs. 
One general characterisation of ESUs that can be extrapolated from the conserva-
tion literature reviewed so far refers to populations of organisms possessing a prop-
erty of conservation interest, such as a peculiar history (i.e., being a distinctive 
lineage) and a crucial functional role in ecosystem welfare (i.e., being a keystone 
species). Even though preservation seems to be, by definition, the aim of conserva-
tion biology, it is interesting to observe that Smith et al. (1993, p. 164) have argued 
that the aim of conservation science is “…to promote and preserve natural dynam-
ics.” What could promotion amount to? A promotion (rather than preservation) 
characterisation of ESUs might refer to properties of populations such as the ability 
to cope with environmental stress (i.e., adaptability) or an enhanced capacity to 
diversify into lineages with distinctive genetic and phenotypic features. In the latter 
two cases, it might be said that the population ESU displays “evolutionary poten-
tial” (Casetta and Marques da Silva 2015), a property that might depend either on 
possessing particular genomic properties or on its tendency to respond to environ-
mental change purely phenotypically, where such properties might be important for 
populations’ adaptability and diversification.11 In the following section we shall 
focus on populations that display evolutionary potential in the latter sense. The 
hypothesis we would like to test is whether plastic populations of a species might be 
considered ESUs amenable to conservation. In particular, we would like to show 
that plastic subpopulations that have enhanced evolutionary potential vis a vis non- 
plastic subpopulations make them amenable to ESU status.
12.4  Can Phenotypic Plasticity Confer Evolutionary 
Potential?
In this section we shall thus focus on a particularly evolutionary process, i.e., phe-
notypic plasticity (Fitzpatrick 2012; Forsman 2015; Miner et al. 2005; Valladares 
et al. 2014; West-Eberhard 2003). By plasticity we refer to the ability of the organ-
ism to react to environmental inputs with an appropriate phenotypic change during 
embryogenesis (developmental plasticity) and further developmental stages (pheno-
typic plasticity). Two main types of plasticity exist: reaction norms and polyphen-
isms. In reaction norms the genome allows a continuous range of potential 
phenotypes. On the other hand, polyphenisms are discontinuous (either/or) pheno-
types elicited by the environment. The essence of plasticity is that the genome does 
not wholly dictate the nature of the phenotypic outcome. It is reasonably straightfor-
ward to intuit about selective advantages to phenotypic plasticity: where there exist 
different or varying environmental conditions that are experienced, either a) by dif-
ferent individuals across a population, or b) by the same/each individual through its 
11 See Minelli, Chap. 11, this volume, for the relationship between evolutionary potential and 
evolvability.
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lifetime, a unique phenotype (narrow reaction norm) would be less fit than plastic 
responses. This is, of course, provided that an appropriate phenotype can be 
expressed, either sensitive to environmental conditions or genetic (West-Eberhard 
1986). An example of a genetic switch is the X-Y sex determination system in mam-
mals. Some species of buttercups (e.g., Ranunculus flammula) exemplify polyphen-
ism through environmental sensitivity: they develop one of two distinct leaf types, 
depending on whether underwater or on land (Cook and Johnson 1968). A particu-
larly advanced form of environmental sensitivity – potentially producing continu-
ous phenotypic responses  – is learning: the capacity to change behaviour in 
particular situations, according to past life experiences (Staddon 1983).
While these phenotypic flexibilities are interesting in their own right, and indeed 
potential benefits of plasticity are easy to identify (notwithstanding discussion 
regarding what those benefits trade off against), could there be a deeper evolution-
ary issue here? Could phenotypic plasticity not only have proximate effects, but also 
impact the course of evolution? The understanding that traits produced through 
plasticity are not heritable goes as far back as the nineteenth century with August 
Weismann’s experiments showing a soma/germ-line separation. And the hypothesis 
now commonly known as Lamarckian evolution, that traits acquired during lifetime 
would be passed on to further generations – e.g., the strong biceps of a blacksmith – 
is not considered compatible with genetic inheritance (discounting epigenetic inher-
itance). But there is an intriguing suggestion that phenotypic changes could influence 
selection in an evolving population, and thus indirectly lead to genetic encoding of 
formerly acquired traits (Baldwin 1896; Osborne 1896; West-Eberhard 2003). The 
basic notion is that the relatively rapid exploration of phenotype space via plastic 
response can introduce a selective gradient towards genetic specification of that 
phenotype, and thus the slower genetic variation can be “guided” by lifetime explo-
ration (Hinton and Nowlan 1987). The selective landscape experienced by a plastic 
population is modulated by that plasticity, in comparison to the landscape experi-
enced by non-plastic populations. But the modulation to fitness of specific geno-
types does not require that the phenotypic traits discovered are heritable, i.e., it 
occurs without so-called “Lamarckian” inheritance. This process has become 
known as the Baldwin effect (a term coined by Simpson 1953). The effect depends 
on the existence of phenotypic plasticity (Bradshaw 1965) having already evolved 
but this in itself can only facilitate the first of two phases: selection among the vari-
ous phenotypes expressed for those most appropriate to the present environmental 
conditions. The second phase, genetic assimilation, is not a necessary consequence 
of the existence of plasticity, nor does it depend on a reduction in the level of plas-
ticity.12 The Baldwin effect has been the subject of a plethora of computational stud-
ies (see e.g., Turney et al. 1996; Paenke et al. 2009; Sznajder et al. 2012), following 
the seminal work of Hinton and Nowlan (1987). Almost all of these works  considered 
evolution in single-peaked fitness landscapes; but in Mills and Watson (2006) we 
showed that, via a Baldwinian process, a learning population is able to cross a fit-
12 Mills and Watson 2005 further discuss how canalisation, although often implicated in studies on 
the Baldwin effect, is not actually a necessary mechanism for the effect.
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ness valley. Here we use the same model to illustrate various scenarios, including 
that learning is able to repeatedly guide genetic evolution in a variable 
environment.
12.4.1  A Model of Plasticity
We model a population of individuals each with a string of n binary variables to 
represent their genotype, which specifies the phenotypes that the individual will 
express throughout its lifetime, through a trivial (but non-deterministic) genotype–
phenotype (G-P) mapping. Specifically, for each lifetime trial i, the phenotype pi is 
based on the genotype with mutation-like variation applied at a rate of 𝜇L, indepen-
dently applied at each locus. The phenotypes from the T trials are independent from 
each other, and can be thought of as a cloud of points surrounding the genotypically- 
specified location. The individuals are bestowed with a simple capacity to learn, 
which is facilitated through the way that fitness is calculated: during each lifetime 
trial, a learning individual recalls the best solution found so far, whether it is the 
newest phenotypic strategy, or whether it was found long ago (see Hinton and 
Nowlan 1987). At the end of each generation, the individuals are selected in propor-
tion to their fitness,13 and reproduce asexually. During reproduction, point mutation 
is applied to each gene, i.e., each gene is transmitted to the offspring with a proba-
bility of 1-𝜇G, otherwise with probability 𝜇G a new random allele is drawn (note that 
this model does not rule out the possibility of multiple mutations but that they are 
uncorrelated when they occur). The population size m is constant through time. In 
this model there is no way for an individual to perform less lifetime exploration, i.e., 
there is no mechanism for canalisation (Waddington 1953). This simplification is 
not meant to imply that there would never be a selective advantage to such a reduc-
tion, but rather to keep the spotlight on the consequences of plasticity.
Simulation Experiment 1 We consider the evolution of a population on a simple 
and abstract fitness landscape, where there are two rare phenotypes p1 and p2 that 
receive high fitness and all other phenotypes are equally bad. Here, our main ques-
tion is to investigate whether the form of phenotypic learning in this model is suf-
ficient for the population to evolve across the fitness valley between the two peaks. 
Accordingly, the first peak/phenotype confers high fitness (f(p1) = H) and the second 
peak confers lower fitness (f(p2) = L). The environment remains like this for s gen-
erations, after which the quality of peaks switches, such that f(p1) = L and f(p2) = H.
Parameters used in this experiment: H = 100, L = 10, f(p|p ≠ p1, p ≠ p2) = 1, n = 16 
genes. The separation d of the two peaks is 5 bits, and the switching interval s is 50 
13 Since all individuals experience the same number of learning trials before selection, it could be 
seen as selection only occurring on adult organisms; however, the model confers benefits to suc-
cessful learning earlier in the lifetime, even though we do not explicitly include phenomena such 
as probabilistic death without reproduction.
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generations. We set the mutation rate 𝜇G at 1/20 and the lifetime variation rate 𝜇L at 
2/n, the number of trials per individual T = 256, and the population size m at 200.
To see what is happening in the population, we can observe the fitness over time 
(Fig. 12.1). Initially all organisms of the population possess the genotype specifying 
phenotype p2, and within only a few generations some individuals in the population 
find a high-fitness phenotype, p1. Any mutation that brings the genotype closer to 
directly specifying p1 will be favoured since discovering the phenotype earlier in the 
lifetime results in higher fitness. Accordingly, such high-fitness genotypes propa-
gate through the population, as is reflected in the rise in mean fitness. After each 
switch in the environment (dashed vertical lines), we see a sharp drop in fitness, 
reflecting the fact that the population was adapted to a previous challenge. However, 
phenotypic plasticity enables individuals to rapidly re-discover p2, which is now the 
highest-fitness phenotype in the environment.
Simulation Experiment 2 Rather than fixing the rate of environmental switching, 
here we leave this parameter s open; and to ascertain the capacity of a plastic popu-
lation to cope with such environmental change we run simulation experiments for 
various different values of T.
From the results in Fig. 12.2 we see two different trends: (1) populations experi-
encing a large number of trials T can achieve high fitness, provided the environment 
does not change too rapidly. When the interval is very short there is insufficient time 
for the population to find the high peak and assimilate it genetically. Note however 
that the high peak is found phenotypically by some fraction of the population: with-
Fig. 12.1 Fitness measures of populations evolving in a switching environment. (a) one example 
run; (b) averages over 50 replicates. The switches in environment are marked by the dotted vertical 
lines
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out doing so, the mean fitness could not be greater than f(L) = 10. (2) The smaller 
the value of T, the less capacity the population has to adapt to the new challenge 
presented by the switched environment. At its extreme, with T = 2, the population 
wholly fails to adapt under any environmental switching rate tested.
The dynamics of a non-plastic population are qualitatively different. As the 
mutation model permits multiple loci to change simultaneously during reproduc-
tion, a multi-locus valley could, in principle, be crossed. However, the expected 
time this takes grows exponentially with the number of genes that must change at 
once. For the 5-bit valley and 𝜇G = 1/20 (as used above), it takes a mean of over 
75,000 generations, and even though a higher rate would reduce this, even an opti-
mal rate of 𝜇G = 5/16 takes a mean of 340 generations (mutation rates that are so 
high introduce difficulties in terms of drift and retaining high-fitness peaks even if/
when discovered, besides severe penalties to average fitness). Importantly, these 
generation times are very high in comparison to the environmental switching fre-
quencies that a learning population is able to thrive in.
The above model and experiments illustrate how one variety of phenotypic plas-
ticity can enable a population to rapidly evolve across fitness valleys, a pattern of 
evolutionary change that cannot be experienced by non-plastic populations. On the 
flip-side, the benefits to the plastic population are lessened under more and more 
constant environments. At some point any benefits would be outweighed by the 
costs of learning (e.g., energetic cost of memory, risks). Although such aspects are 
omitted from the model here, and thus trade-offs are not directly visible in the 
results, the logic is straightforward: if genetic adaptation alone is sufficient in some 
stable environment, we should not expect to see plasticity playing any significant 
role.
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Fig. 12.2 Fitness of the population in the final generation before a switch. Data show the mean 
and standard deviation of mean fitness, across 40 replicates
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Besides these two examples of environments, what other responses to changing 
environments might we expect to see in evolution? In the extreme case where many 
novel challenges appear within one lifetime, there may be plastic responses that do 
not become assimilated into the genome. In the absence of any regularity in those 
challenges, if the new challenges in one’s lifetime are unrelated to the challenges 
faced by their ancestors, plasticity may be favourable but it is hard to see how any 
specific genetic adaptation would arise. If changes occur over a few generations, a 
Baldwinian-type interaction between plasticity and genetic evolution leading to 
genetic assimilation may result. Alternatively, if environmental changes are particu-
larly repetitive, we may expect to see polyphenic/polymorphic genotypes and 
environmentally- sensitive switching (see West-Eberhard 1986, 2003) as mentioned 
above. If the environmental changes are strongly structured, we may additionally 
see modular architectures evolve in the genotypes (Parter et al. 2008) that are able 
to more quickly adapt to new challenges (Watson et al. 2014).
12.5  Conclusion
Our argument has been that focusing solely on entities, be they genes, species or 
ecosystems, is inherently problematic for conservation practice. We first argued that 
what we called biodiversity fundamentalism is untenable. It is both untenable as a 
thesis concerning the exclusive focus on one compositional hierarchy and as a thesis 
concerning the existence of a fundamental unit of conservation. Secondly, we 
argued that the genetic, taxonomic and ecological hierarchies for characterising bio-
diversity in terms of genetic organisation, taxonomic inclusiveness and ecological 
nestedness are, given their compositional ethos, insufficient to capture the func-
tional dimension of biodiversity, particularly the evolutionary processes that main-
tain and originate new biodiversity units. Thirdly, we have proposed a complementary 
entity-and-process-based approach to conservation practice. Within this context, 
we distinguished between two types of important properties that evolutionarily sig-
nificant units (i.e., ESUs) of conservation interest might exhibit: those amenable to 
conservation because they preserve natural dynamics (e.g., being a distinctive lin-
eage) and those that promote them (e.g., being a population with a greater capacity 
for adaptation to change or stress). We focused on the latter because conservation 
strategies are aimed to identify not only “museums” but also “cradles” of biodiver-
sity. Given this background, the hypothesis we wanted to test is whether plastic 
populations of a species might be considered ESUs with relevance for conservation. 
In particular, we wanted to show that plastic subpopulations that have enhanced 
evolutionary potential vis a vis non-plastic subpopulations make them amenable to 
ESU status. The model indeed shows that plasticity yields evolutionary potential, 
which is displayed in environments that switch in a few to a few tens of generations. 
Thus, populations with adaptation capacities available might possess an interesting 
property to consider when deciding on how to focus conservation efforts. Given that 
plastic populations might be important for species’ adaptability and diversification, 
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they might be considered ESUs potentially amenable to conservation. This vindi-
cates, on the one hand, a process-based approach to biodiversity and, on the other, 
suggests the need to take into account the processes generating plasticity when con-
sidering conservation efforts.
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Chapter 13  
Between Explanans and Explanandum: 
Biodiversity and the Unity of Theoretical 
Ecology
Philippe Huneman
Abstract Biodiversity is arguably a major topic in ecology. Some of the key ques-
tions of the discipline are: why are species distributed the way they are, in a given 
area, or across areas? Or: why are there so many animals (as G. Evelyn Hutchinson 
asked in a famous paper)? It appears as what is supposed to be explained, namely an 
explanandum of ecology. Various families of theories have been proposed, which 
are nowadays mostly distinguished according to the role they confer to competition 
and the competitive exclusion principle. Niche theories, where the difference 
between “fundamental” and “realised” niches (Hutchinson GE, Am Nat 93:145–
159, 1959) through competitive exclusion explains species distributions, contrast 
with neutral theories, where an assumption of fitness equivalence, species abun-
dance distributions are explained by stochastic models, inspired by (Hubbell SP, 
The unified neutral theory of biodiversity and biogeography. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2001).
Yet, while an important part of community ecology and biogeography under-
stands biodiversity as an explanandum, in other areas of ecology the concept of 
biodiversity rather plays the role of the explanans. This is manifest in the long last-
ing stability-diversity debate, where the key question has been: how does diversity 
beget stability? Thus explanatory reversibility of the biodiversity concept in ecology 
may prevent biodiversity from being a unifying object for ecology.
In this chapter, I will describe such reversible explanatory status of biodiversity 
in various ecological fields (biogeography, functional ecology, community ecol-
ogy). After having considered diversity as an explanandum, and then as an explan-
ans, I will show that the concepts of biodiversity that are used in each of these 
symmetrical explanatory projects are not identical nor even equivalent. Using an 
approach to the concept of biodiversity in terms of “conceptual space”, I will finally 
argue that the lack of unity of a biodiversity concept able to function identically as 
explanans and explanandum underlies the structural disunity of ecology that has 
been pointed out by some historians and philosophers.
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13.1  Introduction
Amongst the questions that theoretical ecologists have been debating for decades 
one finds: why are species distributed the way they are, in a given area, or across 
areas? How is biodiversity related to areas? Why are there so many species in 
tropical regions? In general, why are there so many animals (as Hutchinson asked 
in a famous paper)? Is the amount of species currently decreasing and at what 
tempo? Why are so many species getting extinct in some environments now? 
Those questions have to do with what we have been calling, since Walter G. Rosen 
coined the word in the 80s (Takacs 1996) and Wilson (1988, 1992) popularized it, 
“biodiversity”.
However, there are many ways of measuring biodiversity, tracking its progress 
or, more realistically, its erosion: different measurement methods defined by differ-
ent indexes, such as Shannon index, Simpson index, etc. (Gosselin 2014; Noss 
1990), as well as various ways of capturing it in relation to the ecological scale, such 
as beta diversity, gamma diversity,1 etc. Moreover, there are several concepts of 
biodiversity, some attributing species a privileged role and others including also 
genes, or ecosystems, as is attested in the definition of biodiversity used in interna-
tional conventions, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992): 
“‘Biological diversity’ means the variability among living organisms from all 
sources including inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems, and 
the ecological complexes of which they are a part; this includes diversity within 
species, between species and of ecosystems”. And even at the level of species diver-
sity, species richness as the mere amount of species is often considered too rough a 
biodiversity concept. In order to design robust diversity indices, ecologists or con-
servation biologists often add species evenness, and then consider the width of 
diversity, named as disparity – some wanting also to integrate the consideration of 
abundances within the concept of diversity (Blandin 2014). In addition to mere spe-
cies counting, however, some dimension of species similarity sometimes ought to 
be included in the concept of diversity: mitigating species diversity by functional or 
phylogenetic similarity results in the concepts of phylogenetic diversity or func-
tional diversity, whose use is especially required in ecophylogenetics (Mouquet 
et al. 2012) for the former and in functional ecology for the latter.
1 Those terms were introduced by Whittaker to capture aspects of the local and regional distribu-
tions of diversity. Alpha diversity refers to species diversity on sites or habitats at a local scale as 
well as to the ratio of local to regional diversity, beta diversity compares the species diversity 
between ecosystems or across environmental gradients; gamma diversity is the total diversity in a 
landscape and therefore the compound of the former two.
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Thus, while it was tempting in the beginning to consider biodiversity as a key 
question and a key explanandum of ecology, the diversity of biodiversity prevents 
us from straightforwardly claiming this. It may be argued, in turn, that this diversity 
seems to echo a lack of unity that affects ecology itself. It has indeed often been 
complained in ecology that the field lacks the unity that characterises the sister field 
of evolutionary biology. In 1989, Hagen already saw ecology as affected by a deep 
cleavage between a holological perspective and a mereological perspective, the lat-
ter using a demographic approach to ecosystems and communities while the former 
relies on a systemic view of the ecological objects, with or without appealing to 
evolutionary schemes of thought and natural selection (Hagen 1989). He concluded 
that this cleavage is essential to the discipline, and in turn allows ecology to explore 
a wide variety of objects and problems. More recently, Vellend (2016) has explicitly 
drawn a parallel between evolutionary biology and ecology and argued that ecology 
never had a unified framework similar to the one that structured evolutionary biol-
ogy from the 50s onwards, and that allowed this science to flourish by providing 
researchers with common concepts, methods, key examples, key issues, and 
references.
Would it make sense to consider that the diversity of biodiversity is involved in 
the lack of unity of theoretical ecology? Or, more precisely, which disunity would 
be induced by this diversity, and is it unredeemable?
This will be the main question of the chapter. I will start by considering the issue 
of the long sought unity of ecology (13.2). Then I will explicate what I call the 
“explanatory reversibility” of biodiversity in ecology, namely its capacity to be 
explanandum and explanans in a science, as an essential feature of its theoretical 
role (13.3). Section 13.4 will consider more precisely the aspects of diversity as an 
explanandum of various ecological programmes, involving distinct explanatory 
schemes. Section 13.5 turns to diversity as an explanans, focusing on the relations 
between various kinds of stability and distinct notions of diversity, and character-
izing the differences between such diversity and the way diversity is used in the 
explanatory programmes formerly described. In Sect. 13.6, I propose an account of 
the ecological notion of diversity in terms of a “conceptual space”, in which various 
biodiversity concepts used in the varied explanatory strategies I described are spe-
cifically constructed. I use it in order to explicate the specific profile of the explana-
tory reversibility of diversity in ecology, and draw conclusions about the lack of 
unity in ecology and the epistemic status of the notion of diversity. The major argu-
ment developed there relies on the fact that the two explanatory projects concerning 
diversity target different “regions” of the total conceptual space of biodiversity so 
described.
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13.2  The Unity of Ecology
It is often heard that ecology lacks unity – be it to complain about the missing unity 
(Vellend 2010), or to claim that it is a richness proper to this scientific discipline 
(Hagen 1989). Inversely, “unifying principles” or theories have been constantly pur-
sued for ecology (e.g. Margalef 1963; Hubbell 2001; Loreau 2010; Vellend 2016). 
Before considering the specific theoretical role of a biodiversity concept in ecology, 
and the possible unifying role it could play as an object or a pervasive concept, I will 
review the most general divides that seem to prevent such unity. After having listed 
some subfields, I will attempt at ordering this disunity by indicating the major lines 
of division (summarized in Fig. 13.1 below).
A quick glance at ecological subdisciplines shows the overall variety of ques-
tions and methods that characterizes the field. Behavioural ecology studies the traits 
(“behaviours”) of organisms, hypothesized as adaptations to their (possibly social) 
environment; community ecology is about communities, i.e. sets of various species 
in the same region, considered from the viewpoint of the diversity and succession of 
species occurring within it. Population ecology mostly considers few species and 
focuses on the dynamics of the abundances of each of them given their major eco-
logical interactions (predation or competition). Biogeography is interested in the 
distribution of species across higher scale dimensions, namely regions. Functional 
ecology considers the interactions between various species from the viewpoint of 
their net effect on the shared environment, especially by addressing networks of 
trophic relations and ascribing its species a role in the ecosystem (Loreau 2010). 
Ecosystem ecology as advocated by the Odum brothers (e.g. Odum 1953) develops 
such approach and uses schemes of thermodynamic thinking in considering ecosys-
tems (i.e. communities plus their abiotic environment) under the perspective of 
semi-closed systems exchanging matter and energy with their environment (Hagen 
1992). On the other hand, Ecological genetics initiated by E.B. Ford (Ford 1964) – a 
student of Fisher – considers the dynamics of population in various species from the 
standpoint of the changes of gene frequency within each species. Finally, evolution-
ary ecology (Roughgarden 1979) borrows tools from ecological genetics and 
approaches ecological patterns as results of evolutionary processes.
Fig. 13.1 The divides of 
ecology. Each thick line 
represents one of the four 
dimensions. The thin lines 
stand for the position of 
three historically important 
views in ecology: in black, 
Clements (1916); in red, 
Allee et al. (1949); in blue 
Nicholson and Bailey 
(1935) (Color figure 
online)
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Broadly speaking, evolutionary biology and ecology have complex relationships 
(McIntosh 1986, pp. 256–263; Collins 1986; Harper 1967; Stearns 1982; Antonovics 
1976; Huneman 2019). Besides its interest in explaining adaptation and evolution 
(phylogenetic patterns), evolutionary biology is interested in explaining the patterns 
of diversity and unity across diversity (i.e. homologies and analogies) that charac-
terize extant and past taxa (as well as molecular patterns). And ecologists are gener-
ally interested, as I will argue more extensively in the following, in diversity within 
and across communities and ecosystems. Thus, both disciplines, at their own times-
cale, focus on the same explanandum, that is diversity.
Haeckel famously defined ecology as the “science of the struggle for existence”, 
thus directly tying it to evolutionary biology to the extent that natural selection is seen 
by Darwinians as the key explanans and cause of evolution, adaptation and diversity. 
In principle, the emphasis on natural selection can be more or less strong in ecology, 
and this characterizes the whole field of ecological sciences: they are somehow 
ordered along a gradient which goes from evolutionary ecology to ecosystem ecol-
ogy. At one extremity, evolutionary ecology adopts a very evolutionary viewpoint, 
considering ecosystems as the scene of competition, cooperation and mutualistic 
interactions, all occurring in evolutionary time and therefore being always dynamic. 
The other extremity of the continuum may be represented by most trends in ecosys-
tem ecology, which adopts a very systemic viewpoint (sometimes akin to thermody-
namics) insofar as ecosystems are open dissipative systems, more or less chaotic, 
dealt with in thermodynamic or statistical mechanics terms (Hagen 1992).
This divide is not the same as Hagen’s distinction between mereological and 
holological perspectives on ecology mentioned before, since the holological view 
would accept an evolutionary understanding of ecology that takes communities or 
ecosystems as targets of selection. For instance, within a holological view echoing a 
Clementsian concept of community, an evolutionary parallel between communities 
and organisms, both being shaped by natural selection, is explicitly drawn in one of 
the major works on animal ecology in the mid twentieth century, namely the 
Principles of animal ecology written by Chicago ecologists Clyde Allee, Thomas 
Park, Orlando Park, Schmitt and Alfred Emerson, and praised in the American 
Naturalist by Dobhzansky. They say: “a community may be said to have a character-
istic anatomy, an equally characteristic physiology and a characteristic heredity”, 
therefore community is the “smallest [unit] that can be (…) selfsustained”, and is 
precisely “a resultant of ecological selection” (Allee et al. 1949, 437).
Besides this gradient around the use of selection, which ranges across ecology, 
from the most systemic explanatory schemes (e.g. Odum’s ecosystem ecology) to 
the most evolutionary understanding (e.g. Roughgarden’s evolutionary ecology), 
ecology has been disciplinary cleaved between plant ecology and animal ecology 
since the 1900s. The two traditions were developed quite separately, starting respec-
tively with the major advances of Warming (1909) and then Clements (1916) in 
plant ecology on the one hand, and the attempt at systematising animal ecology by 
Elton in the 1920s (e.g. Elton 1927), on the other hand.
Clements’ idea of succession in communities, analogous to the development of 
organisms, was a key concept for much of plant ecology (Horn 1975; Lortie et al. 
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2004). Even though the individualistic concept of community put forth by Gleason 
in the 30s (Gleason 1939) won over much of ecology, one can still see a difference 
between plant and animal ecology to the extent that the attention paid to succession 
and assemblages has been more prevalent in plant than in animal ecology. And as 
noted by Harper (1967), it is harder to track the offspring of plants and determine 
their reproductive success, which partly explains why evolutionary perspectives 
were less favoured in plant ecology than in animal ecology.
In turn, animal ecologists have been massively worried about the question of the 
regulation of population size, which was probably the major controversial theme of 
ecology in the 50s, as can be noticed in the major gathering of evolutionary biologists 
and ecologists at the Cold Spring Harbour Symposium in 1957, devoted to popula-
tion biology. Most of the talks – by Anderwartha, Birch, Lack, Chitty, Orians, etc. – 
were about population regulation in animal ecology. Much of this interest in regulation 
of population stemmed from a concern about pests. Charles Elton, a pioneer of inva-
sion ecology, was the founder of the Bureau of Animal Populations in Oxford and 
one of its important tasks was pest control (see Chew (2011) on historical overview 
of invasion ecology, and Richardson (2011) on Elton’s legacy in the field). 
Understanding the reasons of population regulation, population cycles and possible 
overpopulation was a crucial requisite for a successful control. One may argue that 
this context explains the difference between plant and animal ecology regarding the 
prevalence of the population regulation issue.2
Orthogonal to this divide between plant and animal ecology, there is an impor-
tant tension between a more empirically oriented ecology and a mostly mathemati-
cal ecology (e.g. Schoener 1972). In a 1949 paper on population regulation 
(Solomon 1949). ME Solomon, British ecologist of the Bureau of Pest Control, 
noticed that ecologists are divided into two camps, one that starts from biology and 
generalizes, and one that builds mathematical models first and then tries to fit in the 
biological facts – e.g. Thomas Park’s experiments on flour beetles, or perturbation 
experiments on populations (Smith 1952) vs. Lotka and Volterra’s equations. This 
divide (see Kingsland 1995) still persists in various modes, as indicates the need 
recently felt by some theoretical ecologists to vindicate the use of mathematical 
theorizing (Servedio et al. 2014).
Regarding those five distinctions, each theoretical construction can be situated 
on each of the axes constituted by the gradient occurring between the poles of the 
distinction. In Fig. 13.1 I sketched the position of very influential works taken from 
distinct periods of the history of ecology (Allee et al.’s Treatise (1949), Nicholson 
and Bailey’s model of host-parasite dynamics (1935), and Clements’ plant ecology 
(1916)).
2 Actually, Clements and Shelford (1939) intended to close the gap between plant and animal ecol-
ogy, by applying a very general concept of community. They say: “the development of the science 
of ecology has been hindered in its organization and distorted in its growth by the separate devel-
opment of plant ecology on the one hand and animal ecology on the other.” (p.v) Ten years on and 
with a similar goal of systematizing ecological knowledge and providing basic principles, Allee 
et al. (1949), while acknowledging that principles of ecology should be general, still restrained to 
animal ecology for reasons of immaturity of the field.
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However, in the face of these various divides within ecology, someone could 
argue that biodiversity defines an object of investigation that crosses frontiers 
between traditions, paradigms, and explanatory strategies. A major issue in ecology 
is indeed coexistence – why is it that certain various species coexist and others not? 
How can they do so? It is a question in both plant ecology and animal ecology, 
approached from mereological as well as holological perspectives, and through 
mathematical or more empirically oriented perspectives as well. Community ecol-
ogy is openly concerned with explaining biodiversity patterns, and biogeography 
enquires about species-area laws, which are patterns about how biodiversity is scat-
tered across various kinds of areas (MacArthur and Wilson 1967). However, even 
functional ecology gives a key role to diversity (Loreau 2010), at least under the 
mode of “functional diversity”, namely the differences between species partitioned 
according to equivalence classes defined by ecological functional roles (producer, 
nutrient cycler, etc.) (Dussault and Bouchard 2017).
In addition, the emergence of the word ‘biodiversity’ in the 1980s could also 
indicate that there is an object proper to ecology here. In the following I shall focus 
on the explanatory logics of diversity in ecology, in order to assess (and eventually 
infirm) the hypothesis that biodiversity constitutes a shared object amongst various 
ecological theories and traditions, and that its concept could help define a unifying 
framework for ecology.
13.3  The Explanatory Reversibility of Diversity
Many ecologists’ researches indeed focus on diversity. They range from very gen-
eral questions about what causes diversity in general – Hutchinson asking “Why are 
there so many animals?” (Hutchinson 1961)–, to questions about the way diversity 
is distributed locally and regionally – species-area laws in biogeography, and the 
mathematical models explaining them in McArthur and Wilson’s Theory of Island 
Biogeography (1964), species abundance distributions in community ecology, or 
the patterns of succession of plant species in communities (as illustrated in Clements’ 
works), as well as questions of medium degree of generality about how it is possible 
that many species coexist generaliter. One could view all these questions as various 
modes of an overarching coexistence question: how is coexistence (amongst diverse 
species or organisms) possible and realised at various scales?
Besides explaining diversity under its various modes, ecology is concerned with 
biodiversity in another and very different way. A longstanding debate in ecology 
regards what has been labelled the “diversity-stability hypothesis” (Ives and 
Carpenter 2007; Pimm 1984). Simply put, it is the claim that diversity – especially 
species richness – begets stability (mostly in the form of the constancy of species 
abundances). The more species an ecosystem includes, the more stable it seems to 
be (namely, it contains the same species for a long time, with abundances fluctuat-
ing around a steady means). In this sense tropical forests, which are species rich 
ecosystems, have been providing examples of this pattern for many decades. The 
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intuition of this fact was very robust, but its explanation has been overlooked for a 
long time.
However, in 1974 when Robert May started to investigate this hypothesis math-
ematically, by modelling networks of species and increasing the diversity value, it 
turned out that diversity does not beget stability but on the contrary prevents it (May 
1974). Assuming that a system which is “stable only within a comparatively small 
domain of parameter space (…) may be called dynamically fragile”, clearly “such a 
system will persist only for tightly circumscribed values of the environmental 
parameters” (May 1975). The result of May’s models is that a “wide variety of 
mathematical models suggest that as a system becomes more complex, in the sense 
of more species and a more rich structure of interdependence, it becomes more 
dynamically fragile”. (ib.) Researchers then tried to address this gap between these 
mathematical models and some data that tended to show a stability-friendly effect 
of diversity. The question of stability then became: what does explain the fact that 
some empirically attested diversity does not conform to May’s mathematical 
models?
Ecological stability is actually a crucial issue for theoretical reasons. After 
Darwin’s revolution, Linnaeus’ explanations for stability (namely, each species ful-
fills a role in a well-balanced nature; see Pimm 1993) were no longer possible, and, 
inversely, the constancy of ecosystems constitutes a challenge if the world is an 
ever-changing Darwinian world led by competition. Ecological stability is also 
challenging for practical reasons, since understanding what makes ecosystems 
robust could allow us to manage and protect them. (In fact, almost since its begin-
nings scientific ecology has been concerned with the damages inflicted by human 
industry and agriculture to natural ecosystems and ultimately to the environments in 
which human societies live).
Diversity is therefore a two-faceted concept: it is a major explanandum for ecol-
ogy under various guises, but when the question concerns the stability of ecosys-
tems, diversity becomes an explanans. We witness here a major epistemological 
feature of evolutionary and ecological questions, namely the “explanatory revers-
ibility” of key concepts. Some concepts may indeed be the explanandum in some 
contexts and the explanans in others, and this reversibility attests to their theoretical 
significance. In evolutionary biology, notions such as plasticity (Nicoglou 2015), 
robustness (Wagner 2005; Huneman 2018) or mutation rates display this epistemic 
feature, which was first recognised by Fisher in connection with some major proper-
ties of the genetic system (dominance, recessivity, etc.) that condition evolution and 
are at the same time a product of past evolution (Fisher 1932).
In the field of ecology, diversity constitutes one of the concepts whose epistemic 
profile displays such reversibility. In the following I will explore this reversibility in 
more detail, and examine the role it may play in the structure of ecology.
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13.4  Diversity as an Explanandum: Conceptual 
and Historical Aspects of the Ecological Coexistence 
Issue
From the early times of ecology, diversity as an explanandum has been understood 
as a question of coexistence. I shall recapitulate this matter, and then consider a 
theoretical framework used to address it, namely the concept of ecological niche 
and its formulation by Hutchinson. I shall then turn to rival conceptions, mostly 
structured today around the idea of a “neutral theory”. In each case, I will empha-
size the aspects of the concept of biodiversity that are prominently addressed in each 
explanatory scheme.
The coexistence question may be arguably one of the key issues handled by ecol-
ogists since the early twentieth century. For decades, plant ecologists have embraced 
Clements’ concept of community, which is slightly like an organism and displays a 
process of succession analogous to the development of an organism.3 Clements and 
the animal ecologist Sheldon in Bioecology (1939) generalized this idea to plant and 
animal communities. Allee et al. (1949) major treatise on animal ecology took the 
concept of community on board – i.e. “the natural unit of organization in ecology” 
(437)  – as well as the parallel between organisms and communities, since like 
Clements they consider communities to have a “metabolism”. Their question here is 
about explaining the composition rules of an assemblage of species in a given com-
munity, and whether there are laws governing these species’ procession.
However, in the 40s and 50s, the coexistence question seemed to be supplanted 
by a different issue, i.e. the explanation of population regulation: why does a popu-
lation of a species generally fluctuate over a specific abundance, with regular cycles? 
From Elton (1927) to Hutchinson (1957) at least, the regulation issue was the other 
major problem for ecologists, especially animal ecologists  – with, as mentioned 
above, a practical concern for invasions and pest control. To some extent, the regula-
tion issue was more mathematically tractable than that of coexistence, as attested in 
the seminal models by Lotka and Volterra (Volterra 1926) and by Nicholson and 
Bailey (1935), which mostly deal with two or three species. Nicholson and Bailey 
explicitly acknowledged that handling many species would require very sharp 
mathematical skills (1935, 597).
Yet, when Hutchinson (1957) formulated his influential concept of niche as a 
hyperspace of environmental parameters in which a subspace of the hyperspace 
defines the viability conditions for a species, the coexistence question came again at 
the center of theoretical ecology.4 At the time, such question was often traced back 
to an appeal to some form of group selection, as exemplified by Allee et al. (1949) 
animal ecology treatise and shared by many ecologists, as indicated above (see 
3 “Development is the basic process of ecology, as applicable to the habitat and community as to 
the individual and species.” (Clements and Shelford 1939, 4)
4 See Pocheville (2015) for a conceptual history of ‘ecological niche’ that relates Hutchinson to 
earlier views by Grinnell and Elton.
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Mitman (1988) on these ideas of collectives and group selection). Coexistence in a 
community could be thought along the same lines as organismic integration, given 
that natural selection – individual in the latter case, collective in the former case – 
underlied both systems and their cohesiveness. David Lack’s work on clutch size 
(Lack 1947, 1954) however progressively provided powerful arguments to think 
that individual natural selection, and not group selection, was the reason of popula-
tion regulation, and a little bit later the idea of group selection met the devastating 
critique issued by Williams (1966). All this made the group selection approach to 
the coexistence question harder in principle. Hutchinson’s idea of niche to some 
extent thereby set the frame for more fruitful approaches to various modes of the 
coexistence question.
More precisely, Hutchinson published his conception in the “Concluding 
remarks” to the 1957 Cold Spring Harbour Symposium, where prominent ecolo-
gists and evolutionary biologists debated population ecology and mostly the regula-
tion issue.5 The volume was a final landmark in the debate over competition-centered 
(inspired by Nicholson (1933) initial model of regulation by density-dependent fac-
tors, and mostly represented by Lack (1954)) and density-independence-centered 
explanations of population regulation that emphasized factors such as climate 
(Anderwartha and Birch 1954).6 Hutchinson’s view of the niche followed his 
assessment of the debate, which tried to fairly acknowledge some epistemic value 
in both positions – mainly Lack’s view of density-dependent regulation by competi-
tion and Anderwartha and Birch (1954) view of regulation by density-independent 
factors.
This concept of niche was used by Hutchinson to make sense of the role of com-
petition in the regulation process. But more importantly, it also allows a grasp on the 
coexistence issue. Here, what explains coexistence is indeed the fact that first, each 
species has a “fundamental niche”, and second, that the portion of a fundamental 
niche shared by two species will be exclusively inhabited by the best competitor 
(Fig. 13.2). “Fundamental niches” once restricted by the process of competition – 
so, finally, natural selection – yield the “realised niches”, which explain where a 
species will actually be found in the environment. In a classic study, Joseph Connell 
(1961) studied two species of barnacles, Balanus balanoid and Chtamalus stemal-
lus, which have a stratified distribution along the coast of Scotland. The Balanus 
live on the border between see and rock, while the Chtamalus live just above it 
(Fig. 13.3a). Balanus cannot really live much higher because they cannot resist des-
sication during low tides. But if we take out the Balanus, the Chtamalus now appear 
to occupy also the space inhabited by the Balanus, in addition to their known terri-
tory (Fig. 13.3b). Thus, the fundamental niche of Chtamalus is the whole region of 
the rocks on which Balanus and Chtamalus live, but their realised niche is the terri-
tory where one finds them along with the Balanus, because the latter are a better 
competitor and wash Chtamalhus away from this portion of their fundamental 
5 On Hutchinson’s work and influence on ecology see Slack (2010).
6 Collins (1986) and Huneman (2019) argue that this episode was indeed instrumental in introduc-
ing the evolutionary viewpoint in ecology.
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niche. Partitioning the total environmental hyperspace into realised niches through 
the competitive exclusion principle eventually explains coexistence. The basic idea 
is that similar species cannot coexist for a long period of time, so one of them ulti-
mately restricts the realised niche of the other: this idea yields a family of “limiting 
similarity” theories of coexistence that have been elaborated since the 60s. “The 
generalization (..) that two species with the same niche requirements cannot form 
mixed steady-state populations in the same region has become one of the chief 
foundations of modern ecology.” (Hutchinson 1957)
As Hutchinson noticed, this theoretical tool is however not able to wholly 
explain coexistence. The “paradox of plankton”, as he himself formulated 
(Hutchinson 1961), is the fact that while the hyperspace of environmental parame-
ters in the ocean is very small, since there are few parameters (light, pH, tempera-
ture, etc.) distributed over a small range of values, thousands of plankton species 
exist instead of a few ones as predicts the theory of the niche. Hutchinson consid-
ered various accounts to explain this, especially the view that in reality the param-
eter values vary at the same time as the competitive exclusion process operates, 
which entails that the equilibrium partition of the niche hyperspace predicted by the 
Fig. 13.2 Realised and 
fundamental niches (the 
circle dots species is a 
better competitor than the 
crosses species) 
(Hutchinson (1957))
Ocean OceanLow tide
a b
Balanus
Balanus
ChthamalusChthamalus
realized niche
Chthamalus
fundamental niche
realized niche
High tide
Low tide
High tide
Fig. 13.3 (a) Coexistence of Balanus and Chtamallus. (b) When Balanus are taken out, Chtamalus 
reveal their fundamental niche by occupying it
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principle of competitive exclusion cannot be reached,7 and many more species actu-
ally exist.
The niche theory elaborated by Hutchinson has been crucial to address the coex-
istence issue. Hutchinson (1957) used it to explain why there are so many animals: 
the huge variety of plants, on which animals feed, makes for a very large hyperspace 
for possible animals, and hence many realised niches and species. But another cru-
cial ecological aspect is the distribution of species abundances, which is not taken 
into account by Hutchinson’s theory. As seen by Fisher and then Preston in the 30s, 
the species abundance distribution (SAD) seems to realize constant patterns, which 
can be expressed by either a lognormal curve (Fisher et  al. 1943) or a logseries 
(Preston 1948). Witnessing such a regularity in SADs, across various kinds of eco-
systems on the planet, raised the question of explaining such patterns. Consequently, 
theories of coexistence approached by limiting similarity elaborated since the 60s 
have been refined to understand such patterns of biodiversity as SADs. A most 
recent elaboration of this theory is called the R* theory. Stemming from MacArthur 
and Levins (1967) paper on patchy environments and the competition between spe-
cies foraging a finite set of identical resources heterogeneously distributed, and later 
developed by Tilman (1982), this theory asserts that “when resources are heteroge-
neously distributed, the number of species can be larger than the number of limiting 
resources, thereby resolving Hutchinson’s paradox of the plankton. R* theory is a 
conceptual advance over previous phenomenological-competition theories, such as 
the Lotka–Volterra predator–prey model, because it predicts the outcome of compe-
tition experiments before they are performed.” (Marquet et al. 2014).
Biodiversity as an explanandum means more than the coexistence question and 
SAD patterns (see e.g. MacArthur 1972). In fact, another pattern discovered by 
ecologists carrying out censuses (especially on plants) was about the relation of 
surface area and species number. Called “species-area law”, this was also a major 
pattern to be explained. In the seminal book by MacArthur and Wilson, Theory of 
Island Biogeography (1967), the authors recognise that the distribution of species is 
a major explanandum. However, their aim consists in switching from the “natural 
history” of species, which is mostly collecting patterns of those distributions, to a 
mechanistic explanation (more on this below). Theory of Island Biogeography starts 
by elaborating the “inland-island model”. Islands are small territories separated 
from one another by the sea, and all of them are at some distance from the inland. 
The inland constitutes a reservoir for species. Individuals of those species colonise 
islands, but the chances of colonizing an island depend both on the distance of 
inland to X and on the size of X.  The mathematical model therefore intends to 
7 “At any point the illuminated zone of the ocean or a lake the phytoplankton is normally quite 
diversified. There is no opportunity for niche specialization and the fundamental trophic require-
ments of all forms will cause them to draw on the same food supply. Such population cannot 
therefore represent equilibria, but since in general the plankton, though continually changing, 
remains in a highly diversified state, one can only suppose that the direction of competition is 
continually undergoing change with the progress of the seasons and concomitant thermal and 
chemical changes in the water and that no opportunity for the establishment of a single species 
equilibrium condition ever occurs.” (Hutchinson 1959)
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explain varieties of species-area laws on the basis of these three parameters: island 
size, amount of islands, distances to inland.
Theory of Island Biogeography uses a hypothetico-deductive model-based 
method: like Fisher or Kimura’s population genetics, it starts by building models 
and then considers how data and patterns fit to the model. Theory of Island 
Biogeography also works at a higher scale than community ecology. “Islands” of 
course are theoretical entities, not physical islands; they correspond to territories 
that are poorly communicating genes and organisms to other territories: they can be 
valleys, forest patches, etc. (Island biogeography has theoretical affinities with the 
concept of “metapopulation” elaborated at the same time by Richard Levins 
(1969)).
Noticeably, most of Theory of Island Biogeography considers the dispersion and 
colonisation of species and not the relative fitness differences between individuals. 
Hubbell (2001, 2006, 2010) will consider this as the first “dispersal assembly” 
model of coexistence, and will contrast it with the “niche assembly” models deriv-
ing from the limiting similarity theory (Leigh 2007). His own theory, called the 
“neutral unified theory of biogeography and ecology” (Hubbell 2001), intends to 
elaborate a dispersal assembly model, which is therefore ‘neutral’ in the sense that, 
like Kimura’s evolutionary models (Kimura 1985; He and Hubbell 2005), there is 
no fitness differences between elements (alleles for Kimura, species for Hubbell). 
His model integrates both regional and local community scales, and therefore allows 
to explain species abundance distribution as well as species-area laws. The key 
change for his theory (as compared to Theory of Island Biogeography) is that the 
neutrality assumption, called “ecological equivalence”, is defined in terms of per 
capita birth and death rates rather than in terms of species fitness (as McArthur and 
Wilson were doing) (Munoz and Huneman 2016, Hubbell 2005; Purves and Turnbull 
2010). It met predictive success: “It was surprising to find that spatial neutral mod-
els give rise to frequency distributions of precision that are very similar to those 
estimated from biological surveys, as a consequence of the spatial patterns pro-
duced by local dispersal alone” (Bell et al. 2006) – which concerned several kinds 
of communities (see McGill et al. 2006): plants, coral reefs or fish (Muneepeerakul 
et al. 2008).
Thus, a major divide in contemporary community ecology is today defined by 
the meaning ascribed to the neutral theory: whether ecologists follow Hubbell in 
considering that it is a good theory for biodiversity (Bell 2000), especially because 
it has far less parameters than the rival R* theory (Marquet et al. 2014), or think that 
the niche paradigm is still the best explanation since neutral models are not explana-
tions (see amongst others Chave 2004; Hubbell 2005; Holt 2006; Allouche and 
Kadmon 2009; Leibold and McPeek 2006; Doncaster 2009; Rosindell et al. 2011). 
Without delving into the controversy, it has to be noted that the neutral theory 
appears as a unified, scale-encompassing theory of biodiversity while the limiting 
similarity paradigm proposes explanations that are generally different for several 
aspects of coexistence (species abundance distribution, species area laws, etc.) 
(Huneman 2017).
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In all those theories, the explanandum is a range of patterns of coexistence that 
are defined mostly in terms of species diversity, and often the species richness is the 
major aspect – even though species abundances are also taken crucially into account 
in SADs.
But what happens if we turn to diversity as an explanans?
13.5  Diversity as an Explanans
In this section, I will consider the so-called diversity-stability hypothesis and the 
particular notions of diversity that have been involved in the attempts to clarify, 
formulate and test this hypothesis for four decades. I will first consider approaches 
that focus on the way diversity as species richness is organized through interactions 
in ecological networks; then I shall turn to the notions labelled “functional diver-
sity” and “phylogenetic diversity”.
The diversity-stability hypothesis has been for a long time an assumed but 
unproven hypothesis, evidenced by many observations  – somewhat like famous 
mathematical conjectures that are not proven but seem established by the behav-
iours of known numbers. As Orians writes, “The belief that natural ecosystems 
become more diverse and, hence, more stable with time after a disturbance is widely 
accepted and regularly repeated in ecology textbooks (…) the correlations, not to 
mention causations, are still obscure.” (Orians 1975, p. 139) Indeed, Orians notices 
that even the correlation between diversity and stability could not exclude that such 
a common cause as environmental constancy yields both.8
To this extent, the real meaning of the terms involved (which diversity? what 
stability?) was not really investigated.9 Thus, as indicated above, May’s mathemati-
cal findings that diversity per se, crudely defined as the number of species interact-
ing in an ecosystem, does not beget stability, triggered a reflexive turn in the study 
of diversity as a stability-promoter.10
Robert May’s results were in fact showing that an ecosystem with randomly 
interacting species is less stable – in the sense of constancy of species’ abundances – 
while the amount of species increases. Yet some evidence of a stability-begetting 
effect of diversity existed in the field, as stated, for example by McNaughton (1977): 
“The weight of evidence resulting from explicit tests of the diversity-stability 
hypothesis (…) suggests, not that the hypothesis is invalid, but that it is correct”. 
8 “Environmental constancy facilitates diversity while reducing perturbations that might affect sta-
bility” (Orians 1975, p. 139)
9 “The concepts are normally discussed with poorly defined terms, reflecting an uncertainty about 
what concept(s) of stability are useful in ecology” (ib.)
10 Notice that the regulation issue, arguably another key issue of theoretical ecology, also concerns 
an aspect of stability, since it is about the steadiness of one species population abundance. 
Therefore, the diversity as explanans is involved in the other major question of ecology, provided 
one assumes that the key questions are regulation and coexistence.
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Thus, ecologists then enquired about what aspects of diversity were in those cases 
accounting for this effect. First, in contrast with May’s models, the connections in 
an ecological network are often not random. It may be that many predators have 
only one prey, for instance, and that a few superpredators have many preys. In any 
case, few ecosystems are such that species have an even chance of having a given 
number of preys or predators. Thus, the question switched towards the identification 
of the properties of ecological networks that would be such that increasing diversity 
would increase stability. Given a fixed degree of diversity as species richness, many 
networks are possible: a first rough characterization of their differences is their par-
ticular value of connectance, namely, the ratio of the amount of realised connections 
(here, interactions) between species to the total amount of possible connections.
More generally, a perspective on the question of the role of ecological diversity 
in stability is the general investigation of topological properties of graphs realised 
by ecological networks of interactions. Diversity, as species richness per se, does 
not increase stability but some network topologies make it likely to promote stabil-
ity: this hypothesis supports the general move towards an investigation of ecological 
networks and their role in stability (Solé et al. 2002; Dunne 2006; Dunne et al. 2002; 
Kéfi et al. 2016). Some of the results emphasize the key role of species networks 
topologies in guaranteeing some stability. Scale-free networks, in which the distri-
bution of the degrees11 of the nodes follows some power law,12 are stable because 
this topology entails a very low probability for a random species extinction to reach 
one of the hubs of the network and hence alter the overall structure, and ultimately 
the functioning of the community (Solé et al. 2002). This probability becomes lower 
with the increasing size of the network, i.e. with the increase in species richness.
Small-world structures13 of ecological networks, when they are realised, also 
beget stability. This is because the high clustering coefficient means that the overall 
pattern of interaction is mostly preserved if some cluster in the network is altered. 
On the other hand, the short path length means that a species which loses its privi-
leged interacting species in its neighbouring cluster can still be related to its other 
interacting species via the other species in its network, to which it is highly con-
nected (Strogatz 2001; Solé and Goodwin 1988). In this case, similarly, increasing 
11 In a given network, made up of nodes (or vertices) and edges that connect some nodes, the 
“degree” of a node is the amount of edges on this node.
12 Intuitively, there are a few nodes with many connections (they will be called hubs), slightly more 
hubs with a bit less connections, and so on, and a large majority of nodes with only very few con-
nections. Formally speaking, the number of nodes of degree n + 1 will be 1/10 the number of nodes 
of degree n. (Or any mathematically power law of the same kind). Wealth in human societies is 
known to follow power laws; and one frequent generating process for power law nodes distribu-
tions is the “preferential attachment”, namely, the probability of having a new connection is pro-
portional to the extant amount of connections. Sometimes called “rich get richer”, this process is 
clearly instantiated by financial mechanisms (Albert and Barabasi 2002).
13 Small-world is a kind of network characterized by the fact that it is highly clustered (a cluster 
being a set of nodes more significantly connected between themselves than to other nodes) and at 
the same time has a short path length (the path length being the average number of edges between 
two randomly taken nodes) (Watts and Strogatz 1998).
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the amount of species, hence the size of the network, strengthens this stability- 
enhancing property.
May’s counterintuitive findings about stability not yielded by diversity in general 
are therefore corrected or supplemented by those network analyses of the topology 
of ecological network; however, it is not clear exactly what is meant in both cases 
by “stability”. Thus, the meaning of “stability” in all these models had to be ques-
tioned. As Tilman (1994) made clear, even if species richness does not, in theory, 
beget stability as constancy of species abundances, it has a positive effect on the 
constancy of biomass of an ecosystem. That is clearly another meaning of  “stability”, 
which relies on diversity. And early on, Holling (1973) had introduced “resilience” 
understood as the ability of an ecological system to restore its key parameters after 
a perturbation. Resilience has various modes and can be empirically measured. 
Moreover, “persistence” named the fact that an ecosystem does not “lose” a species, 
even though the abundances of all species vary a lot and do not come back to the 
initial state.
Yet, notions of stability are themselves even more numerous than that and it is 
not even clear if there is one overarching meaning. Orians (1975) distinguishes: 
Constancy – “a lack of change in some parameter of a system, such as the number 
of species, taxonomic composition, life form structure of a community, or feature of 
the physical environment”; Persistence – “the survival time of a system or some 
component of it”; Inertia– “the ability of a system to resist external perturbations”; 
Elasticity – “the speed with which the system returns to its former state following a 
perturbation” (which is similar to Holling’s resilience); Amplitude – “the area over 
which a system is stable”; Cyclical Stability – “the property of a system to cycle or 
oscillate around some central point or zone”; Trajectory Stability – “the property of 
a system to move towards some final end point or zone despite differences in start-
ing points”. (Fig. 13.4) Stability, in other words, depends on the kind of perturba-
tions one considers, and for Orians, in addition, all measures should be related to 
fitness: “For these relationships to be insightful, perturbations [or perturbation 
types] should be related to the evolutionary histories of the organisms experiencing 
the perturbations, and measured in terms of the total investments that must be made 
to increase or maintain fitness during those perturbations.” (ib. p. 143) This indi-
cates a bias in favor of evolutionary approaches to ecology, which may not be found 
in other theories of stability, especially when one turns to functional or ecosystems 
ecology.
In any case, the question of which diversity begets stability, and how it is possi-
ble that a certain diversity begets a certain stability, presupposes that one clarifies 
which stability is at stake. Not all diversity properties are likely to beget the same 
stability property.14
Of course, the ecological networks can be understood also from the perspective 
of their dynamics (Ulanowicz 1983; Szyrmer and Ulanowicz 1987), and especially 
14 On the various meanings of stability in ecology, and the possibility of formally making sense of 
some of them in the context of phase spaces, attractors and measures of Lyapounov exponents, see 
Justus (2008).
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by considering not only the constraints put by the topology on the possible dynam-
ics (Huneman 2015), but also, by capturing the major behaviours of the dynamics of 
fluxes within the networks and the possible evolution of the networks likely to fol-
low (Ulanowicz 1986). This approach is perfectly compatible with a functional 
ecology that would consider ecosystems as open thermodynamic systems and model 
their inner behaviour, such as what Odum (1953) theorised. It allows researchers to 
understand the role that increasing diversity (as species richness) plays in the pro-
ductivity of ecosystems, or ecosystem functioning, or some key features of ecosys-
tem functioning.
Fig. 13.4 The six kinds of stability in ecology. (After Orians 1975)
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The network perspective is not the only way to capture the possible contributions 
of diversity, mostly as species richness, to stability, or to some aspects of it. 
Functional ecologists started to define “functional differences” understood in terms 
of functional roles of a species played in an ecosystem (Blandin 2014). From this 
perspective, two species can be biologically different but functionally equivalent. 
Such functional diversity may be likely to play a role that species diversity cannot 
play in the emergence and maintenance of some stability. However, functional 
diversity and species richness are not wholly orthogonal. As Tilman (1996) argued, 
species diversity induces a lot of microscale environmental heterogeneities, which 
in turn allow for a wide variety of ecological roles. But this connection is just plau-
sible and does not allow one to always consider species richness as a proxy for 
functional diversity.
Experiments have recently confirmed the stability-enhancing role of functional 
diversity. The bumphead parrotfish Bolbometopon muricatum is the largest parrot-
fish in the oceans and is considered a keystone species in the coral reef (Huey and 
Belwood 2009). It is a major target for fishermen (and hence an imperilled species) 
but is also heavily consuming reef substrate: “the most conspicuous and perhaps 
most powerful effect B. muricatum has on reef ecology is delivered via individuals’ 
intense direct consumption of reef substrate.” (McCauley et al. 2014)
The experimental change of this parrotfish to another parrotfish, or the reintro-
duction of other parrotfish species after its removal, show that the equilibrium of the 
coral reef is threatened. Species diversity in this case is not changed (Bellwood et al. 
2003). But given that the functional role of the bumphead parrotfish is unique, it 
follows that functional diversity is decreased while species richness remains con-
stant. In this case functional diversity, and not species diversity, is what contributes 
to ecosystem stability.
Functional diversity seems thus to positively relate to productivity and stability 
of ecosystems. However, as argued by Cadotte et al. (2009) “functional group rich-
ness is a problematic measure for two reasons. First, the removal or addition of 
“functionally redundant” species may have effects on community dynamics and 
processes, indicating that there are important functional differences not captured by 
broad groupings. (…) The second reason is that functional group richness tends to 
predict only a limited amount of variation in productivity and may even explain less 
variation than having randomly assigned groups.”
Thus, more recently ecologists have started to consider phylogenetic diversity 
and its role in ecosystem functioning and conservation biology, under the name of 
“ecophylogenetics”. Here, phylogenetic diversity is understood as “the amount of 
evolutionary history represented in the species of a particular community”, and 
“commonly used measures of phylogenetic diversity are the total branch length of a 
phylogenetic tree that contains all species present in a community, or the sum of 
pairwise distances between species weighed by their relative abundances.” (Mouquet 
et al. 2012) Ecologists found, for instance, that plant productivity is enhanced in 
communities with phylogenetically distantly related fungal species compared to 
closely related species. “This result suggests, under the hypothesis of a strong phy-
logenetic signal of the traits considered, that the loss of an entire lineage could have 
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strong negative ecological consequences since distinct lineages are likely to per-
form different functions.” Thus, to this extent one can use phylogenetic diversity “as 
a proxy of unmeasured functional diversity for the purpose of assessing its connec-
tion to ecosystem functioning” (Mouquet et al. 2012).
The three diversities, species richness, phylogenetic diversity and functional 
diversity, are in general quite decoupled. This is manifest in a study by D’Agata 
et al. (2014) on the human impact on biodiversity loss in coral reefs. In the reef area, 
human density varies on a gradient spanning from 1,7 to 1720 inhabitants/km2. 
The researchers investigated the effect of this density upon the three biodiversities. 
It turned out that the impact starts to be sensible at a threshold of around 20 inhabit-
ants/km2; however, the effect is very different regarding each kind of diversity. 
Considering the extreme impact, at 1705 inhabitants/km2 the effects are: on species 
richness: 12%; on functional diversity: 46%; on phylogenetic diversity: 36%. Thus, 
first, species richness is a very bad predictor of human impact on biodiversity loss 
and should be not used as an indicator for coral management, one should prefer 
functional and phylogenetic biodiversity instead; second, the slope of the impact 
after the threshold, on each diversity, is significantly different, therefore they cannot 
be taken as proxies for each other (Fig. 13.5).
Fig. 13.5 Differential 
effects on human density 
in three kinds of 
biodiversity. (After 
D’Agata et al. (2014))
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To sum up, diversity as an explanans is diffracted into several concepts of diver-
sity such that each plays, within different explanatory perspectives, a specific 
explanatory role regarding productivity, stability and other ecosystem functioning 
aspects. Those diversities are not translatable and are in general weakly correlated, 
even though locally under some conditions they can be quite aligned.
It seems therefore that the explanatory reversibility of diversity includes a gap 
between the explanandum and the explanans, since the explanandum is mostly con-
centrated upon species richness, unlike the explanans. In turn, the explanandum is 
instantiated in various patterns of biodiversity that may link space and diversity, 
while the explanans generally does not include biodiversity patterns (or at least the 
same biodiversity patterns: SADs, species-area distributions etc.). Two general con-
clusions can be drawn here: as an explanans, ecological diversity is much more 
diffracted than as an explanandum; and the explanatory reversibility of the concept 
is not transparent, complete or univocal.
One can usefully compare this explanatory reversibility to the explanatory 
reversibility of robustness in evolutionary biology. Here, robustness, understood 
either as a capacity to function notwithstanding disturbances, or as an ability to 
maintain a set of functions in a very wide range of circumstances (Kitano 2004) also 
covers distinct meanings. Especially, the two key types of robustness for evolution-
ary biologists are “mutational robustness”, as a robustness defined with regard to 
genetic mutations, and “environmental robustness”, as a robustness defined with 
regard to environmental changes (de Visser et  al. 2003). Biologists debate about 
whether one has been the effect of the other, and then, given that robustness is a very 
general property of living systems at all levels (Wagner 2005), they ask two kinds of 
questions: what made robustness evolve (robustness as an explanandum)? What 
does robustness do in evolution and how does it affect it (robustness as an explan-
ans)? But such explanatory reversibility of robustness (Huneman 2018) is such that 
the two types of robustness are together considered, both, in the explanans side and 
in the explanandum side. This is not the case with the biodiversity concept in ecol-
ogy. In the last section, I shall attempt to account for the structure of the concept of 
diversity in a way that will make sense of this specific explanatory reversibility of 
the concept. Ultimately, this will decide upon the role of “biodiversity” as a crucial 
concept for unifying ecology.
13.6  A “Conceptual Space” Approach to the Diversity 
Concept
What do I mean when I say that some X – a community or an ecosystem – is more 
diverse than Y? Does it include more species, or species more diverse, or more func-
tionally diversified, or is X phylogenetically more extended on the tree of life than Y?
No principled way exists to answer this question. One could be tempted to say 
that there is no objective answer at all. However, another approach consists in say-
ing that there are many objective facts enveloped in a judgment about X being more 
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diverse than Y, and that the concept of biodiversity is then in each case built or con-
structed upon this set of objective facts. Various answers to the question are then 
yielded by various ways of constructing this concept of biodiversity.
Such an approach could be developed in the following terms: consider each of 
the properties used to construct biodiversity indices and to measure biodiversity as 
axes in a hyperspace. Species richness would obviously be one, as would then be 
species evenness, disparity, species abundance, phylogenetic distance, functional 
differences. Those axes describe facts about each community or ecosystem that can 
be objectively measured: the number of species at the local scale, their abundances, 
the functional redundancies or the amount of the phylogenetic trees covered by the 
species in a community or metacommunity are not in the eye of the beholder, they 
can be settled independently of epistemic preferences, explanatory strategies or 
methodological choices (or, at least, their objectivity is not different or less objec-
tive than generally establishing facts in science). Thus each community or ecosys-
tem occupies a point (or a small neighbourhood, considering that the values evolve 
in time) in this space, defined by how much it scores on each of these axes (Fig. 13.6). 
Functional diversity is the projection of this point on the axis “functional diversity”; 
same for phylogenetic diversity; etc.
But of course each axis may not be as important as the others regarding a given 
diversity measure – for instance, some concepts of diversity used in conservation biol-
ogy would overtone functional diversity or species abundances; and diversity in eco-
phylogenetics, but also in biogeography, could overemphasise the axis of “phylogenetic 
diversity”. Many diversity indices are indeed constructed by considering the values on 
Fig. 13.6 The conceptual space of biodiversity and its axes. Notice that axes can be weighed and 
scaled differently in order to construct a specific biodiversity concept
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several axes but not all of them, and then by possibly weighing the various axes dif-
ferently; e.g. species richness or disparity could be differently weighed. If one wants 
to represent in our conceptual space the way a specific biodiversity concept, and then 
biodiversity measure, is constructed, one could assign different scales to each axis. 
This plurality of choices regarding the importance, weight or scales of each axis 
results in a plurality of possible concepts of biodiversity. And in turn, each explana-
tory project in ecology regarding diversity – as an explanans, or as an explanandum – 
will involve one (or a few) specific biodiversity concepts among this plurality.
In this approach, “biodiversity” appears as a possible construction built upon the 
objective values that X (community, ecosystem) scores on various axes. Each way 
of constructing it, by making projections on some axes, or taking only a few axes, 
possibly scaled or weighed in different ways, provides a different concept of biodi-
versity. Each of these concepts in turn is based on objective facts, but includes some 
epistemic and possibly non-epistemic values that governed the construction of this 
concept from those facts. For instance, the biodiversity concept used in conservation 
may emphasize the dimension of abundance, since the probability of extinction of a 
species – which is in general something conservation biologists intend to prevent – 
is inversely proportional to abundance. But the weighing of the axes here, and the 
overweighing of abundances, relies on the non-epistemic value of our interest in 
conserving species. Inversely, some biodiversity concepts used when one wants to 
design, maintain or maximise ecosystem services, may favor the functional diver-
sity; here too, the reasons for weighing axes differently relies on non-epistemic 
values, namely our interest in flourishing ecosystem services.
Now, the explanatory reversibility of the concept of diversity can be approached 
in this context. Considering that biodiversity is defined in this conceptual space 
determined by the axes I mentioned, it appears that diversity as explanans and diver-
sity as explanandum target different regions of this space (Fig. 13.7). According to 
analyses in Sects. 13.4 and 13.5, the explanans is heavily concentrated around the 
axes on functional and phylogenetic diversity, while the explanandum would be 
rather located around the axes of species richness, evenness and abundances. The 
overall conceptual space of diversity is therefore not identically involved in the two 
explanatory takes on diversity, and this characterizes the epistemic nature of such an 
explanatory reversibility, as compared to the explanatory reversibility of the concept 
of robustness mentioned above. The latter is “complete”, while the former is not – in 
the sense that the conceptual space (respectively, of diversity and of robustness) is 
in the latter case completely and identically concerned by both explanatory projects, 
and in the former, partially and differently concerned by each explanatory project. 
But (unlike diversity) robustness cannot claim to be a shared and pervasive object in 
evolutionary biology, and therefore the “completeness” of its explanatory revers-
ibility does not carry consequences for the question of the theoretical unity of evo-
lutionary biology, unlike in the case of ecological diversity considered here.
This approach to diversity as a conceptual space was not only intended to pro-
vide a representation for the incompleteness of the explanatory reversibility of 
diversity. It is more generally intended to make sense of the fact that the epistemic 
status of diversity in ecology does not allow for a theoretical unity based on such 
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concept, because various explanatory questions in ecology target different concep-
tual areas of this space. Thus, even though there is here some unity, due to the fact 
that there is one conceptual space, it is the unity conferred by a same general object. 
But the fact that the space is so to say differently exploited by various approaches 
and traditions makes it difficult to think that for this sole reason a theoretical unity 
can embrace all those approaches and traditions.
Through this “conceptual space approach” to diversity, one sees that diversity is 
not a purely subjective property, or a property that only exists is the eye of the (sci-
entific) beholder; that many crucial explanatory projects in ecology diversely target 
diversity; and that at the same time, all these projects cannot be theoretically unified 
through this reference to diversity as something objective.
13.7  Conclusion
To wrap up the arguments made here, biodiversity is arguably a key issue in ecol-
ogy, and many theories and explanatory strategies are concerned by it. Diversity is 
manifestly an explanatory reversible concept, and at first stake this could mean that 
it could play a role in unifying ecological theories and tools. However, because of 
the specific incompleteness of the explanatory reversibility of the concept of diver-
sity, illustrated by the way in which its conceptual space is variously targeted by 
explanatory projects, it appears that the discourses, theories and explanatory 
Fig. 13.7 Regions of the conceptual space of biodiversity targeted by explanatory projects: in red, 
when biodiversity is the explanans, in blue, when it is the explanandum (Color figure online)
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strategies of ecologists could not be theoretically unified as a set of scientific 
approaches to diversity. Even if it is perhaps illusory to think that a single concept 
could unify a theoretical field, in a non-superficial manner at least, the present 
enquiry shows that in order to search for unifying principles for ecology, one should 
not start by focusing on biodiversity. Ecologists share a concern for biodiversity, but 
the geography of the concept of diversity is such that this shared concern cannot 
become a principle of unification or an essential part of a unifying strategy.
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Chapter 14  
Functional Biodiversity and the Concept 
of Ecological Function
Antoine C. Dussault
Abstract This chapter argues that the common claim that the ascription of ecologi-
cal functions to organisms in functional ecology raises issues about levels of natural 
selection is ill-founded. This claim, I maintain, mistakenly assumes that the func-
tion concept as understood in functional ecology aligns with the selected effect 
theory of function advocated by many philosophers of biology (sometimes called 
“The Standard Line” on functions). After exploring the implications of Wilson and 
Sober’s defence of multilevel selection for the prospects of defending a selected 
effect account of ecological functions, I identify three main ways in which func-
tional ecology’s understanding of the function concept diverges from the selected 
effect theory. Specifically, I argue (1) that functional ecology conceives ecological 
functions as context-based rather than history-based properties of organisms; (2) 
that it attributes to the ecological function concept the aim of explaining ecosystem 
processes rather than that of explaining the presence of organisms within ecosys-
tems; and (3) that it conceives the ecological functions of organisms as use and 
service functions rather than design functions. I then discuss the extent to which the 
recently proposed causal role and organizational accounts of ecological functions 
better accord with the purposes for which the function concept is used in functional 
ecology.
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14.1  Introduction
In the last decades, functional biodiversity has become a central focus in ecology 
and environmental conservation (e.g. Tilman 2001; Naeem 2002; Petchey and 
Gaston 2006; Nock et al. 2016). This follows from the recognition by an increasing 
number of ecologists of the explanatory and predictive limitations of more tradi-
tional “species richness” measures of biodiversity. This recognition has led ecolo-
gists and conservationists to consider, alongside the number of species present in a 
community, the particular features of organisms of those species and how those 
features determine their potential relationships with their environments (see Hooper 
et al. 2002, 195; DeLaplante and Picasso 2011, 173; Nunes-Neto et al. 2016, 296–
297). Consideration of those features has fostered among ecologists an interest in 
the ways in which organisms can be grouped or classified on the basis of their func-
tional traits, which are deemed to be of more direct ecological importance than 
those on which the more standard taxonomic measures of biodiversity are based.
Those functional groupings include:
Guilds: Groupings of organisms on the basis of similarities in resource use. Two 
organisms are members of a same guild if they tend to use a similar resource in 
a similar way (Simberloff and Dayan 1991; J. B. Wilson 1999; Blondel 2003).
Functional response groups: Groupings of organisms on the basis of similar 
expected response to environmental changes. Two organisms are members of the 
same functional response group if they tend to respond similarly to similar 
changes in environmental conditions (Catovsky 1998; J. B. Wilson 1999; Hooper 
et al. 2002; Lavorel and Garnier 2002)
Functional effect groups: Groupings of organisms on the basis of similar roles in 
ecosystem processes. Two organisms are members of the same functional effect 
group if they tend to contribute similarly to some important ecosystem process 
(e.g. nutrient cycling, primary productivity, energy flows) (Catovsky 1998; 
Hooper et al. 2002; Lavorel and Garnier 2002; Blondel 2003).1
Among those three modes of functional classification, the first two—guilds and func-
tional response groups—are commonly used to explain the assembly of ecological 
communities and how their species composition changes in response to changes in 
their environments. The third—functional effect groups—is commonly used to explain 
1 It should be noted that functional ecologists have adopted various modes of functional classifica-
tion with different emphases, and have used diverse terminologies to refer to them. For instance 
Wilson (1999) draws a contrast between alpha guilds and beta guilds which is essentially equiva-
lent to the contrast made above between guilds and functional response groups. Similarly, Catovsky 
(1998), and Lavorel and Garnier (2002) draw a contrast between functional response groups and 
functional effect groups similar to the one made above, but define functional response groups also 
in reference to resource use (a basis for classification that I associated with guilds). And likewise, 
Blondel (2003) draws a contrast between guilds and functional groups, and his concept of func-
tional group is essentially equivalent to the above concept of functional effect group. I think that 
my above identification of three main modes of functional classification adequately reflects the 
complementary epistemic aims in relation to which ecologists use functional classifications.
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ecosystem processes through delineating the particular contributions of organisms of 
different species to those processes (see discussion in Sect. 14.3.2 below).
A particularity of the third mode of functional classification—functional effect 
groups—is that it involves the ascription of roles or functions to organisms within 
ecosystems (Catovsky 1998, 126; Symstad 2002, 23–24; Jax 2010, 54). As remarked 
by Jax (2010, sec. 4.2) and DeLaplante and Picasso (2011, sec. 3.2), such ascriptions 
of ecological functions to organisms within ecosystems raise important philosophi-
cal issues. One of them concerns the meaning of the function concept and its rela-
tionship to claims about natural selection. Given the association made by many 
biologists and ecologists between the concept of function and the evolutionary con-
cept of adaptation (Williams 1966), the idea that organisms fulfil functions within 
ecosystems has been claimed to raise issues about the levels at which natural selec-
tion customarily operates (see Calow 1987, 60; DeLaplante and Picasso 2011, 184). 
As we shall see, a linkage of the notion of ecological function to community and 
ecosystem selection assumes an elucidation of this notion along the lines of the 
selection effect theory of function advocated by many philosophers of biology (e.g. 
Wright 1973; Millikan 1989; Neander 1991; Godfrey-Smith 1994).2 According to 
this theory, which some refer to as “The Standard Line” on functions given its many 
adherents (Allen and Bekoff 1995, 13–14), the function of a part or trait of a biologi-
cal entity is the effect for which this part or trait was preserved by natural selection 
operating on the ancestors of that entity. A selected effect elucidation of the concept 
of ecological function would therefore entail that ascribing a function to an organism 
within an ecosystem amounts to saying that at least some of the traits of this organ-
ism have been shaped by ecosystem-level selection. Relatedly, a selected effect elu-
cidation of the ecological function concept, as we shall also see, would in some way 
revive the old idea of communities and ecosystems as tightly integrated superorgan-
isms shaped by natural selection (Allee et al. 1949; D. S. Wilson and Sober 1989).
In this chapter, I will argue that the common association between function ascrip-
tions in functional ecology and issues about levels of selection is ill-founded. As just 
mentioned, this association assumes an understanding of ecological functions along 
the lines of the selection effect theory of function, and I will maintain that the under-
standing of the function concept at play in functional ecology does not in fact align 
with this theory. I will do so through identifying important ways in which functional 
ecology’s use of the ecological function concept diverges from the understanding 
conveyed by the selected effect theory. This will highlight that, when they ascribe 
functions to organisms within ecosystems, functional ecologists are not committed 
to views of ecosystems as units of selection. Their understanding of ecological func-
tions and ecosystem functional organization, as I will emphasize, attributes to eco-
systems a lower degree of part-whole integration than what would be entailed by the 
selected effect theory. The discussion of the ecological function concept presented 
in this chapter will therefore reinforce the near consensus that has recently emerged 
among philosophers of biology and ecology, according to which the ecological 
2 For overviews of philosophical theories of function, see McLaughlin (2001), Wouters (2005), 
Walsh (2008), Saborido (2014), and Garson (2016).
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function concept should be elucidated along the lines of non-selectionist alterna-
tives to the selected effect theory of function (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, sec. 6.2; 
Odenbaugh 2010; Gayon 2013; Nunes-Neto et al. 2014).
My discussion will be organized as follows. In Sect. 14.2, I will discuss the com-
mon contention that the use of the function concept in ecology raises issues about 
levels of selection. I will explore the implications of Wilson and Sober’s defence of 
multilevel selection for the prospects of defending a selected effect account of eco-
logical functions. In Sect. 14.3, I will dispute the claim that the ecological function 
concept raises issues about levels of natural selection. I will do so by highlighting 
three important ways in which functional ecology’s understanding of the ecological 
function concept diverges from the selected effect theory. Finally, in Sect. 14.4, I 
will briefly discuss two non-selectionist accounts of ecological functions that have 
recently been proposed by philosophers of biology and ecology; namely, the causal 
role account (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, sec. 6.2; Odenbaugh 2010; Gayon 
2013), and the organizational account (Nunes-Neto et al. 2014). I will maintain that 
neither of these two accounts fully accords with how ecological functions are under-
stood in functional ecology.
14.2  Ecological Functions and Levels of Selection
As mentioned in the introduction, the ascription of ecological functions to organ-
isms in functional ecology is often taken to raise issues about levels of natural selec-
tion. As DeLaplante and Picasso (2011, 184) recall:
[A]ttitudes toward function language in ecology have been influenced by the group selec-
tion debate that took place in the 1960s (Wynne-Edwards 1962; Williams 1966). The cri-
tique of group selection was based on the affirmation that within orthodox evolutionary 
theory, natural selection acts primarily at the level of individual organisms (or, indeed, the 
level of individual genes), and rarely if ever at the level of groups. […] Evolutionary ecolo-
gists tend to associate the language of functions with organism-environment relationships 
relevant to selection and adaptation (e.g., “functional traits”). But if natural selection only 
acts at the level of individuals within species populations, then the language of functions 
should only apply at this level […]. Consequently, evolutionary ecologists are inclined to be 
skeptical of function attributions at the community and ecosystem level.3
Along similar lines, in the inaugural issue of the journal Functional Ecology, Calow 
(1987, 60) maintains that a focus on the functions fulfilled by organisms within 
communities “implies that the way they contribute to the balanced economy of the 
community is an important criterion of selection”.
Such a linkage of the notion of ecological function to community or ecosystem 
selection assumes an understanding of this notion along the lines of the selected 
effect theory of function developed in the philosophy of biology (Wright 1973; 
3 For are more detailed discussion of the issues raised by the group selection debate for functional 
approaches to ecology, see Hagen (1992, chap. 8).
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Millikan 1989; Neander 1991). Some support for this assumption can be found in 
the fact that the selected effect theory has, to some extent, established itself as “The 
Standard Line” on functions in the philosophy of biology (Allen and Bekoff 1995, 
13–14). Since its initial introduction, it has been adopted by many prominent phi-
losophers of biology (e.g. Griffiths 1993; Mitchell 1993; Godfrey-Smith 1994). 
According to the selected effect theory, the function of a part or trait of a biological 
entity is the effect for which this part or trait was preserved by natural selection 
operating on ancestors of this entity. Thus, ascribing a function to an organism 
within an ecosystem would amount to saying that at least some of the traits of this 
organism have been shaped by ecosystem-level selection. In other words, ascribing 
a function to an organism within an ecosystem would amount to saying that organ-
isms from its lineage have the traits on account of which they are classified in a 
particular functional effect group partly because their having those traits conferred 
a selective advantage to the ecosystem they are part of. Thus, functional ecologists’ 
ascribing ecological functions to organisms within ecosystems would commit them 
to the idea that communities and ecosystems are units of natural selection. The view 
of ecosystem functional organization implicitly adopted in functional ecology 
would therefore be similar to that espoused by mid-Twentieth century ecologists 
who believed that communities and ecosystems were tightly integrated superorgan-
isms subject to community or ecosystem-level selection (e.g. Allee et al. 1949).
Although, as remarked by DeLaplante and Picasso (see quote above), many biol-
ogists and ecologists are sceptical about the idea that natural selection customarily 
operates at the level of communities and ecosystems, some support for this idea can 
be found (as they also remark) in Wilson and Sober’s defence of multilevel selection 
(see e.g. Wilson and Sober 1989; Sober and Wilson 1994). Wilson and Sober’s main 
focus is population-level selection, but they also apply their multilevel selectionist 
approach to communities and ecosystems. Wilson and Sober’s defence of multilevel 
selection improves upon previous defences in part by identifying an unrealistic 
assumption underlying classical arguments against it. This assumption is that indi-
vidual organisms within populations interact randomly with each other and there-
fore have equal chances of mating with any other member of their population. 
Contrary to this assumption, Wilson and Sober emphasize, the heterogeneity of 
many environments entails that, in practice, populations in the ecological world 
tend to be structured in ways that make their individual members more likely to 
interact with only a small subset of their whole population. This, as Wilson and 
Sober explain, creates conditions favourable to the operation of natural selection on 
single-species groups of organisms and even communities and ecosystems (Wilson 
and Sober 1989, 341–4).
They illustrate the possibility of community-level selection with the example of 
phoretic associations. Phoretic associations are communities formed by a winged 
insect associated with many wingless organisms (e.g. mites, nematodes, fungi and 
microbes) that rely on the winged insect for transportation from one resource patch 
to another. When the winged insect reaches a new resource patch (e.g. carrion, dung, 
or stressed timber), it brings along a whole community of “phoretic associates” 
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which then colonize the patch. Wilson and Sober explain how natural selection 
might operate on phoretic associations as a whole:
Consider a large number of resource patches, each of which develops into a community 
composed of the insects, their phoretic associates, plus other species that arrive indepen-
dently. The community of phoretic associates may be expected to vary from patch to patch 
in species composition and in the genetic composition of the component species. Some of 
these variant communities may have the effect of killing the carrier insect. Others may have 
the effect of promoting insect survival and reproduction, and these will be differentially 
dispersed to future resource patches. Thus, between-community selection favors phoretic 
communities that do not harm and perhaps even benefit the insect carrier. At the extreme, 
we might expect the community to become organized into an elaborate mutualistic network 
that protects the insect from its natural enemies, gathers its food, and so on. (Wilson and 
Sober 1989, pp. 348–9)
Such a scenario, they emphasize, is not only a theoretical possibility. Empirical data 
from studied phoretic communities show no negative effects on the carrier insect in 
most cases and positive effects in many cases. In a subsequent paper, Wilson (1997), 
2020–22) discusses other likely cases of community selection that conform to his 
and Sober’s approach, as well as a likely case of ecosystem selection involving 
micro-ecosystems forming at the surface of lakes and oceans.4
Wilson and Sober’s defence of community and ecosystem selection thus seems 
to provide grounds for interpreting at least some of the functions fulfilled by organ-
isms within communities and ecosystems along the lines of the selected effect the-
ory of function. For instance, the selected effect theory entails that some phoretic 
associates in Wilson and Sober’s phoretic association case have functions within the 
phoretic association. This is the case of phoretic associates that are part of the asso-
ciation partly because some of their traits conferred a selective advantage to the 
phoretic association as a whole. Similar function ascriptions would be implied by 
the selected effect theory in relation to organisms involved in the other cases of 
community and ecosystem selection described by Wilson (1997). In line with those 
observations, Wilson and Sober themselves conceive their defence of multilevel 
selection as legitimizing the view that some communities and ecosystems are func-
tionally organized entities (Wilson and Sober 1989, 337–344; see also Wilson 
1997). They even claim that communities and ecosystems that are units of selection 
according to their approach can genuinely be regarded as superorganisms (Wilson 
and Sober 1989, 349).5
However, it should be emphasized that Wilson and Sober’s defence of multilevel 
selection lends at best very limited support to the application of the selected effect 
theory in ecology. Wilson and Sober are careful to emphasize that their defence of 
community and ecosystem selection is professedly modest. They see it as an 
 important strength of their approach that it does not consist in an “overly grandiose” 
superorganism theory that attributes “functional design […] to ecosystems in general” 
4 For related discussions of artificial ecosystem selection experiments, see Swenson et al. (2000a), 
Swenson et al. (2000b) and Blouin et al. (2015).
5 For a discussion of Wilson and Sober’s defence of multilevel selection in relation to the selected 
effect theory of function, see Basl (2017, sec. 4.2).
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(Wilson and Sober 1989, 352). As they insist, their approach entails that “[n]ot all 
groups and communities are superorganisms, but only those that meet the specified 
(and often stringent) conditions” (Wilson and Sober 1989, 343). Functional ecolo-
gists, in contrast, envision their approach as a framework for the study of ecosys-
tems in general. Such a broad scope is not legitimized by Wilson and Sober’s 
approach. Therefore the support lent by Wilson and Sober’s defence of multilevel 
selection to the application of the selected effect theory of function in ecology 
seems too limited for the purposes of functional ecology.
In the next section, I will argue that significant aspects of the use of the function 
concept in functional ecology point to an understanding of function that diverges 
from the selected effect theory. This will show that, contrary to what is sometimes 
suggested (see above), the ascription of ecological functions to organisms in func-
tional ecology does not hinge on claims that ecosystems are units of natural 
selection.
14.3  Ecological Functions in Functional Ecology
14.3.1  Ecological Context vs. Selective History
Historically and conceptually, contemporary functional ecology’s construal of the 
function concept derives from the renowned community ecologist Charles Elton’s 
(1927, 1933) understanding of the ecological niche. Elton’s understanding of the 
niche was tied to a functionalist view of ecological communities, which drew an 
analogy between feeding interactions within ecological communities and economic 
exchanges in human societies.6 In Elton’s coinage, the term “niche” referred to 
“what [an animal] is doing in its community”, and emphasized an animal’s “rela-
tions to food and enemies” in contrast to “appearance, names, affinities, and past 
history.” (Elton 1927, 63–64, emphasis in the original) The niche concept was “used 
in ecology in the sense that we speak of trades or professions or jobs in a human 
community” (Elton 1933, 28, emphasis added). Thus, Elton’s understanding of the 
niche was tied to a picture of ecological communities in analogy with human societ-
ies (with an economic focus), rather than with individual organisms. The niches of 
organisms, as he conceived them, were analogous to the economic roles fulfilled by 
individuals within human societies, rather than with the functions of organs within 
organisms. This communitarian-economic analogy attributed to ecological commu-
6 Elton’s understanding of the niche contrasted with the one previously adopted by Joseph Grinnell 
(1917), the other originator of the niche concept, who used the niche concept to denote a species’ 
particular environmental requirements (see Leibold 1995, 1372–1373). The contrast between 
Grinnell’s and Elton’s niches parallels the contrast presented in the introduction between on the 
one hand, guilds and functional response group and on the other hand, functional effect groups (see 
Hooper et  al. 2002, 196). For discussions of the contrast between Grinnell’s and Elton’s niche 
concepts, see also Schoener (1989), Griesemer (1992), and Pocheville (2015).
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nities of a lower degree of part-whole integration than the one characteristically 
found in individual organisms. Notably, Elton (1930) emphasized that individual 
organisms retain a significant degree of autonomy with respect to the communities 
in which they are involved, and he rejected the view (held by some later Twentieth- 
century ecologists) that natural selection customarily operates on ecological com-
munities as a whole (McIntosh 1985, 167; Haak 2000, 32).
Contemporary functional ecology’s understanding of ecological functions is in 
many respects similar to Elton’s functional understanding of the niche. A first impor-
tant aspect of this understanding that does not align with the selected effect theory 
concerns the basis on which ecological functions are ascribed to organisms in func-
tional ecology. In functional ecology, the ecological functions of organisms within 
ecosystems are conceived as context-based properties of those organisms, which 
they bear on account of their actual and potential interactions with other organisms. 
This context-based understanding contrasts with that conveyed by the selected effect 
theory, according to which the functions of biological items are history- based prop-
erties of those items (i.e. properties borne by those items on account of their selec-
tive history). The conceptual dissociation of the ecological function concept from 
evolutionary considerations is made explicit by some functional ecologists. Petchey 
and Gaston (2006, 742), for instance, state that “[f]unctional diversity [in ecology] 
generally involves understanding communities and ecosystems based on what 
organisms do, rather than on their evolutionary history”.
Functional ecology’s context-based understanding of ecological functions is 
aptly portrayed by Jax (2010, 79):
In contrast to parts of an organism, a particular species has no clearly defined role within an 
ecosystem: a bird may have the function of being prey to other animals—but only if these 
carnivorous animals are parts of the specific system. If there are no predators in the system, 
the same species or even individual will not have the role “prey”. Even if we can say that 
the bird actually has the role of being prey, we can also find other roles, e.g. its role to dis-
tribute seeds and nutrients, to be predator for insects, etc. That is, like a person within a 
human society, who may be teacher, spouse, child, politician etc., either at the same time or 
at different times, it can have several roles. Roles can change and the same person as well 
as the same species can even take opposing roles in time […]. “The” one and only role of a 
species does not exist. Roles are strongly context-dependent.
On this context-based understanding, the ascription of ecological functions to 
organisms within ecosystems does not entail claims about selective history. For 
instance, an ecologist’s depiction of a rabbit as fulfilling the role of a prey (or pri-
mary consumer) within an ecosystem does not entail the claim that rabbits and their 
traits were selected for serving as food for predators. Rabbits eat grass and grow 
muscles for their own survival and, as a by-product, acquire traits that make them 
nutritious and palatable for those predators. Likewise, an ecologist’s reference to 
foxes as fulfilling the role of regulator of herbivore populations within an ecosystem 
does not entail the claim that foxes and their traits were selected for regulating her-
bivore populations. Foxes chase and eat preys to feed themselves and, as a by- 
product, exert a form of control over their preys’ populations.
It should be noted, however, that contemporary functional ecology expands upon 
Elton’s approach to the study of ecological communities in two important ways. 
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First, it expands upon Elton’s approach by integrating ecosystem ecology’s thermo-
dynamic and biogeochemical outlook on the ecological world (see Hagen 1992, 
chaps. 4–5). Thus, whereas Elton used the niche primarily to study how interspecific 
interactions within communities explain the regulation of populations within them 
and the maintenance of their structural features (Hagen 1992, 52; Pocheville 2015, 
549), the ascription of ecological functions to organisms in contemporary func-
tional ecology is more primarily tied to the aim of studying how the traits of organ-
isms determine their potential contributions to ecosystem processes (see K.  W. 
Cummins 1974; Naeem 2002). Thus, in contemporary functional ecology, the eco-
logical functions of organisms are their particular contributions to ecosystem pro-
cesses (e.g. nutrient cycling, primary productivity, energy flows). Contemporary 
functional ecologists ascribe functions to organisms in order to delineate their par-
ticular contribution to the realization and maintenance of those processes.
Second, contemporary functional ecology expands upon Elton’s focus on feed-
ing (or trophic) interactions between organisms, by also considering ecological 
functions acquired by organisms through non-trophic interactions with other organ-
isms. Those non-trophic interactions are ones in which organisms affect each oth-
er’s lives through other means than the direct provision of food (in the form of living 
or dead tissues). Important non-trophic ecological functions include those fulfilled 
by ecosystem engineers, i.e. organisms that create, modify and maintain habitats in 
ways that affect the lives of other organisms (e.g. beavers build dams and in so 
doing create habitats and make many resources available for numerous other organ-
isms) (Jones et al. 1994, 1997; Berke 2010). Non-trophic ecological functions also 
include those of pollinators and seed dispersers (see Blondel 2003, 227–228).
Those two significant expansions notwithstanding, it remains the case that eco-
logical function ascriptions as conceived in functional ecology do not involve claims 
about selective history. For instance, an ecologist’s saying that, by building a dam, 
a beaver fulfils the role of a pond provider with respect to the numerous organisms 
for which the pond is a favourable habitat does not entail the claim that beavers were 
selected for providing habitats to those organisms. Beavers build dams and create 
ponds for their own benefit and, as a by-product, provide habitats to numerous 
organisms.
An important research aim associated with functional ecology’s context-based 
understanding of function is that of studying the functional equivalence between 
phylogenetically-divergent organisms. Elton (1927, 65), for instance, remarked that 
the arctic fox, which subsists on guillemot eggs and seal remains left by polar bears, 
occupies essentially the same niche as the spotted hyæna in tropical Africa, which 
feeds upon ostrich eggs and zebra remains left by lions. Although they have evolved 
their traits in distinct selective contexts, arctic foxes and spotted hyæna occupy simi-
lar niches. Along similar lines, contemporary functional ecologists have identified 
functional equivalences, for instance, between ants, birds and rodents, which simi-
larly contribute to seed dispersal in some desert ecosystems, and between humming-
birds, bats and moths, which similarly contribute to the pollination of Lauraceae (a 
family of plants from the group of angiosperm that usually have the form of trees or 
shrubs) (see Blondel 2003, 226). The acknowledgement of functional equivalences 
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between phylogenetically-divergent organisms conflicts with the understanding of 
function conveyed by the selected effect theory, in that this theory would entail that 
two organisms can have similar ecological functions only to the extent that their 
traits have evolved in similar selective contexts.
14.3.2  The Explanatory Aim of Ecological Functions
A second important aspect of functional ecology’s understanding of functions that 
diverges from the selected effect theory concerns the explanatory aim attributed to 
the function concept. In functional ecology, as seen in the preceding section, the 
explanandum of ecological function ascriptions is ecosystem processes. The eco-
logical functions of organisms are their particular contributions to the ability of 
ecosystems to realize and maintain those processes. This contrasts with the explana-
dum of function ascriptions according to the selected effect theory. According to the 
selected effect theory, the explanandum of ecological function ascriptions is the 
presence of the biological items to which functions are ascribed within a system 
(typically an organism). For instance, according to the selected effect theory, saying 
that pumping blood is the function of the heart entails not only saying that pumping 
blood is the way in which hearts contribute to blood circulation in animals with 
circulatory systems. It also entails saying that animals with circulatory systems have 
hearts because hearts pump blood (i.e. that hearts are present within those organ-
isms because they pump blood). The selected effect functions of biological items 
explain the presence of those items because, by definition, those functions are the 
effects for which those items were preserved by natural selection.
To make plain that the explanadum of ecological function ascriptions in func-
tional ecology is not the presence of organisms within ecosystems, we must recall 
functional ecology’s three main modes of functional classification identified in the 
introduction. As seen in the introduction, functional ecologists use three main 
modes of functional classification: (1) guilds (groupings based on similar resource 
use), (2) functional response groups (groupings based on similar response to envi-
ronmental factors), and (3) functional effect groups (grouping based on similar roles 
in ecosystem functioning). As also seen in the introduction, the mode of functional 
classification that is concerned with functions of organisms within ecosystems is the 
third one (i.e. functional effect groups). However, the modes of functional classifica-
tion that are primarily involved in the theoretical frameworks used by functional 
ecologists to explain the presence of organisms within ecosystems are the two other 
ones (guilds and functional response groups). Those functional classifications are 
the ones primarily involved in theories developed for explaining the assembly of 
ecological communities and how communities respond to changes in environmental 
conditions (through changes in species composition). According to those theories 
(see Keddy 1992; Díaz et  al. 1999), the ability of some particular organisms to 
establish and maintain themselves in a given community depends, first, on their 
ability to tolerate the local environmental conditions, and, second, on their ability to 
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exploit the resources available in this community (which requires them to be able to 
successfully compete with other organisms also using those resources or to share 
those resources with them). The former ability depends upon the functional response 
group to which organisms belong, and the latter one depends upon their guild. The 
functional effect groups to which organisms belong play no significant role in 
explaining the assembly of ecological communities and their responses to environ-
mental changes.
To be sure, if some regular coincidence could be found between, on the one hand, 
guilds and functional response groups, and on the other hand, functional effects 
groups, then one could argue that an explanatory connection nevertheless exists 
between the ecological functions of organisms and their presence within ecosys-
tems. Functional ecologists, however, emphasize the frequent non-coincidence of 
those groupings (see e.g. Lavorel and Garnier 2002; Blondel 2003). For instance, 
birds can disperse some plants’ seeds in three different ways: (1) through catching 
seeds in their plumage and then accidentally dropping them elsewhere (epizooch-
ory), (2) through swallowing fruits and then regurgitating or defecating them else-
where (endozoochory), or (3) through caching dry fruit seeds for future use and then 
“forgetting” them (synzoochory). Birds that disperse some plants’ seeds in those 
three ways all belong to the same functional effect group. However, insofar as only 
the birds that disperse seeds in the two latter ways (endozoochory and synzoochory) 
use the seeds as resources, those birds and those that disperse seeds in the former 
way (epizoochory) do not belong to the same guild (see Blondel 2003, 227–228). 
Likewise, some varieties of dung beetles feed upon the non-digestive part of large 
herbivores’ green food. Those dung beetles do so in three different ways: (1) through 
dwelling inside the dung, (2) through burying pieces of the faeces from 0.5 to 1 
meter under the dung, and (3) through making a ball of dung, laying eggs within it 
and rolling it to a place where they can bury it. All dung beetles use the dung as a 
resource and therefore belong to the same guild. However, insofar as the different 
ways of using the resource lead to different decomposition processes, the three 
types of dung beetles do not belong to the same functional effect group (see Blondel 
2003, 228).
It may be objected that the functional effect groups to which organisms belong 
must at least partly explain their presence within ecosystems, given that organisms 
depend upon the achievement of ecosystem processes for their own existence, and, 
for this reason, depend, at least indirectly, upon the reliable fulfilment of their own 
functional contributions to those processes. By fulfilling their ecological functions, 
in other words, organisms must indirectly contribute to the realization and mainte-
nance of their own conditions for existence, such that they are indirect causes of 
their continued presence within the ecosystem (or at least of the continued presence 
of organisms of their functional effect group).
I think, however, that this kind of causal link between the fulfilment of their eco-
logical functions by organisms and their presence within ecosystems can, at best, be 
very weak. Strictly speaking, what organisms contribute to realizing, by fulfilling 
their ecological functions, is not the conditions necessary for their own presence 
within an ecosystem, or even for the presence of organisms from their functional 
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effect group. What they contribute to realizing is, more accurately, the conditions 
necessary for the presence of organisms from the guild or functional response group 
to which they belong. Abilities to exploit the conditions organisms contribute to 
realizing by fulfilling their ecological function are determined by membership in 
guilds and functional response groups, not by membership in functional effect 
groups. This is well illustrated by a phenomenon studied by ecologists as the “nega-
tive selection effect” (Jiang et al. 2008). The “negative selection effect” occurs when 
some ecological function stops being fulfilled as a result of the displacement of a 
species that fulfils this function (i.e. that belongs to a particular functional effect 
group) by another species that does not fulfil it (i.e. that does not belong to the same 
functional effect group). The reason why the latter species displaces the former one 
is that both species use the same resource (i.e. belong to the same guild) and the 
latter species is better at competing for this resource. Thus, suppose, that a species 
S fulfils the ecological function F within the ecosystem E, and that, by doing so, S 
contributes to the realization of environmental condition C and to the availability of 
resource R within E. S therefore belongs to the functional effect group f (which 
encompasses organisms that are able to fulfil F), and also belongs to the guild r and 
the functional response group c (which encompass, respectively, organisms that use 
resource R and that require environmental conditions C). Now, we can see more 
clearly that, by contributing to the realization of C and the availability of R, organ-
isms from S only weakly promote their own presence (or the presence of other spe-
cies from f) in E. What organisms from S promote by contributing to the realization 
of C and the availability of R is, in fact, the presence of any species from guild r and 
functional response group c. By doing so, therefore, organisms from S promote their 
own presence within E only provided that there is no other species SI that also 
belongs to c and r and that is more efficient than S in exploiting R. If such a species 
comes around, then the fulfilment of their ecological function by organisms from S 
will instead promote the presence of SI within the ecosystem, and consequently S’s 
own displacement by SI. And if SI does not belong to f and S was the only species 
that fulfiled F within E, then F will stop being fulfiled in E. Likewise, by contribut-
ing to the realization of C and the availability of R, organisms from S may promote 
the presence of other species from functional effect group f only to the extent that 
those other species belonging to f also belong to r and c. There, however, is no rea-
son to assume that, on a general basis, species that belong to f will also belong to r 
and c. The possibility of such a “negative selection effect,” I think, makes clear that 
the functional effect groups to which organisms belong have only limited relevance 
to the aim of explaining why they are present within ecosystems.
14.3.3  By-Products and the Notion of “Functioning as”
As indicated in Sect. 14.3.1, in functional ecology, ecological functions may be 
ascribed to organisms on the basis of traits that are evolutionary by-products rather 
than selected effects (on this point, see also Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 115; and 
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Odenbaugh 2010, 251). This observation points to a third important aspect of func-
tional ecology’s understanding of functions that does not align with the selected 
effect theory. This aspect can be highlighted by drawing the connection between 
functional ecology’s understanding of the function concept and Achinstein’s (1977, 
350–6) delineation of three distinct meanings of “function” in ordinary language: 
design, use and service functions. An entity’s design function consists in what this 
entity was designed or created to do (e.g. the function of a mouse trap is to catch 
mice); whereas an entity’s use function consists in what it is used for (e.g. this table 
is used for sitting), and an entity’s service function consists in what it serves as (e.g. 
a watch’s second hand serves as a dust sweeper). A table’s functioning as a seat or 
the second hand of a watch’s functioning as a dust sweeper do not entail that tables 
and second hands have been (intentionally) designed for those functions. This dis-
tinction between design functions on the one hand, and use and service functions on 
the other hand, is sometimes also expressed in terms of a contrast between the 
notion of being the function of (e.g. breathing is the function of the nose) and that of 
functioning as (e.g. the nose functions as an eyeglass support) (e.g. Boorse 1976, 
76; Bedau 1992, 787–789).
In light of this distinction, the selected effect theory of functions can be inter-
preted as concerned with design functions, that is, as concerned with specifying the 
function of some biological item (as is reflected in selected effect theorists’ typical 
association of function with design, see e.g. Wright 1973, 164–65; Millikan 1984, 
17). In contrast, functional ecology’s context-based functions can be conceived as 
concerned with use and service functions, that is, as concerned with specifying what 
an ecological item can functions as in relevant ecological contexts. For instance, 
rabbits that are preyed upon by foxes in an ecosystem function as primary consum-
ers within that ecosystem. In turn, foxes that prey upon those rabbits and exert some 
control on their population function as regulators of the rabbit population within 
that ecosystem. And likewise, beavers that build dams within an ecosystem and by 
doing so create habitats and make many resources available for numerous other 
organisms function as pond providers within that ecosystem. Similar to the cases of 
a table’s functioning as a seat and the watch’s second hand’s functioning as a dust 
sweeper, rabbits’ functioning as primary consumers, foxes’ functioning as regula-
tors of rabbit populations and beavers’ functioning as pond providers within an 
ecosystem do not entail claims that rabbits, foxes and beavers were (evolutionarily) 
designed for fulfilling those functions. Functional ecology thus seems to make use 
of an ordinary notion of function that is conceptually distinct from the one that the 
selected effect theory is meant to elucidate. It is not concerned with functions that 
organisms are (evolutionarily) designed to fulfil within ecosystems, but, with func-
tions that they (more fortuitously) fulfil as a result of being (context-dependently) 
involved in use and service interactions with other organisms.
Above, I maintained that functional ecology attributes to ecological communities 
a lower degree of part-whole integration than the one characteristically found in 
individual organisms (in line with Elton’s analogy between ecological communities 
and human societies). Interpreting ecological functions as use and service functions 
provides some illumination of this idea. A notable feature of individual organisms 
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seems to be their characteristic teleological integration (see Queller and Strassmann 
2009, 3144). The parts of organisms seem, in some biologically relevant sense, to 
be designed for fulfilling their functions within those organisms. In Achinstein’s 
terminology, the parts of organisms have design functions. For instance, hearts do 
not merely fulfil the role of pumping blood within organisms with circulatory sys-
tems, they are (evolutionarily) designed for doing so.
Insofar as functional ecology conceives the functions fulfilled by organisms 
within ecosystems as use and service functions (in contrast to design functions), 
then functional ecology does not attribute to ecosystems the kind of teleological 
integration commonly attributed to individual organisms. From the theoretical per-
spective of functional ecology, ecosystems are functionally organized in a much 
weaker way than paradigm individual organisms. They are functionally organized 
not in virtue of being superorganisms shaped by ecosystem-level selective pro-
cesses, but, more weakly, in virtue of being more or less self-maintaining networks 
of organisms involved in use and service interactions with each-other. Those use 
and service interactions collectively generate the ecosystem processes in relation to 
which functional ecologists ascribe functions to organisms. This view of ecosystem 
functional organization contrasts with that espoused by mid-Twentieth century 
ecologists who depicted ecosystems as tightly unified superorganisms shaped by 
community or ecosystem-level natural selection.
14.4  What Is an Ecological Function, Then?
In the previous section, I identified three aspects of functional ecology’s under-
standing of ecological functions that do not align with the selected effect theory of 
function:
 1. Functional ecology conceives ecological functions as context-based rather than 
history-based properties of organisms
 2. Functional ecology attributes to the ecological function concept the aim of 
explaining ecosystem processes rather than that of explaining the presence of 
organisms within ecosystems
 3. Functional ecology conceives the ecological functions of organisms as use and 
service functions rather than design functions
Those three aspects, I think, indicate that, contrary to what is often assumed (see 
Sect. 14.2), the ascription of ecological functions to organisms in functional ecol-
ogy does not hinge on claims that natural selection customarily operates at the level 
of ecosystems. Functional ecology’s understanding of the function concept diverges 
from “The Standard Line” on function according to which functions in biology 
must be understood as naturally selected effects.
Through highlighting the three aspects just mentioned, the above discussion rein-
forces the near consensus that has recently emerged among philosophers of biology 
and ecology, according to which the ecological function concept should be eluci-
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dated along the lines of non-selectionist alternatives to the selected effect theory of 
function (see Nunes-Neto et al. 2013).7 Philosophers who share this consensus have 
proposed accounts of ecological functions along the lines of Cummins’s (1975) 
causal role theory (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 114–115; Odenbaugh 2010, 251–
252; Gayon 2013, 76–77), or along those of Mossio et al. (2009) organizational 
theory of function (Nunes-Neto et  al. 2014). How do these accounts stand with 
respect to functional ecology’s use of the function concept?
In some significant respects, the causal role theory of function accords with 
functional ecology’s use of the function concept as characterized above. The causal 
role theory ascribes functions to the parts of biological entities in a way that is 
entirely independent of their selective history. Function ascriptions, in the causal 
role theory, serve to identify the particular contributions of the parts of a system to 
the activities or capacities of that system. This use of the function concept concords 
with functional ecology’s understanding of ecological functions as contributions of 
organisms to ecosystem processes (see Cooper et al. 2016, sec. 4). Moreover, in line 
with the above linkage of functional ecology’s understanding of functions with 
Achinstein’s notions of use and service functions (see Sect. 14.3.3), the causal role 
theory does not confer a privileged epistemic status to the notion of being the func-
tion of over that of functioning as (see Cummins 1975, 762; Craver 2001, 55). Thus, 
the causal role theory seems to better accord with functional ecology’s use of the 
function concept.
However, a significant limitation of the causal role theory in relation to func-
tional ecology, I think, is its ultimate relativization of functions to the epistemic 
interests of researchers. According to the causal role theory, parts of a system can be 
ascribed functions in relation to any capacity or activity of this system that research-
ers are interested in explaining, provided that the relation between this capacity or 
activity and the individual contributions of the system’s parts is complex enough.8 
As many critics of the causal role theory point out, one problem with this liberal 
take on functions is that it implausibly entails that functions can be ascribed to the 
parts of a system on account of their contributions to capacities that amount to dete-
riorations of those systems (e.g. that a function can be ascribed to a tumour on 
account of its contribution to the capacity of an organism to die from cancer, see 
Neander 1991, 181). Thus, on a causal role account, ecological functions could, for 
instance, be ascribed to organisms from an invasive species on account of their con-
tribution to the ecosystem’s capacity to collapse (the fragilization of ecosystems and 
their possible collapse resulting from the establishment of invasive species is indeed 
something that ecologists are interested in explaining). Such a degree of inclusive-
7 Dissenters from this consensus are Bouchard (2013) and Dussault and Bouchard (2017), who 
argue that ecological functions should be understood as contributions to ecosystem fitness (con-
ceived as ecosystem resilience). It should nonetheless be noted that Dussault and Bouchard do not 
advocate a selected effect account of ecological functions, but rather a forward-looking evolution-
ary account derived from Bigelow and Pargetter’s (1987) dispositional theory of function.
8 For more details on how causal role theorists substantiate this complexity requirement, see 
Cummins (1975, 764), Davies (2001, chap. 4), and Craver (2001, sec. 3.2).
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ness, I think, does not appropriately reflect the fact that functional ecologists tend to 
ascribe functions to organisms mainly in relation to capacities or activities of eco-
systems that contribute to those ecosystems’ ability to maintain themselves. Those 
processes include primary productivity, nutrient cycling, water uptake, storage of 
resources, etc. (see, enumerations of ecosystem processes in Walker 1992, 20; and 
Blondel 2003, 226). Thus, the common objection that the causal role theory is 
overly liberal also seems to apply in the case of ecological functions.
An organizational account of ecological functions would avoid this problem. The 
organizational theory defines the functions of the parts of a system as their contribu-
tion to the ability of the system to maintain its organization (see Mossio et al. 2009). 
Such a linkage between functions and the self-maintenance of systems excludes 
function ascriptions in relation to capacities that amount to deteriorations of sys-
tems (see Nunes-Neto et  al. 2014, 137–138). In this respect, the organizational 
theory of function seems to restrict function ascriptions in a way that is consistent 
with the use of the concept in functional ecology.
However, an important limitation of the organizational theory in relation to func-
tional ecology, I think, is that it shares with the selected effect theory the idea that 
function ascriptions in part explain the presence of function bearers within systems. 
According to the organizational theory, a biological item has a function within a 
system if, on the one hand, it contributes to the maintenance of the organization of 
this system, and if, on the other hand, it is in turn maintained by the organization of 
the system (Mossio et al. 2009, 16–20). Thus, according to the organizational the-
ory, the function bearing parts of a system indirectly contribute to (and therefore 
explain) their own presence within this system through contributing to that system’s 
maintenance. In this regard, the organizational theory is similar to the selected effect 
theory (though, in contrast to the selected effect theory, the organizational theory 
does not make it a requirement that natural selection be the process through which 
the function bearing parts of systems promote their own presence). The organiza-
tional theory therefore attributes to function ascriptions an explanatory aim that is 
foreign to functional ecology’s understanding of the concept. As seen in Sect. 
14.3.2, ecological functions as understood in functional ecology are not conceived 
as explanatory of the presence of organisms within ecosystems. The presence of 
organisms within ecosystems is explained by their belonging to some guilds and 
functional response groups, not by their belonging to some functional effect groups. 
Ecological function ascriptions and the grouping of organisms in functional effect 
groups serve to explain the realization and maintenance of ecosystem processes 
through delineating the particular contribution of organisms to those processes.
Hence, neither the causal role nor the organizational account of ecological func-
tions fully accord with functional ecology’s use of the function concept. The 
 observations made in this section, however, suggest that functional ecology requires 
an account of functions that combines aspects of those two accounts while eschew-
ing some of their other aspects. An elaboration of such an account must be deferred 
to future work.
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14.5  Conclusion
In the preceding sections, I criticised the common supposition that the ascription of 
ecological functions to organisms in functional ecology hinges on claims that natu-
ral selection customarily operates at the level of ecosystems. This supposition, I 
maintained, rests on the incorrect assumption that the function concept as under-
stood in functional ecology aligns with the selected effect theory of function advo-
cated by many philosophers of biology (sometimes deemed “The Standard Line” on 
functions). After exploring the implications of Wilson and Sober’s defence of mul-
tilevel selection for the prospects of defending a selected effect account of ecologi-
cal functions, I identified three main ways in which functional ecology’s 
understanding of the function concept diverges from the selected effect theory. 
Specifically, I argued (1) that functional ecology conceives ecological functions as 
context-based rather than history-based properties of organisms; (2) that it attributes 
to the ecological function concept the aim of explaining ecosystem processes rather 
than with that of explaining the presence of organisms within ecosystems; and (3) 
that it conceives the ecological functions of organisms as use and service functions 
rather than design functions. I then briefly discussed the recently proposed accounts 
of ecological functions along the lines of the causal role and organizational theories 
of function, and concluded that functional ecology requires an account of functions 
that selectively draws on those two accounts.
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Chapter 15
Integrating Ecology and Evolutionary 
Theory: A Game Changer for Biodiversity 
Conservation?
Silvia Di Marco
Abstract Currently, one of the central arguments in favour of biodiversity conser-
vation is that it is essential for the maintenance of ecosystem services, that is, the 
benefits that people receive from ecosystems. However, the relationship between 
ecosystem services and biodiversity is contested and needs clarification. The goal of 
this chapter is to spell out the interaction and reciprocal influences between conser-
vation science, evolutionary biology, and ecology, in order to understand whether a 
stronger integration of evolutionary and ecological studies might help clarify the 
interaction between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning as well as influence 
biodiversity conservation practices. To this end, the eco-evolutionary feedback the-
ory proposed by David Post and Eric Palkovacs is analysed, arguing that it helps 
operationalise niche construction theory and develop a more sophisticated under-
standing of the relationship between ecosystem functioning and biodiversity. 
Finally, it is proposed that by deepening the integration of ecological and evolution-
ary factors in our understanding of ecosystem functioning, the eco-evolutionary 
feedback theory is supportive of an “evolutionary-enlightened management” of bio-
diversity within the ecosystem services approach.
Keywords Ecosystem functions · Evolution · Niche construction · Ecosystem 
engineering · Conservation biology
15.1  Introduction
Currently, one of the central arguments in favour of biodiversity conservation is that 
it is essential for the maintenance of ecosystem services, that is, the benefits that 
people receive from ecosystems (MA 2003, 2005). However, as remarked by 
Georgina Mace and colleagues, although both biodiversity and ecosystem scientists 
implicitly acknowledge that biodiversity plays different roles at the different levels 
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of the ecosystem services hierarchy, their approach to biodiversity conservation 
remains fundamentally different. Conservation biologists typically struggle to 
develop an evidence base that supports the protection of biodiversity, in particular 
charismatic and endangered species, as a good endowed with cultural, scientific and 
even “intrinsic” value, while ecologists focus on the contribution provided by biodi-
versity, usually understood as functional diversity, to ecosystem processes and ser-
vices (Mace et al. 2012). Face to the challenges posed by the ecosystem services 
approach to biodiversity conservation, this mismatch amongst professionals is a 
reason of concern. Still, the growing interest amongst ecologists for the feedbacks 
between organisms and ecosystems promises to shed new light on the interactions 
between biodiversity, ecosystem processes and ecosystem services, and has the 
potential to influence biodiversity conservation planning.
In this regard, various authors stress the fact that since the introduction of the 
concept of ecosystem service in conservation policies, community and ecosystem 
ecologists have paid more and more attention to biodiversity, especially species and 
genes diversity, as a driver of ecosystem functioning (Naeem 2002; Loreau 2010). 
In particular, Michel Loreau has argued that if ecologists are to understand and 
model the effects of biodiversity on the functioning of ecosystems, they have to 
develop new theories to connect the dots that link the evolution of species traits at 
the individual level (evolutionary biology), the dynamics of species interactions 
(community ecology) and the overall functioning of ecosystems (ecosystem ecol-
ogy) (Loreau 2010). An endeavor whose difficulties cannot be understated, espe-
cially if one takes into account the “explanatory reversibility” of the concept of 
biodiversity in ecology,1 and the philosophical issues posed by both the notion of 
ecosystem function and the idea that organisms play a role in an ecosystem.2
Bracketing these questions, as well as the problems posed by the polysemy of 
‘biodiversity’,3 the present chapter aims to spell out the interaction and reciprocal 
influence between conservation science, evolutionary biology, and ecology, in order 
to understand whether a stronger integration of evolutionary and ecological studies 
might help clarify the relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning, 
and influence biodiversity conservation practices within the ecosystem services 
approach.
To this aim I will first describe the divide between what Mace et al. (2012) have 
called the “ecosystem services perspective” and the “conservation perspective” 
within the ecosystem services approach, and present Loreau’s view on the possible 
integration of ecological and evolutionary studies. Subsequently, I will analyse the 
eco-evolutionary feedback theory by Post and Palkovacs (2009), as an example of 
such integration. In particular, I will argue that this theory helps operationalise the 
evolutionary concept of niche construction (Laland et al. 1999; Odling-Smee et al. 
2003), and offers theoretical instruments to develop a more sophisticated under-
standing of the relationship between ecosystem functioning and biodiversity. 
1 See Huneman, Chap. 13, in this volume.
2 See Dussault, Chap. 14, in this volume.
3 See Toepfer, Chap. 16, and Meinard et al., Chap. 17, in this volume.
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Finally,4 I will argue that by deepening the integration of ecological and evolution-
ary factors in our understanding of ecosystem functioning, the eco-evolutionary 
feedback theory is supportive of an “evolutionary-enlightened management” 
(Ashley et al. 2003) of biodiversity within the ecosystem services approach.
15.2  On the Relationship Between Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services
Ecosystem services are the benefits that humans derive, directly or indirectly, from 
the ecosystems or, phrased differently, they are “the functions and processes of eco-
systems that benefit humans” (Costanza et al. 2017). They are classified into provi-
sioning services, such as food, clear water, timber, and fuel; regulating services, 
such as flood protection, pests control, and climate regulation; supporting services, 
corresponding to basic ecosystem processes such as primary production, soil forma-
tion, and nutrients cycle; and cultural services, corresponding to a range of cultural 
benefits  – e.g., aesthetic, recreational, or spiritual  – that people receive from 
ecosystems.
15.2.1  Ecosystem Services in Brief
The idea of ecosystem service is a socio-economic concept that dates back to 1977, 
when Science published the article “How much are Nature’s services worth?” by 
Walter Westman, but gained momentum in the academia only in 1997, with the 
publication of the book Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural 
Ecosystems (Daily 1997) and an article by Robert Costanza and colleagues on the 
value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital (Costanza et al. 1997). 
The goal of these publications was to make explicit the contribution of ecosystems 
to human well-being, and put an economic value on it (between 16 and 54 trillion 
USD per year at the time), in order to make transparent the trade-offs involved in 
any decision concerning the use of land and natural resources. This monetary 
approach stirred a fierce debate, which is still ongoing, but eventually the concept of 
ecosystem service met biodiversity conservation: first, in 2001, with the launch of 
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) by the United Nations Environment 
Programme, and later, in 2007, with The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
(TEEB) initiative promoted by the German Government and the European 
Commission. These programmes are focused, respectively, on the ecological and 
economic aspects of ecosystem services, and are based on a utilitarian view of bio-
diversity (biodiversity must be preserved as an ecosystem service in itself, or as a 
4 With an argument intersecting that expounded by Alessandro Minelli, Chap. 11, in this volume.
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component of the environment necessary for the maintenance of other ecosystem 
services), and on the implicit (and controversial) assumption that the protection of 
the ecosystem services leads to the protection of biodiversity (Mace et al. 2012).
15.2.2  Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity: Epistemological 
and Ethical Troubles
Biodiversity is considered a cultural service or an actual good (which might be mar-
ketable or not) when it provides non-material benefits to human beings. Wildlife, 
uncontaminated landscapes, totemic, charismatic and rare or endangered species 
have a particular appeal to human beings, because they respond to aesthetic, spiri-
tual, religious, educational and recreational values. In these cases, people value the 
diversity of life as such—or some specific actualization of that diversity, as for 
instance charismatic species—and not some product or purported effect of biodiver-
sity (e.g., variety of food or possibility to discover new drugs).5 For all the other 
services, the relationship between biodiversity and human benefits is all but clear 
and needs to be examined on a case by case basis (Harrison et al. 2014). As a general 
rule, there is stronger evidence for the effects of biodiversity on ecosystems stability 
than on ecosystem services (Cardinale et al. 2012; Srivastava and Vellend 2005), 
and although it is generally agreed that biodiversity plays an insurance role, by 
potentially buffering ecosystems against environmental changes (Cottingham et al. 
2001; Hooper et al. 2005; Loreau 2010a), data reviews and meta-analysis on the 
threefold relationship between biodiversity, ecosystem functioning, and ecosystem 
services are hampered by the lack of unified definitions and measures of biodiver-
sity, and by the complexity and multi-faceted nature of each of the factors of the 
equation (Cardinale et al. 2012; Mace et al. 2012). Also, in many cases it is difficult 
to establish if the biodiversity effect is due to diversity as such (e.g., at the level of 
species, genes, or traits) or to other factors such as composition or biomass.
As mentioned above, within the ecosystem services approach, ecosystem ser-
vices and biodiversity are often used as synonyms, thus implying that they are the 
same thing and that, by protecting one, we are automatically protecting the other 
(Costanza et al. 2017; TEEB 2010). On the contrary, within the conservationist per-
spective, biodiversity is an ecosystem service or a good per se, and as such it does 
not necessarily contribute to other ecosystem services and is potentially in conflict 
with them. Both positions have pitfalls. For what concerns the conservationist per-
spective, the main problem is that it is blind to the functional role of biodiversity, 
and often focuses on charismatic or endangered species. In so doing it loses sight of 
the greater variety of units, levels and scales at which biodiversity occurs, and per-
petuates a static vision of life both at the species and ecosystem level. On the con-
trary, within the ecosystem services perspective, the functional role of biodiversity 
5 But for a problematisation of the relationship between biodiversity and cultural services see, for 
instance, Sarkar 2005, Cardinale et al. 2012.
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is acknowledged, but in practice ecologists account for its contribution to the eco-
system almost exclusively in terms of simple trophic structures and the related 
stocks and flows of energy, nutrients and biomass. This poses epistemological prob-
lems related to the different aims, conceptual frameworks, and methodologies 
adopted in different scientific disciplines, where such problems call for theoretical 
and empirical solutions. Also, values of biodiversity other than its contribution to 
ecosystem functioning are not taken into account, thus posing an ethical problem 
(Mace et al. 2012).
The ethical criticism is the one most often leveraged against the ecosystem ser-
vices approach (Reyers et al. 2012), and can be framed within a number of related 
debates: the controversy on the monetary nature of the concept of ecosystem service 
(e.g., McCauley 2006; Redford and Adams 2009); the debate about the instrumental 
versus intrinsic value of biodiversity (e.g., Norton 1986; Sarkar 2005; Maquire and 
Justus 2008; Justus et al. 2009); or the opposition between ecocentrism and anthro-
pocentrism in environmental ethics (e.g., Singer 1975; Thompson and Barton 1994; 
Naess 1973). In this chapter, I let aside the ethical issues and focus on the epistemo-
logical problems instead, trying to understand whether a stronger integration 
between ecology and evolutionary theory might make a difference in conservation 
planning within the ecosystem services approach.
15.2.3  Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity: An Ecologist’s 
Perspective
For those who embrace the conservation perspective, there is a potential opposition 
between biodiversity and ecosystem services, and some authors see the ecosystem 
services approach as an unwarranted thwarting of the original mission of conserva-
tion, namely, the protection of biodiversity or, more generally, nature, for its own 
sake (e.g., McCauley 2006; Redford and Adams 2009). From this perspective, the 
ecosystem services approach is detrimental to biodiversity conservation. However, 
if one tackles this criticism from an epistemological point of view, letting aside the 
controversy concerning the value of biodiversity, it becomes apparent that the 
endorsement of the concept of ecological service in many conservation policies has 
produced at least one major benefit for biodiversity science in that it has given spe-
cial impulse to the study of the effects of biodiversity on ecosystem functioning in 
experimental and theoretical ecology (Loreau 2010). According to Loreau, this had 
relevant consequences for ecology both at the epistemological and disciplinary 
level. At the epistemological level, it has revived and reshaped the diversity-stability 
debate—that has run through ecosystem ecology since the 1950s (e.g., MacArthur 
1955; May 1973; Pimm 1984)6—, and has given momentum to the study of the 
respective roles of individual-level and ecosystem-level selection in shaping ecosys-
6 See Huneman, Chap. 13, in this volume, for a discussion of the notions of diversity used in the 
formulation and test of the stability hypothesis (biodiversity as an explanans).
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tem properties—a controversial issue in both ecology and evolutionary biology (see 
Williams and Lenton 2007; Loreau 2010b). More importantly, it has changed the 
way ecosystem and community ecologists approach the study of biodiversity, giving 
prominence to the idea that biodiversity, especially species and genes diversity, is a 
driver of ecosystem functioning (Naeem 2002; Loreau 2010), and populations can-
not be studied as homogeneous biomass pools in which individuals operate in iden-
tical ways to influence the nutrient and energy flows amongst the ecosystem 
compartments (Bassar et al. 2010).
At the disciplinary level, the need to better understand the effects of biodiversity 
on ecosystem functions at different spatial and temporal scales has made more evi-
dent and urgent the importance of integrating community ecology, ecosystem ecol-
ogy and evolutionary biology (Loreau 2010, b).7 Indeed, the development of the 
ecosystem services approach in environmental protection and biodiversity conser-
vation has not only turned the study of the relationship between biodiversity and 
ecosystems into a pressing scientific matter, imposing a research agenda on ecolo-
gists (i.e., to understand the role and relevance of biodiversity for the delivery of 
ecosystem services). It has also implicitly indicated the scientific hypothesis to be 
tested, namely that biodiversity is necessary for ecosystem processes and that the 
loss of biodiversity hampers the functioning of ecosystems in the short and/or long 
term, thus affecting the provision of ecosystem services.
To answer the practical questions raised by the ecosystem services approach it is 
necessary to understand how ecosystems function and predict how they might 
change under a variety of environmental and anthropic pressures, such as climate 
change, habitat loss and degradation, overharvesting and diffusion of invasive exotic 
species. All these factors affect biodiversity as much as ecosystems as a whole. 
Loreau agrees with Mace and colleagues that current models of interaction between 
biodiversity and ecosystem functioning, based mostly on the modelling of evolu-
tionary complex food webs, have several limitations. He stresses that important 
insights might come from theories such as ecosystem engineering (Jones et al. 1994, 
1997; Wright and Jones 2006) and niche construction (Laland et al. 1999; Odling- 
Smee et al. 2003), which try to account for the ability of organisms to transform 
their habitat with relevant consequences both at the ecological and evolutionary 
level. In the last decade, there has been a surge of interest for eco-evolutionary theo-
ries (Whitham et al. 2006; Fussman et al. 2007), particularly in theoretical ecology 
(Kokko and Lopez-Sepulcre 2007). In what follows I present and discuss David 
Post and Eric Palkovacs’ eco-evolutionary feedback (EEFB) theory, because it is an 
interesting example of ecological re-elaboration and clarification of the niche con-
struction theory (henceforth NCT) originally formulated by Kevin Laland and John 
Odling-Smee, and also because Post and Palkovacs suggest that an integration of 
ecological and evolutionary theories would have relevant consequences not only for 
our understanding of ecosystem functioning, but also for biodiversity 
conservation.
7 But see Huneman, Chap. 13, in this volume, for a criticism of this endeavour.
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15.3  Eco-Evolutionary Feedback Theory
An eco-evolutionary feedback is “the cyclical interaction between ecology and evo-
lution such that changes in ecological interactions drive evolutionary change in 
organismal traits that, in turn, alter the form of ecological interactions, and so forth” 
(Post and Palkovacs 2009). This description of the reciprocal causation between 
ecological and evolutionary change clarifies the ecological relevance of NCT by 
making a clear distinction between the process of niche construction, defined as 
“the effect of an organism on its environment” (Post and Palkovacs 2009), and the 
evolutionary feedbacks that occur in response to the environmental changes caused 
by organisms. Niche construction sensu stricto (Post and Palkovacs 2009) includes 
both active engineering and the effects caused by the by-products of biological pro-
cess, while the evolutionary feedback can be the result of heritable traits change or 
phenotypic plasticity. By explicitly separating the general process of EEFB into two 
sub-processes (niche construction + evolutionary feedback), EEFB theory makes 
clear that not all the biotic processes that shape the environment can cause subse-
quent evolution, because many factors can prevent the evolutionary feedback. 
However, when the feedback occurs, it has important consequences at both the evo-
lutionary and ecological level, because it can affect the direction of evolution and 
alter the role of species in the ecosystem. It also highlights that both processes, even 
when they do not occur together, have important ecological and evolutionary conse-
quences, hence deserving in-depth study. Finally, unlike NCT, at least in its initial 
version, EEFB allows for cases in which the recipient population of the modified 
selective pressure can be different from the population that produced the environ-
mental transformation in the first place (see Odling-Smee et al. 2013; Barker and 
Odling-Smee 2014).
For an EEFB to occur, three conditions need be satisfied: (1) organisms must 
have a phenotype that strongly impacts the environment, i.e., they must structure or 
construct their niche (e.g., nutrients cycling and translocation, habitat construction 
and modification, consumption)8; (2) the changes produced in the environment must 
cause selection on a population and that this population has sufficient genetic capac-
ity to evolve in response to changes in the environment; (3) the time-scales of the 
ecological and evolutionary responses have to be congruent, i.e., the constructed 
niche must persist for a duration that is sufficient to select the relevant traits (this 
corresponds to the concept of ecological inheritance in NCT).
For what concerns (2) it should be noticed that, as in adaptive evolution more 
generally, the evolutionary factors that determine whether a population will evolve 
or go extinct are a combination of genetic factors (e.g., high levels of genetic varia-
tion are expected to favour evolutionary change); demographic factors (e.g., 
8 Potentially, all organisms are niche constructors, because all organisms interact with the environ-
ment. However, as it will be explained below, a key factor for the identification of meaningful cases 
of niche construction in the EEFB theory is the strength (magnitude and/or extent) of the interac-
tion between an organism and the environment (which includes other organisms), and the spatial 
and temporal scale of the effects of such interaction.
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 population size and genetic drift); and ecological factors (e.g., the rate of deforesta-
tion or the introduction of a toxic compound).
For what concerns (3), what counts as a sufficient duration will depend on the 
niche, as well as on the species and traits under consideration. In any case, there 
must be an overlap of ecological and evolutionary time: the constructed niche must 
persist long enough to produce evolutionary effects, and evolution must be fast 
enough to feed back on the constructed niche and further influence it. Since what 
matters is the congruence between ecological and evolutionary time, in principle 
evolution does not need to be rapid for EEFB to emerge. Slow niche construction, 
such as the oxygenation of earth’s atmosphere by cyanobacteria, can create eco- 
evolutionary feedbacks as much as rapid evolution associated with rapid niche con-
struction. However, the study of EEFB associated with rapid evolution has the 
advantage of being more easily amenable to empirical tests, and is more likely to be 
relevant in terms of biodiversity protection and ecosystem services conservation 
practices.
15.3.1  EEFB and Contemporary Evolution: Three Empirical 
Cases
The existence of rapid contemporary evolution, i.e., the evolution of heritable traits 
over a few generations (Stockwell et al. 2003; Jones et al. 2009),9 is neither particu-
larly controversial in ecology nor in evolutionary biology. What is controversial is 
the overall ecological and evolutionary relevance (prevalence and magnitude) of 
this phenomenon. As a matter of fact, in spite of the accumulation of studies that in 
the course of the last 40 years have shown that a strict distinction between ecologi-
cal and evolutionary time is unwarranted, ecologists still tend to ignore potential 
effects of evolution on ecological interactions, because they assume that evolution 
occurs on a much slower time scale than ecological dynamics (Bassar et al. 2010). 
On the other hand, evolutionary biologists tend to ignore the action of organisms on 
their environment, because it is considered too weak and flimsy to significantly 
change selection pressures (Laland and Sterelny 2006). Eco-evolutionary theories 
challenge these entrenched views. In fact, there is growing evidence that contempo-
rary evolution is a widespread phenomenon—which concerns many traits and many 
organisms from all kingdoms—and the evidence for potential cases of eco- 
evolutionary feedbacks is growing. Here I summarise three of the five empirical 
cases reviewed by Post and Palkovacs (2009): alewives’ speciation caused by pat-
terns of migration, its influence on zooplankton communities, and the subsequent 
evolution of foraging traits; the effect of the life histories of Trinidad guppies on 
9 Rapid evolution, contemporary evolution and microevolution are sometimes used as synonyms, 
and definitions vary (e.g., Thompson 1998, Kinnison and Hairston 2007, Ashley et al. 2003). Here 
I follow Post and Palkovacs 2009 and use contemporary evolution to refer to the overlap of eco-
logical and evolutionary times, irrespectively of the actual duration of the process.
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nutrient cycling and its potential feedback on male guppies’ phenotype; the soil- 
mediated impact of Populus leaf tannins levels on the development of adapted roots.
15.3.1.1  Alewives and Zooplankton
Along North America East coast, the ecological isolation of lakes from the ocean 
has led to the phenotypic differentiation of alewife (Alosa pseudoharengus) land-
locked populations that differ from the original anadromous population in feeding 
morphology and prey selectivity. Anadromous fishes migrate up rivers from the 
ocean to spawn and then go back to the open sea. In this case, the alewives only 
temporarily affect the community structure of lacustrine zooplankton (niche con-
struction via predation, Post and Palkovacs 2009) before they go back to the ocean, 
thus the duration of the constructed niche is not long enough to cause an eco- 
evolutionary feedback. On the contrary, in the landlocked populations, intense year- 
round predation pressure eliminates large-bodied preys and produces a lacustrine 
zooplankton community of relatively low biomass of small-bodied zooplankton 
throughout the year (persistent constructed niche). This exerts a strong selection for 
traits related to foraging on small zooplankton, so that the landlocked population 
has developed smaller mouth gape and narrower spacing between gill rakes com-
pared to the ancestral anadromous population (evolutionary feedback). In this case 
there is strong evidence for a complete EEFB.
15.3.1.2  Trinidad Guppies and Nutrients Cycling
Observations in the wild have shown that the life-histories (age and size at maturity) 
of Trinidad guppies (Poecilia reticulata) are affected by predation pressure. In high- 
predation environments, guppies reach maturity at an earlier age and smaller size, 
and they reproduce more frequently giving birth to smaller offsprings, with impor-
tant effects for the population phenotype. Mesocosm experiments have shown that 
under conditions of equal biomass, populations characterised by a high number of 
small individuals (high-predation environment) drive higher nutrients flows com-
pared to populations with fewer larger individuals (low-predation environment), 
thus increasing the rates of primary production, i.e., algal biomass (constructed 
niche). This, in turn, might influence further differentiation amongst guppies’ popu-
lations, for instance, by influencing traits such as male colour patterns, which are 
under natural and sexual selection, and are sensitive to the levels of algae-derived 
carotenoids in the environment (potential eco-evolutionary feedback).
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15.3.1.3  Populus and Soil Nutrients Levels
Poplar trees are foundation species whose chemical effects on leaf litter strongly 
influence community dynamics and ecosystem processes. Observational studies 
have shown that intraspecific variation in condensed tannin levels in poplar trees’ 
leaves controls decomposition and nitrogen mineralisation rates, as well as the com-
position of the microbial community in the soil, thus creating a microhabitat (con-
structed niche). Since high concentrations of tannins inhibit nutrients release from 
leaves litter, poplar trees with high tannin levels will have to cope with low nutrients 
levels. According to EEFB theory, these trees should display some form of adapta-
tion. Indeed, a strong positive correlation between leaf tannin levels and the devel-
opment of finer roots has been observed, thus providing indirect evidence for 
eco-evolutionary feedback. However, ecological factors such as the presence of 
other plant species, herbivores and nutrients loading might disrupt or reduce the 
strength of the feedback by altering the ecology of the soil.
It is worth noticing that it is not always clear whether contemporary evolution is 
due to heritable traits or phenotypic plasticity. However, as remarked by Palkovacs 
et al. (2012), although such distinction is fundamental to our understanding of evo-
lutionary and ecological processes, in the context of conservation biology it might 
be more important, and urgent, to link phenotypic change and ecosystem dynamics, 
regardless of the specific causes of change. Also, considering that plasticity itself is 
a hereditary trait that evolves and can direct future phenotypic change, it is not 
always useful to draw a thick line between plasticity and genetic change in terms of 
potential ecological causes and effects (Ghalambor et  al. 2007; Palkovacs et  al. 
2012).10 What is most relevant here is to highlight that the species more likely 
involved in EEFB are also the most relevant in terms of ecosystem functioning, 
because they strongly affect the community and the ecosystem where they live. 
They can be keystone, foundation, or dominant species, ecosystem engineers, or 
species that alter nutrient cycles through translocation or recycling.
15.3.2  EEFB, Niche Construction, and Ecosystem 
Engineering
What all these organisms have in common is that they are strong interactors.11 To be 
a strong interactor, however, often depends on the ecological context: foundation 
species in one habitat might be rare in another, weak interactors in species-rich 
communities might have strong effects in species-poor communities, and species 
that move nutrients will have very different impacts in low- compared to high- 
nutrient environments (Post and Palcovaks 2009; Paine 1966; Menge et al. 1994). 
10 See also Minelli, Chap. 11, in this volume.
11 For a detailed discussion of the differences between strong interactors, in particular between 
keystone species and ecosystem engineers see Boogert et al. 2006.
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Thus, the ability of a species to construct a persistent niche often depends on the 
overall conditions of the ecosystem and the community, which means that it can 
vary in space and time. In turn, the eco-evolutionary feedback, with its potential to 
alter and respond to environmental selective pressure, can lead to the differentiation 
of a population whose ecological role is different from that of the original popula-
tion, thus affecting community and ecosystem dynamics. Indeed, there might be 
instances in which the change of the traits of a species is at least as important as its 
presence/absence in terms of ecological effects. In the case of the alewives from 
North American coastal lakes, for example, there is evidence that the differentiation 
of the landlocked population has influenced the evolution of one of its preys, 
Daphnia ambigua, and this is likely to cause further effects on trophic cascades, 
because Daphnia is itself a strong interactor (a dominant grazer for zooplankton) 
(Palkovacs et al. 2012).
A main feature of EEFB theory is that it highlights the fact that organisms 
actively build their environment and that species, species traits, and species ecologi-
cal impacts are dynamic and vary across space and time. A consequence of this is 
that within the research framework set by eco-evolutionary theories, the functional 
role of biodiversity in an ecosystem cannot be understood simply in terms of more 
or less complex trophic webs. This simplifying idealisation has been at the core of 
the success of ecosystem ecology in the study of terrestrial global biogeochemistry, 
but it has been increasingly called into question by ecologists themselves at least 
since the 1990s (Loreau 2010). In particular, the concept of ecosystem engineering 
introduced by Clive Jones and colleagues (Jones et al. 1994, 1997; Wright and Jones 
2006), often considered the ecological counterpart of Laland and Odling-Smee’s 
NCT, has shown that connectance webs that describe the processes driven by eco-
system engineers should be studied along with trophic webs, if we are to accurately 
model the interactions between communities and ecosystems. Importantly, these 
studies have shown that the laws of conservation of mass and energy, as well as the 
stoichiometry rules used to model trophic webs, cannot be used to predict the struc-
ture and outputs of ecosystem engineering networks, for which specific qualitative 
and quantitative models have been proposed (Jones et al. 1997; Boogert et al. 2006).
Ecosystem engineers are “organisms that directly or indirectly modulate the avail-
ability of resources (other than themselves) to other species, by causing physical 
state changes in biotic and abiotic materials. In so doing they modify, maintain and/
or create habitats” (Jones et al. 1994). Within EEFB theory, they are seen as strong 
candidates for eco-evolutionary feedbacks, together with keystone species (species, 
usually predators, whose impact on their community or ecosystem is much larger 
than would be expected from their abundance), dominant species (species that out-
number their competitors in abundance or total biomass), and foundation species 
(species that strongly influence the structure of the community, e.g., by creating habi-
tats). Accordingly, studying ecosystems from an EEFB theory perspective implies to 
parse strong ecological interactors according to a range of qualitative and quantita-
tive models, e.g., strong per capita interactions that produce effects in the short term 
vs. weak but continuous per capita interactions that produce cumulative effects in the 
long term. Trophic webs, then, are but one of the interaction networks that compose 
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the overall connectivity of the ecosystem. The other crucial ecological relationships 
that need attention are the non-trophic interaction webs described by ecosystem engi-
neering theory, and the environmentally-mediated gene-associations (EMGAs) theo-
rised by Odling-Smee and colleagues (Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 2013; Barker and 
Odling-Smee 2014), in a development of the original NCT, prompted by the insights 
provided by ecosystem engineering and eco-evolutionary theories.
15.3.3  EEFB and Environmentally-Mediated 
Gene-Associations
EMGAs are “indirect but specific connections between distinct genotypes mediated 
either by biotic or abiotic environmental components in the external environment 
[…]. They map sources of selection stemming from one population’s genes onto 
genotypes in another population that evolve in response to those modified sources” 
(Odling-Smee et al. 2013). These indirect evolutionary interactions mediated by the 
environment emerge when the niche constructed by a population—via its physio-
logical processes as well as active engineering—influences the selective pressure 
acting on the same population or, more often, on a different population of different 
species. For example, in the case of Trinidad guppies, predators, through differential 
predation pressure, can influence guppy populations’ life histories, leading to the 
differentiations of populations of larger or smaller guppies, characterised by differ-
ent rates of excretion that determine differential inorganic nutrients distribution. 
This, in turn, affects algal growth, which has the potential to feed back on the selec-
tion of male guppy colour patterns through the concentration of carotenoids released 
by algae in the environment.
The idea of EMGAs helps formalise the causal chain of EEFB in genetic terms, 
and can be used to visualise the ramifications of evolutionary and ecological effects 
deriving from niche construction via biotic or abiotic mediations. In its original 
form, it gives epistemic priority to the genetic component within the EEFB’s causal 
chain, but in those cases in which the niche construction is underpinned by non- 
heritable variation, environmentally-mediated genotypic-associations are replaced 
by environmentally-mediated phenotypic-associations (EMPAs), thus emphasising 
that the phenotype should not be thought of as the mere epiphenomenon of genetic 
information, but as the dynamic result of the combination of heritable variation with 
a number of non-heritable factors, such as plasticity, epigenetics and population 
structure (Odling-Smee et al. 2013).
It follows that, in order to respond to the requirements of EEFB theory, the study 
of ecosystem processes and functioning should be articulated along two inter- 
related axes, which force ecosystem ecology to revise its operational simplifying 
idealisations. On the one hand, the study of the sub-process of niche construction 
requires the development of ecosystem models that account for high degrees of con-
nectance at the different scales of the ecosystem, integrating trophic and  competitive 
webs with more complex interaction webs, as well as EMGAs or EMPAs; on the 
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other hand, the study of the sub-process of evolutionary feedbacks needs to be car-
ried out taking into account both genetic and non-heritable phenotypic variation, 
because both can be sources of functional evolution and adaptation. Accordingly, 
functional diversity must be understood as a dynamic epiphenomenon that can 
potentially emerge from both genetic and non-genetic factors that need to be studied 
on a case by case basis.
All in all, what emerges from EEFB theory is a highly dynamic picture of eco-
systems, populations and communities, in which the structure of biodiversity—used 
here as a shorthand for diversity at the level of species, genes, traits, communities, 
etc.—can vary more easily than both ecologists and evolutionary biologists are 
prone to believe, and where the causal chain of change does not go exclusively from 
the environment to the organism (ecological change as a cause of trait change), but 
can go from the organism to the environment (trait change as a cause of ecological 
change). In the next section, I explore the potential consequences of this shift of 
perspective for conservation biology.
15.4  Eco-Evolutionary Feedback Theory: Some 
Consequences for Biodiversity Conservation
The study of EEFB pushes ecologists to recognise that contemporary evolution cre-
ates phenotypic differences that can alter the role of a species in a community or 
ecosystem at ecological time-scales. This implies that evolution can no longer be 
considered mere background noise in the study of ecosystem dynamics, and extant 
and potential novel biodiversity become a fundamental component of the study of 
ecosystem dynamics. For Post and Palkovacs: “the study of eco-evolutionary feed-
backs focuses attention on the bidirectional interactions that unify ecology and evo-
lution, and highlights the importance of conserving both ecological and evolutionary 
diversity in nature” (Post and Palkovacs 2009). But how, exactly, could EEFB the-
ory guide biodiversity conservation? As referred to in Sect. 15.1, a criticism lever-
aged by conservation biologists to ecologists within the ecosystem services approach 
is that they account for biodiversity’s contribution to ecosystem functions almost 
exclusively in terms of simple trophic structures (Mace et al. 2012). What kind of 
instruments does EEFB theory offer to tackle this issue?
15.4.1  Ecosystem Engineers First?
Considering that EEFB theory has many points in common with the ecosystem 
engineering theory, some important insights about the impact of eco-evolutionary 
theories on biodiversity conservation can be found in Crain and Bertness 2006 and 
in Boogert et al. 2006. For these authors, ecosystem engineers should be the primary 
targets of biodiversity conservation policies, because they shape habitats and 
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ecosystems, with all their related species and functions. Since ecosystem engineers 
are responsible for a much higher and more complex level of inter-species con-
nectance than the trophic webs generated by other organisms, the loss of ecosystem 
engineers is more likely to have far reaching negative consequences on both com-
munities and whole ecosystems (Crain and Bertness 2006. See also Jones et  al. 
1997; Wright and Jones 2006). Although species that are ecosystem engineers under 
certain circumstances may not be so under others, it is possible to identify funda-
mental engineering roles in ecosystems, independently of the specific species 
involved. Accordingly, to grant stability to ecosystem structure and functioning, 
conservation policies should focus on protecting the activity of key engineers, rather 
than the species composition of an ecosystem (Boogert et al. 2006; see also Odling-
Smee et  al. 2003). This is a classical argument in favour of the preservation of 
functional diversity rather than species diversity, and is usually criticised for being 
too narrow a criterion for selecting the aspects of biodiversity worth protection 
(Mace et al. 2012). To preserve ecosystem functioning, in fact, we do not need to 
protect all the species that perform a given function and their genetic variability. For 
instance, we do not need to protect all the species of trees in a forest, and their intra-
specific variation, to ensure biomass production, oxygen emission, and CO2 seques-
tration. From this perspective, the most efficient course of action would be to select 
the species that better perform the function of interest, and focus our conservation 
efforts on them. This approach is likely to leave aside rare species, which represent 
a primary target for conservation biology, because their functional role on an eco-
system is often negligible. In this respect, not only do aspects of biodiversity not 
related to ecological functions become irrelevant, but the replacement of ecosystem 
engineering species using artificial solutions becomes an acceptable option (e.g., 
replacing of caterpillars by artificially created leaf ties, see Lill and Marquis 2003). 
Here, at least in principle, the choice to favour technological solutions over biodi-
versity conservation will be constrained by considerations of efficacy and cost-
effectiveness (Boogert et al. 2006), rather than by an a priori obligation to avoid 
species extinction, or a precautionary approach whereby a species (or a genome) 
that has no particular functional import under the present conditions might become 
relevant under different conditions, because of ecological changes or because our 
knowledge of the benefits we obtain from that particular species/genome changes 
(see Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008; Sarkar 2005). Thus, although there are compel-
ling reasons for choosing ecosystem engineers as targets of biodiversity conserva-
tion, this choice must be further qualified and refined.
15.4.2  Genetic Diversity: Better Safe than Sorry
Niche construction (of which ecosystem engineering is just one possible case) is 
only one half of the EEFB process. The other is evolutionary feedback. To the extent 
that evolutionary feedbacks have the potential to produce relevant ecological effects, 
they should be taken into account in conservation policies aimed at preserving eco-
system functions. Since one of the conditions for EEFB is that the population(s) 
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affected by the constructed niche must have sufficient genetic capacity to evolve in 
response to new selective pressures before going extinct, it follows that it is impor-
tant to preserve not only functional diversity, but also genetic diversity (that might 
include phenotypic plasticity), because this ensures that niche constructing species, 
or other species potentially affected by the constructed niche, will maintain their 
ability to respond to environmental modifications. In this respect, it should be noted 
that trait change per se is not a guarantee of ecosystem stability, because phenotypic 
variation can be both a driver of or a buffer against ecological change. In the empiri-
cal cases described in Sect. 15.3.1, in fact, the putative evolutionary feedback works 
clearly as a stabiliser of functions only in the case of poplar trees, while in the cases 
of the alewives and Trinidad guppies the evolutionary feedback potentially causes a 
cascade of changes in the community structures whose consequences in terms of 
ecosystem functions need further clarification. This only makes the need to improve 
our understanding of eco-evolutionary interactions more compelling, in order to be 
able to predict when they could buffer the ecosystem and when they would magnify 
potential functional disruptions. Sweeping generalisations are not warranted in this 
relatively recent domain of inquiry, but there is evidence that contemporary evolu-
tion is most common, although less evident, when it counteracts phenotypic changes 
caused by environmental pressure, thus buffering ecosystem functions (Ellner et al. 
2011; Palkovacs et al. 2012). Preserving the genetic diversity that feeds contempo-
rary evolution, then, seems a safe bet.
Without entering into the debate on what genetic diversity exactly is, how to mea-
sure it, and what to do to preserve it (see Mace and Purvis 2008 for a list of problems 
in this field), we can say that, by providing a clear and well-structured theoretical 
framework for the empirical study of the reciprocal interaction between evolutionary 
and ecological processes, EEFB theory offers decisive evidence for the necessity of 
keeping into account evolutionary dynamics in the study of ecosystem functioning. 
Accordingly, it provides arguments to support the importance of “evolutionary- 
enlightened management” in biodiversity conservation (Ashley et al. 2003). In fact, 
whether the eco-evolutionary feedbacks magnify ecological change or buffer against 
it, they must be taken into account if we are to preserve ecosystems functioning.
15.4.3  EEFB Theory and Evolutionary-Enlightened 
Management
For the proponents of evolutionary approaches to biodiversity protection, conserva-
tion policies are hampered by the misplaced idea that while human disturbance is 
very fast, adaptation is a very slow process, thus irrelevant to conservation planning, 
whose temporal horizon seldom exceeds a few decades (Mace and Purvis 2008). 
Typological thinking concerning both species and ecosystems is another hindrance 
to evolutionary-enlightened management, since it promotes the idea that evolution-
ary change has relevant consequences at an ecological and human time- scale only 
when it concerns organisms with short generation time (e.g., microorganisms). 
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Consequently, it is argued, its effects on the whole of biodiversity are negligible 
(Ashley et al. 2003; Santamaria and Mendez 2012). Mary Ashley and colleagues 
also remark that, although in conservation planning it is theoretically acknowledged 
that species respond to change both ecologically and evolutionarily, in practice the 
importance of evolutionary responses is often neglected. For instance, research 
models on potential impacts of rising temperature and CO2 concentrations generally 
make predictions concerning possible ecological adaptations based on the present 
ecologies of extant species, without taking into account evolutionary factors such as 
climate adaptation and the potential disruption to gene flow caused by climate 
change. Similarly, conservation approaches based on population viability analysis 
are based on models that assume that the life histories and demographic character-
istics of a species are fixed (Ashley et al. 2003). Still, as seen in the example of the 
Trinidad guppies, environmental factors can significantly affect life histories, with 
relevant consequences for the structure of a population. This can in turn produce 
changes in the environment, e.g. in the recycling of nutrients, creating the condi-
tions for further evolutionary feedbacks.
Rapid contemporary evolution is the main preoccupation of evolutionary-minded 
conservationists, not least because anthropic drivers of rapid evolution, such as hab-
itat loss and degradation, overharvesting, and the introduction of exotic species, are 
also the factors that have led to the current extinction crisis (Stockwell et al. 2003; 
Palkovacs et al. 2012). EEFB theory reinforces this preoccupation because it draws 
on the evidence that rapid contemporary evolution is a widespread phenomenon. At 
the same time, one of its theoretical tenets is that eco-evolutionary feedbacks can 
occur at any timescale, thus highlighting that just as evolutionary factors must be 
taken into account not only in the long, but also in the short term, ecological effects 
of evolutionary change might become salient over long timescales. This happens, 
for instance, when a newly evolved trait constructs a niche whose effects slowly 
accumulate over time, because it has little per capita impact or because external 
factors intervene to dissipate or swamp the niche. Thus, the effects of EEFB can be 
time-lagged (Odling-Smee et al. 2013), and this makes predictions more complex, 
thus more prone to error, but also more realistic.
The implementation of evolutionary-enlightened management for biodiversity 
conservation would imply the development of research programmes that incorporate 
evolution into applied ecology and resource management; the assessment of popula-
tions’ short-term evolutionary potential using direct measures of genetic variation 
rather than the proxy of neutral molecular variation; and the use of quantitative 
genetics to assess the genetic variability of traits that are likely to be under selective 
pressure in hypothetical scenarios (Ashley et al. 2003). Ecological and evolutionary 
interactions are extremely complex and it is very hard to create workable predicting 
models. EEFB theory per se does not provide a direct answer to this problem, but 
offers a theoretical framework that can favour the development of such models. Post 
and Palkovacs’ simple move of refining the NCT by splitting the EEFB into two well 
defined sub-processes allows to break down intricate eco-evolutionary pathways into 
more tractable components, which can be analysed at different spatial and temporal 
scales (from long-term whole-ecosystem observation to short-term, small-scale 
experiments). Subsequently, the general picture can be reconstructed by retracing the 
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network of interactions, their strength and their variation over time (see Odling-
Smee et al. 2013). As pointed out in Barker and Odling-Smee (2014), in order to be 
able to make predictions about the evolution of whole ecosystems and of their com-
ponents, we need to bring together theories that are general and realistic enough to 
afford a “local theoretical unification” with precise and realistic models that describe 
the details of particular complex systems, providing “explanatory concrete integra-
tion” (Mitchell 2002). Theories such as EEFB are good candidates for making this 
synthesis, because they favour the integration of ecosystem ecology, population 
ecology, and evolutionary biology, and their respective methodological frameworks. 
If EEFB theory proved successful, then, we would be able to overcome the problem 
of having too simplified an account of ecosystem functioning and it would be pos-
sible to clarify the role of functional diversity within ecosystem processes.
15.5  Conclusions
Since the late 1990s, the development of the concept of ecosystem service for con-
servation policies has given new momentum to the study of the effects of biodiver-
sity on ecosystem functioning in experimental and theoretical ecology, revitalising 
the traditional diversity-stability debate and fostering the development of ecosystem 
evolution theories.
EEFB theory emphasises the active role of organisms in shaping their environ-
ment and supports the idea that contemporary evolution is a common and wide-
spread phenomenon. This means that species, their traits, and their ecological 
impacts are dynamic and vary across space and time. As a consequence, the func-
tional contribution of biodiversity to ecosystem processes cannot be understood 
simply in terms of mass and energy conservation and stoichiometry rules for trophic 
webs, but must include, at least, the more elaborated connectance webs proposed by 
ecosystem engineering theory, and models of environmentally-mediated gene or 
phenotype associations proposed in recent developments of the NCT. Also, since 
contemporary evolution can be either a source of ecological change (potential dis-
ruption of ecosystem functions) or a buffer against change (preservation of ecosys-
tem functions), in order to make predictions on the evolution of ecosystems and 
their capacity to sustain ecosystem services, we need to better understand eco- 
evolutionary interactions from the population to the whole-ecosystem level. On the 
whole, EEFB theory provides a non-typological image of both species and ecosys-
tem, and challenges static visions in both ecology and evolutionary biology. On the 
one hand, it defies the idea that evolution is too slow to be relevant in the modelling 
of ecosystem processes; on the other hand, it undermines the idea that the action of 
organisms on their environment is too ephemeral to direct selective pressures. All in 
all, this calls for an evolutionary-enlightened management of biodiversity.
Ultimately, by emphasising the fact that organisms are active agents of ecologi-
cal and evolutionary change rather than passive objects of selection, EEFB theory 
causes a shift of perspective on the role of biodiversity in the transformation of 
ecosystems. In fact, if “organisms and their local environments [are] integrated sys-
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tems that evolve together” (Barker and Odling-Smee 2014), then species and genetic 
diversity are at least as important as functional diversity for the evolution and future 
functioning of an ecosystem. Now, to be able to make predictions about the poten-
tial evolution of ecosystems is a fundamental feature of the ecosystem services 
approach. By definition, what matters the most within the ecosystem services 
approach is to preserve functional ecosystems, so that humans can receive benefits 
from them. Accordingly, biodiversity is valued for what it can deliver in terms of 
ecological functions (with the sole exception of cultural services, where biodiver-
sity can be relevant for its existence value). But in a scenario of locally co-evolving 
organisms and ecosystems, functions can be preserved only if we can preserve the 
possibility of organismal change. This implies to protect species and genetic diver-
sity together with functional diversity. While the latter grants ecosystem functioning 
in the present, the former influences the ability of the ecosystem to continue to func-
tion under changing conditions, which can be generated in the long as well as the 
short term by the internal dynamics of eco-evolutionary change or by external eco-
logical pressures, often of anthropic origin. In ecosystem services parlance, this 
increases the insurance value of biodiversity. Importantly, the idea of evolving spe-
cies in evolving ecosystems defies static and typological thinking in ecosystem ser-
vices policies as much as in traditional biodiversity conservation, thus fostering 
dynamic approaches and long-term planning.
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Chapter 16
On the Impossibility and Dispensability  
of Defining ‘‘Biodiversity’’
Georg Toepfer
Abstract The impressive success of the concept ‘biodiversity’ in the last decades, 
in particular in the arena of politics, is in a large part due to its power to amalgamate 
facts and values: the fact that living beings show variety on every level of their exis-
tence, and the assumed values that are associated with this variety. These values are 
far from obvious or objective, they are rather normatively prescribed. They are 
already at work in the process of selecting the level of analysis, e.g. the level of 
genes, species, or ecosystems. The concept thus ties together many different dis-
courses from the fields of biology and bioethics, aesthetics and economy, law and 
global justice. One important consequence of the concept’s integrative power is the 
impossibility of its general definition. Just as ‘life’, ‘time’ or ‘world’ the word is an 
“absolute metaphor” or “non-concept” in the sense of Hans Blumenberg: it cannot 
have a fixed meaning just because it mediates between various contexts and disci-
plines. Any attempt to define ‘biodiversity’ in general terms is thus futile and does 
not capture the role it fulfills in contemporary discourse. Rather than trying to define 
the concept, reconstructing the interaction of its various contexts is a more promis-
ing approach. These include, besides the obvious reference to biology and nature 
conservation, ancient narratives about divine creation, paradise and Noah’s ark as 
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The complexity of the biodiversity concept does not only mirror 
the natural world it supposedly represents; it is that plus the 
complexity of human interactions with the natural world, the 
inextricable skein of our values and its value, of our inability to 
separate our concept of a thing from the thing itself. Don’t 
know what biodiversity is? You can’t.
David Takacs (1996, p. 341)
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well as political ideas of pluralism, egalitarianism and non-hierarchical representa-
tion of individuals, or the values of market economy. In order to understand the 
current success and discursive role of the concept, I will analyze some of the under-
lying ideas, especially with respect to the representation of biodiversity in images.
16.1  The Integrative Power of ‘Biodiversity’
In order to understand why ‘biodiversity’ has become such a successful term in the 
last decades it is necessary to look beyond biology to the broader socio-cultural and 
political contexts in which diversity became an important issue. From a merely 
biological point of view or from the standpoint of conservation biology it is not 
obvious that diversity should be more important than other abstract properties of 
biological systems such as stability, resilience or wilderness; or, to be more practi-
cal, the protection of one particularly endangered species or of an ecosystem. For 
the purpose of understanding why we now live in the “decade of biodiversity”, as 
declared by the United Nations in 2010, it is not enough to point at increased bio-
logical knowledge in the modern age or at the crisis of mass extinction. It is neces-
sary to focus on cultural and political values present in scientific issues—or at least 
in the public understanding of scientific issues.
The parallels between cultural and biological diversity are underlined by two 
conventions of the United Nations (Heyd 2010): The Rio “Convention on Biological 
Diversity” of 1992 explicitly calls for the protection and use of “biological resources 
in accordance with traditional cultural practices” (UNEP 1992). And the 2001 
UNESCO “Declaration on Cultural Diversity” claims that “[a]s a source of 
exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for human-
kind as biodiversity is for nature” (UNESCO 2001).
At least on a rhetorical level, ‘diversity’ functions as a versatile concept bringing 
together diverse fields. It can be linked to economic considerations: to plants and 
animals as entities providing “ecosystem services” regarding the supply of food, 
fibres or pharmaceuticals, or for the regulation of climate, water balance, etc. 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). At the same time, the term maintains its 
strong non-instrumental ethical dimension: it expresses a non-anthropocentric value 
of plants and animals. With this in mind the Holy Father, Pope Francis, in his 2015 
encyclical Laudato si’, referred to biodiversity and ascribed intrinsic value to non- 
human creatures (Pope Francis 2015, no. 118; 140). Finally, ‘biodiversity’ has the 
dignity of a scientific term, as it seems to refer to something objective and 
measurable.
‘Biodiversity’ obviously forms an efficient basis for the integration of 
heterogeneous discourses and their public communication. Yet, by putting many 
things together—ethics, religion, science, business and politics—the term has an 
 undifferentiating effect. On a political level this effect has also been welcomed 
because to be politically effective a term should not only describe a natural state of 
affairs but declare it as an important and good thing.
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The main strength of the term seems to be that it does not take sides in fundamental 
ideological dichotomies such as scientific/emotional, profane/sacred or utilitarian/
intrinsic value. It remains neutral and thus can be used in either position. And, 
surprisingly, considering its integrative power and ideological neutrality, ‘biodiver-
sity’ seems not to be abstract: It refers primarily to concrete individuals and spe-
cies – well-liked species for the most part, the so-called “charismatic megafauna” 
such as polar bears, lions and elephants. These tangible references make ‘biodiver-
sity’ a much more attractive concept, than, for example, ‘stability’, ‘ecosystem ser-
vices’ or ‘sustainability’. This suggestive concreteness is, of course, a huge 
advantage in the communication with the general public; it is a potent instrument 
for connecting nature and people (Díaz et al. 2015).
In addition to its integrative function and its concreteness, ‘biodiversity’ fits very 
well into our pluralistic present because the concept renounces an overarching, uni-
versally valid (world) order and expresses a de-hierarchization and pluralization of 
perspectives. It refers to the heterogeneous interests and intrinsic worth of every 
single individual. With respect to human and non-human living beings the concept 
of diversity is successful, because it conveys respect and responsibility, tolerance 
and pleasure of heterogeneity. Since the 1980s, ‘diversity’ has become a central 
concept in social emancipation movements. It emphasizes cultural difference and 
includes a critical reflection of one’s own cultural-relative standpoint. But, again, 
‘diversity’ functions by integration because it refers not only to current concerns but 
has also a deeply rooted historical dimension leading far back to the very first writ-
ten texts of mankind (see Sect. 16.3). The story of biodiversity has been so success-
ful because it is related to some deeply rooted ideals about the world, not least the 
idea of paradise: for one essential characteristic of the Garden of Eden is that it is 
full of plants and animals of different species coexisting in a joyful and peaceful 
manner.
Its ongoing scientific usage and at the same time latent connection to ancient 
cultural-religious ideas (such as paradise) makes ‘biodiversity’ a powerful concept 
for mediating between science and the broader public. It is a paradigmatic example 
of what has been called “post-normal science”, where “facts are uncertain, values in 
dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992, p. 138). 
This characterization applies particularly well to the status of ‘biodiversity’: First, 
the investigation of biodiversity has to cope with uncertainties on the factual as well 
as the axiological or ethical level. We simply do not know enough about the amount 
and function of biological diversity; we do not know, for example, whether there are 
currently three or 100 million species of animals on earth, and we do not know how 
they contribute to the stability of our ecosystems. Second, we do not know how we 
should evaluate biodiversity: instrumentally or intrinsically. Third, stakes are high 
because we are currently facing a loss of biological species probably on the level of 
one of the five mass extinction events in earth history. Finally, decisions are urgent 
because this is an irreversible loss and we do not know whether there will be a tip-
ping point when things get worse at an increased speed and scale.
Furthermore, biodiversity studies are paradigmatic for post-normal science because 
they examine a field where laypersons are becoming experts. Big data provided by 
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millions of people taking part in observation surveys particularly for birds and insects 
is an important basis for decision-making in conservation biology. These extended 
peer communities with their socially distributed expertise are especially important for 
the knowledge of local conditions.
These factors have transformed biodiversity studies from the old paradigm of 
scientific discovery (‘Mode 1’), characterized by the hegemony of theoretical and 
experimental science, to a new paradigm of knowledge production (the ‘Mode 2’), 
in which knowledge is “socially distributed, application-oriented, trans- disciplinary, 
and subject to multiple accountabilities” (Nowotny et al. 2003, p. 179). The investi-
gation of biodiversity is a post-normal Mode 2-science because it is “issue-driven” 
and “mission-oriented” rather than theoretical and driven by curiosity. In situations 
of Mode 2-science experts are incapable of providing conclusive answers to the 
associated problems. They can provide their views but decisions have to be made in 
public forums such as the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services (IPBES).
Being immersed in issues of philosophy, cultural history and economy, 
biodiversity is not being a merely scientific problem anymore, but rather one where 
science and politics meet. As an object of public attention and a focal point of 
conflicting interests, ‘biodiversity’ concerns the management of an issue rather than 
the solution to a problem.
16.2  On Defining ‘Biodiversity’
As the concept of ‘biodiversity’ is vague or versatile, it still has to be defined to be 
of any value in public or scientific argumentation. In the mid-1980s ‘biodiversity’ 
was explicitly introduced with a non-scientific, but political intent. The term was 
coined in preparation of the National Forum on BioDiversity, which took place in 
September 1986 in Washington, D.C. The American botanist Walter G. Rosen who 
was involved in preparing the conference explained how he came up with the term 
in a later interview: Creating the term, he said, was “easy to do: all you do is to take 
the ‘logical’ out of ‘biological’” (Rosen 1992, in Takacs 1996, p. 37). Linguistically 
speaking it was an easy task: Rosen simply used ‘biodiversity’ instead of ‘biological 
diversity’ which was already a well-established technical term in biology. His aim 
was, as he said, to create room for “emotion” and “spirit”.
And this is the situation we are in now: ‘Biodiversity’ is a term full of emotion 
and spirit, expressing an ethical concern following the mass-extinction of species 
due to human actions. Compared to this strong ethical pulse, the explicit definitions 
of the term that have been given after the conference in Washington are rather weak. 
Most of them given by biologists, for example, are very broad. In one of the first 
explicit definitions of ‘biodiversity’ formulated by the US Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) in 1987, it is defined as “the variety and variability among living 
organisms and the ecological complexes in which they occur” (OTA 1987, p. 3). A 
few years later, Solbrig’s much cited definition explains the term as “the property of 
living systems of being distinct, that is different, unlike” (Solbrig 1991, p. 9). The 
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Convention on Biological Diversity from 1992 sees it as “the variability among liv-
ing organisms from all sources” (UNEP 1992, art. 2). In one of the implicit and 
open definitions Sarkar explains biodiversity as “what is being conserved by the 
practice of conservation biology” (Sarkar 2002, p.  132), and a few years later, 
Norton demands that any definition must be rich enough to capture “all that we 
mean by, and value in, nature” (Norton 2006, p. 57).
From these definitions it is obvious that the term was designed to be open, 
versatile, polyvalent and adaptable to changing situations (Casetta and Delord 
2014, p. 251). It has been characterized as an “umbrella concept” encompassing 
the entire field that has formerly been called “nature protection” or “nature 
conservation” (Potthast 2014, p. 132). Because of its oscillation between scientific 
and non- scientific contexts Gutmann sees it as a “pragmatic concept” or “metaphor” 
(2014, p. 66). Regular movements across discoursive borders allow the concept to 
touch upon and somehow integrate many diverse aspects of nature and its use by 
humans. This mediating quality depends on the term’s “performativity” by mobi-
lizing attitudes and reactions in diverse contexts (Casetta and Delord 2014, p 251). 
For this performativity to be effective, the multifarious character of ‘biodiversity’ 
is essential; it allows for the fact that “[i]n biodiversity each of us finds a mirror for 
our most treasured natural images, our most fervent environmental concerns.” 
(Takacs 1996, 81).
Thus, ‘biodiversity’ is exactly what a politically successful concept ought to be: 
sufficiently open in order to be meaningful to many people and powerfully employed 
in political processes. It amalgamates scientific and political developments, public 
concern and cultural changes in society.
16.3  Representing Biodiversity
Apparently, the success of ‘biodiversity’ as a concept in the public discourse results, 
at least in part, from its reference to political and social concerns about diversity in 
non-biological contexts. Another reason for its power in social discourse might be 
that it brings into play ancient formats of representing the multitude of things. 
Representing biodiversity—understood as species’ inventory—starts with the begin-
ning of writing, roughly 5000 years ago. In the world’s earliest examples, which are 
lists from Mesopotamian cultures, a huge variety of trees, domestic animals, fish and 
birds appear alongside lists of goods which have been traded, as well as other inven-
tory-like lists of things in the world: metals, vessels, official functions, and geo-
graphic places (Veldhuis 2014). The early list of bird species in proto cuneiform 
from around 3000 BC featured more than 100 entries, including ravens, which pre-
sumably were of no direct use or benefit to humans. The lists seem to be inventories 
of species or of kinds of things in the world regardless of their utilitarian value.
Since Mesopotamian times, such lists have been used by natural historians to 
log, check and order species of living beings. Linnaeus’ Systema naturae is basi-
cally still a list; in its tenth edition of 1758 it contains about 4200 species on 800 
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pages. Today’s records of diversity are also organized as lists, for example the 
Encyclopedia of Life, the largest online database of systematic biology.
The discovery of biodiversity could be seen as a science of lists—
Listenwissenschaft as Assyriologists have called the presentation of knowledge in 
this form in Mesopotomian cultures (Schneider 1907, p. 368). The list’s essential 
logic is paratactical: lists do not primarily explain, as hypotactical theory-centered 
science does, but they first of all describe and arrange things on the same level. Lists 
are apt devices for the egalitarian, non-hierarchical presentation of things.
Biodiversity images put this logic into the visual sphere by showing an egalitarian 
representation of diverse living beings. Paradigmatic images of this type appear in 
the Flemish still life of the late sixteenth and seventeenth century, for example in the 
work of Joris Hoefnagel or Jan van Kessel the Elder. The scattered arrangement of 
decontextualized animal bodies, a “strewn pattern image” (Schütz 2002, p.  66), 
shows what biodiversity essentially is: a state of difference. Biodiversity is the sum 
of different individuals with different lifeforms and lifestyles. They are presented 
according to the principle of addition, a colorful diversity that does not manifest a 
closed totality or a system of interaction. Central to this depiction is that there is no 
top or bottom, no hierarchy and no evaluation within one set. The principle of rep-
resentation is a paratactic egalitarianism, the line-up of individuals with an equal 
standing, a juxtaposition of forms.
In the popular visual culture of our days you can find many examples of images 
that follow this paratactic, egalitarian logic. One example is a photo project by nature 
photographer David Liittschwager: In A World in One Cubic Foot he took a bright 
green metal cube—measuring precisely one cubic foot—and set it in various ecosys-
tems around the world, from Costa Rica to New York Central Park (Liittschwager 
2012). He documented what moved through that small space in a period of 24 h and 
photographed the plant and animal life he encountered in that period of time. An 
image of local biodiversity was then created by compiling all these photographs 
according to paratactic logic. In another example, Christopher Marley arranged his 
photographs of beetles in a kind of biodiversity mosaics (Marley 2008). This resulted 
in holistic figures such as squares or circles. No mosaic stone here resembles the 
other, and no element may be missing for the whole to be complete.
There is a striking parallel between the iconic logic of contemporary biodiversity 
pictures and some seventeenth-century Flemish still lives. The still lives, however, 
do not visualize ethical concerns about extinction of species, but refer to their cre-
ation. Their reference point is natural theology: the animals are considered immedi-
ate manifestations of God’s will and thus provide access to God’s plan equal to the 
Holy Scriptures. Although the modern concern with extinction and the late 
seventeenth- century focus on creation are rather distinct, they have one essential 
thing in common: the emphasis on and evaluation of individuals and species. In 
biodiversity images it is individuals and species that are appreciated in the first 
place, whereas their interactions with their environment and each other are pushed 
into the background. This decontextualizing, egalitarian logic, “specimen logic” as 
Jenice Neri has called it (Neri 2011, p. xiii), is essential for understanding our con-
ceptualization and appreciation of biodiversity.
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In the last decades, this specimen logic, the paratactic order of individuals, has 
become a dominant mode of presenting animals. It is manifest in installations at 
natural history museums such as the Hall of Biodiversity in the American Museum 
of Natural History in New  York or the Wall of Biodiversity in the Museum für 
Naturkunde in Berlin. Without further explanation, these installations group together 
a great variety of stuffed animals that do not naturally occur next to each other in the 
same location. The installations are not about explaining and understanding, but 
about creating astonishment and amazement by this variety. The focus is on the 
aesthetic quality of the individual objects and on the feeling that each species is 
threatened by humans. Thus, questions of nature conservation and ethics are 
addressed. In parallel with older biodiversity images, the museum installations are 
characterised by the fact that (1) they stress the individual character of different spe-
cies by presenting them in an extremely naturalistic way, (2) they decontextualize 
each species by displaying only one individual devoid of its ecological setting, and 
(3) they arrange the specimens in a non-hierarchical, egalitarian order. In contrast to 
earlier forms of presentation in natural history museums, biodiversity installations 
abandon showing causal, functional or systemic relations. The rationale of this form 
of presentation is that the mere sequence of different animal bodies is intended to be 
free of ideological or cultural preconceptions.
In these museum installations, the individuals play the central role: Each 
specimen not only represents the living organism its parts once belonged to, but, as 
there is only one specimen for each species, each specimen also represents its entire 
species. In these representations biodiversity is an ethic not for individuals in the 
first place but for species; it is about the moral dignity of species. The installation 
exemplifies yet another form of representation, a political representation: If the 
showcase of the installations is seen as a kind of parliament then each species has 
one vote in it; there is an equal representation for each species.
Interpreted in this way, the representations of biodiversity in natural history 
museums correspond, of course, to the normative discourse of egalitarian pluralistic 
democracies. Accordingly, it may be seen in terms of political iconography: as an 
expression of pluralistic social and political ideas. In short, it displays political ide-
als in the guise of nature.
However, the non-hierarchical, paratactic logic of presenting animals not only 
corresponds to liberal ideas of an egalitarian society, it also corresponds to the store- 
aesthetics of the market economy where the consumer can choose among the many 
products of equal value offered to him as being different. The increased attention to 
diversity can thus also be interpreted as having been influenced or enforced by capi-
talist economy. Moreover, it has also been argued that the origin of the dominating 
“taste for colorful diversity” lies in “the market”: “It is the taste formed by the con-
temporary market, and it is the taste for the market” (Groys 2008, p. 151).
The aesthetic of diversity thus has many different roots. It can be found, amongst 
others, in the very old history going back to the Mesopotamian Listenwissenschaft, 
the general pleasure in the manifold of Western culture (poikilia in Greek, varietas 
in Latin; Grand-Clément 2015; Fitzgerald 2016), the social emancipatory move-
ments of the second half of the twentieth century, capitalist market economy, or just 
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postmodern taste. Just as ‘biodiversity’ refers to a multitude of perspectives that 
cannot be reduced to one coherent system there is no master-narrative for the expla-
nation of its current success.
16.4  The Hybridization of Facts and Values in ‘Biodiversity’
The various new and old traditions of diversity have in common that they are not 
merely descriptive but place value on variety and variability. The intersection of fact 
and value in the representation of diversity is particularly evident with respect to 
biodiversity. In the Judeo-Christian context four fundamental scenes are connected 
to biodiversity: scenes of Creation, of Paradise, the naming of animals by Adam and 
the animals boarding Noah’s ark. As these are well-known religious scenes in a 
particular ethical context, their effect is placing values on diversity, charging it posi-
tively. This evaluative stance is also evident in Christopher Columbus’s first letter 
from the New World (addressed to the finance minister at the Spanish court, Luis de 
Santángel, who supported Columbus) in which reference to the biodiversity he 
encountered—trees and birds of “a thousand different kinds” (de mil maneras)—
forms an essential element of his praise of the promising land he discovered.
A more explicit appreciation of diversity can be found in Christian authors 
such as Augustine of Hippo who used reference to the huge diversity of animal 
species (“tantas diversitates animalium”) for the praise of God: “how great all 
these things are, how magnificent, how beautiful, how amazing! And he who 
made them all is your God” (Enarrationes in Psalmos, 145, 12; transl. by Boulding 
2004, p. 411). In a similar vein, Thomas Aquinas wrote: “Although an angel, con-
sidered absolutely, is better than a stone, nevertheless two natures are better than 
one only; and therefore a universe containing angels and other things is better than 
one containing angels only; since the perfection of the universe is attained essen-
tially in proportion to the diversity of natures in it, whereby the diverse grades of 
goodness are filled, and not in proportion to the multiplication of individuals of a 
single nature.” (Scriptum super Sententiis, lib. I, dist. 44, quaest.1, art 2; transl. by 
Lovejoy 1936, p. 77).
Similar views are expressed in the writings of Leibniz, who weighs one man 
against the whole species of lions, and writes, by the way, that he is not sure whether 
God would actually prefer the individual human (Essais de théodicée, 1710; Lovejoy 
1936, p.  225). In this understanding of diversity, human beings are co-ordinated 
with the other species of living beings; they do not inhabit an absolute and excellent 
position, but compete eye-to-eye with other species. Value is placed not (only) on 
the intrinsic qualities of each single being but on the state of being different from 
others. This evaluative stance towards diversity as such can be seen as a prefigura-
tion of the modern concept of biodiversity as an “epistemic-moral hybrid” (Potthast 
2014, p. 138); it is a kind of biodiversity avant la lettre.
On the basis of these prefigurations it was an easy task for concerned biologists 
in the late twentieth century to propagate ‘biodiversity’ as an important issue by 
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taking out the ‘logical’ from ‘biological diversity’—which was taken to be a bio-
logical term—, and putting in “emotion” and “spirit” instead. This strategic reen-
chantment of a (supposedly) biological concept made the term very useful for the 
political sphere. Being full of concern and sufficiently vague, open to many ideas, 
even contradictory ones, the term became an effective instrument for politics.
However, in recent years the intrinsic value and hybrid character of ‘biodiversity’ 
came under attack. It has been doubted that biodiversity is a useful basis for deci-
sions in nature conservation (Morar et al. 2015; Santana in this book). For in many 
cases we are not interested in the diversity of things as such. Nature conservation is 
often concerned not with protecting as many species as possible, but only very spe-
cific, typical or rare ones. In some cases, we are trying to limit genetic diversity, for 
example in cases where it leads to functional disorders, or we are trying to eradicate 
pathogens. Diversity in itself is not always a good thing, but only the right measure 
of it, so it has been argued.
Accordingly, one problem of the concept is the unconditionally positive 
evaluation of diversity. Another problem is that the evaluative charge of the term 
‘biodiversity’ makes it impossible to distinguish between scientific knowledge as 
such and the process of evaluating this knowledge. Morar et al. (2015) argue that we 
should decide in an open democratic discourse which diversity we want where. The 
amalgamation of the two steps of gaining and evaluating knowledge into one, as the 
hybrid concept ‘biodiversity’ does, obscures the need for separating scientific facts 
and public review of its results: “the role of [political] judgments is obscured when 
decisions are presented as following automatically from empirical evidence” (Morar 
et al. 2015, p. 25).
This criticism problematizes exactly that aspect of the concept, which was 
responsible for its success: the hybridization of descriptive and normative dimen-
sions. Obviously, the comprehensive success of the rhetoric of biodiversity was 
bought at no small price. Its power to hybridize makes biodiversity a useful political 
concept but it also stands in the way of any precise argument. Good intentions and 
positive effects connected to the concept cannot replace differentiated ethical rea-
soning. The important integrative function of the concept needs to be complemented 
with arguments in which the hybridization of facts and norms, of science and val-
ues, of knowledge and wonder is carefully separated again. Not scientists and their 
concepts but the democratic society as a whole has to decide which diversity it 
desires, one that includes genetic disorders, the polio virus or the Anopheles mos-
quito – or not.
16.5  Conclusion: Biodiversity as an Absolute Metaphor
Because of its involvement in various ancient traditions, and correspondingly 
hybrid and multifarious character, ‘biodiversity’ can be understood as an “absolute 
metaphor” or “non-concept” (Unbegriff) in the sense of Hans Blumenberg. Just as 
‘life’, ‘time’ or ‘world’ the word cannot have a fixed meaning because it mediates 
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between various contexts and disciplines. Aspects of the term can be defined within 
each separate context. Biology, for example, has provided many mathematically 
precise definitions of biological diversity as an index for measuring species rich-
ness and evenness in their distribution (but, already at this level diversity has been 
called a “non-concept” because it can be measured in very different ways; see 
Hurlbert 1971).
However, this technical understanding of biological diversity is distinct from 
‘biodiversity’ as it functions in public debates. In these debates the concept func-
tions as an absolute metaphor the meaning of which cannot be exhausted in any 
context of its use and proves “resistant to terminological claims and cannot be dis-
solved into conceptuality” (Blumenberg 2010, p.  5). It therefore seems that any 
attempt to define ‘biodiversity’ in precise terms is futile and does not capture the 
role that the word fulfills in contemporary discourses. Its interdiscoursive function 
depends on not having a clear-cut definition but being an open concept. ‘Biodiversity’ 
not only refers to the variety and variability of the natural world but also to our 
conceptualization and valuation of it. This complexity is the reason for the vague-
ness and at the same time the power of the concept: “le plus vague est le plus puis-
sant” (Bachelard 1947, p. 184).
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Chapter 17
The Vagueness of “Biodiversity” and Its 
Implications in Conservation Practice
Yves Meinard, Sylvain Coq, and Bernhard Schmid
Abstract The vagueness of the notion of biodiversity is discussed in the philo-
sophical literature but most ecologists admit that it is unproblematic in practice. We 
analyze a series of case studies to argue that this denial of the importance of clarify-
ing the definition of biodiversity has worrying implications in practice, at three lev-
els: it can impair the coordination of conservation actions, hide the need to improve 
management knowledge and cover up incompatibilities between disciplinary 
assumptions. This is because the formal agreement on the term “biodiversity” can 
hide profound disagreements on the nature of conservation issues. We then explore 
avenues to unlock this situation, using the literature in decision analysis. Decision 
analysts claim that decision-makers requesting decision-support often do not pre-
cisely know for what problem they request support. Clarifying a better formulation, 
eliminating vagueness, is therefore a critical step for decision analysis. We explain 
how this logic can be implemented in our case studies and similar situations, where 
various interacting actors face complex, multifaceted problems that they have to 
solve collectively. To sum up, although “biodiversity” has long been considered a 
flagship to galvanize conservation action, the vagueness of the term actually com-
plicates this perennial task of conservation practitioners. As conservation scientists, 
we have a duty to stop promoting a term whose vagueness impairs conservation 
practice. This approach allows introducing a dynamic definition of “biodiversity 
practices”, designed to play the integrating role that the term “biodiversity” cannot 
achieve, due to the ambiguity of its general definition.
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17.1  Introduction
The Convention on Biological Diversity defines biological diversity or biodiversity 
as “the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of 
which they are part: this includes diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems (United Nations 2013).” This now classical definition is largely dis-
cussed in the philosophical literature for being exceedingly vague and in need of 
clarification (Sarkar 2005; MacLaurin and Sterelny 2008; Meinard et  al. 2014; 
Santana 2014). By contrast, most ecologists consider that this vagueness is unprob-
lematic in practice (Mace et al. 2012).
In this chapter, we argue that this vagueness does have worrying implications in 
practice, at three levels: it can impair the coordination of conservation actions, hide 
the need to improve management knowledge and cover up incompatibilities between 
disciplinary assumptions. Our purview in this chapter is accordingly mainly practi-
cal: we aim to address ecologists, conservation biologists and practitioners, with the 
objective of convincing them that debates on the definition of biodiversity may have 
concrete implications. The problems that we thereby highlight all stem from the 
lack of a clear and shared definition of biodiversity. Biodiversity is certainly not the 
only concept that suffers from being vaguely defined, and in many cases this vague-
ness does not create much problems. Accordingly, our aim here is not to claim that 
vagueness is a problem in itself. Our more modest aim is to argue that, in the very 
specific case of biodiversity, it does have worrying consequences.
Indeed, in this specific case, formal agreements among various actors on the term 
“biodiversity” can hide profound disagreements on the nature of conservation and 
ecological issues. This is reminiscent of a classical problem in decision modelling 
(Bouyssou et al. 2000), for which the proven solution is for interacting actors to 
articulate a commonly accepted formulation of the key questions structuring their 
interaction. In line with this view, we propose that, although the notion of biodiver-
sity does not unify biodiversity sciences in a transparent, rigorous way, such a uni-
fication may be achieved by clarifying a concept of biodiversity practices, understood 
as coherent collaborative interdisciplinary efforts to tackle commonly identified 
environmental and conservation problems. We take advantage of insights from the 
philosophical literature to champion this approach and to argue that, although a 
definitive definition of these biodiversity practices might be unreachable, the task to 
constantly improve definitions, taking seriously conservation biologists’ and con-
servation practitioners’ value-laden stances, is crucial to the enrichment and 
improvement of conservation theories and practices. If we may paraphrase Burch- 
Brown and Archer (2017), although we emphasize that one cannot hope to reach a 
definitive answer to the question “what is biodiversity?”, our approach hence pro-
poses a “defense of biodiversity” that consists in championing a collective effort to 
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constantly improve our understanding of the value-laden practices gathered under 
banner of “conserving biodiversity”.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts. In Sect. 17.2, we first 
show that, despite its being seemingly simple and unequivocal, the definition of 
“biodiversity” is exceedingly vague. Vagueness in itself is not necessarily a prob-
lem. But Sect. 17.3 uses cases studies to show that, in the case of “biodiversity”, this 
vagueness creates problems in practice. In Sect. 17.4 we then explain our proposed 
solution. Section 17.5 briefly concludes.
17.2  The False Transparency of the Definition of Biodiversity
The vagueness of definitions of “biodiversity” has been extensively studied in the 
philosophical literature (Sarkar 2005; MacLaurin and Sterelny 2008; Meinard et al. 
2014), but for lack of a concrete understanding of its implications for conservation 
science and practices, this debate has been largely confined to philosophical discus-
sions without affecting real-life conservation and ecological practices (for a notice-
able exception, see Delong 1996). Let us first explain why we claim that definitions 
of “biodiversity” are vague.
17.2.1  Diverging Definitions of “Biodiversity” Coexist
A first example will illustrate how deceptive is the idea that the definition of “biodi-
versity” is clear and unequivocal. Let us look at two prominent approaches to biodi-
versity, articulated by a leading author in conservation biology and a leading author 
in ecosystem ecology: Sarkar (2005) and Loreau (2010).
Loreau (2010) does not delve into definitional debates. He uses a definition very 
similar to the one of the CBD, stating that “biodiversity […] includes all aspects of 
the diversity of life—including molecules, genes, behaviors, functions, species, 
interactions, and ecosystems” (p. 56). The fact that he uses such a sketchy definition 
suggests that he takes the definition to be unproblematic and consensual. By con-
trast, Sarkar (2005) explicitly tackles the definitional issue. Following Maclaurin 
and Sterelny (2008, p. 8), one can summarize his approach by stating that, accord-
ing to his definition, “‘biodiversity’ [means] whatever we think is valuable about a 
biological system” (Maclaurin and Sterelny’s interpretation of Sarkar’s theory can 
be criticized, but for the purpose of the present chapter, we will not delve into this 
exegetic debate).
A striking difference between Loreau’s (2010) and Sarkar’s (2005) definitions is 
that, whereas Sarkar’s definition explicitly mentions values, Loreau’s definition 
exclusively mentions purely biological concepts and objects. Despite this major dif-
ference, Sarkar explicitly claims that he use the concept of biodiversity in an uncon-
troversial and widely shared sense: he even writes that his approach captures the 
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“consensus view” (p. 145). And Loreau makes the same claim, though implicitly, 
since he admits that there is no need to delve into definitional issues. Despite the 
major difference between their respective definitions, both authors hence claim that 
their approach captures the general understanding of the concept.
Hence, although Loreau (2010) and Sarkar (2005) use the same term and take for 
granted that they understand it in the same way as everyone else, they actually 
understand it markedly differently. Can this kind of misunderstanding have practi-
cal implications? In the sections to follow, we argue that, in the case of biodiversity, 
it can.
17.2.2  The Various Disciplinary Studies “of Biodiversity” Do 
Not Study the Same Things
The literature presenting the numerous measures and indexes of biodiversity is 
extensive (Muguran and McGill 2011). It is commonplace to notice that the differ-
ent disciplines (encompassing what will thereafter be termed various “biodiversity 
studies”) respectively favor different indexes because they capture concepts that are 
better adapted to their subject-matter. The term “biodiversity” is used in articles 
from these various disciplines mostly in introductions and conclusions, whereas 
discipline-specific concepts such as species richness (Fleishman et al. 2006), phylo-
genetic distances (Faith 1992) or functional traits or attributes (Petchey and Gaston 
2002; Mason et al. 2003) replace it in the methods and results sections (Meinard 
2011). Similarly, environmental economists often use the term “biodiversity” to 
introduce and justify their research, but rapidly switch to disciplinary concepts, 
such as “naturalness” (Eichner and Tschirhart 2007) or “perceived diversity” 
(Moran 1994). The same is true of the other disciplines concerned with biodiversity. 
Accordingly, although they all claim to study biodiversity, the various biodiversity 
studies actually produce results that account for different objects, properties and 
processes (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008).
The concept of biodiversity itself is never used in articulating results, in any of 
these disciplines. It is mostly confined to introductions and conclusions, where it 
plays the role of a catchword.
17.2.3  The Various Disciplinary Studies “of Biodiversity” 
Presuppose that they Study Various Aspects 
of a Common Entity
By using the notion of biodiversity in their introductions and conclusions, all these 
heterogeneous studies presuppose, at least implicitly, that the various objects, prop-
erties and processes that they study are aspects of a common entity: biodiversity 
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(here we use the term “entity” in a purportedly very large sense, encompassing all 
sorts of ontological units, such as objects, properties, natural kinds, and so on). They 
do not claim that their concepts or measures represent all of biodiversity, but that 
there is a common entity, biodiversity, which is partially captured by their favorite 
measures and concepts.
In the current literature on biodiversity, the various studies simply state that their 
subject-matter is an aspect of the putative entity biodiversity, without explaining 
what this entity is supposed to be. What is this putative common entity supposed to 
be?
17.2.4  Defining “Biodiversity” Thanks to the Notions 
of Diversity or Variety Is Insufficient to Identify  
such a Common Entity
The literature on indexes and measures of biodiversity is notably vague on the issue 
of a proper identification of this common putative entity—biodiversity. The usual 
explanation identifies it as a specification of a more general entity: the property 
diversity (Maris 2010). Biodiversity would be the diversity of living things (Gaston 
and Spicer 2004), along genetic, phylogenetic and functional dimensions (Purvis 
and Hector 2000).
This approach bears some seeming credibility because “diversity”, and synonyms 
in ordinary language such as “variety”, belong to the everyday language and thus 
seem clear and self-evident. Intuitively, diversity is a property characterizing groups 
of individuals, depending on the number of individuals and on their similarities and 
dissimilarities. But the precise roles of numbers, similarities and dissimilarities, and 
the metrics used to measure them, are not elucidated at this intuitive level.
To determine whether “diversity” truly captures a coherent notion, axiomatic 
studies have tried to formalize the properties associated with it (Weitzman 1992; 
Nehring and Puppe 2002). They thereby showed that these properties are highly 
variable and that the notion of diversity is accordingly deeply ambiguous (Gravel 
2008) (in other words, what these studies show is that, whereas it seems self-evident 
at first sight that diversity is a property, in fact the term “diversity” captures different 
sets of properties in different contexts, which makes it questionable to claim that 
“diversity” refers to a property properly speaking). The terms “diversity” or “vari-
ety” thus function like a term such as “adaptation”. “Adaptation” has different 
meanings in various subfields of evolutionary biology, it has a markedly different 
meaning in medical physiology, and yet other meanings in ordinary language. The 
same holds true for “diversity” and “variety”. Within disciplines or, more precisely, 
within subfields, these terms are relatively unambiguous and generally well-defined, 
but their meaning varies between disciplines or subfields. As a consequence, these 
terms cannot be unambiguously used in both ways at the same time. Either one 
relies on subfield-specific, technical and well-clarified definitions of the terms 
“diversity”, “variety”, etc.―but in that case one can no longer draw upon the self- 
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evidence of these terms in everyday language. Or one relies on everyday language―
but in that case, one has to face the fact that ordinary language does not delineate 
coherent notions of diversity or variety. In both cases, using the terms “diversity” or 
“variety” in a general definition of biodiversity is problematic, because one cannot 
take for granted that others will understand the notion in the intended way. Therefore, 
if buttressed on general terms like “diversity” or “variety”, a general definition of 
biodiversity does not single out a unique entity, and is therefore useless to support 
the idea that “biodiversity” refers to a common entity.
Here again, the comparison with “adaptation” is illustrative. A rigorous evolu-
tionary biologist would never use the term “adaptation” when talking to lay people 
or to physiologists without specifying that his technical understanding of the term is 
very specific. The evolutionary biologist knows that his interlocutors think that they 
understand the term “adaptation”, and he knows also that, in a sense, they are right 
to think that they understand the term. But he also knows that they understand the 
term in another sense, rather than the one he has in mind. Therefore, it is natural for 
him to clarify the meaning of the term. This crucial step is the one that is missing in 
the case of “biodiversity”.
The theoretical considerations developed in this Sect. 17.2 may appear purely 
formal, without implications for concrete conservation science and action. The goal 
of the following section is to demonstrate that the reverse is true.
17.3  How False Transparency Creates Concrete Problems 
for Conservation Science and Action
In order to explain the concrete problems created by the seemingly purely theoreti-
cal reasoning spelled out in Sect. 17.2, let us now take three concrete case studies, 
each illustrating a specific kind of problem.
17.3.1  The False Transparency of “Biodiversity” Can Impair 
the Coordination of Interacting Conservation Actions
Misunderstandings created by the false transparency of “biodiversity” can have det-
rimental implications at the level of practical conservation management, as can be 
illustrated by the story of the management of the Bel-Air valley in South-west 
France (Gereco, unpublished report 2014). This is a small valley (Fig. 17.1) contain-
ing a rich mosaic of aquatic and humid habitats in a karstic system close to semi-arid 
grasslands and upstream water meadows (surrounding the Charente River).
This valley shelters a population of otters (Lutra lutra) and a massive population 
of Louisiana crayfish (Procambarus clarkia). The latter is an invasive species hav-
ing major detrimental impacts on the functioning of aquatic ecosystems (Angeler 
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et al. 2001; Rodriguez et al. 2005). However, its impact on Mammals populations is 
modestly positive (Correira 2001), and from the point of view of otter-watchers it 
has the advantage to turn otters’ spraints into red, greatly facilitating the observation 
and monitoring of otter populations. The above report also unveiled the presence of 
Japanese knotweed (Reynoutria japonica Houtt., 1777), an invasive plant with 
deeply damaging impacts on wetland ecosystems.
The valley is managed by an environmental association, Perennis. The down-
stream water meadows are protected under the Habitat Directive (HD, a cornerstone 
of the European Union policy to maintain biodiversity: European Commission 
1992) and are accordingly managed by another environmental association, the Birds 
Protection League (“LPO”). Both actors act according to management schemes 
explicitly aimed at conserving “biodiversity”.
Fig. 17.1 The Bel-Air valley
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But on closer examination, it appears that Perennis understands “biodiversity” in 
a Sarkar-like manner. Indeed, as amateur naturalists, they value first and foremost 
the emblematic otters: for them promoting biodiversity mainly means managing the 
otter population. Because crayfish makes it easier to observe otter, and because they 
have not witnessed any impact of knotweed on otters yet, they do not see invasive 
species as a prominent topic in their agenda to conserve “biodiversity”. By contrast, 
directed as it is by European guidelines applicable to the entire Natura 2000 net-
work, the LPO has to conceive of its objective to preserve biodiversity in a way that 
puts more emphasis on ecological functioning. In particular, following the guide-
lines spelled out in Evans and Arvella (2011), its management actions have to 
actively tackle the problems created by invasive species populations. Accordingly, 
for the LPO, conserving biodiversity in this area implies managing the crayfish and 
knotweed populations (or at least it implies a need to carve out a strategy assessing 
the kind of invasive mitigation actions that can be performed, and the cogency of 
implementing them in the light of their cost and likelihood of success).
Perennis’ management strategy aims at “conserving biodiversity”, but this means 
protecting the otter population, and does not mean tackling the invasive species 
issue; similarly, the LPO’s strategy aims at “conserving biodiversity”, but this time 
it means tackling the invasive species issue. Both actors could agree when compar-
ing their objectives: they both strive to “conserve biodiversity.” But if it dismisses 
the invasive issue when managing the valley, Perennis actually jeopardizes any 
attempt to tackle this very issue downstream. The formal agreement on “biodiver-
sity” hence hides a deep disagreement on what has concretely to be done.
At this stage, one might retort that misunderstandings like the one sketched 
above can easily be solved if the actors talk to each other about the concrete actions 
they want to implement. This is certainly true, and this example is indeed somewhat 
schematic. Our personal experience however suggests that, in real-life management 
situations, such seemingly trivial disagreements can persist. This is because the 
term “biodiversity” provides a common vocabulary that various actors can use to 
express very different objectives, which can all too easily lead them to fail to see the 
underlying divergences. In the present work, we obviously do not claim to have 
quantitatively demonstrated that such problems often arise in concrete conservation 
situation. Our more modest claim is that it can arise.
17.3.2  The False Transparency of “Biodiversity” Hides 
the Need to Improve Scientific Knowledge to Solve 
Complex Management Problems
The case of the Bel-Air valley provided a first illustration of how a concrete man-
agement problem can remain unseen because various actors fail to see the need to 
compare their respective understandings of “biodiversity”. In this case, the problem 
arises at the level of the interactions between actors implementing conservation 
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actions. But a deeper problem can arise when innovative solutions and new manage-
ment knowledge are needed to solve more complex conservation issues. In such 
cases, the false transparency of “biodiversity” can hide the need to improve scien-
tific knowledge.
An example illustrating this idea is given by the management of so-called “habi-
tats of community interest”, when biological invasion mitigation conflicts with 
habitat conservation (see Jeanmougin et al. 2016 for a deeper investigation of this 
conflict). “Habitats of community interest” (HCI) are natural or semi-natural habi-
tats constituting the Natura 2000 network, as application of HD (European 
Commission 1992). HCI are typically defined in European guidelines (European 
Commission 2013) and more detailed regional scale manuals (e.g. Bensettiti 2001–
2005) by lists of floristic species. For some HCI, these lists contain numerous inva-
sive species (see Jeanmougin et al. 2016, SI-Table 3). For example, this is the case 
of the HCI “Constantly flowing Mediterranean rivers with Paspalo-Agrostidion spe-
cies and hanging curtains of Salix and Populus alba (Habitat 3280)”, whose  presence 
has been recently reported in the lower Taravo River area (Corsica, France) 
(Fig. 17.2) (Gereco, unpublished report 2015).
Eight of the 34 index species of this habitat (Paspalum distichum L., 1759, 
Paspalum dilatatum Poir., 1804, Xanthium strumarium L., 1753, Symphyotrichum 
subulatum var. squamatum (Spreng.) S.D.Sundb., 2004, Dysphania ambrosioides 
(L.) Mosyakin & Clemants, 2002, Amaranthus retroflexus L., 1753, Cyperus 
eragrostis Lam., 1791and Erigeron canadensis L., 1753) are considered invasive 
species according to various European, national or local databases. HD, as a politi-
Fig. 17.2 Paspalo-Agrostidion and curtain of Salix purpurea along the Taravo river
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cal tool to maintain biodiversity, promotes the maintenance of HCI. On the other 
hand, the control and eradication of invasive species is also a central objective of 
many European initiatives to maintain biodiversity, such as the DAISIE (Delivering 
Alien Invasive Species Inventories in Europe) program and the recent European 
Directive on Invasive Species (Beninde et al. 2015).
In the case of habitats like HCI 3280, there is an antagonism between the inva-
sive approach and the habitat approach. Indeed, if management actions achieve to 
mitigate populations of the above-cited invasive species, this will unavoidable imply 
that the area identifiable as HCI 3280 will decrease. Conversely, if management 
actions achieve an increase of the area occupied by HCI 3280, this will be accom-
panied by an expansion of populations of the above-cited invasive species. 
Consequently, elaborating a management scheme in areas like the lower Taravo is 
problematic, because two actions that are typically considered keystones of any 
biodiversity conservation strategy (invasive species mitigation and habitat conserva-
tion) are antagonist in such cases.
However, there is no scientific study or publication tackling this question (see 
Jeanmougin et al. 2016 for a bibliographic exploration quantitatively corroborating 
this idea). According to the database (ETC-BD 2015) constructed as part of the 
European-wide evaluation of the conservation status of HCI (European Union 
2015), this habitat is present in no less than five countries in Europe (France, Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal). Management schemes are hence devised and imple-
mented all year long in the whole European Mediterranean region to manage this 
HCI, but there is no scientific guideline to decide how to solve the contradiction 
between the objectives to mitigate biological invasion and to promote the conserva-
tion status of habitat 3280.
Like most complex problems at the science-policy interface, this specific prob-
lem certainly has multifarious origins, having to do with the complex challenges in 
(1) translating ecological theory into practice (Knight et al. 2008), (2) defining the 
relevant expertise (Burgman et al. 2011), (3) choosing the relevant scientific para-
digms to ensure operationality (Jeanmougin et  al. 2016), (4) drawing the line 
between scientific information and advocacy (Brussard and Tull 2007), (5) assess-
ing the proper place of scientific knowledge in the process of policy making 
(Josanoff 2012) and (6) entrenching the importance of an open diffusion of informa-
tion on conservation practices (Meinard 2017a). We do not claim here to do justice 
to all these aspects, their interrelations and their relative importance in the genesis 
of problems such as the one of the above introduced lack of knowledge on HCI 3280 
management and invasive species. Our more modest purpose is the following. We 
want to show that, by granting a key-role in the coordination between disciplinary 
approaches to a vague term like “biodiversity”, one tends in all likelihood to render 
invisible the kind of knowledge gap at issue in our example. We accordingly do not 
claim to unfold a scientific demonstration here, but rather to hypothesize a possible 
mechanism that occurred to us thanks to our own field experience.
We propose that this mechanism is simply that specialists of invasive species 
stress the importance of controlling invasive species and present such a control as a 
prominent means to maintain biodiversity. But as non-specialists of habitats, they 
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simply accept what specialists say about the self-evidence that maintaining HCI is 
also unquestionably good for biodiversity. Specialists of habitats behave in a sym-
metric way. Everyone thus agrees with the overarching objective to maintain biodi-
versity, everyone is careful not to question the expertise of one’s interlocutor, and no 
one sees the need to improve knowledge and to carve out innovative management 
solutions in complex cases such as the one of habitat 3280.
As a consequence in the field, at the end of the story the resulting management 
scheme is most of the time decided more or less arbitrarily by political decision- 
makers or consultants on the basis of political, economic or circumstantial consid-
erations. In the case of the Taravo River, the management scheme produced in 2014 
(Lindenia, unpublished report 2015) does not mention this problem.
17.3.3  The False Transparency of “Biodiversity” Hides that 
Various Approaches Are Based on Incompatible 
Postulates
A more subtle, but no less important problem arises when interactions with non- 
ecological disciplines are involved. Let us start by illustrating the problem with an 
example: Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s ecological-economic study of a fishery 
ecosystem. Their aim is to establish how to organize fisheries given that the exploi-
tation of a given species can have complex repercussions on the broader ecosystem. 
In their study system, human consumers buy items of one species (Pollock, Theragra 
chalcogramma) on markets and thereby indirectly impact other species due to 
between-species interactions in the ecosystem. This indirect impact then alters the 
provision of various ecological services. For example, the sheltering function of 
kelp (Laminaria spp.) can be altered, which has an impact on the populations of 
Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) and Pink salmon (Oncorhynchus gorbu-
sha), which in turn alters the so-called “consumption services” (MEA 2005) for 
consumers of the latter species.
Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s solution is that if taxes on harvesting activities 
or caps on harvest, calibrated thanks to a precise knowledge of the functioning of 
the ecosystem, are implemented, demand will drop, overfishing will cease, kelp will 
recover, etc., and consumers will end-up being more satisfied.
The economists who authored this study claim that they provide insights that are 
complementary to those provided by ecologists to resolve a commonly identified 
problem—the problem of how to manage a complex ecological-economic system. 
Unfortunately, the way they see this problem is strikingly different from the way 
many ecologists see it. The compatibility of their prescriptions with prescriptions 
stemming from biological studies can accordingly become problematic.
Indeed, Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s understanding of the problem is based 
on a moral assumption—that is, an assumption about what is morally legitimate for 
scientists to do. They assume that consumers’ preferences are given, and that the 
17 The Vagueness of “Biodiversity” and Its Implications in Conservation Practice
364
results of their study should not lead to a modification of consumers’ preferences. 
Consequently, they do not integrate in their models the fact that being aware of the 
ecological impact of their act may change the behavior of the consumers. In techni-
cal economic terms, this assumption is encapsulated by the fact that human behav-
ior is modeled using a predetermined utility function (Orléan 2011), whose 
parameters are not fed-back by the results of the study. Consumers are assumed to 
behave has if they were maximizing a function whose arguments are prices and 
quantities of goods they buy on markets. The knowledge of the system does not 
appear in the function: when a given consumer learns to know that his buying 
Pollock has impacts on populations of Salmon, this does not make any difference in 
his behavior on the Pollock market.
Such predetermined utility functions are often presented, like many other eco-
nomic modelling tools, as morally neutral tools providing empirical complements 
to moral discussion (e.g. Scharks and Masuda 2016). When presented like this, it 
seems that predetermined utility function, as well as other modelling tools widely 
used in ecological-economic studies, can be used in conservation initiatives without 
interfering with the ethical motivations underlying the latter. Following the same 
logic, when an ecosystem ecologist works on a specific ecosystem process and an 
economist computes the economic value of an ecosystem service based on this pro-
cess, it might look as though the two can work together and the end-result of their 
conjoint work is no less ethically neutral than the original ecological study of the 
ecological process. This repeatedly rehearsed logic is, however, largely acknowl-
edged to be flawed: predetermined utility functions are not morally neutral model-
ing tools (Sen 2002; Hausman and McPherson 2006; Meinard et al. 2016). Using 
these tools means assuming that the results of the study should not lead to a modifi-
cation of consumers’ preferences: if consumers prefer x to y, the study should never 
aim at modifying this fact. This is not a technical constraint: implementing a feed-
back between the results of the model and preferences is not technically difficult 
(Lesourne et al. 2006). It is a moral stance: using predetermined utility functions is 
a means to promote the anti-paternalistic attitude to leave preferences as they are 
(Kolm 2005; Sagoff 2008) and to advocate that the satisfaction of preferences as 
they are is an acceptable, or even desirable, objective (Sagoff 2008).
This moral stance might seem reasonable enough—why should the economist 
think that he knows better than the consumer what the latter should prefer? But this 
moral stance can be problematic from the point of view of conservation sciences, 
because convincing people that their preferences are ill-conceived is a prominent 
means to achieve conservation targets. Many applied ecological studies are even 
openly based on moral assumptions that are diametrically opposed to the above one. 
Take for example the adaptive management approach (Norton 2005), according to 
which management practices should be seen as experiments from which managers 
can learn and thereby both improve their knowledge of the managed system and 
adjust the criteria that they use to evaluate alternative courses of actions (Lee 1993). 
Contrary to Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s model, this approach assumes that 
people’s objectives and preferences are responsive to improvements of their knowl-
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edge of the ecological constraints (Maris and Bechet 2010), and that enabling such 
improvements is precisely one of the motivations to study these systems.
Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s solutions are solutions to the problem as they 
see it, constrained by moral assumptions that are not generally accepted by biolo-
gists. This does not mean that their approach is irredeemably irrelevant for biolo-
gists, but that using it to identify solutions to the problem as biologists see it requires 
important reinterpretations and adaptations. Eichner and Tschirhart (2007) however 
eschew the clarification of this point, and their argument is accepted in the ecologi-
cal literature without a discussion (as illustrated by its extensive mention in Naeem 
et al. 2009). It is difficult to see why biologists do not assess the relevance of this 
model more critically. Our interpretation here is that the false transparency of the 
notion of biodiversity plays a role in the explanation of the existence of this blind 
spot. Indeed, this false transparency makes it look as though Eichner and Tschirhart 
(2007)‘s is self-evidently relevant, since it claims to be about biodiversity. We can-
not overemphasize that, obviously enough, we do not claim that the term “biodiver-
sity” is the unique, or even the main, culprit in failures of ecological-economic 
studies of fisheries. The precautions articulated above when analyzing the former 
case study apply here as well. Our point is more modestly that, by granting a key- 
role in the coordination between disciplinary approaches to a vague term like “bio-
diversity”, one tends in all likelihood to render invisible the fact that different 
disciplinary approaches are anchored in different moral assumptions. Like in our 
former case study once again, we do not claim to unfold a scientific demonstration 
here, but rather to hypothesize a possible mechanism, accounting for one possible 
cause among others behind the shortcomings of the models that we analyze.
Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s model is just one example, but it is a paradig-
matic one, for two reasons.
First, the moral assumption mentioned above is so entrenched in the economic 
literature that some authors (e.g. Orléan 2011) use it to characterize the vast major-
ity of the current economic literature. This does not mean that economic studies 
necessarily make this assumption, since heterodox approaches reject it (Lesourne 
et al. 2006), but rather that this assumption is bound to create recurrent problems in 
economics/ecology interactions.
Second, the problem witnessed in our example between ecology and economics 
exists between ecology and other disciplines. For example, numerous anthropologi-
cal studies presenting themselves as studies of biodiversity acknowledge that they 
are based on moral postulates (e.g. Mougenot 2003). But if ecologists and anthro-
pologists do not investigate whether their respective moral assumptions are 
 compatible, the possibility for them to provide coherent prescriptions for action is 
unwarranted.
To sum up the lesson from this third case study: when various disciplines present 
themselves as studies of different aspects of a common object—biodiversity—they 
tend to ignore that, if they are based on incompatible moral assumptions—as they 
often are—the very meaning and usefulness of their interactions are questionable.
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17.4  The Way Forward
In the former section, we explored various concrete examples that allowed us to 
illustrate different kinds of problems created by the false transparency of “biodiver-
sity”. The order of presentation was one of increasing complexity and increasing 
explanatory content: the first example was a simple case of diverging conservation 
objectives, the second one involved a more interpretative analysis, and the last one 
eventually allowed us to articulate the crux of the problem created by the false trans-
parency of “biodiversity”: collaborative works or disciplinarily studies that con-
ceive of themselves as tackling different aspects of a common object fail to 
acknowledge the need to ensure that they tackle different parts of a similarly identi-
fied problem. They are caged in an illusory shared ontology of the entity 
biodiversity.
One might argue that the simple solution to all the problems mentioned above 
would be to get rid of the term “biodiversity” and stop pretending that the various 
“biodiversity sciences” have anything in common. Such a radical solution (champi-
oned, for example, by Santana 2014) could be counterproductive though, by dis-
couraging interdisciplinary collaboration. This would be at odds with the widely 
accepted idea that interdisciplinary approaches are needed to tackle the globally 
pressing environmental challenges (Norton 2002; Loreau 2010b).
The aim of the present section is to delineate possible solutions based on the idea 
that the need to arrive at commonly identified problems should be taken seriously. 
We first sketch what such a requirement would concretely mean in the case of our 
three concrete examples, and then we take a broader view.
17.4.1  Facing the Issue of Problem Identification
A leitmotif for contemporary decision analysts, especially those working in multi- 
actor settings, is that decision-makers requesting decision-support often do not pre-
cisely know for what problem they really need support (Bouyssou et  al. 2000; 
Tsoukias et  al. 2013). For example, private firms can be aware that they have a 
problem in their production process because the output is lower than expected. But 
they don’t know if the problem is that they are inefficient or that they were unreal-
istic when setting their objectives or that their overall conception of what they aim 
to do was flawed, etc. They know that they have a problem, but can only articulate 
a rough, ambiguous formulation of it. More interestingly, various stakeholders, for 
example involved in the management of a complex system such as a watershed, may 
have only a very partial understanding of the problem that that are nonetheless in 
charge of tackling. Clarifying a better formulation of the problem, eliminating 
ambiguities and vagueness often associated with the terms spontaneously used to 
request decision support, is accordingly a first, critical step for decision analysis 
(Belton et al. 1997; Rosenhead 2001). Given the nature of the problems identified in 
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this chapter, a similar clarification, on a case-by-case basis, of the precise nature of 
the problem for the resolution of which (often interdisciplinary) interactions are put 
to use, may substantially improve the situation.
In the case of the Bel-Air valley, instead of resting content with the fact that they 
both manage their respective areas according to a scheme that mentions the preser-
vation of biodiversity as an overarching aim, the two managers should answer the 
following questions. “What is the precise nature of the functional links between the 
Charente water meadows and the habitats of its tributary, the Bel-Air?”, “What are 
the functional consequences of the absence of a control of the crayfish and Japanese 
knotweed populations in the Bel-Air on the ecological functioning of the nearby 
water meadows?”, “Would it be justified that the manager of the water meadows 
contribute (through money or workforce) to help the manager of the Bel-Air to 
implement specific conservation measures?” These are difficult questions, but 
sweeping them under the carpet by framing the discussions with the vague consen-
sual terms of “biodiversity” does not make them any less urgent.
In the Taravo case, the question “How to manage the river area in such a way as 
to promote biodiversity?” is meaningless, because, in this case, the two kinds of 
stakeholders in charge of the site management have distinct concrete objectives and 
would implement very different and potentially contradictory action. These differ-
ences and discrepancies, however, are hidden by the use of the common word “bio-
diversity”. In this case, a clear management policy and scientific knowledge are 
simply lacking. The very notion that HCI 3280 is protected under European legisla-
tion is nonsense so long as there are no scientific answers to the questions: “Is it 
possible to define this habitat on the basis of other criteria than species lists?” and 
“Is it possible to preserve this habitat while controlling invasive species at the same 
time?” These scientific issues are currently not investigated because, mainly due to 
the fact that problems are formulated in the vague terms of “biodiversity”, these 
genuine, underlying problems do not surface. Similarly, the national and local strat-
egies regularly produced and updated by environmental institutions are of little use 
if they do not clarify how the various aspects of biodiversity should be ordered when 
they conflict in a practical management situation. If such a ranking were available, 
even if scientific studies turned out to demonstrate that it is impossible to define 
habitat 3280 without referring to invasive species, a management program could be 
defined for the lower Taravo on an informed, legitimate basis.
Lastly, in the case of economics/ecology interactions, they would gain much 
transparency if, instead of rehearsing the vulgate of the supposed biodiversity/well-
being link, ecology/economics interactions were systematically anchored in a 
 common identification of the answers to the following questions: “For the purpose 
of a given decision-making on a conservation issue, what kind of economic infor-
mation is useful?”, “Should we take an anti-paternalistic stance like most econo-
mists, or should we rather take a more pedagogic stance and admit that ecological 
knowledge can rightfully be used to improve everyone’s decisions?” and “More 
generally, what kind of prescription for action is legitimate for biodiversity scien-
tists to formulate on the basis of scientific models?”
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17.4.2  A Broader View
The above paragraphs might leave the reader somewhat unsatisfied, since we simply 
spelled out the questions that the actors should ask themselves in the specific cases 
we considered. Isn’t it possible to elaborate a more general approach, liable to help 
solve problems created by the false transparency of “biodiversity” in a more general 
setting? We believe that it is possible, and here we sketch our proposal.
17.4.2.1  What Do We Need to Define?
A common view, although often implicit, in the literature, is that the definition of 
the term “biodiversity” has to be an objectivist definition. An objectivist definition 
is a description of the independent, preexisting entity to which the term to be defined 
refers. For example, an objectivist definition of the term “Mars” is a description 
enabling to identify the planet to which the term refers—an object independent 
from and preexisting our specifying that the term “Mars” refers to it. When one 
claims to define “biodiversity” by specifying preexisting independent objects, prop-
erties or processes, one attempts to provide an objectivist definition.
We have argued above that the ambiguity of the current general definition of 
biodiversity can create damaging problems, but it is unlikely that objectivist defini-
tions can prevent such problems from arising. Our analysis of the case of ecological- 
economic models rather suggests that, unless it makes an explicit reference to the 
value-laden aspirations that make sense of the various biodiversity sciences, a defi-
nition can hardly be useful to prevent such problems.
We therefore have to carefully examine the reason why we need a definition. We 
want to make sure that the various approaches gathered under the umbrella of the 
term “biodiversity” can provide relevant insights to coherently resolve common 
problems. The term “biodiversity” provides a form of unification between different 
approaches and disciplines. But this form of unification is defective when it comes 
to doing justice to this reason, because it covers up misunderstandings between 
approaches. What we need is another form of unification, liable to prevent such 
misunderstandings. Our suggestion is that this unification should rather be  buttressed 
on a general definition of biodiversity practices, understood as a coherent collabora-
tive effort from various disciplines to tackle commonly identified environmental or 
conservation problems.
Our suggestion is therefore to shift the focus from the definition of biodiversity 
conceived as a putative entity to the definition of biodiversity practices, emphasiz-
ing the value-laden aspirations underlying them. This suggestion might seem odd at 
first sight, because it looks as though one needs to have a prior concept of biodiver-
sity in order to talk about “biodiversity practices”. Underlying our suggestion is the 
idea that such a criticism stems from a linguistic illusion. Our language treats “bio-
diversity” as a substantive, which makes it look as though “biodiversity practices” 
necessarily are practices towards the entity to which the substantive refers. But we 
have argued that there is no such entity biodiversity to which “biodiversity” refers. 
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Whereas our language gives the false impression that one cannot understand what 
biodiversity practices are without antecedently understanding what biodiversity is, 
our suggestion is that the reverse is the case: in order to understand what biodiver-
sity is, what we have to do is to start by thinking through what biodiversity practices 
are (Sarkar’s (2005) approach is very similar to ours in this respect; for an analysis 
of the differences, see Meinard 2017b).
The search for such a definition of biodiversity practices is bound to be unavoid-
ably largely tentative and interpretative, but it would be misleading to presuppose 
that this creates a serious problem. The reason is that, when one defines a practice, 
the suitable definitions cannot be definitive objectivist definitions, because the very 
act of defining can modify the practice, and this modification can in turn modify the 
definition. In such a case, the definition does not identify an independent, preexist-
ing practice: it rather participates in the construction of the practice.
The vast literature on the definition of the terms “art” and “artistic practices” 
perfectly illustrates this idea. Although everybody intuitively knows what these 
terms mean, there is a vast literature striving to capture definitions of these terms. 
Unlike biodiversity scientists, art theoreticians have never accepted to rest content 
with the apparent self-evidence of the central notions of their field: they have end-
lessly kept trying to find better definitions. It turns out that, in so doing, they have 
greatly contributed to the enrichment of artistic practices. Indeed, the various defini-
tions of art by prominent art theoreticians have aroused creative responses by artists, 
who have (more or less consciously) modified their artistic practices to highlight the 
restrictiveness of these definitions or to explore the avenues they had opened up 
(Pignocchi 2012).
We argue that, as biodiversity scientists, we should follow this example of art 
theoreticians. We should always include an explicit definition of the global value- 
laden biodiversity practices into which we see our studies as being embedded, in 
such a way as to dissipate misunderstandings like the one highlighted in Sect. 17.3. 
The point of such references is not just to harbor values, but to prevent misunder-
standings. In particular, the value-laden features mentioned in such definitions must 
be the ones that are crucial to the identification of the general problems that biodi-
versity sciences should be devoted to solve. If such definitions were systematically 
formulated, this would launch a creative process by which other biodiversity scien-
tists would modify their practices to criticize the shortcomings or exploit the 
strengths of each definition, and in turn suggest new definitions, etc.
17.4.2.2  A Tentative Definition
Let us exemplify our approach by articulating our own tentative definition of biodi-
versity practices:
Biodiversity practices are studies, actions, strategies based on the aspiration that the devel-
opment and diffusion of ecological knowledge can lead people to improve their course of 
action by developing responsible, informed and long-term decision strategies and prefer-
ences, mindful of the environmental constraints.
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This definition is not the result of a grand deductive, philosophical or scientific, 
reasoning. It is a tentative interpretation of the studies, actions, strategies that our 
own experience as conservation scientists and practitioners allowed us to experi-
ence—and that our case studies above exemplified. This definition is obviously nei-
ther definitive nor uncontroversial. In some contexts, it might appear to be too vague 
and in need of qualifications or discussions, and the emergence of misunderstand-
ings in the future may require reformulations. But as it stands, it is the kind of defi-
nition needed to clarify misunderstandings like the one unveiled above.
For example, if Naeem et al. (2009) had started by articulating such a definition, 
based on the identification of the problems tackled by biologists, they would most 
probably have faced difficulties to encompass Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s 
model in it, because these authors do not understand the problem of biodiversity 
management in the same way as most biologists do. Naeem et  al. (2009) would 
accordingly have admitted the necessity to critically scrutinize the relevance of this 
model for conservation and ecological purposes. A fruitful critical discussion could 
have ensued and damaging misunderstanding could have been possibly dissipated.
One seeming problem with this approach is that it is likely that the problems 
tackled by biodiversity sciences will change over time. Encapsulating them in a 
single definition of biodiversity practices might accordingly risk encouraging 
immobility. The tentative definition of biodiversity practices just introduced is, 
however, liable to play a clarifying role without encouraging immobility because it 
harbors two crucial features. These two features characterize what we will term a 
“dynamic definition”.
First, since it is granted the status of a tentative definition, it is open to discussion 
and accordingly flexible enough to continuously adapt to new insights and 
developments.
Second, since it is meant to be used to critically assess the relevance of various 
studies for one another, the very act, by a given scientist, to formulate such a 
 definition and test it on a given study can lead him to modify his own practice instead 
of rejecting the study he assesses. Defining a practice can thereby lead to a modifica-
tion of this very practice, and this modification can in turn modify the definition.
In this dynamic approach, the best thing that can happen now to the tentative 
definition of biodiversity practices introduced above is that it be taken seriously 
enough by biodiversity scientists for them to criticize it, thereby launching the co- 
evolution of biodiversity practices and their definition.
17.5  Conclusion
The term “biodiversity” is diversely understood by various users, and its general 
definition is vague. Here we have taken advantage of several case studies to show 
that this vagueness, which is usually taken by biologists to be innocuous at a theo-
retical level, can create problems at the concrete level of practical interactions 
between various approaches to biodiversity issues. The problems studied here share 
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a common structure. In these various settings, the term “biodiversity” is used by 
various actors to link their respective approaches. The resulting impermeable divi-
sion of labor, based on the formal but illusory agreement on the objective to study 
or conserve “biodiversity”, hides the fact that the various approaches can promote 
mutually incompatible goals, eventually leading in conservation practice to self- 
defeating actions. To end such deadlocks, we have claimed that a clarification, on a 
case-by-case basis, of the precise nature of the problems for the resolution of which 
interdisciplinary interactions are put to use is a critical step. It can make the various 
misunderstandings and contradictions currently impeding management practices 
due to the false transparency of “biodiversity” visible and subsequently help to 
resolve them. This case-by-case approach then allowed us to develop a more general 
proposal, delineating a path towards the resolution of problems created by the false 
transparency of “biodiversity”. The logic of this path can be summed up in four 
steps:
 1. There is need to clarify a general definition of biodiversity practices, understood 
as a coherent collaborative effort from various disciplines to tackle environmen-
tal or conservation problems commonly identified on the basis of coherent value- 
laden aspirations.
 2. General definitions of biodiversity practices are always tentative, because the 
very act of defining them can lead to a modification of our theoretical and practi-
cal approaches to biodiversity theorizing and management.
 3. In our contributions, we should all make it a rule to always define the global 
value-laden biodiversity practices into which we see our studies as being embed-
ded, in such a way as to prevent, as far as possible, misunderstandings with other 
biodiversity studies or actions.
 4. We should seize every opportunity to discuss and criticize the definitions put 
forward by the other biodiversity scientists who have followed the steps above.
Although they have never formally articulated it, art theoreticians and artists have 
historically followed a similar path, which proved to be very fruitful. Our hope is 
that biodiversity scientists can learn from this example.
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Chapter 18
What Should “Biodiversity” Be?
Sahotra Sarkar
Abstract This paper argues that biodiversity should be understood as a normative 
concept constrained by a set of adequacy conditions that reflect scientific explications 
of diversity. That there is a normative aspect to biodiversity has long been recognized 
by environmental philosophers though there is no consensus on the question of 
what, precisely, biodiversity is supposed to be. There is also disagreement amongst 
these philosophers as well as amongst conservationists about whether the operative 
norms should view biodiversity as a global heritage or as embodying local values. 
After critically analyzing and rejecting the first alternative, this paper gives 
precedence to local values in defining biodiversity but then notes many problems 
associated with this move. The adequacy conditions to constrain all natural features 
from being dubbed as biodiversity include a restriction to biotic elements, attention 
to variability, and to taxonomic spread, as well as measurability. The biotic elements 
could be taxa, community types, or even non-standard land cover units such as 
sacred groves. This approach to biodiversity is intended to explicate its use within 
the conservation sciences which is the context in which the concept (and term) was 
first introduced in the late 1980s. It differs from approaches that also attempt to 
capture the co-option of the term in other fields such as systematics.
18.1  Introduction
Many commentators have noted that the term “biodiversity” is of very recent vin-
tage even though biodiversity conservation has become one of the best-known com-
ponents of both popular and technical discussions of environmental goals today 
(Takacs 1996; Sarkar 2005, 2017a). The term and associated concept(s) were only 
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introduced in the context of the institutional establishment of conservation biology 
as an academic discipline in the late 1980s. The introduction of the term is usually 
attributed to Walter G.  Rosen at some point during the organization of a 1986 
National Forum on BioDiversity held under the auspices of the United States 
National Academy of Sciences and the Smithsonian Institution (Takacs 1996; 
Sarkar 2002).
Originally “biodiversity” was only intended as a shorthand for “biological diver-
sity”; by the time the proceedings of the forum were published as an edited book 
(Wilson 1988), the new term had been promoted to become its title. The BioDiversity 
forum was held shortly after the founding of the U.S.  Society for Conservation 
Biology in 1985 (Sarkar 2002). Soulé’s (1985) manifesto for the new discipline of 
conservation biology and Janzen’s (1986) exhortation to tropical ecologists to 
undertake the political activism necessary for conservation had appeared in the pre-
vious two years. A sociologically synergistic interaction between the use of “biodi-
versity” and the growth of conservation biology as a discipline then occurred and it 
led to a reconfiguration of environmental studies so that the conservation of biodi-
versity became a central concern. Conservation biology, starting in the 1990s, was 
conceptualized as the goal-oriented discipline devoted to the protection of biodiver-
sity. Soulé (1985) drew a powerful analogy between conservation biology and med-
icine; biodiversity was the analog of health.
The existence of a goal engenders a corresponding norm for evaluating whether 
an action contributes to that goal and, in many contexts, of assaying the extent to 
which it does so. All the major programs for biodiversity conservation, viz., 
conservation biology (Soulé 1985), conservation science (Kareiva and Marvier 
2012), and systematic conservation planning (Margules and Sarkar 2007), 
acknowledge the normative component of biodiversity conservation. Not 
surprisingly, many environmental philosophers have followed suit in treating 
biodiversity as at least partly a normative concept (Callicott et  al. 1999; Norton 
2008; Sarkar 2008, 2012b).
But not all. Some philosophers (e.g., Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008), following 
the lead of many biologists (see Gaston 1996b and Takacs 1996), have treated 
biodiversity as if it were a purely scientific concept bereft of normative content. 
That perspective has led to a wide variety of scientific (more accurately, scientistic) 
definitions of biodiversity, each disputed, and with no prospect of resolution of 
these disputes. The persistence of these disputes has led to many deflationary 
accounts of “biodiversity” (e.g., Sarkar 2002) as well as proposals to eliminate the 
term completely (e.g., Morar et al. 2015; Santana 2017). These varied approaches 
have recently been reviewed by Sarkar (2017a) and that discussion is very briefly 
summarized in Sect. 18.2 of this paper.
Section 18.3 turns to the core purpose of this paper: a defense of normativism in 
defining biodiversity. Any such defense must address the question: whose norms? 
Global norms invoked by Northern conservationists must be pitted against the local 
norms of communities whose livelihoods are often threatened by biodiversity 
conservationists’ interventions. Section 18.3 traces the ideological underpinnings of 
global normativism, then rejects it, and critically endorses the use of local values to 
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define biodiversity. But endorsing local values is hardly unproblematic. Section 
18.4 examines the problems that beset local normativism.
Accepting normativism does not mean rejecting the use of science any more in 
biodiversity conservation than it does in healthcare practices. For biodiversity, a 
partial synthesis is possible. Section 18.5 argues that a rich tradition of discussions 
within biology of what constitutes biodiversity can be used to lay down adequacy 
conditions that constrain the latitude available to normative definitions of 
biodiversity. It also lays out how this synthetic proposal, integrating values and 
(ostensibly value-free) technical science, can be used in the practice of conservation. 
Section 18.6 consists of some final remarks.
18.2  Approaches
Sarkar (2017a) has recently distinguished four approaches to defining biodiversity:
 1. Scientism: Definitions falling under this rubric claim to use non-normative crite-
ria to define and quantify biodiversity. Three such criteria have most often been 
deployed: richness, difference, and rarity. Each criterion has been used not only 
singly but also in conjunction with the others. Richness, measured by the number 
of units, is probably what most users of “biodiversity” have in mind when the 
term is not explicitly defined. It has also been partly or wholly explicitly defended 
by Gaston (1996a) and Maclaurin and Sterelny (2008). Difference, interpreted as 
complementarity, or how many new biodiversity units are introduced to those 
already present in an entity (such as an area or a community), has been con-
trasted to richness and promoted by proponents of systematic conservation plan-
ning (Sarkar 2002; Sarkar and Margules 2002; Margules and Sarkar 2007). 
Rarity, interpreted as endemism, along with richness has formed the basis for 
identifying biodiversity hotspots (Myers 1988; Myers et al. 2000).
The main problem with these attempts, pointed out by critics such as Santana 
(2017), is that there seems to be no possible potential resolution of the 
disagreements between proponents of the different scientific definitions of 
biodiversity. Difficulties abound: for instance, even within ecology it has long 
been recognized that richness alone cannot be an adequate characterization of 
diversity because it does not take equitability into account (Sarkar 2007).1
Efforts to decide between scientific definitions of biodiversity inevitably end 
up requiring the use of extra-scientific criteria. For instance, proponents of 
complementarity argue that its use is preferable to richness as a characterization 
of biodiversity because of the following argument: Consider three potential 
conservation areas, A, B, and C of which only two can be prioritized. Let A have 
1 Consider two ecological communities, A and B. Let A consist of 90 % species μ and 10 % species 
ν. Let B consist of 50 % species μ and 50 % species ν. Both A and B have richness 2 (assuming 
species are the relevant unit). Yet, there is a clear sense in which B is more diverse than A. Richness 
does not capture that sense.
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richness 100, B have richness 90, and C have richness 50. If diversity is to be 
characterized as richness, the diversity ranking of the three areas would be A > 
B > C and choosing the best two would mean choosing A and B. However, 
suppose that A and B have 80 units in common. Then A and B together would 
contain 110 units. Now suppose that A and C have 30 units in common and B and 
C have 5 units in common. Then A and C would contain 120 units and B and C 
would contain 135 units. Thus the richness-based choice of A and B is the worst 
choice for biodiversity representation even if we use total richness as the relevant 
criterion for the biodiversity content of the prioritized set of conservation areas! 
This leads to the principle of complementarity (Vane-Wright et al. 1991; Sarkar 
2012b): a new conservation area should be prioritized from the available ones on 
the basis of how many new units it adds to what is already present in those that 
have been chosen earlier.2 The relevant point here is that the argument assumes 
that only two of the three potential conservation areas can be prioritized. Science 
does not supply this assumption. Its provenance is the existence of some resource 
constraint that must be respected.
Consider another choice: should richness or endemism or both be a compo-
nent of biodiversity? Richness appears natural but, as seen earlier, its use is 
fraught with problems. How about endemism? We may opt for it out of concern 
for the rare and unusual. The point, though, is that these are no longer scientific 
claims. We have moved on to talk about values, what aspect of natural variety we 
deem most worthy of conservation, that is, there has been a transition to an anal-
ysis of norms. These cases are typical: extra-scientific considerations are neces-
sary to adjudicate between conflicting scientific definitions of biodiversity.
 2. Eliminativism: The failure of scientism in the definitional enterprise has led to 
one extreme response: proposals to eliminate the use of the term “biodiversity” 
altogether. Such a position has been forcefully argued by Morar et al. (2015) and 
Santana (2017). However, such a response would only become plausible if there 
is no other alternative to scientism. The rest of this paper argues that there is a 
plenitude of other available options. Suffice it here to note that banning 
“biodiversity” in current environmental discourse would be a daunting task and 
require efforts that, presumably, even eliminativists would accept as being better 
used to ensuring conservation in practice.3
 3. Deflationism: Eliminativism as a response to the failure of scientism was pre-
ceded by a weaker strategy of deflationism. A strong form of deflationism was an 
assumption that, not only was there no fact of the matter about what biodiversity 
is, but that how it should be defined depends on local contexts, and can be 
gleaned by studying the practices of conservation biologists, for instance, what 
2 Note that this choice does not guarantee that the total richness (that is, the number of unique spe-
cies) would be maximized. In the example earlier, it would lead to the choice of A and C rather than 
B and C.
3 For more details of these arguments, see Sarkar (2017a). Meinard, Coq, and Schmid, (Chap. 17, 
in this volume) give a different perspective on why eliminating “biodiversity” or even allowing it 
to remain irreducibly vague would lead to problems for the practice of conservation.
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is being optimized when areas are prioritized for conservation (Sarkar 2002; 
Sarkar and Margules 2002).
Strong deflationism was problematic for a variety of reasons, most notably 
perhaps because it seemed to leave no role for explicit discussion of how 
biodiversity should be defined, even in a given context. It was replaced by a 
weaker form in which normative discussion of what merits conservation 
determines what constitutes biodiversity (Sarkar 2008). But this takes us to 
normativism.
 4. Normativism: Normativism will be developed in some detail in Sect. 18.3. What 
motivates this set of definitions is the recognition that the preservation of natural 
variety is a desirable social goal. For more than a generation, environmental 
ethicists have argued about the proper warrant for the admissibility of such a 
goal without reaching consensus (Norton 1987; Sarkar 2005) but, as 
environmental pragmatists have argued (e.g., Minteer and Manning 1999), these 
intractable foundational disputes are almost always beside the point in the 
practical contexts that determine how a conservation policy is formulated and 
whether it succeeds or fails. For environmental pragmatists, what is of paramount 
importance is achieving agreement on practical courses of action, shelving 
foundational disputes in favor of policy achievement. What matters in such 
contexts is to map, evaluate, and critically engage the values of legitimate 
decision-makers. These values are not determined by scientific inferences drawn 
from biological data though those data may—and should—inform the values of 
the decision-makers. What is critical is a community’s vision of the future it 
desires including but not limited to its perception of its proper role in the natural 
world. Natural variety is one of those values and the one that is reflected in 
biodiversity; but biodiversity need not be the only natural value. Given this 
motivation, it remains to develop normativism more systematically. That 
discussion begins by moving beyond these assertions to arguments designed to 
establish that biodiversity must be a normative concept. In line with environmental 
pragmatism, there will be no further attention to foundationalist concerns in this 
paper.
18.3  Normativism
There are three loosely related arguments that aim to show why biodiversity must 
be a normative concept. To motivate these arguments consider what is perhaps the 
most general scientistic definition: biodiversity is the variety of life at all levels of 
structural, taxonomic, and functional organization. As Gaston (1996b) has 
documented, many biologists have defended similar definitions (e.g., McNeely 
et al. 1990; Wilson 1992; Johnson 1993). Is this what biodiversity means? If so, it 
does not seem plausible that biodiversity is the goal of conservation for at least two 
reasons: (1) There is the venerable ethical principle, ought implies can. Can all of 
biodiversity as defined above be conserved? Ecological communities left undisturbed 
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lose species diversity through competitive exclusion. Evolving populations lose 
genetic (that is, allelic) diversity through natural selection. Conserving all such 
diversity is in practice impossible; (2) Is all such diversity in principle a desirable 
target of conservation? The human skin hosts thousands of microbial species though 
interpersonal variability is not as high as in the gut which hosts millions (Grice et al. 
2009). Should we feel an imperative to conserve all the microbial diversity on the 
human skin or gut? Bacterial pathogens are rapidly evolving diversity to generate 
resistance in response to innovation in antibiotics designed to contain them. Other 
pathogens have shown similar, if less spectacular, responses to drugs. Should such 
diversity also merit active conservation?
The first argument for normativism begins with the assumption that concepts 
should be understood against the historical context of their introduction and use.4 
For biodiversity that context is the establishment and institutionalization of 
conservation biology as an academic discipline. As noted earlier, programs for 
conservation have always accepted the goal-orientation of the project, and the 
existence of that goal endows biodiversity with an irreducibly normative aspect. 
Proponents of conservation biology from the 1980s fundamentally disagree about 
goals with proponents of systematic conservation planning from the 2000s and, 
especially, the new conservation science from the 2010s (Kloor 2015) but they all 
agree with the goal-orientation of conservation. In most cultural contexts, pathogen 
variability is seen as removed from “biodiversity” with its attendant positive 
connotation.
The second argument builds on the first. As a result of the goal-orientation of 
conservation, biodiversity has always been used with a positive connotation. It 
consists of those aspects of biotic variety that should be conserved. That does not 
necessarily include all of natural variety. Though the rhetoric of contemporary 
political discourse often suggests otherwise, not all diversity is positive (Sarkar 
2010). A society with extreme economic disparities is more diverse than one that 
is more egalitarian; but it certainly is not better. A population with both healthy 
and sick individuals is more diverse but less desirable than one that has only 
healthy individuals.
The third argument notes that, by the time “biodiversity” was introduced in the 
1980s, there had been a generation-long tradition of defining and studying diversity 
within ecology (Sarkar 2007). Much of this work was spurred by a central theoretical 
hypothesis of ecology dating back to the 1950s, that diversity begets stability of 
ecosystems. While both the empirical and theoretical status of this claim continues 
to be debated today, by the mid-1980s its exploration had led to the formulation of 
a large variety of diversity (as well as stability) measures. These measures and the 
4 This claim is open to philosophical dispute: for instance, adherents of a hard distinction between 
the context of discovery and context of justification, etc., may deny this assumption (perhaps most 
famously developed by Mach in his study of physical concepts in the late nineteenth century). 
Those who view science through the lens of analytic metaphysics and study concepts through 
intuition and abstraction may also deny it. These issues will be left for another occasion. Suffice it 
here to note that core analytic methodologies of concept formation (for example, Carnapian expli-
cation) accept the relevance of the pragmatic context of conceptual innovation (Carnap 1950).
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associated concepts they were supposed to quantify, in contrast to biodiversity, did 
not display normativity in their use. It is telling that this body of work was entirely 
ignored by conservation biologists attempting to define biodiversity in the 1990s 
and since. The most plausible interpretation of this lack of interest in the existing 
work on ecological diversity is that they viewed their own normative enterprise of 
designating aspects of natural variety for protection as distinct from these earlier 
ecological efforts. Thus, scientism was irrelevant to that enterprise. But, then, what 
requires explanation is why the explicit statements of definitions of biodiversity 
from biologists, as recorded by Gaston (1996b) and Takacs (1996), are almost 
always scientistic. Perhaps the explanation lies in the discomfort scientists often 
feel about explicit normative discussions—but this suggestive explanation is no 
more than sociological speculation at this point (but see Wolpe 2017).
18.3.1  Global Heritage
For biodiversity, who should set the relevant norms? In the present context this 
questions amount to asking who determines what aspects of natural variety should 
be protected. Here conservation efforts have been marred by serious ethical problems 
reflecting the structural inequities between the global North and the South. 
Conservation biology was first academically institutionalized in the United States 
and its agenda reflected the agenda of what has forcefully been criticized from the 
South as “radical American environmentalism” (Guha 1989). Soulé and his 
immediate followers had no hesitation in importing their values to the South, at one 
point arguing that the U.S. federal legal restrictions be circumvented to allow 
purchase of land for conservation in the South (Soulé and Kohm 1989): “Land 
acquisition is a very specific need … The National Science Foundation should view 
land purchase and maintenance in exactly the same way that it views the purchase 
of a piece of fancy machinery ... If there are legal barriers to direct acquisition of 
land in other countries by U.S. government agencies, then alternatives such as 
grants to such countries for the establishment and management of research reserves 
should be explored ” (p. 89; emphasis added). Available aid money would be better 
spent satisfying the desires of conservation biologists than, for instance, improving 
livelihoods of local people: “A potential funding source would be Public Law 480 
programs which are currently operating in many developing countries” (p. 89).
If Soulé’s strictures were imperialist proclamations, Janzen (1986) endorsed the 
missionary position when he urged: “If biologists want a tropics in which to 
biologize, they are going to have to buy it with care, energy, effort, strategy, tactics, 
time, and cash. Within the next 10–30 years (depending on where you are), whatever 
tropical nature has not become embedded in the cultural consciousness of local and 
distant societies will be obliterated.… We are the generation [that must] devote [its] 
life to activities that will bring the world to understand that tropical nature is an 
integral part of human life” (p.  306). Wilson (1992 and elsewhere) joined many 
others in declaring biodiversity to be a global heritage. The efforts of Northern 
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conservationists were codified in various documents emerging from global agencies, 
most notably, the 1992 Rio Convention on Biodiversity.
But claims of global heritage require careful analysis and, when required, sys-
tematic deconstruction. Beyond bland assertion, what makes some natural feature 
or cultural artefact a world heritage? As we shall see there is no pat comfortable 
answer. Global heritage claims typically promote intervention by politically power-
ful external agents on decisions affecting the habitats of local residents who may 
have no interest in these global concerns. Moreover, these claims may not even be 
backed by any legitimate tangible material interest of these external agents—think 
of protecting a historical ruin just because of its age or a tropical rainforest because 
of its species richness.
The salience of these issues is borne out by looking at some particular cases: 
Was it wrong for the Taliban to destroy the Buddhas of Bamiyan? If so, why? And 
who decides? What gives the so-called international community—which is hardly 
a community of equals—a legitimate basis for questioning what a community in 
Afghanistan decides to do with some cultural artefacts present in its domain 
through no choice on its part? There is no reason to doubt that the strong feelings 
generated by the destruction of these statues probably reflects some defensible 
trans-cultural values. But what are they? How can they be spelt out and legitimized? 
How do these values serve the interest of the international community? Why do 
these interests override those of the local community? These questions have not 
received the attention they deserve. To return to the concern of this paper, turn to a 
biodiversity- related analog (Bevis 1995): Was it wrong for the Malaysians to log 
the lowland rainforests of Borneo? Why? And who decides? And so on. In this case 
there is an additional level of complexity. By and large, the local communities in 
Borneo were resistant to logging (Bevis 1995). The Malaysians opting for 
development were mainly economic and political elites from the mainland with the 
required power. The so-called international conservation community, largely 
activists from Europe and Australia, adopted and possibly manipulated the 
communities’ concerns. But no one bothered to spell out whose heritage the great 
forests of Borneo were. And why. No matter how strongly we feel about these 
cases, the answers are not obvious.
Scholars have argued that concepts of heritage emerged in Europe in synchrony 
with the emergence of nation-states. Meskell (2014) puts it: “Intimately connected 
with the Enlightenment project, the formation of national identity relied on a 
coherent national heritage that might be marshaled to fend off the counter claims of 
other groups and nations” (p. 218). By the nineteenth century, in the late colonial 
context, the concept of heritage had begun to be applied across national boundaries, 
especially into the colonies. However, a concept of supranational cultural heritage 
only began to be formulated after World War I with tentative attempts at its legal 
codification originally under the auspices of the League of Nations (Boes 2013; 
Gfeller and Eisenberg 2016).
Full-fledged self-conscious efforts for global heritage designation and protection 
began with the post- World War II onset of the decolonization era and the formation 
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
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in 1945 (Gfeller and Eisenberg 2016). Claims and designations of global heritage 
emerged in tandem for both cultural artefacts and natural features. Arguably, 
especially through the Northern domination of UNESCO and other global agencies, 
they served to maintain Northern control of these entities in the post-colonial South 
even after decolonization had brought direct control to an end, for instance, when 
UNESCO’s director Julian Huxley proposed setting aside large areas of central and 
east Africa as reserves (Huxley 1961; see Adams and McShane 1992 for a critique). 
(There will be other African examples below.) What is striking is that, beyond 
implicit appeals to claims of importance for some supranational group of individuals, 
no argument was advanced to codify why some feature is a global rather than, say, 
a national heritage; this is a problem that has only recently begun to receive attention 
(Di Giovine 2015). Instead of argument, attributions of global heritage status have 
systematically relied on bold assertions by proponents and demands for acquiescence 
on the part of those who may otherwise have resisted the globalization of their 
resources.
The first campaign to draw transnational attention to an ostensibly global heri-
tage feature focused on Egypt, starting in the late 1950s, after President Nasser’s 
modernization plan for the country included construction of the Aswan Dam. The 
project envisioned the submersion of a large number of historic sites and monuments 
of the Nile Valley, perhaps most notably the Great Temple of Ramses II at Abu 
Simbel. The plan generated vocal opposition from archaeologists and historians, 
mainly from Europe; their rhetoric suggested that Egyptians were not legitimate 
stakeholders in decisions about the fate of these sites (Boes 2013). Though the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal and his neutrality in the Cold War hardly made 
Nasser a popular figure in the West, conservationists were able to co-opt him to their 
campaign in the late 1950s. In 1960 UNESCO undertook an ambitious rescue 
project of relocating the monuments at risk to higher elevations. Nasser was 
applauded for recognizing a “right to heritage.”
Parallel to the developments around Aswan, two German environmentalists, the 
father and son team of Bernhardt and Michael Grzimek initiated a global campaign 
for designating the Serengeti Plain of Tanganyika as a global heritage and “saving” 
it through formal protection and exclusion of local human use. The core component 
of their campaign was the creation of the documentary, Serengeti Shall Not Die, in 
which they explicitly and controversially drew an analogy between African wildlife 
and European historical monuments.5 Immensely successful, the documentary 
transformed discussions of the global status of the natural heritage of the South. To 
continue with the Aswan parallel, shortly afterwards, and this time in India, 
conservationists from the North, supported by a local elite consisting largely of 
hunters, co-opted Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to launch Project Tiger in 1973 
(Mountfort 1983) in spite of local problems due to tiger-human conflicts. There will 
be more on Project Tiger below.
5 The German Filmbewertungsstelle Wiesbaden (FMW) dubbed this an “impermissible equation” 
(unerlaubte Gleichsetzung) and its request for the caption’s removal captivated op-ed pages in the 
Federal Republic of Germany with discussions of censorship—see Boes (2013) for more detail.
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The normative claims of conservation biology fall into this tradition and are 
based on the assumption that biodiversity is a global heritage. That is what makes it 
possible for Soulé to demand the acquisition of land in the South for the benefit of 
Northern conservationists. Janzen is gentler: he only wants to proselytize and 
convert the perceived heathens in the name of the global deity that is biodiversity. 
Indeed, it is commonplace for Northern conservationists to propose policies for 
distant lands in the South and to demand action (Dowie 2009).
For instance, in the 1980s the British parliament debated sending British troops 
to Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique to protect elephants (Neumann 2004). In the 
Central African Republic, in the 1990s, Bruce Hayes (a co-founder of the radical 
environmental organization, Earth First! in the United States), hired mercenaries to 
shoot at alleged poachers with no semblance of a trial, let alone a fair trial (Neumann 
2004). Even when military threats are not used—unlike these African examples—
economic power is often deployed against people living near or below the subsistence 
level if they do not conform to the demands of Northern conservationists (Dowie 
2009).
To drive home the point being made, consider a hypothetical example originally 
constructed by Sarkar and Montoya (2011). Central Texas is home to a suite of 
endangered and endemic species including birds, salamanders, and arthropods 
(Beatley 1994; Beatley et al. 1995). In central Texas, attempts to list species under 
the U. S. Endangered Species Act (ESA), and then to delineate critical habitat and 
develop habitat conservation plans (as required by law) have long been controversial 
and have often led to ugly confrontations between landowners and conservationists 
(Mann and Plummer 1995). Now, imagine that an environmentalist from Mongolia 
decides to come to Texas, claim expertise on desert landscapes and cave ecology 
(perhaps justifiably), and demand that prime real estate around the capital city of 
Austin be converted into a national park. It is intriguing to speculate on the reactions 
from gun-toting Texans.
But, is there a salient ethical difference between this hypothetical situation and 
the one in which Oates (1999) (among others) demands more and better-policed 
national parks in west Africa? Or is it simply a question of power relations? From 
an ethical perspective, in both situations either we are denying the legitimacy of 
local sovereignty over resources or we are not. We are either accepting the legitimacy 
of local residents on the use of habitat or not. If we are forced to conclude that all 
that differentiates the two situations are power relations, Northern conservationism, 
as argued earlier, are continuing colonial attitudes and policies in the South (see, 
also, Guha 1997).
The critical normative issue here is that of parity. What one community—whether 
it be Northern conservationists or Mongolian desert experts—values should not be 
transferred without consent to the habitats of other communities. When we couple 
this normative claim with the realization that a definition of biodiversity is context- 
dependent in the sense that the valuation of biological resources varies over space 
(Escobar 1996), then we must turn to local values.
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18.3.2  Local Values
Recall that normativism views biodiversity as consisting of entities that merit pro-
tection. What is most relevant to the present discussion is that, in practice, different 
groups have made different choices (Margules and Sarkar 2007). Let us begin with 
governmental agencies and the big non-governmental organizations (derisively 
dubbed “BINGOs” by Dowie (2009)) that dominate large-scale biodiversity conser-
vation efforts.6 In the United States, most governmental agencies adopt endangered 
and threatened species as biodiversity units but that is because much of conservation 
policy is set in the context of the legal requirements of the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) of 1973. The ESA envisions protection of both animals and plants, includes 
subspecies under its purview, but excludes “pest” insects. In contrast, The Nature 
Conservancy (TNC), one of the best-known BINGOs, uses habitat types defined by 
characteristic ecological communities. Conservation International (CI), another 
BINGO, uses both globally threatened and geographically concentrated species.
Some such choice is necessary in order to provide the minimal precision 
required to devise conservation policy. Each of these choices reflects cultural 
values. For instance, US governmental agencies and CI implicitly presume that 
species are the bearers of value. Moreover, they implicitly presume that the 
extinction of every species that is admissible (excluding insect pest species) is 
equally (normatively) undesirable. TNC implicitly presumes that ecological 
communities are the bearers of value. The point is that these definitions embody 
cultural norms even though they are often presented as if they are universal and 
purely scientific definitions (Sarkar 2008).
Moreover, there are many other equally defensible choices. Sacred groves are 
widespread in South Asia, especially in the Western Ghats with evergreen wet 
forests and northeastern India, in the Eastern Himalayas. Forest communities of the 
Eastern Himalayas have maintained intact patches of cloud forest amidst an almost 
completely denuded landscape and have done so in spite of loss of most cultural 
associations with their sacred groves due to massive conversion of local populations 
to various Christian denominations starting in the mid-nineteenth century. In the 
state of Meghalaya, in many of these sacred groves not even deadwood can be 
removed.7 The extant 29 sacred groves occupy over 25,000 ha. These are evergreen 
forests on a landscape dominated by limestone. Much of the ecology of the region 
continues to be devastated through coal mining and quarrying for limestone besides 
swidden farming that has an increasingly shorter cycle (five years now compared to 
30 years in 1900). Traditionally each village had at least one sacred grove but local 
traditions were largely destroyed by the Christian missionaries. Not one of the 
sacred groves has been systematically inventoried except for major tree species; but 
they are known to be particularly rich in amphibian species that have a high degree 
of microendemism. At least 18 IUCN Red List amphibian species occur in this 
6 For more detail and documentation of these examples, see Sarkar (2012b).
7 Details are from Malhotra et al. (2007) and personal fieldwork.
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region. Cave invertebrates in the many caves and fissures under the ground have not 
been inventoried at all.
Some of the best-known sacred groves of Meghalaya are in the Khasi Hills near 
the town of Sohra (formerly known as Cherrapunji) which, with an average annual 
rainfall of 11,430 mm, is one of the wettest places on Earth. (The honor of being the 
wettest place in the world now belongs to nearby Mawsynram.) Most groves are 
small and occur on the top of hills but the larger ones also include valleys and the 
streams that run through them. The most impressive grove here is at Mawphlang 
which is protected because it is supposed to be inhabited by the spirit “U Basa.” Its 
80 ha contains at least 400 tree species; the fauna have never been inventoried. The 
protection regime (known as “Kw’Law Lyngdoh”) is severe: Mawphlang is one of 
the sacred groves from which even deadwood removal is not permitted. The land 
around the grove is severely degraded.
The complete protection of entire ecological communities may be uncommon 
even though sacred groves occur throughout the South, especially in sub-Saharan 
African countries, most notably Ghana and Kenya. In most African countries, sacred 
groves target a single species or small set of species. Many cultures around the 
world value individual species in other ways (e.g., as totemic species) that may be 
of symbolic value or associated with religious practices. Some communities value 
entire forests. Vermuelen and Koziell (2002) report the case of the Irula hunter- 
gatherers, a semi-nomadic tribe from Tamil Nadu state of southern India. The tribe 
is well-known for its association with snakes, both in catching them and in treating 
snakebites. What this community values is reflected in how they choose a site for 
settlement. First, they assay a forest for medicinal plants, then snakes, then animals 
hunted for food or money (rats, rabbits, mongoose, wild cats, etc.). The assessment 
is complex. The size of animal populations matters and is assessed using the density 
of footprints. Ecological associations between vegetation type and animals are 
taken into account (for example, rabbits with arugampul (Cynodon dactylon), that 
is, Bermuda grass which, despite its name, originated in West Asia). Typically, in a 
twist opposite to conventional ecology, animals are taken as indicators for plants. 
The persistence of forests is critical to the survival of the Irula way of life.
However, this divergence of values need not lead to a vapid cultural relativism 
in which anything can count as biodiversity. We leave ample room for disagree-
ment which may potentially be resolved: for instance, within a culture we may 
debate what we value most, whether we value every endangered species as much as 
we value selected endemic or charismatic ones (species of symbolic and other cul-
tural value). Moreover, cultural values evolve and there can be crosscultural dialec-
tics of engagement, disagreement, and change. Moreover, as we shall see in Sect. 
18.5, we may adopt adequacy conditions that delimit which forms of valuing natu-
ral entities may count as valuing biodiversity. As an example, if we impose a condi-
tion that an adequate definition must value entities that cover a large portion of the 
taxonomic spectrum, valuing totemic species would not count as valuing biodiver-
sity (Sarkar 2012b). These adequacy conditions will allow a partial synthesis of 
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scientific insight and local values. But science will play a subsidiary role: even 
these adequacy conditions have to be culturally debated.
18.4  Problems with Local Normativism
Since a form of local normativism is being endorsed here, it behooves us to rec-
ognize and pay particular attention to potential problems. There are at least four 
of these.
18.4.1  Problems of Scale
The last section contrasted local values with global heritage claims about biodiver-
sity. The designation “global” is clear enough in most contexts, referring to Earth as 
a whole. But “local” is far from clear: it could vary from a community defined by a 
municipality (or perhaps an even smaller spatial unit) to a nation-state. (Nation- 
states, in turn, can vary in size from the Vatican with a population of a few hundred 
or Lichtenstein with a few ten thousand, to China or India each with over a billion.) 
A few nation-states are ethnically almost homogeneous; while some cities alone 
embrace scores of culturally distinctive ethnic groups. Is there a natural scale at 
which biodiversity should be defined or at which conservation measures enacted? 
The former seems implausible and the latter, as we shall see below, is problematic.
As if to mimic this problem, biotic features that are typically held to merit pro-
tection also vary in spatial scale (or extent). In central Texas, microendemic sala-
manders sometimes have their range restricted to a single neighborhood of a city. 
The Barton Springs Salamander (Eurycea sosorum) and the Austin Blind Salamander 
(Eurycea waterlooensis) both have habitat limited to Barton Springs in the middle 
of the city of Austin. The Devil’s Hole Pupfish (Cyprinodon diabolis) is endemic to 
a single cavern-like habitat in Nevada, United States, and has the smallest known 
habitat of a vertebrate species, just 0.008 ha (or 80 sq. m.) at the surface (Reed and 
Stockwell 2014). At the other spatial extreme, the endangered tiger (Panthera tigris) 
ranges from South Asia through Southeast Asia to Siberia (with a large gap at pres-
ent, though not historically, in China) even after it has lost more than 90% of its 
habitat during the twentieth century. Earlier it was also present in parts of West Asia.
Different cultural concerns and values may be dominant at different spatial 
scales. In the case of the two salamander species just mentioned, the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) Red List, the 
global standard for risk designation, identifies them as “Vulnerable” but this 
designation is largely irrelevant to their future since the IUCN has negligible 
influence on conservation efforts in the United States. More pertinently, the United 
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States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) designates them as “Endangered” which 
affords them protection under the ESA.  So does the state of Texas in its own 
assessment of risk for its native species. Most importantly, the protection of both 
salamander species has strong support within the city government of Austin and this 
support gets translated into actions by city agencies to maintain their habitat. The 
Barton Springs Salamander, in particular, is woven into the fabric of the city’s 
cultural life. For those who view such endangered species as important components 
of biodiversity, this is a happy situation.
In contrast, the situation with the tiger is much more complicated. Globally, few 
species have dominated the consciousness of individuals for centuries as the tigers. 
About 70% of the world’s tigers live in India (Gibbens 2017). At the national level, 
since the 1970s, tiger conservation has been a priority as exemplified by the 1973 
launch of Project Tiger. Since 1972, the tiger has been India’s National Animal 
(replacing the Asiatic Lion, Panthera leo persica, a subspecies of which the only 
extant population is also found in one state, Gujarat, in India). At the local level, 
conservation is not so simple. Tigers, as predators, often target cattle and other 
economically important domestic animals. They sometimes prey on humans, 
especially when habitat degradation and conversion, accompanied by a decrease in 
their non-human diet options, brings them into close contact with humans. In some 
tiger habitats, such as the mangrove swamps of the Sunderbans in eastern India and 
Bangladesh, tigers have long been positively embedded into local culture 
(Montgomery 1995). In many other tiger habitats in South Asia, human-tiger con-
flicts have led to local hostility (Gadgil and Guha 1995; Gibbens 2017).
For instance, between 2007 and 2014, in an area near the Chitwan National Park 
in south-central Nepal, local inhabitants intentionally killed four tigers (Dhungana 
et al. 2016). In India, local attitudes have been further confounded by the forced 
dislocation of tens of thousands of resident humans (though accurate numbers are 
hard to come by) during the process of the creation of Tiger Reserves under the 
auspices of Project Tiger (Sarkar 1999, 2005). It would come as no surprise that 
tiger conservation may not be welcome for communities living adjacent to tiger 
habitats. In fact, local resentment in India sometimes allows tiger poachers to hire 
local villagers to help them successfully evade anti-poaching efforts using local 
knowledge; there have even been acts of arson against parks and reserves by 
villagers adversely affected by their establishment under the aegis of Project Tiger 
(Gadgil and Guha 1995). Local values in many of these villages will likely not 
enshrine the protection of as hallowed a conservationist icon as the tiger in India. 
Returning to our definitional project, tigers would not necessarily be enshrined as a 
component of biodiversity. What is required are negotiations and tradeoffs between 
conservationists and victims of tiger depredation.
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18.4.2  Conflicts Between Hierarchical Levels
The ambiguity of “local” shows the potential for conflicts between entities at differ-
ent levels of the political (or cultural) hierarchy from communities through cities, 
districts, provinces, and the nation-state. These conflicts bear upon choices of a 
place embedded in different levels of this hierarchy. So, a locality is not only 
accountable to its community or city values, but also to those of the various regions 
of which it is a part including the nation-state that may well centralize the most 
relevant power for nature protection. Returning to the problem of tiger conservation 
in India, local communities suspicious of tiger conservation are typically pitted 
against conservationists at every other level of government.
The tiger case is hardly unique. In the late 1980s and early 1990s conservation 
efforts in central Texas were dominated by programs to protect multiple species 
besides the salamanders mentioned earlier. These included two migratory bird 
species, the Golden-cheeked Warbler (Dendroica chrysoparia) and the Black- 
capped Vireo (Vireo atricapilla) both of which were eventually declared as 
endangered by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (Mann and Plummer 
1995). Typically, such a declaration must be accompanied by the designation of 
“Critical Habitat” for the persistence of the species which imposes some limits on 
habitat use and transformation. Especially in the case of the Warbler, potential 
designation of Critical Habitat would have affected a wide swath of central and 
southern Texas. Opposition from ranchers was such that it is believed to have played 
a role in the defeat of incumbent Democrat Ann Richards to Republican George 
W. Bush in the gubernatorial election of 1994 (in spite of a promise by USFWS not 
to designate any Critical Habitat in a forlorn attempt to save the election for 
Richards). At the height of the conflict, ranchers explicitly promoted the decimation 
of endangered species. For these ranchers and much of rural Texas from where they 
came, these species would not form part of natural values that they would have 
chosen to protect. Yet, many of the same areas have a long history of private 
conservation of land and wild areas for a variety of reasons including game 
management for hunting.
18.4.3  Conflicts Between Localities
Conflicts occur not only across levels of a hierarchy in which a place may be embed-
ded but between places across space. Returning to our well-worne case of tiger 
conservation, efforts at the national level throughout South and Southeast Asia were 
for a long time in conflict with China (where, perhaps, a few wild tigers persist) 
because of a demand for tiger body parts in a set of practices dubbed traditional 
Chinese medicine. In Southeast Asia many local communities (for instance, in 
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Borneo) value their forests which are viewed as cheap sources of timber in 
neighboring societies such as Japan (Bevis 1995). There are several species that are 
protected in their home range because they are perceived to be at risk but categorized 
as undesirable aliens elsewhere (Marchetti and Engstrom 2016).
It is not being suggested here that these conflicts—across geographical scales, 
within a hierarchy, or across localities—cannot be resolved. Resolution requires 
tradeoffs between different groups. Because the use of formal techniques for group 
decision leads to serious paradoxes (such as the Arrow’s theorem—see Sarkar 
(2012b)), the preferred method for resolution requires deliberation, a process that 
has many other virtues in the resolution of environmental disputes (Norton 1994). 
However, there remains another problem, very similar to the conflict between 
places, but not quite identical; it requires cooperation, rather than tradeoffs, between 
communities across large geographical scales.
18.4.4  Conservation of Processes
When conservation efforts are directed towards landscapes and seascapes, their 
focus is typically on individual places (conservation areas), that is, culturally 
embedded areas with significant biodiversity content, though (as noted earlier) 
care must be taken to accommodate interactions between such localities. However, 
protecting places in isolation is rarely enough to ensure persistence of biodiversity. 
Persistence requires the maintenance of biophysical processes and these occur at 
multiple scales, from local wind-borne pollination and seed dispersal to ocean 
currents.
Processes themselves that can become the goal of conservation efforts include 
long-distance animal migrations. The spectacular 10,000-km migration of 
loggerhead turtles (Caretta caretta) between Baja California (Mexico) and Japan is 
well known (Shanker 2015). The annual migration of Monarch butterflies (Danaus 
plexippus) in North America is perhaps even more impressive. It is the longest insect 
migration known to science and the problems faced for its conservation exemplify 
the difficulties of conserving processes.
There are two North American migratory populations, one with habitat largely 
restricted to the west of the Rockies, mainly in California and adjoining states, and 
the other migrating from central Mexico to the north of the United States and 
southern Canada east of the Rockies. There are also several non-migratory 
populations in Florida, the Caribbean, Latin America, and elsewhere. (This means 
that an end to the migration phenomenon does not constitute the extinction of the 
species.)
The western population mainly winters in California but some insects do move 
further south through Arizona to Sonora in Mexico. During the Spring most 
individuals move to the north and east of California. The eastern population, once 
over a billion individuals, overwinters in a dozen or so high altitude oyamel fir 
forests in the Transvolcanic Belt of central Mexico, covering the trees like carpets. 
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All these winter roosts occur within a 100 × 100 km square (Brower and Aridjis 
2013). In the spring, after a frenzy of mating, the insects fly north to Texas. Most 
females lay their eggs on Texas milkweeds, typically attached to the underside of a 
leaf with only one egg per plant. Most of the wintering generation dies.
The eggs hatch into caterpillars that feed exclusively on milkweeds, pupate, and 
emerge as adult butterflies. (In contrast, adults feed on the nectar of flowers of a 
wide range of plant species; milkweeds are no longer particularly important.) The 
new generation hatched in Texas continues the northward journey. The population 
fans out, covering much of the United States north of Texas and east of the Rockies. 
Some butterflies probably change course to turn south to Florida to add numbers to 
a local non-migratory monarch population found in that state. Most continue going 
north over a third and, sometimes, even a fourth generation. The northern limit of 
the migration spans the upper Midwest of the United States onwards to Ontario and 
the southern edge of Canada. Over these three or four generations the butterflies 
may travel up to almost 5000 km.
The return journey is even more impressive. The last generation produced in the 
north travels back to the tiny overwintering area in Mexico. The insects sip nectar 
for fuel along the way, and flying only by day while typically roosting in small 
groups for the night. How the insects manage to find their oyamel islands is still 
poorly understood. Each insect must have both a “map” and a “compass” (Agrawal 
2017). Here a “map” means that the insect must know where it is: how the monarch 
does this remains an unsolved problem. Direction is set by a “time-compensated sun 
compass” by which each insect uses its internal circadian clock to sense the time of 
day and the position of the sun to orient itself in the correct direction. When the fall 
migration starts, the preferred direction is south. The compass is reset during the 
winter; in spring, the preferred direction becomes north.
For the last few decades, biologists have been warning that this process is endan-
gered. (The species itself is not at risk because of the existence of many non- 
migratory populations.) Because the overwintering population in Mexico is the 
entire source of the entire northward migratory population in the spring (and, 
therefore, of the migratory phenomenon itself), trends in its size are directly relevant 
to the question whether the migration will persist in the future. These overwintering 
populations numbered 400 million individuals in the early 1990s but only 100 million 
yearly since 2010, with a historical low of about 35 million in 2013–2014 (Sarkar 
2017b). What has caused this decline remains a matter of controversy.
There is some consensus the degradation and disappearance of the wintering hab-
itat in Mexico has contributed to the migratory population decline. For the wintering 
habitat, Mexican authorities began systematic conservation efforts in 2000, and these 
now appear promising in spite of past problems (Víctor Sánchez- Cordero, personal 
communication). Beyond that, two conflicting hypotheses have been suggested 
though both could be operative. The milkweed limitation hypothesis predicts that 
spring monarch breeding populations before migration are in decline in the midwest-
ern and northeastern United States and southern Canada. The alternative migration 
survival hypothesis proposes that the southward migratory population is suffering 
excessive mortality on its way south in Texas and northern Mexico (Sarkar 2017b).
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If the milkweed limitation hypothesis is correct, conservation measures should 
be directed to milkweed restoration at the northern end of the migratory range, and 
many such efforts have been under way for more than a decade though, arguably, 
little to show in way of results. If the migration survival hypothesis is correct, 
efforts should be directed to providing food and shelter to the migrating population 
towards the southern end of the migration. If both are correct, both measures 
become important.
The salient point here is that maintaining the monarch migration will require 
collaboration across a continent-sized landscape. It is dissimilar to the case of 
conflicts between localities discussed earlier only because there is no potential for 
a solution through tradeoffs. Those who value monarch migration conservation as 
an important goal have a difficult task: what they are demanding is the value be 
attached to a process, not an entity, because the monarch as a species is not at risk 
of pending extinction.
18.5  A Synthetic Proposal
Where does all this leave us? Recall that, at the end of Sect. 18.3, it was noted that 
adequacy conditions can be adopted to constrain potential definitions of biodiversity 
based on local norms. It will be taken for granted that what is being targeted for 
protection is some aspect of nature (operationally distinguished from what are 
considered cultural features though, this distinction is not always trivial to maintain). 
The proposed constraints are intended to prevent all such natural targets of protection 
to be characterized as components of biodiversity, that is, what, elsewhere, I have 
called biodiversity constituents (Sarkar 2008, 2012b).8 These adequacy conditions 
are necessary to distinguish biodiversity as a value from cases such as: what is 
valued is some magnificent geological formation, the desire to preserve pristine 
wildernesses9, the protection of totemic species alone, the targeted protection of 
charismatic species such as large mammals in eastern and southern Africa, and so 
on. This is not to suggest that these are not important and culturally salient goals of 
conservation; biodiversity is not the only feature that deserves protection.10
More importantly, these adequacy conditions can be used to incorporate many, 
though not all, of the intuitions behind the many scientistic attempts to define 
biodiversity mentioned in Sect. 18.2. This claim will be elaborated below as the four 
conditions proposed here are discussed in detail. Suffice it here to know that such a 
8 Earlier in the literature, these were called “true surrogates” for biodiversity—see Sarkar (2002), 
Margules and Sarkar (2002), and Margules and Sarkar (2007).
9 There are serious ethical problems with wilderness preservation (Woods 2001) but what is most 
important here is that the
goal of wilderness preservation is not only distinct but also divergent from biodiversity conser-
vation (Sarkar 1999).
10 See Santana’s contribution to this volume to find a similar claim in different terminology.
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strategy allows a partial synthesis between the scientistic and normativist approaches, 
though only partial because only the intuitions behind the scientistic definitions 
rather than their specifics get incorporated into this strategy.
What requirements should we impose on potential biodiversity constituents? 
Here, four adequacy conditions will be proposed11:
 1. Constituent entities be biotic: We are proposing a definition of biodiversity. This 
conditions dates back to Sarkar and Margules (2002). It allows biodiversity 
constituents to be habitat types, taxa, communities, genes, traits, and so on; but 
it excludes, for instance, physical environmental features such as rock formations 
or sand dunes. It also excludes human cultural diversity whether or not cultural 
diversity contributes to the presence or persistence of biodiversity in a given 
context.
Nonbiotic features may well be good surrogates for the constituents in con-
servation planning. For instance, Sarkar et al. (2005) showed that sets of abiotic 
environmental classes are often adequate surrogates for varied classes of biota 
(the putative biodiversity constituents), while many authors have argued that sets 
of taxa are very rarely good surrogates for each other (Margules and Sarkar 
2007) even though they continue to be used (Caro 2010). The success of environ-
mental surrogates does not provide any argument that such abiotic features 
should be considered as components of biodiversity; rather, it shows that they are 
good surrogates for biodiversity.
 2. Emphasis must be on variability of the constituent set: That is why it is biodiver-
sity. The motivation for this criterion is best explained using an example. 
Neotropical rain forests have played an iconic role in conservationist campaigns 
since the mid-1980s, their public appeal perhaps best exemplified by Caufield’s 
(1984) haunting account of their disappearance around the world. Yet, neotropical 
dry forests are far rarer and more threatened (due to ongoing land cover 
conversion) than rain forests. When neotropical rain forests, which are arguably 
over-protected in some regions such as Ecuador, are taken to be emblematic of 
biodiversity at the expense of neotropical dry forests to the extent of being the 
basis for a characterization of biodiversity, this condition is not met.
For habitat types this means that attention should not be restricted to some 
subset and exclude all others entirely when biodiversity is defined. When dealing 
with taxonomic groups, this condition also suggests that differences at higher 
taxonomic levels than that of species are more salient than inter-specific 
differences. To put it another way, a species that is the sole member of a phylum 
(e.g., the aquatic species, Trichoplax adhaerens, the sole member of Placozoa12) 
11 In my own work, these adequacy conditions have evolved over the years due to continued discus-
sion in many forums—see, for example, Sarkar (2008, 2012b). Condition 4 is being proposed here 
for the first time.
12 Note that there is some controversy over this uniqueness claim because some taxonomists feel 
that there is sufficient genetic diversity within this putative species to distinguish it into several 
morphogenetically very similar species (Voigt et al. 2004).
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is more important for conservation than a species which belongs to a genus with 
thousands of species (e.g., any jewel beetle species of the genus Agrilus).
 3. Embrace taxonomic spread: It is particularly important that the definition does 
not by fiat place arbitrary limitations on the taxa permitted to fall under the scope 
of “biodiversity.” This requirement is probably not controversial. Part of the 
rhetoric of early conservation biology was that there was a need to move beyond 
charismatic species that had been the traditional foci of conservation campaigns 
and embrace the full spectrum of life as worthy of preservation. This rhetoric 
was often matched by the more concrete proposals that emerged from the field. 
Its sincerity is being accepted here.
An important function of “biodiversity” was to codify this broadening of con-
servationist intent. It is arguable that not imposing some requirement that is 
functionally equivalent to the one being proposed here would miss the entire 
point of why the new term was enthusiastically adopted in the historical context 
of its introduction.
 4. Biodiversity constituents must be precise enough for their presence and abun-
dance to be measured: Within conservation biology in the 1990s, one of the 
motivations for defining biodiversity was to enable its measurement and 
quantification. For instance, Williams and Humphreys (1994) begin their 
discussion with two problems that have to be solved: (1) a relatively theoretical 
one—what is to be measured? and (2) a practical one—can the data “realistically” 
be collected? So, it seems reasonable to impose a measurability adequacy 
condition.
Margules and Sarkar (2002) modified Williams and Humphreys’ distinction 
to distinguish between a quantification problem and an estimation problem 
which together form what they called a biodiversity assessment problem. Solving 
the former requires the ability to measure biodiversity constituents in principle. 
That is what this condition requires. Solving the latter problem requires the oper-
ationalization of biodiversity for various purposes. For instance, in conservation 
planning, the detailed spatial distributions of thousands of biodiversity units are 
required as data. For many biodiversity constituents, obtaining such data, even 
though in principle possible, is not in practice reasonable given time and other 
resource constraints. What must then be found are adequate surrogates (such as 
the environmental classes discussed earlier) but these are not part of the defini-
tion of biodiversity.
It is instructive to analyze which sets of features survive this adequacy test and 
which ones do not. One standard approach, that biodiversity is all diversity at the 
level of genes, species, and ecosystems does not—it calls afoul of Condition 4. 
Sets of all at-risk species survive community; as do sets of habitat types (so long as 
they are defined, at least in part, using the ecological communities in them) though 
it is arguable that the first of these satisfies Conditions 2 and 3 only accidentally 
rather than as a matter of emphasis. (There is no deep reason why at-risk species—
or other taxa—should be varied in their content or span much of the taxonomic 
hierarchy.)
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These cases will probably come as no surprise to conservation biologists who 
embrace a scientistic attitude to biodiversity. In fact, they show how these adequacy 
criteria help bridge the gap between normativism and scientism. However, the 
adequacy conditions also admit non-standard collectives as potential constituent 
sets for biodiversity, for instance, the sacred groves of Meghalaya (India) discussed 
earlier. Conditions 1 is obviously satisfied. Condition 2 is satisfied because different 
kinds of forests present in the region can constitute sacred groves and, internally, 
they exhibit the variability of tropical cloud forests. Condition 3 is satisfied because 
each sacred grove is viewed as consisting of all biotic features within them. 
Condition 4 is satisfied because the number and type of sacred groves in any given 
collection is relatively easily assayed. If the earlier cases show that the adequacy 
conditions enable the relevance of scientific intuitions, this one shows how local 
normativism does not lose out. These conditions permit wide cultural divergences 
about what type of natural variety merits protection.
18.6  Concluding Remarks
The discussion of biodiversity in this paper has presumed the categoricity of its use 
in conservation biology and, more generally, biodiversity conservation. However, 
other areas of biology, in particular taxonomy, have also laid claim to the term over 
the years. How would the definitional strategy proposed here fare in these areas? 
Not very well, at least in the case of taxonomy. Taxonomy, by its own explicit goals, 
is fundamentally a descriptive enterprise; though its theoretical structure does 
embrace some normative issues, these are epistemological rather than axiological as 
seen, for instance, in the debates over cladistics (Platnick 1978). Normativism, as 
outlined here, is simply irrelevant to taxonomy though most taxonomists no doubt 
embrace many of the normative goals of biodiversity conservation.
How should we address the potential dissonance between the strategy for defin-
ing biodiversity presented here and the concerns of taxonomy? The answer given 
here will be cynical and based on sociological speculation that must be tested 
against data before the answer is deemed plausible. The speculations: Classical tax-
onomy had been underfunded since the dominance of molecular biology over the 
life sciences was established in the 1960s. By the time that conservation biology and 
“biodiversity” came along in the late 1980s, classical taxonomy based on 
macroscopic organismic rather than molecular traits, was a dying discipline. 
Taxonomists jumped on the biodiversity bandwagon when it became apparent that 
conservation was becoming a powerful current within and beyond the environmental 
movement. There was money for biodiversity inventory and conservation and, by 
endorsing that locution, taxonomists could lay claim to some of those resources.
To continue with the cynicism: Conservation biology was supposed to be a “cri-
sis discipline” (Soulé 1985) because species were becoming extinct before biolo-
gists could even describe, let alone study, them. With respect to description, the 
problem was presented as a shortage of trained taxonomists available for 
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that task.13 The solution? More money for taxonomy. In Costa Rica, there were even 
moves to generate an army of sparsely-trained “parataxonomists,” akin to China’s 
barefoot doctors of the Cultural Revolution, with the task of inventory, producing 
lists of species at individual locations.
Taxonomy obviously does not place any taxonomic limit on what should be 
described: the more obscure or difficult a group of organisms, the more technical 
acuity could be deployed in their classification. From this perspective, the operative 
measure of biodiversity is species richness (or, possibly, richness at some higher 
taxonomic level). Success in taxonomy is determined in part by the sheer number of 
taxa that are successfully described. It is perhaps because they take the claims of 
taxonomists to be as pertinent as those of conservationists that philosophers such as 
Maclaurin and Sterelny (2008) embrace richness in their account of biodiversity. A 
major advantage of this approach is simplicity: richness is conceptually easy to 
grasp and relatively easy to measure in the field. But the earlier discussions in this 
paper should also underline the problems.
Why reject the salience of taxonomy? It is time to move beyond cynicism and 
speculation. The point is that the concept of richness was available to taxonomists 
long before the advent of “biodiversity.” Not only did taxonomy not need the new 
concept, the neologism made no difference to the practice of taxonomy as a discipline. 
For taxonomists, “biodiversity” was a slogan, a source of resources for their field.
In contrast, conservation biologists required an operationalized concept of biodi-
versity to assess the extent to which any measure succeeds or fails because the 
conservation of biodiversity was the explicit goal of the field (Sarkar and Margules 
2002). This is the argument from necessity. If we also accept that concepts are best 
understood in the context of their introduction and use, biodiversity must be 
understood in the context of conservation biology. But even if we do not endorse 
this argument from genesis, the argument from necessity makes conservation central 
to the meaning of biodiversity which, given this context, in turn requires a focus on 
norms and values for its definition.
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Chapter 19 
Natural Diversity: How Taking the Bio- out 
of Biodiversity Aligns with Conservation 
Priorities
Carlos Santana
Abstract The concept of biodiversity, I argue, is poorly suited as an indicator of 
conservation value. An earlier concept, natural diversity, fits the role better. Natural 
diversity is broader than biodiversity not only in moving beyond taxonomic catego-
ries to encompass other patterns in the tapestry of life, but also in including abiotic, 
but valuable, aspects of nature. It encompasses, for instance, geological curiosities, 
natural entities of historical and cultural significance, and parts of nature with 
unique recreational and aesthetic value. It allows us to capture the idea of a diversity 
of ecosystem services, many of which are abiotic or have significant abiotic compo-
nents. I make the case that refocusing conservation science around natural diversity 
retains many of benefits of using biodiversity as an indicator of value, while avoid-
ing many of biodiversity’s shortcomings. In particular, it provides a framework that 
highlights the conservation value of many biodiversity “coldspots,” avoids the injus-
tice of making conservation primarily the responsibility of the global south/devel-
oping world, and fits more neatly with the legal and ethical frameworks used to 
make conservation decisions in the public sphere.
Keywords Biodiversity · Ecosystem services · Environmental science
Summers in the Great Basin Desert of the Western United States are often intoler-
ably hot and dry, but this is mitigated by the fact that in the Great Basin you’re never 
far from a mountain range. One hot summer a decade or so ago, some friends and I 
escaped the heat by hiking up Mount Timpanogos, home of the only glacier in Utah. 
A highlight of the trek was taking a shortcut on the descent by sliding down the 
glacier. Years later I recounted this to a colleague who moved to Utah more recently, 
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and she replied, “what glacier?” A quick online search revealed that the glacier has 
retreated to below the talus and hikers can no longer slide down it, one of many 
signs that our Great Basin environment is being reshaped by climate change.
Glaciers won’t be the only climate losers in Utah. Decades earlier, famed envi-
ronmentalist and author Edward Abbey wrote about ascending Tukuhnikivats, a 
mountain near Arches National Monument. He calls the mountain an “island in the 
desert” and flees to it in the heat of late August (Abbey 2011: 217). Scrambling up 
the talus below the summit late in his hike, he hears the whistles of pikas, a sound 
he equates with the experience of reaching the summit (ibid: 224). Pikas are rabbit- 
like creatures which in Utah live only in alpine and subalpine zones. For the pika, 
the mountain peaks are quite literally islands in the desert, and as the Earth warms 
and the tree line creeps upward, those islands will become submerged. Soon there 
may be no more pikas in Utah, and none of us will be able to relive Abbey’s famous 
experience.
These losses due to climate change are obviously losses of some sort of value. I 
want to probe how we conceptualize that loss of value. In the case of the pika, one 
ready answer is that if the pika goes locally extinct, we will have lost biodiversity 
(in the form of species richness). That biodiversity loss encompasses and explains 
the various ways in which losing the pika is a loss of value, including the inability 
to relive Abbey’s hike the way he experienced it. But what about the glacier which 
I slid down as a young man? Its loss is also a loss of value, and it’s a shame that my 
present-day students can’t recreate the experience I had when I hiked Timpanogos. 
The loss of the glacier is not a biodiversity loss, but it feels like a loss of much the 
same sort as the loss of the pika. This similarity suggests a need for a concept that 
encompasses both sorts of loss.
Moreover, we need a concept that better captures the way in which having alpine 
islands in the desert is valuable. It isn’t merely the way the pikas and the alpine flora 
contribute to local biodiversity. By providing a contrast to the desert valleys below—
in biodiversity, yes, but also in aesthetic experience, in ecosystem services provided, 
and even in temperature and humidity—the mountain peaks contribute to Utah’s 
natural diversity. The loss of our last glacier is a loss of natural diversity, even if it 
isn’t a loss in biodiversity,1 and that same feature will be true of all sorts of changes 
in ecological value.
Biodiversity plays a central role in how we measure and discuss value in the 
conservation context, but it is an inadequate indicator of ecological value. The more 
inclusive concept of natural diversity avoids most of these shortcomings without 
bringing significant new baggage of its own. These reasons, I suggest, warrant plac-
ing natural diversity in the central conservation role that biodiversity currently occu-
pies. At the very least, entertaining the concept of natural diversity can, by providing 
1 It is probable, of course, that the glacier contributes to the diversity of the microbiome. Suppose, 
however, that the microbial diversity persists under the talus but the glacier remains inaccessible to 
hikers. This is still a loss of value. Furthermore, even if some microbial diversity is lost, it is 
implausible that most of the loss of value is explained by the loss of the microbial diversity.
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a useful contrast, clarify many of the issues in assessing and characterizing biodi-
versity that motivate this volume.
19.1  The Shortcomings of Biodiversity
Biodiversity occupies a central place in conservation science as an object of mea-
surement, a basis for decisions in conservation planning, and as the primary conser-
vation objective.2 In occupying these roles, biodiversity is an organizing concept 
which focuses and unifies conservation research, and an umbrella concept (Lévêque 
1994) which covers a broad array of conservation concerns. By playing this key role 
biodiversity serves as a representative of ecological value, the complete set of envi-
ronmental goods of any sort—not only the intrinsic value of natural entities, but the 
economic, aesthetic, cultural, recreational, spiritual, and health amenities they pro-
vide (Santana 2016). Ecological value in this broad sense is the grounds for conser-
vation efforts, so as Norton argues, the right definition of biodiversity is one “rich 
enough to capture all that we mean by, and value in, nature” (2006: 57). By conserv-
ing biodiversity, we aim to conserve ecological value of all kinds. In many ways 
biodiversity is well suited to this task. Ecological value of most kinds tends to 
depend on the living organisms that compose ecosystems, and thus on biodiversity. 
Conversely, since biodiversity relies on many ecological factors, including abiotic 
processes (Noss 1990), biodiversity conservation entails the conservation of other 
natural goods. Biodiversity can be operationalized in various useful ways, such as 
counts of richness (number of units), relative abundance, and measures of differ-
ence. It can also be assessed at biological levels of various sorts, such as genes, 
species, and ecosystems. This makes for flexible, scientifically meaningful, and 
computationally tractable measures that can feed into conservation planning (Sarkar 
and Margules 2002). Biodiversity also has an inclusive scope, allowing us to argue 
for the conservation of species and populations which might fall through the cracks 
were we to prioritize a different indicator of ecological value. For all these reasons, 
biodiversity makes sense as a conservation target.
The concept of biodiversity has come under scrutiny, however, in large part 
because of a sizeable gap between biodiversity value and ecological value construed 
broadly. It’s easy, as a working conservationist, to lose sight of the connection 
between what’s being measured and ecological value. For this reason, even some 
defenders of biodiversity worry, writing “we do not think that measurement strate-
gies in conservation biology have been convincingly connected to wider theories 
that show the importance of the magnitudes measured” (Maclaurin and Sterelny 
2008: 149). The assumption that our measurements of genes, species, higher taxa 
2 Biological diversity also plays important roles outside the context of conservation, such as an 
explanandum in ecology and evolutionary biology. This chapter isn’t concerned with these roles, 
but more narrowly with biodiversity’s central role in conservation.
19 Natural Diversity: How Taking the Bio- out of Biodiversity Aligns…
404
and so on adequately represent those economic, cultural, aesthetic, and other values 
needs to be called into question.
Many researchers have done just that, calling into question how our measures of 
biodiversity relate to ecological value. Sarkar (2002; see also his 2008 and 2016), 
for instance, notes that the standard units of diversity in conservation biology fail to 
capture important units of ecological value, such as butterfly migration patterns. He 
argues that we should adopt a highly-flexible, open-ended concept of biodiversity. 
On Sarkar’s picture, selecting the object of measurement (the true surrogate) when 
we assess biodiversity “is not an empirical question; rather it must be settled by 
convention” (2014: 5). Specifically, each local, conventional definition of biodiver-
sity should be “based on normative considerations” that reflect the individual con-
text and local cultural values (2014: 5–6). In this way, biodiversity measures can be 
tailored to account for, say, the cultural significance of a non-endangered species 
such as the Bald Eagle, which was never in danger of extinction but merited costly 
conservation efforts (2014). In its most extreme form, this deflationary, contextual 
account of biodiversity would give up on the content of the concept of biodiversity 
(i.e. that it is about the biota and about diversity) to allow it to encompass the whole 
range of ecological values. Sarkar’s more recent work (2014, 2016) disavows this 
extreme stance, but the issues which motivated a more deflationary account of bio-
diversity remain.
Alternatively, Maier (2012) argues in detail that extant defenses of the value of 
biodiversity all commit fallacies, perhaps most significantly that of conflating the 
value of biodiversity with the value of other individual entities such as species and 
ecosystem processes. It is these natural entities that have value, and not the system- 
level property of being biodiverse. Motivated by similar issues, Santana (2014, 
2016) argues that biodiversity is often a poor indicator of others sorts of ecological 
value. For example, cultural and aesthetic values often attach to places existing in a 
preferred state, even if that state has lower biodiversity than a possible alternative. 
Invasive plant species, for instance, can sometimes coexist alongside indigenous 
plants, meaning that invasions can increase biodiversity (Cleland et al. 2004). But 
we are still justified, because of our attachment to historical landscapes, in fighting 
benignly invasive species. To give another example, the units of biodiversity (spe-
cies, phyla, genes, etc.) are, in measurement practice, interchangeable with other 
units of the same type. Consequently, biodiversity measures ignore the way in which 
some units differ significantly in value from others. They ignore, for instance, how 
a bat species which eats tons of disease-carrying mosquitos has higher ecological 
value than the mosquito species it eats.3 Another set of critics, Morar et al., put the 
3 True, biodiversity measures can be sensitive to where organisms sit in the trophic network, not 
only through direct measures of trophic diversity, but also because the secondary effects of biodi-
versity loss are mediated by the structure of the trophic network (Dunne et al. 2002), and because 
trophic factors may regulate levels of species diversity (Terborgh 2015).
But my claim here isn’t that biodiversity measures are insensitive to the importance of trophic 
roles to ecosystem function. I’m claiming that important normative considerations (e.g. malaria is 
value-negative) are largely invisible to biodiversity measures. Because malaria is value-negative, 
mosquito species which transmit malaria have less value, and bat species which prey on those 
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issue succinctly: “there are good reasons to doubt whether [biodiversity] provides 
any guidance for environmental decision-makers or has any clearly established rela-
tionship with those aspects of nature about which we care the most” (2015: 16–17).
In addition to worries about the gap between ecological value and biodiversity 
measures, Morar et al. accuse the concept of biodiversity as presenting a veneer of 
scientific objectivity while conservation scientists undemocratically impose their 
own environmental values on policy-making. According to this argument, the nor-
mativity of the biodiversity concept means that the policies supported by the tech-
niques of conservation biology are value-laden. Whose values? The scientists’ 
values, since they choose how to define and measure biodiversity. But this isn’t 
transparent to society at large, thus the values of the broader public might not have 
an appropriate input to conservation decision-making. The focus on biodiversity 
conservation is, in effect, an injustice through technocracy. For this reason, Kareiva 
and Marvier (2012) suggest that conservation biology reframe itself as an interdis-
ciplinary conservation science, one which uses social science to better measure 
anthropocentric ecological value. The original sin of conservation biology, they 
argue, was its “inattention to human well-being” (2012: 963). If biodiversity is at 
the heart of what matters, then “the vast majority of people are a threat” to ecologi-
cal value, rather than among its beneficiaries (ibid). The focus on biodiversity con-
servation has thus unjustly relegated socially-oriented ecological values to the 
background.
Mismatch between biodiversity value and ecological value shows up in practice 
as well as theory, perhaps most notably in how biodiversity conservation is largely 
a burden on the “Global South.” Although conservation biology emerged in wealthy 
industrialized countries (the “Global North”), biodiversity increases on a latitudinal 
gradient that peaks at the equator (Hillebrand 2004), meaning that most biodiversity 
is concentrated in the less-developed tropical and subtropical nations of the Global 
South. Likewise, the areas identified by conservation biologists as biodiversity 
hotspots—the places of highest conservation concern—are mostly in South 
America, Africa, South Asia, and tropical islands (Myers et al. 2000). We hear a lot 
about saving the rainforests and coral reefs, but not so much about how the American 
Midwest is no longer a place where “the buffalo roam and the deer and the antelope 
play,” in the words of a nineteenth century folk song. As a result, conservation has 
focused much more on the Global South, and while biodiversity conservation and 
economic development are not always in competition (Tallis et al. 2008), there are 
almost always tradeoffs (McShane et al. 2011). Most importantly, a chief tool of 
conservation biology is setting aside protected areas (Rands et al. 2010; Miller et al. 
2011), which often imposes significant burdens on local people and indigenous 
groups (Adams et  al. 2004). For this reason, socially-oriented environmental 
researchers have often been at odds with conservation biologists and environmental 
philosophers who extoll biodiversity value (Miller et al. 2011). The focus on biodi-
mosquitos are more valuable. Bats and mosquitos thus exhibit a value differential, one that is 
explained by factors independent of their relative contributions to biodiversity, and so isn’t easy 
represented by a biodiversity measure.
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versity conservation has thus been a double injustice, placing unfair burdens on the 
Global South, and ignoring ecological values in the Global North and biodiversity 
“cold-spots” more generally.
19.2  Natural Diversity as an Alternative
Deconstruct biodiversity into its two components, biological and diversity. My pro-
posal is that the chief virtues of treating biodiversity as the primary target of conser-
vation come solely from the diversity component. Conversely most of the 
problematic features of biodiversity arise from the biological component, since it is 
the focus on organisms which excludes many sources of value. We should therefore 
aim to retain the benefits of the diversity component while mitigating the drawbacks 
of the biological component.
A good candidate for doing so would be to supplant the concept of biodiversity 
in conservation concepts with a diversity concept that extends beyond the biologi-
cal, which I’ll call natural diversity. The United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity defines biodiversity as “the variability among living organisms from all 
sources4;” modeled on that definition, we can define natural diversity as ‘the vari-
ability among natural entities from all sources’. Note that this is a departure from 
some previous usage of the term, which has sometimes equated natural diversity 
with what we would now call biodiversity (e.g. in Terborgh 1974, or as used in 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service directive 701 FW 1). In the broader sense of natural 
diversity that I have specified, preserving natural diversity is a better conservation 
goal than preserving biodiversity because it retains the benefits of the diversity com-
ponent, but moves beyond the biological component.
The chief virtues of biodiversity as an organizing concept in conservation are its 
flexibility and its inclusivity. What makes biodiversity so flexible is the number of 
ways we can operationalize it: as species richness, as complementarity, as func-
tional diversity, and so on. As a broader concept, natural diversity could be opera-
tionalized even more flexibly, for instance in measures of abiotic soil components, 
as diversity of human experience of landscapes (measured through psychological or 
economic methods), or as measures of geological composition,5 to give a few exam-
ples. Measures such as these might account for how the loss of a glacier is a loss of 
ecological value even if there is no corresponding loss of biodiversity. Natural diver-
sity would thus be a more flexible conservation target.
It would also be more inclusive, for similar reasons. Natural diversity includes 
the diversity of living things, but also other forms of diversity. Lakes whose mineral 
4 https://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/default.shtml?a=cbd-02
5 This might draw on extant conceptions of geodiversity (Kozłowski 2004; Gray 2004), or some 
alternative. Either way, because natural diversity includes cultural, historical, economic, and expe-
riential components (among other things), it is more than just biodiversity supplemented with 
geodiversity.
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content is too high to support the diversity of species other lakes support (e.g. Mono 
Lake or the Great Salt Lake) still contribute to natural diversity, partially in virtue of 
being inhospitable to most forms of biodiversity!6 A barren sandstone cliff which 
hosts few organisms, and thus contributes little to biodiversity, might support unique 
climbing routes and thus have high ecological value. The frigid Kola Peninsula in 
the Russian Arctic won’t show up on any maps of biodiversity hotspots, but its 
unusual mineral assemblages are of great scientific interest. An area held to be 
uniquely sacred by an indigenous group is naturally diverse for that reason, even if 
it isn’t biodiverse. A waterway which hosts no endangered species may provide a 
unique transportation corridor for the local population. If our aim is to conserve 
natural diversity, all these places will rank high in ecological value, but if biodiver-
sity is our primary conservation goal, they might be ignored. Natural diversity is 
thus a more inclusive concept than biodiversity.
In addition to surpassing biodiversity in the virtues of flexibility and inclusive-
ness, natural diversity avoids some (but not all) of biodiversity’s vices. Most impor-
tantly, as the examples in the last paragraph highlight, it is a better indicator of 
ecological value. Any natural entity of distinctive ecological value is a significant 
site of natural diversity in virtue of that distinctiveness. This includes entities of 
distinctive cultural, recreational, scientific, and economic value, even if those enti-
ties contribute little to biodiversity. The gap between natural diversity and ecologi-
cal value is thus much smaller than the gap between biodiversity and ecological 
value. Some gap will remain, since some ecological value just doesn’t fall under the 
rubric of diversity in any form, as Maier (2012) and Santana (2016) demonstrate. 
No single concept that is anything less than intolerably vague is likely to encompass 
everything of ecological value, however, and that natural diversity does better than 
biodiversity is a strong point in its favor.
Natural diversity also avoids the potentially unjust ramifications of using biodi-
versity as the central conservation concept. We have no reason to expect that natural 
diversity hotspots will cluster in the Global South or that any components of natural 
diversity besides biodiversity increase on a latitudinal gradient. If natural diversity 
is the more fundamental concept, conservationists should take the loss of visible 
stars in a European city to be a loss of conservation value commensurable with 
(though not necessarily equal to) the loss of an insect species in Madagascar. 
Consider the following contrast: the rowdy Canadian filmmakers who needlessly 
damaged unusual natural wonders in the U.S., such as the Bonneville Salt Flats and 
Yellowstone’s Grand Prismatic Spring, got off with a small fine and are publicly 
called “good young men” (Penrod 2016). In South Africa, by contrast, impover-
ished hunters who kill endangered species are themselves killed by the hundreds 
and imprisoned by the thousands (Burleigh 2017). Although damaging a tract of salt 
flat may not be as morally significant as killing a sentient animal, there is clearly 
something inequitable in how those who harm natural diversity in the developed 
6 Uniquely inhospitable environments host unique organisms such as extremophiles, and so con-
tribute to biodiversity as well, but (a) still have comparatively low biodiversity, and (b) their biodi-
versity value is the lesser part of their value.
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world receive a mere slap on the wrist, while those who harm biodiversity in the 
developing world can pay with their lives. In terms of conservation value, both cases 
are serious losses of natural diversity and we should expend commensurate efforts 
to promote conservation in both cases. In fact, given that individual rhinos and ele-
phants are more easily replaced than individual geological oddities, in terms of 
conservation values7 the “good young men” may have caused more harm than any 
individual poacher. Obviously, few conservationists would endorse the murder of 
South African poachers. But a biodiversity-centered conservation framework does 
entail that the actions of the poachers are much more serious than the actions of the 
thoughtless filmmakers. A natural diversity framework, on the other hand, entails 
that the actions of both poacher and “good young man” are of a type: harm to natu-
ral diversity. The threats to natural diversity, like natural diversity itself, are thus 
globally distributed, and the burdens of conservation are correspondingly placed as 
much on the shoulders of relatively wealthy First-Worlders as much as they are on 
the backs of the Global South.
Another advantage of natural diversity as the central value concept in justifying 
protected areas is that legal frameworks for establishing conservation areas already 
appeal to something like it. At the very least, the law typically subordinates biodi-
versity to a broader class of values. In one chapter of her book Imagining Extinction, 
Heise examines how conservation law around the world is not preoccupied with 
“mainly a matter of counting how many species have been preserved or have died 
out,” but more with fulfilling “the political, social, and cultural purposes to which it 
links the conservation of biodiversity” (2016: 91–92). For example, German law 
“protects endangered species for the sake of conserving culturally defined land-
scapes rather than habitats for the sake of species” (2016: 90). In other words, the 
law prioritizes a set of landscapes, which is diversity at the level of natural diversity, 
not biodiversity. In Bolivia, as Heise recounts, biodiversity conservation is legally 
situated as part of laws situating the Earth itself as a legal subject, and which invoke 
the cosmologies of indigenous people (2016: 114–116). Biodiversity conservation’s 
ultimate justification in such a system is thus its contribution to a broader category, 
“the differentiation and variety of the beings that make Mother Earth” (2016: 116), 
which sounds more like natural diversity. Even in the United States, where the 
Endangered Species Act is so central to the environmentalist’s toolkit, much, per-
haps most, of the legal justification for setting aside protected areas comes from the 
American Antiquities Act of 1906 (Harmon et al. 2006), which justifies protection 
not of biodiversity, but of “objects of historic or scientific interest.” These sorts of 
objects are cultural, archaeological, and geological features which may not fall 
under the rubric of biodiversity, but do contribute to natural diversity more broadly. 
Furthermore, the designation of national and state parks, which are some of the 
7 There are non-conservation values at play here as well: large mammals are sentient, and thus 
hedonistic values matter as well. But poaching is a bad mostly in terms of conservation value—if 
the suffering inflicted on the hunted animals was the chief concern, poaching would be no worse 
than the hunting of unprotected species, and much less immoral than eating factory-farmed meat. 
For present purposes, we thus have no grounds to say that the reckless filmmakers’ crime, because 
they made no living thing suffer, was less serious than poaching.
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most significant protected areas, is justified by the unique aesthetic and recreational 
opportunities they provide more than the species they protect. Across much of the 
globe, natural diversity better captures the systems of value behind the legal justifi-
cations for conservation, much of which either does not invoke biodiversity or 
places the value of biodiversity subordinate to a broader class of natural values.
The impulse to protect biodiversity is plausibly grounded in a reasonable aver-
sion towards losing unique, rare, unusual, and distinctive parts of our world. In other 
words, we find real value in diversity. But this is true not just of biological organ-
isms, but of unique, rare, unusual, and distinctive natural goods of all sorts—of 
natural diversity inclusive of, but going beyond, biodiversity. An ethnic group’s 
ancestral homeland is unique in virtue of that fact, and merits preservation because 
in its uniqueness it represents natural diversity. A landscape that is a local rarity, like 
a glacier in Utah, is particularly valuable in virtue of that rarity. An unusual environ-
ment, such as undersea thermal vents, is scientifically valuable in part because it is 
unusual in abiotic as well as biotic composition. These sorts of natural values fall 
clearly under a notion of diversity, but not under biological diversity. The concept 
of natural diversity thus retains the conceptual benefits of biodiversity, while better 
fulfilling the role of capturing value in the natural world. Moreover, the political 
implications of conserving natural diversity are both more commonsensical and less 
unjust than a focus on conserving biodiversity primarily. Insofar as they are con-
cepts competing for the same conceptual role, natural diversity thus has a clear 
advantage.
19.3  Operationalizability
Let’s consider a possible disadvantage of natural diversity. Biodiversity serves not 
only as an indicator of ecological value, but as a measurement concept. 
Conservationists can operationalize biodiversity in various ways, estimate the 
amount of biodiversity in different areas, and use these estimates as inputs to con-
servation decision-making. Natural diversity, as a broader, less cohesive concept, 
might be more resistant to operationalization, and thus less useful as a measurement 
concept.
I don’t think this is the case, in large part because biodiversity is itself extremely 
resistant to operationalization and measurement. Natural diversity comes down to 
meaning something close to “all of nature,” and it seems almost nonsensical to try 
to argue that some areas have more nature than others. But as Sarkar insightfully 
points out, standard definitions of biodiversity equate it to “all of biology” (2002: 
137) as well.8 Morar et  al. contend, with supporting citations to a dozen or so 
8 Many writers have observed that the term biodiversity is even more vague than “all of biology.” 
Blandin suggests that biodiversity is just a new incarnation of nature, and has become “aussi indé-
finissable que l’est la nature [as indefinable as nature]” (2014:51). Similarly, others have suggested 
that biodiversity is interpreted flexibly, with each interpreter using the vagueness of the term to 
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 conservation biologists and philosophers, that “the widest consensus about biodi-
versity understood in this broad and all-inclusive sense is that it cannot, as a matter 
of principle, be quantified, due to its multidimensionality and the lack of commen-
surability and covariance among its components” (2015: 18). True, biodiversity can 
be made amenable to precise measurement, but only by ignoring most its compo-
nents to focus on merely one or two at a time, such as species richness, genes, traits, 
habitat types and so on. But this gives biodiversity no advantage over natural diver-
sity. While natural diversity, broadly construed, is utterly unquantifiable, there is 
nothing preventing picking a couple of dimensions at a time for particular purposes 
and measuring those. We could, for instance, in selecting conservation areas have 
measures of recreational usage, number of archaeological sites, and biological fam-
ily richness, and use all three in tandem to determine what areas to prioritize. This 
leaves out much of natural diversity, but any practical measure of biodiversity is 
similarly limited. So, the breadth and vagueness of natural diversity is no different 
in kind than that of biodiversity.
We might worry, however, that the great flexibility available in selecting indica-
tors of natural diversity will lead to inconsistent measures of natural diversity. 
Again, on this score natural diversity does no worse than biodiversity. With biodi-
versity measures, “there will always be some way of comparing (say) one wetland 
to another that will count the first as the more diverse, and another procedure that 
will reverse the result” (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008: 133). This inconsistency 
across different methods of measurement may be a feature and not a bug, however. 
Sarkar (2002, 2008) argues that the ability to have different measures of biodiversity 
which yield different results allows us to fit our concept of biodiversity to the con-
servation priorities of each local situation, which differ from context to context. If 
this situational flexibility is a beneficial feature of biodiversity measures, then it 
would also be a feature of natural diversity measures. The difference, of course, 
would be even greater flexibility with natural diversity, and a greater ability to use 
measures which closely track non-biotic entities of ecological value. What might 
have seemed to be an objection to natural diversity—the sheer range of specific 
ways to quantify it—turns out to be a point in its favor.
read into whatever it is they value in nature. Takacs, for instance writes that “[i]n biodiversity, each 
of us finds a mirror for our most treasured natural images, our most fervent environmental con-
cerns” (1996:81; cited in Morar et al. 2015). And Blondel observes that biodiversity is “coquille 
vide ou chacun met ce qu’il veut [an empty shell in which each person places whatever they want 
to see]” (1995: 225). (Thanks to Elena Casetta for help with the French references and 
translations).
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19.4  More Than Ecosystem Diversity
The astute reader might be wondering whether the concept of natural diversity 
treads new ground. Doesn’t ecosystem diversity, for instance, already cover the 
same territory? Ecosystem diversity is often treated as the one of the three main 
components of biodiversity, with species and genetic diversity being the others 
(McNeely et al. 1990). As the diversity of habitat types and community structure 
and composition (Sohier 2007), it seems that ecosystem diversity captures many of 
the abiotic entities and landscape-level features that I have argued require a move 
from bio- to natural diversity. I grant that, when taken seriously as a component of 
biodiversity, ecosystem diversity addresses some of the worries I have raised. But 
not most of them, since it only values abiotic entities and landscape features qua 
contributors to biotic activity, and not in terms of many other facets of ecological 
value, such as aesthetic or economic contributions. For this reason, I think ecosys-
tem diversity still falls short.
19.5  A Natural Bridge
The concept of biodiversity, as I’ve discussed, has come under attack from several 
fronts. One reaction to these attacks could be to abandon it and move to some other 
means of representing and measuring ecological value. Leading alternatives are 
found in the social sciences, particularly economics, and focus on non-market valu-
ation methods.9 To abandon biodiversity for economic demand values would likely 
be to push the non-human biota too far into the background. It would also require us 
to give up much of the valuable research that conservation biologists have con-
ducted, and leave behind useful tools they have developed. In addition, we would be 
abandoning a concept that has gained political and rhetorical importance. All these 
considerations imply that the cost of biodiversity eliminativism is very high.
Natural diversity, I am proposing, is a way to move beyond biodiversity in a way 
that avoids paying much of this cost. Natural diversity can be a bridge between tra-
ditional biodiversity-focused conservation and socially-focused environmental 
planning, because it includes both biodiversity and human-generated values under 
an umbrella concept. It suggests that, in principle, various sorts of ecological value 
are commensurable, and thus we can take research on biodiversity conservation and 
put it in conversation with other conservation strategies and goals. Of course, the 
extant concept ecosystem services (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment 2005) already 
tries to do this. Biodiversity and ecosystem services, however, are often an awkward 
fit. One way to include biodiversity in the ecosystem services framework is to just 
include biodiversity as a final ecosystem service (Mace et al. 2012). But this is ad 
9 For an introduction to these methods of environmental valuation, see Champ et al. (2003).
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hoc, and doesn’t really suggest in what way biodiversity is comparable to other 
services. In practice, this often means that valuations of ecosystem services, which 
are most easily quantified in economic terms, will rate the value of biodiversity 
quite low (Fromm 2000; Heinzerling 2016). Another means of trying to incorporate 
biodiversity in the ecosystem services approach is to argue that other services are 
reliant on biodiversity, but the relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem ser-
vices is anything but straightforward (Srivastava and Vellend 2005; Mace et  al. 
2012). What natural diversity offers is an alternative, perhaps superior, means of 
accomplishing the same goal. Shoehorning biodiversity into the ecosystem services 
approach falls short because it is ad hoc and has no common standard of  comparison. 
But a natural diversity approach would take the extant tools of biodiversity conser-
vation planning and apply them to a broader set of ecological values, in a natural 
extension of existing conservation biology. In pitching natural diversity, I’m 
attempting to refocus our conservation thinking on those glaciers, and landscapes, 
and ancestral homelands, and other natural features that fall out of the conversation 
when we discuss biodiversity. But I’m raising the possibility of doing so in a way 
that is an organic expansion of biodiversity thinking and extant conservation prac-
tice, rather than leaving it behind as we embrace a broader set of ecological 
values.
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Chapter 20
Ordinary Biodiversity. The Case of Food
Andrea Borghini
Abstract The green revolution, the biotech revolution, and other major changes in 
food production, distribution, and consumption have deeply subverted the relation-
ship between humans and food. Such a drastic rupture is forcing a rethinking of that 
relationship and a careful consideration of which items we shall preserve and why. 
This essay aims at introducing a philosophical frame for assessing the biodiversity 
of that portion of the living realm that I call the edible environment. With such 
expression I intend not simply those plants and animals (including in this category, 
henceforth, also fish and insects) that were domesticated for human consumption, 
but also the thousands of species that are regularly consumed by some human popu-
lation and that are regarded to some degree as wild. The visceral, existential, and 
identity-related relationship that link humans with the edible environment can be 
regarded as sui generis and can constitute a ground for explaining why it should 
receive a preferential treatment when it comes to preservation, propagation, and 
development. First of all, I discuss whether we should draw a sharp divide, when it 
comes to preservation efforts, between wild and domesticated species (§1); sec-
ondly, I assess whether to draw a sharp divide between natural and unnatural enti-
ties, when it comes to measurements and interventions regarding the edible 
environment (§2); finally, I ask what is the value of biodiversity as far as food is 
concerned, and how best to preserve and foster it (§3 and §4). The closing section 
draws some suggestions for future investigations and interventions.
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20.1  Introduction
The concept of biodiversity is rather unquestionably associated with the idea of 
untamed forms of life, living entities, or parts of living entities, which developed on 
Earth independently of or prior to humans. Far more controversial, instead, is 
whether biodiversity measurements and interventions should take into account also 
forms of life and living entities that have been to some degree influenced by human 
activities (cfr. Siipi 2016, section 1, for a comparison of the opposing camps.) Some 
authors lean towards a very inclusive notion of biodiversity, which virtually leaves 
out no (actual or possible) form of life, living entity or any part of a living entity. 
But, no matter where one wishes to draw the line, it seems unfeasible to have a 
notion of biodiversity that excludes all those entities that have been in some way or 
other influenced by humans. Not only would it currently appear unfeasible to insist 
on protecting only those entities that are untamed; more importantly, any effort of 
preservation or development of such entities would by itself undermine their being 
in some way or other independent of human existence. Hence, any account of bio-
diversity seems bound to address the following two questions:
 (1) Are there living entities that should be excluded from measurements of biodi-
versity as well as from efforts of conservation1?
 (2) Should the criteria for inclusion in a measurement or intervention be context- 
dependent or context-independent? For instance, could different criteria be 
selected depending on circumstances?
Another important outcome of the literature on the concept of biodiversity is that, at 
a closer look, most accounts of biodiversity reveal a preference towards more famil-
iar forms of life.2 Thus, for instance, preserving the existence of pandas seems a 
much more important goal than preserving the existence of any species of mollusks 
that inhabits some remote marine areas, no matter how important such mollusks 
may be to a certain ecosystem; or, consider the little attention that the preservation 
of bacteria has received in comparison to animals or plants, which can arguably 
only in part be justified by the taxonomic challenge of classifying bacteria. It is 
important to reflect on the reasons that might have supported such preference of 
certain forms of life over others; are those good reasons, that is, reasons that justify 
keeping such preferences in our accounts of biodiversity? Or, are such preferences 
biases, which cannot be justified? Hence, the following additional question for any 
account of biodiversity:
1 In this paper I shall refer to conservation, rather than preservation, efforts. I do not have in mind 
such a sharp distinction between the two notions, as established in the classical dispute between 
Gifford Pinchot and John Muir; at the same time, it seems most appropriate to speak of conserva-
tion of ordinary biodiversity, rather than its preservation, because of the active human role not only 
in establishing and maintaining it, but also in exploiting it for the purposes of – among others – 
dieting, pleasure, research, and profit.
2 See Marques da Silva & Casetta, Chap. 9, in this volume.
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 (3) What are the grounds for preferring certain (possibly more familiar) forms of 
life over others? For instance, do such preferences rest on efficiency, or perhaps 
on some emotional or spiritual connection?
In this essay I aim to address the three questions just raised from a particular 
angle, which has thus far received relatively sparse attention from philosophers. I 
aim to analyze the value of biodiversity when it comes to that portion of the living 
realm that I call the edible environment. With “edible environment” I intend not 
simply those plants and animals (including in this category, henceforth, also fish, 
insects, mushrooms, and some algae) that were domesticated for human consump-
tion, but also the thousands of species that are regularly consumed by some human 
population and that are regarded to some degree as wild. The edible environment 
constitutes a particularly significant point of entry into the preferential attitudes that 
humans bear towards different forms of life. The visceral, existential, and identitar-
ian relationship that humans bear with the edible environment can be regarded as sui 
generis and, as we shall see, can constitute a ground for answering question (3), that 
is, why the edible environment should receive a preferential treatment when it 
comes to preservation, propagation, and development. The edible environment is 
also an intuitive entry point into questions (1) and (2). Are there edible (parts of) 
living entities that ought not to be included in measurements of biodiversity (e.g., 
GMOs)? Should measurements and preservation efforts be contextual; for instance, 
should they tend to clearly demarcate between biodiversity of the edible environ-
ment and other forms of biodiversity? Are the criteria employed to account for the 
biodiversity of the edible environment specific to it? Are they consistent across the 
board?
In order to investigate questions (1)–(3), in what follows I will take up a number 
of issues that cut across them. First of all, the issue of whether we should draw a 
sharp divide, when it comes to conservation efforts, between wild and domesticated 
species. I address this in §1. Secondly, we should assess whether to draw a sharp 
divide between natural and unnatural entities, when it comes to measurements and 
interventions regarding the edible environment; this issue will be at the center of §2. 
Finally, we should ask what is the value of biodiverse foods and how best to pre-
serve and foster it; these two issues will occupy sections §3 and §4, respectively. In 
§5 I shall return to questions (1)–(3) and suggest some answers.
20.2  Wild and Domesticated Foods
Today the food for sale at any supermarket, deli, or food market in an agriculturally 
industrialized country such as the United States, Holland, or Japan is a testimony to 
two kinds of success stories. The first is the story of human attempt to tweak the 
edible environment to serve human nutritional, economic, and social purposes; call 
this the conquer and divide story. There are a few remarkable facts about the diver-
sity of domesticated species, which reveal the importance of looking at taxonomic 
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levels below species when it comes to domesticated plants and animals (cfr. 
Especially Diamond 2002: 702). Only 14 out of 148 large terrestrial mammalian 
were domesticated, and only about 100 plants out of 200,000 candidates. Any of 
those species is in itself a remarkable success story, featuring the rise of an astonish-
ing number of varieties3: – e.g. over 40,000 varieties of beans, over 10,000 varieties 
of tomatoes, over 8000 varieties of apples, and circa 8000 breeds of animals (for a 
concise and up to date overview of the diversity of animals that humans consume, 
cfr. Chemnitz and Becheva 2014: 22–25). But, the first success story tells also of the 
many ways in which humans managed to cooperate with microscopic organisms 
such as bacteria, yeasts, and fungi, to preserve, modify, create key staples, including 
cheese, yoghurt, beer, wine, vinegar, chocolate, coffee, whisky, and hundreds more.
The second, more recent, success story tells of the increasing connection of food 
production and distribution systems worldwide; call this the food revolution story. 
Characteristic of it is the decline or extinction of thousands of varieties and breeds 
produced throughout the long path to domestication. For instance, in 2012 the FAO 
update on the state of livestock biodiversity estimated that circa 2000 of the 8000 
animal breeds are at risk of extinction or nearly extinct. Or, to make two examples 
regarding plants, of the 287 varieties of carrots that humans devised, only 21 are still 
cultivated; and of the 8000 varieties of apples that we have a trace of, only 800 are 
still cultivated (cfr. Fromartz 2006, Chapter 1 and Pollan 2001, Chapter 1) If we 
look at the broad picture, data from The Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO-UN) indicate that since the beginning of last century 75 per-
cent of plant genetic diversity has been lost. To offer some additional examples, “at 
least one breed of traditional livestock dies out every week in the global context; of 
the 3831 breeds of cattle, water buffalo, goats, pigs, sheep, horses and donkeys 
believed to have in this twentieth century, 16% have become extinct and 15% are 
rare; some 474 of livestock breeds can be regarded as rare, and about 617 have 
become extinct since 1892” (Conservation and Sustainable Use of Agricultural 
Biodiversity 2003, paper 3, p. 23). Also, over 97% of the varieties of foods sold in 
1900 in the United States had disappeared from the market by 1983 (Cfr. Fromartz 
2006, Chapter 1). The shrinkage of the number of varieties is principally due to the 
increased integration of food markets, controlled by fewer and fewer actors at the 
origin and during distribution, as well as by a growing syncretism and homogeneity 
within diets across the planet. Within a globalized food market, only a few varieties 
3 Some reader may wonder why the data presented in this section regard varieties rather than culti-
vars. Although the two concepts are at times used interchangeably (cfr. ICNCP 2009, Chapter 2, 
Art. 2.2), the technical usage of ‘cultivar’ picks out a more restrictive taxonomic notion, based on 
three principles: (i) possession of a distinctive character; (ii) uniformity and stability of such char-
acter; (iii) heritability of said character (ICNCP 2009, Chapter 2, Art. 2.3). At the same time, 
though, “no assemblage of plants can be regarded as a cultivar or Group until its category, name, 
and circumscription has been published” (ICNCP 2009, Chapter 2, Art. 9, Note 1); yet, many 
extant and past varieties, that may suitably comprise a cultivar, were never inventoried; thus, in a 
discussion of the biodiversity of edible plants, it seems most suitable to at least start off by consid-
ering all varieties, and then possibly refine the domain by considering the stricter notion of 
cultivar.
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per species tend to be favored, namely those varieties that deliver an economic 
advantage such as production cost, shelf life, or consumers’ appeal.
Much of the discussion concerning food biodiversity has indeed focused on 
either the conquer and divide story or the food revolution story. It is hard to overes-
timate the importance of the first story to human evolution. There are still countless 
details of the processes of domestication of each animal and plant that await to be 
uncovered, which will shed light over the economic, medical, social, political, and 
cultural history of humanity (cfr. Wrangham 2009). Equally important is the aston-
ishing shift in food production and consumption, which occurred since the advent 
of synthetic fertilizers and, more recently, biotechnologies. In the past century, 
nearly all varieties on the market have been replaced. This leaves us with two major 
interrogatives: to what extent biodiversity efforts should focus on preserving ancient 
varieties, and to what extent measurements of biodiversity within the edible envi-
ronment should include cultivars created by means of techniques such as lab clon-
ing and genetic modification.
As important as they may be, the conquer and divide story and the food revolu-
tion story are far from portraying a comprehensive picture of the biodiversity of the 
edible environment. Indeed, the two stories leave out so-called ‘wild’ organisms 
(which can be counted not only in terms of cultivars, varieties or races, but also 
higher taxa such as species and families), which not only comprise a very significant 
portion of human diets, but also reveal a continuum between the discussions of 
prototypical biodiversity conservation targets (e.g. hot spots and endangered spe-
cies) and conservation targets within the edible environment. By aggregating a 
number of studies, ethnobotanists estimated that humans have fed themselves off of 
over 7000 species (Grivetti and Ogle 2000; MEA 2005). Looking at 36 studies in 22 
countries of Asia and Africa, Bharucha and Pretty (2010: 2918) estimated that “the 
mean use of wild foods (discounting country- or continent-wide aggregates) is 
90–100 species per place and community group. Individual country estimates can 
reach 300–800 species (India, Ethiopia, Kenya).” Most importantly to our purposes, 
in nearly all countries across the globe, with the notable exception of United States, 
wild species and domesticated species are tended and consumed jointly, and in a 
number of occasions they are also jointly marketed. To many farmers, the distinc-
tion between domesticated and wild species is, indeed, of little significance. At the 
outset of their paper, Bharucha and Pretty (2010) report the words of a woman 
farmer, interviewed in Mazhar et al. (2007: 18), who exclaims: “What do you mean 
by weed? There is nothing like a weed in our agriculture.”
Hunting and gathering have coexisted with agriculture in most societies. Both 
hunting and gathering, when integrated into the dietary routines of a society, require 
a deep knowledge of the prey, which encourages strategies for favoring the repro-
duction of animals and plants, possibly favoring desirable traits.4 For example, a 
boar hunter may favor the reproduction of certain boar families, which possess cer-
tain particularly desirable traits (e.g. size and build); a gatherer of mushrooms may 
favor the reproduction of certain species in a spot by facilitating or creating specific 
4 Cfr. (Kowalsky 2010).
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environmental conditions (e.g. humidity, shade, enclosure from the passage of cer-
tain animals, selection of surrounding plants). From this perspective, the so-called 
wild species found within the edible environment are typically far from the most 
untamed species known on Earth. This is not surprising since eating is a relation-
ship, which in the case in point involves humans and a few thousands species; with 
time, although humans did not domesticate such species, they (voluntarily or invol-
untarily) managed them. The study of biodiversity within agriculture should be 
undertaken alongside with the study of biodiversity within the wild edible environ-
ment. As Bharucha and Pretty (2010: 2923) conclude,
The evidence shows that wild foods provide substantial health and economic benefits to 
those who depend on them. It is now clear that efforts to conserve biodiversity and preserve 
traditional food systems and farming practices need to be combined and enhanced.
Another important consideration, which shows how simplistic is the view that 
draws a strong divide between wild and domesticated species within the edible envi-
ronment, is that such a view leaves no place for the myriads of microscopic organ-
isms that are essential to human diets worldwide, with virtually no exception. To 
illustrate the point with an example, it would be unsound to claim that, at origins, 
humans domesticated Saccharomyces cerevisiae and that sourdough is one of the 
countless outcomes of such domestication process.5 After all, humans were not even 
aware of the existence of such a microscopic fungus when they started making use 
of it to produce bread, beer, chocolate, etc. Rather, sourdough emerged out of a form 
of cooperation between humans and a variety of fungus, which was not guided by 
specific species design, but that likely proceeded through trials and errors guided 
solely by taste and, more broadly, culinary success. Yet, Saccharomyces cerevisiae 
is arguably part of the biodiversity within the edible environment that humans 
should aim to preserve. Parallel arguments can be developed with respect to pro-
genitors of domesticated plants that are still lingering in the wild: they are especially 
precious because they typically preserve the widest genetic pool of the taxon. 
Hence, the discussion of the biodiversity within the edible environment found in 
virtually any extant human diet should include not only domesticated species and 
varieties.
The upshot for subsequent discussion is that any assessment of the measurement 
of the biodiversity found within the edible environment, and of the best means best 
conserve it, should recognize how variegated are the relationships that humans cre-
ated with species in the edible environment. The edible environment is constituted 
by organisms (or parts of organisms) that can hardly be put on a scale with respect 
to their untamedness – from the wildest to the most domesticated. This complicates 
a bit the picture when it comes to decide whether to leave out certain items within 
the edible environment from measurements of biodiversity and efforts of conserva-
tion. Is there really a difference between domesticated and wild species, which 
5 It may be more plausibly argued, however, that Saccharomyces cerevisiae was in some sense 
domesticated by contemporary biotechnology, through the selection of best suited samples and 
genetic engineering interventions. I shall leave the issue open here.
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should be reflected in the study of the biodiversity of the edible environment? What 
to make of microorganisms? What about bioengineered plants and animals? These 
questions shall occupy us in the next section.
20.3  Finding Natural Joints
In her assessment of biodiversity with respect to human modified entities, Siipi 
(2016) distinguishes between three main ways to devise a cutoff point between what 
should be included in an inventory of biodiversity and what should not. They are 
respectively based on the (i) history, (ii) properties, and (iii) relations of the entities 
under consideration. It may be useful to begin by illustrating the three ways.
 (i) With respect to the first way, imagine the case of two portabella mushrooms, 
one of which is grown wild in a forest and one that is induced by a human in a 
garage; suppose further that the two mushrooms are genetically identical, 
because the mushroom mycelia of the wild mushroom have been transplanted 
in a litter in the garage, that they are hardly distinguishable when it comes to 
taste and nutritional characteristics (their properties), and that they have simi-
lar market and culinary value (their relations); nonetheless, since the mush-
rooms have different histories, which rest on their different contexts of 
development, the forest-grown is regarded as ‘wild’ or ‘naturally grown’ and 
the other is labeled as ‘home-grown’.
 (ii) To illustrate the second way, based on properties, imagine two portabella 
mushrooms grown side by side in a forest (hence having alike histories) and 
having similar market and culinary values (relations), but possessing quite dif-
ferent nutritional and gustatory properties, due to the malformation of one of 
them, developed just a few hours before being picked (hence, not really histori-
cally based). You can conceive of a classification according to which the mal-
formed mushroom is regarded as ‘unnatural’ and the other as ‘natural,’ based 
on their morphological properties.
 (iii) To illustrate the third way, based on relations, imagine two portabella mush-
rooms grown side by side in a forest and perfectly comparable in terms of size, 
nutritional and gustatory properties, but ending up in two different markets 
and, from there, two different restaurants; although alike in terms of origin and 
properties, one of the mushrooms belongs to the market and restaurants where 
it ends up, being recognized as a ‘natural’ element within the edible environ-
ment of the culinary culture(s) showcased within the market and the restaurant; 
the other mushroom instead is considered as somewhat foreign to its market, 
and ends up in a restaurant to be featured as an exotic, ‘unnatural’ item to be 
placed alongside the other foods.
In her paper, Siipi distinguishes in total six criteria for telling apart natural from 
unnatural foods for the purposes of finding a cutoff point between entities that 
should be relevant for biodiversity measurements and preservation, and those that 
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should not be so regarded. Three criteria are history-based and concern respectively: 
the organisms that are independent of humans (e.g. a wild herb spontaneously 
grown in a remote beach), the organisms that are not controlled by humans (e.g. 
wild blackberries), and the organisms that are regarded as non-artificial (e.g. Golden 
Delicious apples). Two additional criteria are property-based and regard the foods 
that are: alike to spontaneously occurring (e.g. two mushrooms, one forest-grown 
and one garage-grown, which are alike in terms of culinary and nutritional values); 
alike to possibly existent foods (e.g. seedless grapes, obtained by grafting spontane-
ously occurring samples of seedless grapes (cfr. Sperber 2007). The sixth and final 
criterion is relation-based and rests on whether a certain food ‘belongs,’ or is ‘suit-
able to’ a given context (e.g. grapes being unsuitable for the original climate and 
soil of Central Valley, California, and thus requiring amounts of water, pests, and 
herbs that are disproportionate).
Siipi’s thorough examination of the ways in which a portion of an edible environ-
ment may be found to be natural or unnatural, and hence possibly included or 
excluded in biodiversity measurements and conservation policies, demonstrates the 
complexity of the matter at stake. To further her analysis, we should first of all avail 
ourselves of the conclusion reached at the end of the previous section. Concepts of 
‘wild’ and ‘domesticated’ do little to usefully represent key relationship between 
humans and parts of the edible environment that are relevant for the purposes of 
biodiversity; these concepts should be better substituted with specific histories of 
the relationships between humans and parts of the edible environment, which evi-
dence characteristic traits. But, which traits should matter? A tentative list should 
include things such as control over reproduction, difficulty of reproduction, poten-
tial variability of the desired trait, nutritional properties, gustatory properties, 
broadly cultural properties, ecological fit, culinary fit … Yet, can an exhaustive list 
be provided? Interesting in this context is also to recall that focusing on individual 
species may not be the best manner to proceed in an assessment of biodiversity; 
rather, we should look at broader networks of biotic and abiotic entities that produce 
certain foods. Indeed, the production of certain foods requires the employment of 
additional living organisms; for instance, any peach orchard requires bees for pol-
lination, or any fig orchard requires a specific species of tiny wasps as well as trees 
that are both female and male, even though the latter produces fruits that are gener-
ally not eaten. More generally, it seems best in a number of circumstances to pay 
attention to ecosystems that deliver foods, rather than to single species within the 
edible environment; for instance, Vitalini et al. (2009) proposed a EU designation of 
‘Site of Community Interest,’ which would stress indeed the presence of a number 
of biotic and abiotic conditions that are necessary to sustain portions of the edible 
environment. Hence, to guarantee the security of the relevant edible plants, mea-
surements of the biodiversity of the edible environment should take into account not 
simply the (parts of the) species or varieties that we feed off, but also the other biotic 
and abiotic conditions that are necessary for their survival.
In conclusion, although a number of traits, such as the ones just listed, are argu-
ably most relevant in the majority of contexts, it seems methodologically incorrect 
to proceed by devising a list that should fit every assessment of biodiversity within 
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an edible environment. In other terms, this discussion suggests that there is no one 
vantage point from which to assess the naturalness of a (part of an) organism found 
within the edible environment; this is because naturalness is not a matter of that 
(part of an) organism being domesticated or wild, but what function it plays in a 
system of food production, which ecological relationships it bears to other sur-
rounding organisms, as well as what functions it could play in possible edible envi-
ronments that are considered relevant for the purposes of the assessment. The 
remaining of the paper will elaborate on this thesis.
20.4  The Values of a Biodiverse Edible Environment
The previous two sections argued that the biodiversity within the edible environ-
ment includes a wide array of entities, which can hardly be systematized in a 
context- independent taxonomy. Recapping the complexity of the domain under 
examination will be useful to start assessing its multiple dimensions of value.
While a distinction between wild and domesticated species could be defended, 
based on the degree of human intervention during reproduction and selection, it 
would be unseemly to claim that all wild species develop(ed) fully independently of 
human interference. Some developed actually in conjunction with human artifice. 
For instance, many forms of gathering and hunting do proceed through subtle modi-
fications of the surrounding environments by humans, which facilitate the reproduc-
tion and growth of specific populations of the designated species or variety. The 
spectrum of domesticated species varies significantly, as it includes plants that are 
reproduced by cutting (e.g. rosemary, strawberries, avocados), plants that are repro-
duced by grafting (e.g. grapes, most fruit trees), plants that spread by sexual repro-
duction (e.g. most grains), and a number of plants that can reproduced in any of 
those ways (e.g. avocados, cacao trees). For any of the domesticated species, we can 
wonder what is the degree of interference that humans have access to in any single 
instance of reproduction: with animal farming, breeding is often controlled down to 
the minutest details by the farmer; but, with grains, it is not feasible to control the 
path of all the pollen in a field and often also the selection of seeds is only partially 
decided by the farmer, who will work with what was provided by the previous har-
vest; in an orchard, the farmer cannot control the process of pollination by bees to 
the minutest details; ditto for controlling reproduction within a fish farm. 
Alternatively, we can measure the overall degree of interference between humans 
and the species by looking at the genetic distance of domesticated organisms from 
their wild progenitors, factoring in the number of generations that occur between 
the two samples.
Species are not the main units when biodiversity of the edible environment is at 
issue. Rather, cooperation among different clusters of organisms, organized in more 
or less spontaneous communities, seem to be the key concept. In this light, the coop-
tation of microorganisms to produce viable foods, which at least until Pasteur pro-
ceeded somewhat blindly with respect to the biological details of the microorganisms, 
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comprises a chapter of its own in the inventory of the relationships between humans 
and the edible environment. Beer, bread, chocolate, yoghurt, cheese are all exam-
ples of a culture of fermentation, which played an essential role in food production 
and conservation and in human evolution. Fermentation, as we know it today, is the 
outcome of a microbial diversity, which is formed during food preparation and 
aging, and which confers a distinctive specificity to food; not only it is arguable that, 
without being fermented, beer would not be beer, but it is also arguable that without 
certain strains and species of microbes that are characteristic to it, a certain beer 
style (e.g. pilsner) would be not that beer style. The research on this issue is exten-
sive; cfr. Borghini 2014: 1118 and, for a recent significant example based on cacao 
Ludlow et al. 2016). But, in the human cooptation of certain microorganisms with 
the aim of producing viable foods, what matters most? Is it most important to pre-
serve – say – the spontaneity of a process (as it happens in spirits which are sponta-
neously fermented) or, rather, to preserve certain final characteristics of a product? 
Do (some aspects of) the genetic profiles of the microbes fix the identity of the final 
product? Or, rather, should a certain style, brand, gustatory profile be privileged? 
These questions suggest that the diversity within the microbial world correlated to 
the edible environment is not all on the same level, and that privileging the diversity 
derived from a type of process (e.g. spontaneous fermentation) may hinder the tend-
ing to the diversity of other aspects of the fermentation process, such as the preser-
vation of certain strains or varieties.
Finally, we should consider the complexity of biotic and abiotic factors that favor 
the reproduction, growth, and development of the edible environment. Hence, spe-
cies of bees and wasps, varieties of soils, minerals within water, etc. It seems that an 
inventory of the biodiversity of the edible environment should include these items 
too, since they are arguably essential to the creation of a number of products, such 
as geographical indications (see Borghini 2014). Hence, the biodiversity of the edi-
ble environment is bound to include also a vast array of entities that are not really 
edible, but that are conducive to the production of the foods we eat, currently or 
possibly. There is here an overlap between the concept of biodiversity, when applied 
to edible items and when applied to non-edible items; for instance, we have reasons 
to protect the biodiversity of soils for reasons that are independent of food produc-
tion (cfr. Brussaard et al. 2007), and yet the study of biodiversity of the edible envi-
ronment will argue for their protection too.
The fluidity between the different categories of entities found within the edible 
environment is also reflected in the fluidity between roles taken up by food workers. 
For example, it is common for farmers to act as custodians of both domesticated and 
wild species, and to be farmers of both agricultural products and weeds; also, gath-
erers and hunters are oftentimes also farmers; and it is common to a fisherman to 
hunt too.
The edible environment showcases the complexity of the idea of biodiversity 
because of the multifarious forms that the relationship between humans and edible 
items can take and has historically taken. Such complexity is mirrored also in the 
reasons we have for valuing biodiversity within the edible environment. Because 
the subject matter are ordinary living entities, which are considered in relationship 
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to humans, it is fairly obvious that the reasons to value the biodiversity within the 
edible environment is entrenched with human existence and culinary cultures. I 
shall here divide up the field in four points: (i) food sovereignty; (ii) food security; 
(iii) gastronomic pleasure; and (iv) intrinsic value. Let us illustrate each of them, in 
order.
 (i) Food sovereignty. With food sovereignty we intend the ability within a group of 
people to self-determine a sufficiently ample and relevant portion of their dietary 
choice by means of food production. Food sovereignty emphasizes, hence, the 
active ability of a society to determine which plants and animals to harvest and 
produce, as well as the means of production. Such a power of a society is foun-
dational with respect to the possibility (not the necessity, of course) of actively 
fostering biodiversity within the edible environment. This power is especially 
critical when it comes to farming societies that are economically, technologi-
cally, and politically at a disadvantage. It was indeed introduced in 2002 by the 
World Bank with the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, 
Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), a 3-year program aimed 
at improving food production knowledge and technology within disadvantaged 
societies. But, the idea of food sovereignty was implicitly already at the core of 
the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, 
issued during the World Food Conference of 17 December 1973. The declara-
tion begins by noting “the grave food crisis that is afflicting the peoples of the 
developing countries where most of the world’s hungry and ill-nourished live 
and where more than two thirds of the world’s population produce about one 
third of the world’s food;” it then goes on to suggest that “all countries, and 
primarily the highly industrialized countries, should promote the advancement 
of food production technology and should make all efforts to promote the trans-
fer, adaptation and dissemination of appropriate food production technology for 
the benefit of the developing countries and, to that end, they should inter alia 
make all efforts to disseminate the results of their research work to Governments 
and scientific institutions of developing countries in order to enable them to 
promote a sustained agricultural development.”
 (ii) Food security. If food sovereignty regards the foods that are produced within a 
society, food security concerns instead the kinds, qualities, and quantities of 
foods accessible for consumption within a society. A consistent portion of the 
literature on the biodiversity of edible organisms focused on the importance of 
an ample spectrum of nutrients for combating malnutrition, when manifested 
both as a lack of sufficient calories or nutrients (undernutrition), or as an exces-
sive amount of calories or nutrients (overnutrition) (cfr. Borghini 2017 for a 
philosophical analysis of hunger). In their literature review on food security and 
biodiversity, Chappell and La Valle (2011) provide significant evidence that 
“alternative agriculture, which is generally targeted at sustainability and com-
patibility with biodiversity conservation, is indeed on average better for biodi-
versity conservation than conventional agriculture, which usually (though not 
always) targets increases in yields to the exclusion and even detriment of direct 
20 Ordinary Biodiversity. The Case of Food
426
concerns about biodiversity, equitability, and food access.” (Chappell and La 
Valle 2011: 17) Chappell and La Valle’s conclusion, which stresses the link 
between food sovereignty and food security (see also Jarosz (2014) on this 
point), goes hand in hand with the so-called “ecoagriculture approach” 
(McNeely and Sherr 2002), according to which landscape biodiversity is key to 
ensure sustainable farming practices that are in sinking with their surrounding 
ecosystems.
A limitation of much literature on food security and biodiversity rests on a nar-
row conception of the edible environment, which is basically limited to agricultural 
products. As we have discussed above, landscapes comprising wild and domesti-
cated foods come into closest contact in some of the regions where food access is 
most insecure. The availability of a diverse spectrum of plants, animals, and other 
suitable living entities for setting up an edible environment is a form of empower-
ment for communities that aim to improve their conditions with respect to food 
sovereignty (see below) and food security. Farming in urban or rural regions that 
present adverse climatic conditions or inadequate natural resources can be much 
improved by a wide stock of living entities that can adapt to different circumstances. 
Thus, an approach such as ecoagriculture is best appreciated when conjoined with 
the thesis that there is no sharp discontinuity between wild and domesticated spe-
cies, and no easy cutoff point between natural and unnatural entities, at least when 
it comes to the edible environment.
Fostering biodiversity, hence, can aid to food security at two different levels: at 
the ecosystem level, and at the level of the edible environment. At the ecosystem 
level, biodiversity can facilitate a sustainable availability of resources, to be 
employed by producers with the edible environment. At the level of the edible envi-
ronment, the wider the stock of organisms available to any producer worldwide, the 
higher will be her power to deliver suitable goods to a market; this, in turn, will 
increase opportunities for a diverse diet, which is key to address malnutrition. Of 
course, the availability of certain goods on the market is far from granting, by itself, 
a solution to food insecurity (cfr. Chappell and La Valle 2011: 17–18, for a discus-
sion of this point); yet it is certainly a necessary step in order to address it.6
 (iii) Gastronomic pleasure. Both food sovereignty and food security are linked to 
gastronomic pleasure, as they by and large shape the link between dining and 
civic values (cfr. Alkon and Mares 2012). Promoting a biodiverse edible envi-
ronment is a mean to empower communities not only by strengthening the 
6 I should mention a difficult question arising at this point in connection to bioengineered organ-
isms, which cannot be fully developed here. Consistent efforts are underway to engineer organisms 
(e.g. GM crops) and foods (e.g. lab meat), which may add to the diversity available to farmers 
worldwide. Arguably, these items should be included in an inventory of the (actual or potential) 
biodiversity of the edible environment; but, should they rank as equally valuable as their non-
genetic counterparts? In keeping with the approach presented above, an answer to this question can 
be provided only when faced with a broader decisional framework, which keeps into account also 
the other three values to be considered next, that is gastronomic pleasure, food sovereignty, and 
intrinsic value.
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sustainability of their agricultural production and by improving the likelihood 
that they will be food secure, but also by allowing them to diet in a manner that 
is most in keeping with their ethical, political, religious, an identity-related 
values. In this sense, the biodiversity of the edible environment is directly 
linked to the power of a society of choosing and determining its diet.
Slow Food may have been the first and to date the most fervent voice to insist on 
the link between biodiversity and gastronomic pleasure. The Slow Food movement, 
founded in 1986 by Carlo Petrini among others, focused since the beginning on the 
importance of gastronomic pleasure for any conversation concerning the political, 
ethical, and socio-economic discourse about food. In a telling passage of Slow Food 
Nation, Petrini writes: “Pleasure is a human right because it is physiological; we 
cannot fail to feel pleasure when we eat. Anyone who eats the food that is available 
to him, devising the best ways of making it agreeable, feels pleasure.” (2013: 50) 
Now, for Petrini gastronomic pleasure is directly linked to the availability of a 
diverse array of products, which in turn can be obtained only by actively encourag-
ing the diversity of forms by means of which humans tend the edible environment. 
Hence, gastronomic pleasure necessarily passes through the promotion of the diver-
sity of the edible environment, by supporting typically small-scale tending prac-
tices, which aim to express the most meaningful relationship that humans can 
establish with the edible environment.
Unthinkingly, it may seem that pleasure is an accessory feature of human rela-
tionship to food, which should be kept out of the ethical and political sphere. 
Nonetheless, in the past three decades it has become increasingly more evident that 
there is a link between gastronomic pleasure and such issues as biodiversity, malnu-
trition, food sovereignty, and food access. Petrini’s position echoed that of Wendell 
Berry (cfr. 1990) and has been re-proposed in different forms by several additional 
authors, such as Pollan (cfr. 2006) and Stiegler (cfr. 2006). Thompson (2015: 
Chapter 3) especially lays out a convincing discourse showing the link between 
dieting and the ethico-political sphere. It is impossible to tell apart the meaningful-
ness of the pleasure experienced during the act of eating and the sorts of food that 
are consumed (cfr. Borghini 2017 on this point); such pleasures are most often (pos-
itively or oppositionally) linked to values imbued in a society, to empowerment, and 
civic values, no matter how ordinary they may seem in any single dining occasion. 
For these reasons, gastronomic pleasure is to be included within the spiritual eco-
system services.
 (iv) Intrinsic value. Finally, the value of a biodiverse edible landscape may rest on 
the value of the species, the varieties, and the trophic chains themselves. This 
may be the most intuitive value of a biodiverse edible environment in the con-
text of a general discussion of the philosophy of biodiversity. A wider spectrum 
of forms of life has not only a utilitarian value, perhaps quantifiable in mone-
tary terms like Costanza et  al. (1997) provocatively suggested; rather, it is 
worth to invest time and resources in the fostering of biodiversity because there 
is a beauty and value in its mere existence, regardless of the consequences. 
When it comes to edible landscapes, the history of painting offers some neat 
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illustrations of the view of those who hold that biodiversity should be regarded 
as an intrinsic value. The paintings of Bartolomeo Bimbi, for example Pears of 
June and July (1696), entertain the spectators by simply showcasing a mesmer-
izing array of pears cultivated under the Medici family at the end of ‘600 s.7
In closing, it is important to ask whether the four reasons for measuring the edi-
ble environment are in some way affected or affecting a diet; more specifically, 
should a diet be influenced by consideration of biodiversity or, vice versa, do dietary 
decisions influence our stance on the measurements of the biodiversity of edible 
plants and animals? The fourth reason suggests implicitly that the wider a variety of 
edible items in a diet, the more commendable the diet; and you may wonder whether 
such a constraint is acceptable. You can fancy a society that is food secure, suffi-
ciently pleased when it comes to dining, whose members have in some way come to 
agree in an equitable manner upon their diet, and which nonetheless survives within 
an extremely monotonous diet (made, perhaps, of one daily pill synthesized in dedi-
cated laboratories). This society would arguably not contribute to the fostering of 
the biodiversity of the edible environment; should its members still pay dues to 
those in other societies who, instead, aim to foster it? If they should, in what mea-
sure should they contribute? For instance, suppose that the vast majority of the 
world population would come to prefer such a diet; would it still be feasible to 
maintain the goal of fostering an edible environment as diverse as we currently 
have? In other words: does the specific diet undertaken by an individual, or a soci-
ety, maintain obligations to others who chose different diets? In what measures?
Since the biodiversity of the edible environment depends on human tending pos-
sibly in a more active manner than the biodiversity of other forms of life, these 
questions are far from trivial to answer. An important upshot is that, if we accept 
that the biodiversity of the edible environment is valuable independently of its con-
sequences, then we should keep tending edible items even if they were to phase out 
of any human diet. To what extent this is a feasible goal is an issue that is worth 
further, future investigation.
20.5  What to Foster Within the Edible Environment?
Although a definitive cutoff for what is to be included in the edible environment 
cannot be provided, it is arguable that it is valuable for at least four reasons, no mat-
ter how we come to individuate it from time to time. But, what is it really that is of 
7 To be clear, I am not suggesting that the aesthetic appreciation of nature necessarily implies the 
recognition of an the intrinsic value of some natural elements, nor that all works of art illustrating 
nature do illustrate nature’s intrinsic value; at a minimum, since the biodiversity of the edible envi-
ronment depends on its relationship to human tending, showcasing and valuing it, per se, is also a 
mean to showcase and value per se human efforts to establish a meaningful relationship with the 
edible landscape; I am more modestly claiming that certain works of art can serve as illustrations 
of the view that nature has an intrinsic value.
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value? And, are there any theoretical or practical conflicts in the items that we are 
seeking to foster? We shall address these two questions, in order.
With respect to the first question, we shall distinguish three kinds of items that 
are typically regarded as valuable in discussion of the edible environment. (1) The 
first, more traditionally valued kind of item is the variety or breed as established by 
means of reproduction. It is under this regard, for instance, that we shall include the 
conservation of the thousands of breeds of animals reared by humans over the 
course of millennia; ditto for the thousands of varieties of beans, potatoes, tomatoes, 
corn, and other plants; the hundreds of mushrooms that humans consume; the thou-
sands of varieties of fungi, yeasts, and strains of bacteria coopted for food produc-
tion. The problem with this proposal is that it is often controversial whether some 
characters of a plant or an animal are novel to the point of constituting the founda-
tion of a new breed or a new variety.8 The issue had been touched upon also by 
Darwin in the Origins of Species, especially Chapter II.  Is a variety a cluster of 
organisms that has the potentiality to become a new species in a near future? That 
seems doubtable in the case of most edible organisms. Are varieties distinguishable 
at the genetic, phenotypic, behavioral, ecologic, nutritional, gustatory level? Should 
we pick varieties based on their significance for a certain culinary history, for their 
relationships with surrounding ecosystems, or rather for more arguably intrinsic 
characteristics of the product? Notice, finally, that to intensify the efforts to preserve 
a variety can imply to weaken it, because it may make it increasingly dependent 
from humans.
(2) In recent years a new method for marking the diversity of an item within the 
edible realm has come to be employed: it traces the genetic specificity of a variety 
of plants, of the breed of an animal, or of a microorganism. Thus, a clone of – say – 
Sangiovese grapes can now be identified not in terms of its phenotypic traits and 
ancestral history, but in terms of certain genetic traits that arguably are responsible 
for its characteristic phenotypic traits, such as the size of its fruits, its color, its skin, 
or a certain gustatory quality (cfr. also Borghini 2014 on this point). Although this 
method of identifying an item may seem similar to the one based on breeds and 
varieties, it is actually quite different. Indeed, breeds and varieties are essentially 
linked to ancestral history; on the other hand, fixing the identity on the basis of a 
selected number of genetic features is compatible with cis-genesis, cloning, and 
other potential forms of bioengineering. Hence, the identity of a certain breed of 
cattle would be fixed in terms of its genetic characteristics, no matter how the cattle 
would come into existence (actually, no matter whether the cattle ever came into 
existence or whether, instead, some of its cells where cultivated in a lab; on lab- 
grown meat, see Van Mensvoort and Grievink 2014).
(3) A third and last kind of item that may be worth fostering in order to foster the 
biodiversity of the edible environment are procedures and techniques for breeding 
and tending plants, animals, and microorganisms. Hence, the different manners by 
8 The more technical definition of ‘cultivar’ provided for plants in ICNCP (2009, Chapter II Art. 
2.3) does not help here, because it still relies on a judgment regarding the novelty of the plant 
character.
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means of which humans have facilitated, reared, and coopted new breeds of ani-
mals, new varieties of plants, and clusters of microorganisms. Should techniques 
employed within bioengineering be included in this list, too? Should they receive 
equal weight with respect to older methods?
To the purposes of the present discussion, which aims at framing a philosophical 
discussion of biodiversity when it comes to the edible environment, it is important 
to point out that there are some incompatibilities among the three kinds of items that 
may be targeted for being fostered. I have hinted at one incompatibility already 
when presenting genetic specificity. If the policy of an institution is to foster the 
continuation of existence of certain genetic traits, that may imply to have to change 
procedures and techniques for tending it, as well as changing its reproductive his-
tory (hence, what are commonly regarded as breeds or varieties); for example, some 
speculated that in order to keep producing Champagne in Champagne, farmers will 
have to introduce genetically modified clones of grapes, possibly employing differ-
ent techniques for planting (and perhaps harvesting and processing) them. On the 
other hand, concentrating on certain methods of, say, wine production, will typi-
cally imply that at some moment farmers will have to discard clones that are not in 
sinking with relevant changes within the ecosystem of production, thereby also 
compromising the genetic identity of the clones. Finally, focusing on breeds and 
varieties based on ancestry, implies embracing genetic changes over time as well as 
methods of production that would best meet such changes. The upshot of this analy-
sis is that, when issuing policies for fostering the biodiversity of (some part of) the 
edible environment, it is relevant to specify both which kind of items are to be fos-
tered and to what extent the kinds of items that are not to be fostered should be kept 
into account into the measurement and intervention efforts. This is far from being 
accomplished by the extent literature on the topic as well as by extant policies, such 
as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.
20.6  Conclusions
We shall at last return to our initial three questions and suggest answers based on the 
considerations made thus far. (1) Are there living entities that should be excluded 
from measurements of biodiversity as well as from conservation efforts? When it 
comes to the diversity of the edible environment, the first suggestion is to consider 
the importance of so-called wild species, which to date play a critical role in inte-
grating agricultural and industrial produce in most societies, constituting also an 
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important back-up safety net for food security purposes. A second suggestion is to 
proceed with great care when it comes to drawing cutoff points between items that 
are natural enough to deserve inclusion in an inventory of food biodiversity and 
items that are not so; it seems most prudent to proceed by devising cutoff points that 
are suitable to specific sub-domains; these can be individuated on different grounds, 
such as biological taxa (e.g. cucurbitaceae, beans, mushrooms) or methods of pro-
duction (e.g. grafting, sexual reproduction, genetic modification). Thus, we have 
multiple possible inventories to choose from, giving rise to our second question.
(2) Should the criteria for inclusion in a measurement or intervention be context- 
dependent or context-independent? For instance, could different criteria be selected 
depending on circumstances? A successful discussion of the matter, I submit, would 
demarcate as clearly as possible what are the conceptual and axiological differences 
between the criteria, as well as their potential practical consequences. It is important 
to remark here that the diversity of the edible environment is deeply entrenched with 
human cultures, so that the criteria for biodiversity measurement must reflect human 
perspectives within different societies, embedded in the conceptions of plants, ani-
mals, and dieting.
(3) What are the grounds for preferring certain (possibly more familiar) forms of 
life over others? For instance, do such preferences rest on efficiency, or perhaps on 
some emotional or spiritual connection? This question addresses the values that are 
involved across possibly different context of evaluation, e.g., food sovereignty, food 
security, and gastronomic pleasure. It is important to explore how such values differ 
across societies and whether convergence over a few selected values is a desirable 
goal, or if lack of convergence is actually more fruitful for the purposed of the bio-
diversity of the edible environment.
The new agricultural technologies introduced by the Green Revolution between 
the 1930s and the 1960s, followed by the more recent innovations in biotechnology, 
along with an increased capacity of transportation, have deeply subverted the rela-
tionship between humans and food. Such a drastic rupture is forcing a rethinking of 
that relationship, and a careful consideration of which items we shall conserve and 
why. This essay aimed at introducing a philosophical a frame for assessing the bio-
diversity of the edible environment, and pointing at a number of questions that seem 
in need of being addressed in the near future.
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Abstract Many key concepts in conservation biology such as ‘endangered species’ 
and ‘natural’ or ‘historic range’ are universalistic, nation-blind and do not implicate 
the existence of geopolitical borders and sovereign states. However, it is impossible 
to consider biodiversity conservation without any reference to sovereign states. 
Consequently, the units of biodiversity and their ranges transform into legal con-
cepts and categories. This paper explores the area that results from this transforma-
tion of the universalist idea into national policy targets. Conservation sovereignty 
denotes to right of each state to design and carry out its own conservation policies. 
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critical look upon the anomalies in universalism and conservation sovereignty.
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21.1  Introduction
Many commonly used concepts in conservation biology such as ‘endangered spe-
cies’ and ‘natural’ or ‘historic’ range1 are universalistic, nation-blind and do not 
implicate the existence of any geopolitical borders or sovereign states.2 To ignore 
the current nation-state system and to consider conservation of biodiversity without 
any reference to states would, however, be unsatisfactory. States are self- determining 
actors and the principal possessors of biological resources in their territories. At the 
international level, sovereignty is manifested in the international treaties and decla-
rations approved by the states. By these treaties and declarations, states commit 
themselves to certain responsibilities and thus voluntarily restrict the ways of acting 
open to them. At the national level, sovereign states implement these agreements 
within their jurisdictions, that is, within their established geopolitical borders. From 
this constellation, a vital point emerges with respect to biodiversity conservation: 
the units of biodiversity and concepts ascribing their ranges transform into legal 
concepts and categories that inform policies and practices. This perspective regards 
sovereign states as the only relevant legal actors. The transformation thus occurs 
within, and is organised by, the sovereign states.
In creating national policies for biodiversity conservation, sovereign states act 
either alone or in close collaboration with other states (consider the EU). A global 
division of conservation labour arises out of joint multiple actions by states.3 The 
fundamental idea is that each country, as a sovereign actor, is in charge of the biodi-
versity within its territory while the biodiversity outside the territories of sovereign 
states (the high seas, the Antarctica) as well as migrating biodiversity (waterfowl, 
whales) are subject to transnational decision-making, if any.
In this chapter, the traditional thinking will be modestly challenged in two ways. 
On the one hand, we argue that the global division of conservation labour in its pres-
ent form is not always efficient from the conservation perspective if each country 
only focuses on safeguarding its territorial biodiversity. On the other hand, we ask 
whether climate change (in the global perspective) could challenge the current con-
servation policies by requiring actions that would make state borders more porous, 
and applied policies more interventionistic than what they are today. We contend 
that in some cases successful conservation may require international translocation 
measures for the establishment of new populations outside the historical ranges, and 
geopolitical territory, of particular species.
1 There are a plenty of other attributes to describe ranges such as ‘indigenous’ and ‘native’, some 
of which may be more sensitive to current geopolitical structure than the notions of natural and 
historic (on their differences, see Siipi and Ahteensuu 2016).
2 Smith’s (2016) analysis manifests a universalistic viewpoint concerning the ethics of endangered 
species preservation.
3 In addition to this expression being powerful in its own right, it articulates and explicitly includes 
human-dependent form of biodiversity. In most cases, this biodiversity literally results from human 
labour.
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The aim of the chapter is to explore issues that result from the transformation of 
the universalistic idea into national policy targets the foci of which are not merely 
species universally understood but a wider variety of different “conservables”. To 
understand what these conservables are, we come across the political dimensions of 
biodiversity conservation. In the first section, we discuss the idea of state sover-
eignty and its relation to the control of natural resources and biodiversity. The sec-
ond section, in turn, presents a typology of sovereignty in the context of biodiversity 
conservation. In the third section, we examine the global division of conservation 
labour and its insensitivity for the issue of prioritisation, and the resulting obvious 
need to transform conventional conservation. The fourth section analyses assisted 
migration, or whether it is acceptable to translocate species (across the state bor-
ders) with the intention of helping them to survive global warming. A short conclu-
sion ends the discussion.
Four clarifying remarks on the nature and scope of our inquiry need to be made. 
First, our approach is multidisciplinary and focuses on conceptual and theoretical 
problems arising from sovereignty in the context of biodiversity conservation. We 
also examine some real-life examples. Second, the transformation from scientific 
descriptions to legal categories and to conservation success may seem simple but is 
in reality a complicated and twisted issue because corruption in land-use decisions 
is widespread and it is difficult to prevent poaching and illegal wildlife trade. 
Although tackling illegalities is undoubtedly relevant to policy design, it is outside 
our main analysis. Third, our approach is stated-centred and thus extremely con-
stricted. For a more comprehensive picture, the nonstate or civil society actors such 
as citizens, academics, non-governmental organisations, state-funded think tanks 
like the OECD (the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
and transnational companies should be taken into account. Fourth, issues of security 
and safety, in particular the border control of the import of unwanted or hazardous 
biomaterial, have been and are important components of sovereignty; they are out-
side our scope of analysis. Therefore, keeping these remarks in mind, the picture we 
paint of sovereignty is at best sketchy and filled with promises that may never actu-
alise; it is, nonetheless, a useful starting point for further analysis.
21.2  Biodiversity in the World of Sovereign States
Sovereignty over natural resources within the state territory is today an established 
principle in international law. The concept of ‘sovereignty’ dates back to the late 
sixteenth century and to the French political theorist Jean Bodin who famously 
wrote that, “sovereignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the 
citizens and subjects in a Commonwealth” (cited in Turchetti 2015). In actual poli-
tics, sovereignty became a leading principle in international law as a result of the 
Westphalian peace in 1648; hence the international system of sovereign nation- 
states is still known as the Westphalian system. In the historical context of Bodin 
and other peace negotiators, the unchallenged presumption was that absolute 
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monarchy is a legitimate form of government. This aspect is not relevant to our 
analysis despite the facts that many biodiversity-rich countries lean towards abso-
lutism and their democracy, civil societies and status of minorities can be ques-
tioned and the global developers’ and resource buyers’ voices are often compelling. 
In modern use, sovereignty is typically understood as a form of power that belongs 
to the state indivisibly and above other powers. In this sense, sovereignty expresses 
the idea of the right to self-determination that is hold by the nation-state over terri-
tory, natural resources and the peoples who inhabit the area. The sovereignty of the 
nation-states also guarantees a legal personhood for this entity in the international 
legal system, that is, it is externally independent and can exercise power within a 
community (Endicott 2010). Because of sovereignty, states are in the position to 
enter voluntarily into binding, action-limiting and, in some cases, external interfer-
ence entitling conventions (Shue 2014, 146).
A key issue in discussions on sovereignty has been the control of natural 
resources. Natural resources are thought of as instrumental for the full exercise of 
self-determination: hence, without possibility to exclude other states (and nonstate 
trespassers) from using natural resources within their territories, states cannot be 
truly independent beneficiaries of their own natural wealth. This idea was particu-
larly powerful in the post-World War II period of decolonization and the dissolution 
of the British, French, Japanese and other empires. In addition, resource scarcity 
was a matter of mounting concern, which inspired the US President Truman set up 
by the Materials Policy Commission in 1951. The Commission’s analysis Resources 
for Freedom (1952) reflected the general pessimistic mentality with respect to 
resource availability now and in the future although it recommended policies sup-
porting economic growth. (Andrews 1999, 182–83.) To consolidate the ties between 
national independence and self-determination and the control of natural resources, 
the General Assembly of United Nations adopted resolution 1803 (XVII) on the 
“Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” in 1962.
Sustainable development became a truly global issue by the publication of 
Brundtland’s Commission report Our Common Future in 1987. According to it, the 
current use of resources must not come about at the cost of the resource use, or 
welfare, of the future generations. It strongly influenced the contents of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. According to 
Article 2 of the Convention, biological resources include genetic resources, organ-
isms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems 
with actual or potential use or value for humanity. Furthermore, sustainable use of 
these resources “does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, 
thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and 
future generations”. Later, a resource-based approach to biodiversity conservation 
has been very strong in the Ecosystem Approach that is a framework for action 
under the Convention.
The question is then: in what sense is biodiversity a natural resource? It seems 
straightforward to reason that if the concept of natural resources covers all resources 
that are biological, and if the concept of biological resources, in turn, includes bio-
diversity in all of its manifestations, then biodiversity is a natural resource. This 
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view is emphasised by the Ecosystem Approach that focuses on the importance of 
ecosystem services that in fact cover all major biological processes in their natural 
environments. Not all resources are tangible; the category of cultural services, as a 
component of ecosystem services, includes historical, spiritual, educational and rec-
reational values that ecosystems have but which can be damaged through the loss of 
biodiversity. Obviously, the convertibility of such cultural values into resources, or 
monetary values for that matter, is problematic, perhaps with the exception of eco-
tourism or popular historical monuments that clearly have a market value. Many 
authors, however, resist this way of considering biodiversity merely as a resource 
(see e.g. Wood 1997) and the associated rather explicit anthropocentric attitude to 
the rest of nature.
When we adopt the conception of state sovereignty – a conception that is at least 
historically anthropocentric since it entitles ‘peoples and nations’ to utilize their 
natural resources – it depends on states what meanings they attribute to biodiversity 
in practice. This framework, however, emphasizes for the above mentioned histori-
cal reasons the status of biodiversity as an instance of natural resources. It is clear, 
however, that there are natural resources that do not fall into the category of biodi-
versity conveniently (e.g. water and non-renewable mineral resources) and the sig-
nificance of biodiversity is not exhaustively reducible to its resource character. For 
this reason, when we talk about biodiversity within the framework of sovereignty, 
we should not consider it merely as a bundle of natural resources but having signifi-
cance beyond their “resourceness”, a point also made in the opening lines of the 
Preamble to the Rio Convention. An interesting question is which parts of biodiver-
sity fall outside the popular concept of ecosystem services. To make these conserva-
tion dimensions more explicit, we purport the idea of conservation sovereignty.
Conservation sovereignty, as a political idea, stands for the right of each state to 
design and carry out its own conservation and related natural resource policies, as if 
there were no transnational regulation. Since there is, however, transnational regula-
tion agreed upon by the sovereign states, though not necessarily by all of them, the 
question arises whether there can then be sovereignty with respect to biodiversity 
and its conservation. The paradox is apparent and there are rival attempts to tackle 
it. As Endicott (2010, 246) has noted, “state sovereignty seems both to demand the 
power to enter into treaties, and to rule out the binding force of treaties.” It is clearly 
analogous with the better-know philosophical dilemma of whether the freedom of a 
human individual includes the possibility to enslave oneself for a fellow human, as 
Endicott (2010, 246) points out. We follow Endicott’s (2010, 258) conclusion that 
sovereignty and participation in global agreements and international law are “at 
least potentially compatible” although the function of these agreements and laws is 
to give directions to domestic laws and policymaking and to guide interactions 
between states. As Shue (2014, 143) puts it, “sovereignty is not some mystical cloud 
that either envelops the state entirely or dissipates completely; there are bits and 
pieces of asserted sovereignty.” A look at the recent history makes one think that 
there are no theoretical tensions: the processes of decolonization and the formation 
of the system of over 200 sovereign states have occurred simultaneously with the 
growing number of international environmental treaties (Frank 1997).
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The paradoxical dimensions of sovereignty are also recognizable in the Rio 
Convention. According to the Preamble, “States have sovereign rights over their 
own biological resources” and thus it merely expresses the established principle that 
the biological resources in state territories are freely at disposal of the state. The 
previous passage, however, outlines reasons for restricting state sovereignty and the 
free use of these resources, since “the conservation of biological diversity is a com-
mon concern of humankind”. Nevertheless, this paradox is a milestone in the devel-
opment of international regulation concerning biodiversity. Given the long UN 
history on the issues of sovereignty and natural resources, the authors of the 
Preamble were fully aware of tensions between national interests and universal con-
cerns and the essential differences between objects of human interests. The novel 
expression ‘common concern’ reflects the negotiators’ worry about the state of bio-
logical diversity beyond specific geographical areas and resources to which the 
already established concepts of common area and common heritage apply (see 
Brunnée 2008).
The Preamble of the Rio Convention effectively captures the two-dimensional 
nature of global conservation efforts: it is international and domestic at the same 
time. Within the European Union, two-dimensionality is most clearly manifested in 
the Natura 2000 conservation area network, established by the Habitats Directive in 
1992. The duality between nationalism and internationalism has its roots in the 
origins of modern conservation movement in the late nineteenth century.4 Ever since 
the creation of the Yellowstone National Park in 1872, most countries have followed 
the model and selected areas to sustain wilderness and pristinity. In spite of its 
gradually increasing popularity in the USA (see Nash 2001, 108–21) and other 
countries, the national park movement was essentially a nationalistic enterprise that 
emphasized each country’s unique nature values – in some cases compared with 
those of neighbour states. As Sheail (2010, 12) put it: “National parks presuppose 
sovereign nation states”.
The idea ultimately reached the Old Continent with the first European national 
parks founded in Sweden in 1909.5 The famous explorer A. E. Nordenskiöld had 
already in 1880 urged the establishment of ‘state parks’ in Nordic countries to pre-
serve samples of fatherlands’ pristine nature for the future generations (Palmgren 
1922). The patriotic tone was unmistakable in the essay of the Finnish State 
Conservation Inspector, Dr. Reino Kalliola, who wrote in the first issue of Suomen 
Luonto – the journal of the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation – that, “the 
richness and beauty of the Finnish nature is our shared and precious heritage that 
everyone of us is obliged to cherish” (Kalliola 1941, 20; also Kalliola 1942). 
Although similar nationalistic tones were probably heard in conservationist circles 
across the world in the nineteenth century, also the first important multilateral 
4 In this analysis, we try not to identify the origin of conservation practices and we leave out the 
discussion on imperialist roots of early conservation (see Grove 1995).
5 A somewhat parallel development took place in Britain, with the Establishment of the National 
Trust in 1895. Although emphasis of the National Trust has been on preservation of cultural heri-
tage, also areas of natural beauty have been preserved (Sheail 2010).
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 conservation agreements, such as for instance the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Birds Useful to Agriculture (1902), date back to that period (Lyster 1994).
Some early pioneers of conservation movement were active both internationally 
and nationally. The protection of migratory birds is a case in point. Even before the 
independence of Finland in 1917, the leading Finnish conservation pioneers had 
close relations to colleagues abroad and in different occasions pursued internation-
ally defined objectives at the national level. Dr. Johan Axel Palmén, Professor of 
Zoology in Helsinki, took great interest in the 1st International Ornithological 
Congress in Vienna in 1884. It is notable that the delegates of the conference 
attended as individual citizens, as respected members of the scientific community 
and not as official delegates sent by their respective governments. The governmental 
acceptance of conservation matters was, however crucial and official participation 
increased gradually. It is illustrative that The International Council for Bird 
Preservation (ICBP; from 1993 on, Birdlife International) was founded at the 
Finance Minister’s home in London in 1922 (Birdlife 2017). Accordingly, the idea 
of national representation in international meetings was stronger providing a better 
basis for national action on bird conservation. To return to Palmén, the year follow-
ing the Vienna conference, he published a seminal paper that outlined a plan, based 
on the conference proceedings, for a reliable collection of nationwide data on bird 
species distribution and abundance in all regions of the country (Palmén 1885). 
Palmén’s programme turned out to be very successful (Vuorisalo et al. 2015). Later, 
Palmén (1905) proposed setting up a national conservation society (this happened 
in 1938), and protecting the endemic Saimaa ringed seal population (legal protec-
tion 1955, see Case 1). After independence in 1917, it seems that the attention of 
Finnish conservationists turned almost entirely to domestic affairs, with a strong 
emphasis on the establishing and expanding of the national and nature park network 
(Vuorisalo and Laihonen 2000).
Scientific communities of specific disciplines are universal and, in principle, 
independent of governments. However, without governmental support their goals, 
both scientific and non-scientific, are difficult to reach. Likewise, as compared to the 
powers at the disposal of the state, the international community is rather weak in 
environmental matters. One reason for this is structural and institutional: there is no 
global government with the right to tax persons or states or penalise those parties 
who violate the global rules. The possibilities of ruling sanctions are limited. The 
ambition to reach unanimity in policy-making often leads to vague compromises, 
and when unanimity is not aimed at, the risk of free-riding (benefiting without taking 
responsibility) and gaps in policies is apparent. As Simon Lyster states, “the interna-
tional community … has no legislature capable of formulating laws binding on indi-
vidual States or their peoples without their individual consent” (1994, 3). What is the 
ensuing nature of conservation sovereignty in such a situation? The answer is that 
there have been and still are rival conceptions very vivid in the political debates.
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21.3  Three types of National Sovereignty in Biodiversity 
Conservation
The starting point of sovereignty with respect to biodiversity is that biodiversity 
constitutes an instance of natural resources. Of course, in the background is the 
policy of priority setting based on the conservation value of biological units, that is, 
of subspecies, species and biotypes. Within biology, the definitions of biodiversity 
and its units have been debated continuously since the 1980s, as the existence of this 
volume also indicates (see also, Gaston and Spicer 2004). Whatever the units, we 
may call them here conservables. As pointed out earlier, biodiversity is not merely 
a resource but also a conservable. The most crucial distinctive factor between these 
two concepts is that conservables have such significance for humans that is not 
entirely reducible to crudely instrumental or purely monetary values, whereas the 
notion of resource specifically implies both of those values. In the context of mod-
ern market economy, resources are resources to someone whose access to the 
resources depends on established property and market relations. Although conserv-
ables can also be classified as resources, their status and significance is not limited 
to their ‘resourceness’; consider as an example cultural landscapes with exceptional 
diversity (cf. Oksanen and Kumpula 2018). Thus, the adopted approach should be 
wide enough so as to include conservation policies that take into account these non- 
resource dimensions. Conservation sovereignty, distinctively, refers to the right of 
each state to design and carry out its own conservation and natural resource policies. 
One such option, within a strong conception of sovereignty, is that the state decides 
not to have any conservation policies and gives free hands for the user of natural 
resources as long as inflicted harms are at a tolerable level. In today’s world, such 
an option would stand out as exceptional.
To make precise the contrasting understandings about sovereignty and conserva-
tion, we distinguish between three kinds of sovereignty. These types are both his-
torical and theoretical constructions. One can also envision, as many have done, 
global systems without putting states in the central positions and having some kind 
of a world government; such a system would undermine the talk over sovereignty as 
we know it and is therefore not analysed here.
Traditional conservation sovereignty (‘brute nationalism’) refers to the tradi-
tional system, stemming from the nineteenth century, where each country creates its 
conservation legislation and network independently of other countries. The pioneer-
ing phase of national park movement across the world clearly represents this cate-
gory. In each country, national parks were established based on the country’s own 
legislative system. Decision-making was thus strictly national and any country hav-
ing no interest in adopting conservationist policies was at liberty to do so.6 The aim 
6 Henry Shue, in discussion on climate changes policies, is critical of sovereignty that allows states 
to pursue economic growth, if they choose to. He writes that “there ought to be external limits on 
the means by which domestic economic ends may be pursued by states, limits that ought to become 
binding on individual sovereigns irrespective of whether those sovereigns wish to acknowledge 
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of self-sufficiency naturally does not exclude possibilities that some influences 
spread from one country to another. Moreover, cooperation between states is rea-
sonable since some activities can generate transboundary harms and many resources 
(migratory species, boundary rivers, for instance) are multi-territorial. In those 
cases, bi- and multilateral resolutions may be agreed upon. In social studies on con-
servation and natural resource use, the classical research themes include the analy-
sis of the conflictual relationships between the central power and the localities and 
what kind of institutional arrangements would work best in given conditions. The 
traditional conservation sovereignty can be understood to imply a strongly state-led 
approach to conservation in which local-level interests and arrangements, including 
those of the indigenous peoples, become overridden. On the other hand, often, but 
not always, localities are the best managers of extant biological diversity and deci-
sions from afar can lack adequate local acceptance. In traditional conservation sov-
ereignty, it is a domestic issue how these challenges are met (although there can be 
other relevant restrictions based on international law such as human rights).
The traditional conservation sovereignty is deficient because of the biospheric 
nature of biodiversity and its components. As mentioned earlier, historically interna-
tional practices that aimed at bird conservation were developed very early. There 
were also debates about the inexhaustibility of other migratory and often highly 
exploited species and, respectively, a need for international regulation in hunting, 
fishing and whaling (Lyster 1994). What this has brought about is internationally 
regulated conservation sovereignty (‘externally constrained nationalism’). According 
to it, countries voluntarily participate in international conservation agreements and 
pursue the harmonisation and unification of conservation efforts at the regional and 
global levels. This is the system characterized by most of today’s states’ conserva-
tion policies (cf. Lyster 1994). For instance, the Convention on Biological Diversity 
has now (as of June 2017) 196 Parties that have ratified the treaty.7 Internationally 
regulated conservation sovereignty has prevailed ever since the Stockholm 
Conference of 1972 that launched unprecedented international environmental activ-
ity. Although the principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration declares that, “States 
have … the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies”, the same principle continues by requiring that developmen-
tal activities do not damage the environment. Many international environmental trea-
ties acknowledge broad principles that guide the construction and implementation of 
more specific norms. These principles include the recognition of the duties to future 
generations, the prevention of environmental harms, the polluter- pays principle, 
cooperation among states and ideas about burden sharing. More recently, the devel-
opment of international environmental law has focused on establishing institutions 
and procedures through which scientific communities and new research results can 
be better accommodated into policies. The flagship model is the IPCC, the name of 
which refers to collaboration between sovereign states – Intergovernmental Panel on 
them, just as sovereigns are already bound by both legal and moral rights against domestic use of 
torture […]” (Shue 2014, 150).
7 See the list of signatories here: https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml
21 Conservation Sovereignty and Biodiversity
444
Climate Change. The model was adopted to biodiversity conservation when the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES) set off in 2012. Currently (as of June 2017), IPBES has 126 states as its 
members.
The system where a state has only a partial sovereignty over its natural resources 
can be called federal conservation sovereignty (‘regionally constrained national-
ism’). In this system, states share a major portion of their conservation legislation 
and the compliance with supranational laws is monitored and sanctioned. The 
European Union is the prime example of this case. According to article 47 of the 
Treaty on European Union (the Treaty of Lisbon, 2007), the Union recognises itself 
as a legal person with rights to join international conventions, for instance. However, 
to state that it is a sovereign state in its own right is a contentious federalist state-
ment and seen to contradict the sovereignty of the member states. Therefore, there 
is no such official statement. Since it is not our main topic to tackle this sensitive 
issue and suggest appropriate political moniker, it is a safe bet to characterize it as a 
closely-knit alliance of sovereign states with sovereignty in selected international 
issues and with power to circumscribe national sovereignty over agreed areas of 
public policy (cf. Philpott 2016). At the Union level, the principal issues of biodiver-
sity are being dictated through ‘directives’. The idea of the directive is that the 
addressed member states must adopt into their legislation the designated goals while 
the choice of form and methods of achieving them belongs to national authorities. 
The Birds and Habitats directives are the main legislative tools for biodiversity con-
servation in the EU, and in addition to habitats, their focus is on species, as the 
official website summarises: “The Habitats Directive ensures the conservation of a 
wide range of rare, threatened or endemic animal and plant species” (European 
Commission 2017). Many federal states are legal persons in international law 
whereas their provincial components are not. In the Westphalian system, these 
actors are not sovereign and are therefore excluded from foreign politics. However, 
one of the elements of globalisation is the increasing cooperation between cities and 
regional actors across national borders and in some cases in explicit opposition to 
the decisions of the central government. There are numerous comparative studies on 
the EU and existing federal states like the USA on specific policy areas. It is easy to 
parallel, for instance, the Birds and Habitats Directives with the Endangered Species 
Act of the USA: both are regulations from the central government. Such a parallel-
ism can, however, be a simplification. With respect to biodiversity, in the United 
States an individual state and municipalities may adopt rather independent policies; 
whereas in the European Union the EU decrees and directives strictly control what 
a member country can rule in its national legislation (cf. Wells et al. 2010).
As these three contrasting views on sovereignty indicate, the development of 
supranational and international environmental law constrains the opportunities to 
enforce policies solely on the national basis. The pure or brute form of sovereignty 
has become, as has been noted from time and again, an obsolete idea as soon as the 
ecological ideas have matured enough. In international studies, discussion on states 
and their standing has been enduring. Though sovereignty is a kind of trump card, 
the international processes and institutions of governance have evolved to tackle the 
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complex problems of biodiversity loss. Nevertheless, sovereignty should not hide 
from us the complexities of vocabularies, institutions and practices in international 
biodiversity management, and from its somewhat decentralised character (see e.g. 
Ostrom 1998).
21.4  Case 1: Global Division of Conservation Labour: 
The Prioritisation Problem
Interestingly, the case of biodiversity has some structural commonalities and sub-
stantial convergences with the idea of human rights. Consider Beitz’s formulation of 
what he calls the two-level model of human rights: “The two levels express a divi-
sion of labour between states as the bearers of the primary responsibilities to respect 
and protect human rights and the international community and those acting as its 
agents as the guarantors of these responsibilities.” (Beitz 2009, 108.) To some 
extent, this has been apparent also in the field of international environmental law 
(Lyster 1994). As applied to biodiversity conservation, such a division of labour 
could mean that states bear primary responsibility for biodiversity conservation 
within their territory while the international community may set general guiding 
principles for conservation efforts in multilateral agreements and acts as a guarantor 
of this responsibility. As a result, some division of labour in biodiversity conserva-
tion develops between sovereign states and the international community.
In conservation policy, the idea of the global division of conservation labour 
refers to the emergent properties of conservation and how they are manifested 
through adopted collaborative and domestic practices for instance in the ratification 
processes of multilateral environmental treaties. Fundamentally, each state is a sov-
ereign state with rights and obligations to accomplish within its territory. On the one 
hand, sovereign states have rights to resources; on the other hand, and in our analy-
sis more importantly, each nation-state is responsible for protecting the biodiversity 
within its borders. We can take this literally and thus have a rather mechanistic 
approach to biodiversity conservation. This means that the conservation value of 
policy targets, or conservables, is defined nationally based on their abundance and 
distribution within the state borders.
Reflecting the general tone of this edited volume, we reckon that the emphasis in 
policymaking has traditionally been on species although there are more nuances to 
it. As the main goal of conservation efforts is to conserve evolutionary potential, we 
often need to be concerned about possible management units below the species 
level. Such units have been called Evolutionarily Significant Units (or ESUs), and 
may be defined as partially genetically differentiated populations that are thought to 
require management as separate units (Frankham et al. 2002). Biologically, it may 
be a matter of taste whether such units are called species, subspecies, or simply 
local populations. However, terminology matters in conservation policy. It may be 
easier to get support for conservation of a separate endemic species (that may even 
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become a national symbol) than for an obscure local population. Under such cir-
cumstances, ‘species as targets of conservation policies’ may be created through 
campaigning, policies and practices, not purely scientifically. A case in point is the 
Saimaa ringed seal (Pusa hispida saimensis) in Finland, first scientifically described 
in the late nineteenth century (Nordqvist 1899); it is either a “critically endangered” 
species or a rare fresh-water population (or subspecies) of the “least concern” ringed 
seal. Today, the Saimaa ringed seal is a symbol of national conservation efforts in 
Finland even without being a species proper. Because we do not want to deny the 
significance of its conservation, our point is the following: if the populations and 
subspecies are classified as species proper, this is not necessarily a scientific error 
but rather an inaccuracy based on inherent ambiguity of taxonomic classifications. 
As this example indicates, biodiversity is a political concept that relates to existing 
political systems in a way that may affect the scientific basis of conservation.8
Another type of conservation controversy arises when the population of a certain 
species is endangered locally or regionally, but not globally. Consider the following 
example of species preservation where the targeted species occurs across the 
Eurasian taiga but is rare within the European Union. In the EU, the Siberian flying 
squirrel (Pteromys volans) only occurs in Finland and the Baltic states (Estonia and 
Latvia). Despite its universal Red List status as ‘least concern’, the mechanistic 
application of global division of conservation labour calls for its prioritisation in 
national policy. In Finland, the flying squirrel has become a symbol of public con-
servation battles that has caused trouble to, in particular, building and road construc-
tion (Hurme et  al. 2007). The big question now is: does it really make sense to 
mechanistically follow the division of conservation labour between sovereign states, 
especially in situations like the aforementioned?
In the EU, the Habitats Directive defines as an overall objective of conservation 
measures the maintenance or restoration of natural habitats and populations of 
Community interest at a favourable conservation status (Mehtälä and Vuorisalo 
2007; Epstein et al. 2016). This objective is achieved through a division of labour 
between member states which, in the case of the Siberian flying squirrel, means that 
the above-mentioned three states are responsible for maintaining the conservation 
status of the species within the Union at a favourable level. Again, in this case of 
federal conservation sovereignty the target is set only taking into account the spe-
cies’ status within the Union, with no regard of its thriving main population in the 
Russian Federation.
There seem to be three basic arguments in conflict here: efficiency, lack of means 
of global prioritization of conservation targets, and risk of erosion of the division of 
conservation labour. Efficiency here points to the chronic resource scarcity in con-
servation and the following necessity to make prioritisation decisions from a univer-
salistic perspective and by ignoring national borders. However, although there is no 
8 Smith (2016) is an example of an approach focusing on endangered species so heavily that, he 
alleges, “sub-species are not real” (p. 4) and their identification is arbitrary. By implication, the 
reason for their conservation must be different from the reasons used for justifying species 
conservation.
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lack of global and science-informed attempts for prioritization (cf. Norman Myers’ 
36 global biodiversity hotspots or the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species), inter-
national law does not provide any effective tools for global-level prioritization of 
conservation targets. Accordingly, the populations of common species in fringe 
areas deserve less attention. Whereas the former is crucial, the latter might affect the 
motivation of conservation in a negative manner. It is obvious that without any other 
agreement that would define the specific responsibilities, the possibility that the spe-
cies is neglected emerges. Thus, these specific responsibilities must be agreed upon 
by all relevant parties and made explicit to avoid the vicious circle that could, at 
worst, lead to its extinction. A case in point of the risk of erosion of division of 
global conservation could be the recent policy conflicts over the Great Cormorant 
conservation status between the EU and some of its member states (Rusanen et al. 
2011).
Obviously, from the conservation biology perspective decisions concerning the 
conservation of biodiversity should be made as if there were no state borders. Even 
the currently prevailing internationally regulated conservation sovereignty can be 
considered wasteful as resources are invested (sometimes massively) on local con-
servation efforts that have little value from the global perspective. For instance, 
since the 1980s lots of resources have been invested in the protection of the local 
White-backed woodpecker (Dendrocopos leucotos) in Finland, although the species 
continues to be common in the neighbour states of Norway (700–900 pairs) and 
Estonia (500–1000 pairs) (Väisänen et al. 1998; Laine 2015). Luckily, the national 
conservation efforts appear to have been effective, since the breeding population of 
the White-backed woodpeckers in Finland has clearly increased since 2010 (Laine 
2015).
So it is obvious that rigid, non-adjustable nationalism has its shortcomings in 
today’s globalized world. Moreover, we argue that under the global biodiversity 
crisis conservation sovereignty is becoming problematic also for two biological rea-
sons. First, conflicting conservation priorities between countries and between the 
international and national level make rational (in the conservation biology sense) 
resource allocation very difficult. Second, the conservation area networks estab-
lished by sovereign states are rapidly losing their original natural values due to cli-
mate change. The biodiversity crisis calls for an unprejudiced re-evaluation of alien 
species policies and assisted migration attempts that can result in some minor 
changes to current legislation (see Trouwborst 2014 on the EU legislation).
21.5  Case 2: Assisted Migration of Plants and Animals
Let us turn to the second issue challenging the mechanistic understanding of conser-
vation sovereignty: the designed relocation of alien organisms across state borders. 
Considering the political restlessness caused by refugees from armed conflict areas 
in the Near East and the number of immigrants, a letter titled “Britain should wel-
come climate refugee species” appears extremely provocative. It was published in 
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The New Scientist in 2011, well before the Brexit referendum of 2016. The author, 
British biologist Chris Thomas, condensed his message in two sentences: “Some 
places are ideal havens for species threatened by climate change. One is Britain, and 
it should throw open its doors.” (Thomas 2011a, b).
Thomas took sides in the recently burgeoned discussion about a new approach to 
biodiversity conservation: assisted migration. Assisted migration is just one of the 
many monikers of this particular approach; assisted colonization, managed translo-
cation and managed relocation are among others (Hällfors et al. 2014). Indeterminable 
numbers of species in many countries have already begun to adapt to climate change 
by expanding their ranges upslope or to higher latitudes (Parmesan and Yohe 2003). 
This survival strategy is, however, not available to each and every species. Assisted 
migration roughly means that humans are to take an active role in translocating spe-
cies that are believed to be at the risk of disappearance in their current range of 
distribution because of the impacts of global warming. The potential recipient areas 
are those where these species can be predicted to survive and reproduce in the future 
warmer climate, provided that there are no dispersal barriers or lack of time (Hällfors 
et al. 2014). It requires, of course, a lot of work to identify to suitable species for 
relocation (see Hällfors et al. 2016). Moreover, since the climate change scenarios 
are numerous and controversial, so are the potential recipient areas, too.
Assisted migration departs from conventional conservation policies in three 
ways. Firstly, unlike the established in situ conservation strategy that seeks to pro-
tect species within their current ranges, as the vital elements of their present or 
historic habitats, assisted migration is interventionist in essence. Secondly, the 
international legislation regarding wildlife, such as the CITES treaty and, to some 
extent, the Rio Convention on Biodiversity, restricts the transfer of species and/or 
biological material across national borders. Assisted migration, or some aspects of 
it, could be in conflict with current legislation although less so, if the translocation 
takes place within one country. And thirdly, non-native animals or plants are typi-
cally thought of as unwelcome invaders, as aliens. The national border is the most 
important border, although invasion can occur also within the nation-state. As 
Thomas’ use of words exemplified, the notion of non-nativity is often constructed 
in terms of nationality and the role of national borders plays a greater role than the 
biological ideas of indigenous or historic ranges. Of course, borrowing concepts 
from political discourses affects how the activity will be perceived by the public.
It seems to us, thus, that we can conceptualize animal and plant species either as 
climate refugees or as exotic or alien invasive species. This conceptual divide seems 
to capture the conflicting attitudes to the ideas of plant (or animal) relocation and 
expresses in a word whether the newcomers are accepted or repelled. The default 
position is that invasive alien species are undesirable newcomers, in particular if 
their dispersal is human-assisted; climate refugees are instead victims of anthropo-
genic change in nature. The victimhood implies that there must be a culpable party 
who owes something to the victims. Perhaps one acceptable, if not obligatory, way 
of repairing the moral relationship is to help the victim to survive, preferably in its 
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current location or, if that is not possible, elsewhere. In other words, essential to the 
idea of assisted migration is the fact that conservables, such as species, populations 
or individuals, may not be able to survive without help provided by humans.
In general, it is important to ponder the nature of the responsibilities of humans 
whose actions in the form of global warming disturb ecosystem functioning and 
compel organisms to adapt or flee from their original habitats. The concept of refu-
gee is a political one and presupposes the existence of a system of nation-states, 
territories and borders and the idea of citizenship; without the social reality as we 
today know it, refugeeship would not make much sense. In the borderless world, 
however, people could use their traditional “hunter-gatherer” adaptation strategy by 
migrating and taking important local flora and fauna with them. In this light, it does 
not seem a distant idea to apply the concept of refugee to non-human organisms, 
even though they are not persecuted for their convictions or ethnicity. It is equally 
interesting that the concept of citizenship seems to apply not only to humans but 
also for biological species, as their status changes after crossing national borders.
21.6  Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have examined conservation issues from the viewpoint of state 
sovereignty, and shown that problems may indeed in some cases arise. Biodiversity 
is a highly abstract idea embracing all biological variety above individual unique-
ness on Earth. If humanity seeks conservation of this variety, the received wisdom 
says that collaboration between states is necessary. And when states collaborate and 
commit to the common guidelines for biodiversity conservation, they voluntarily 
narrow their scope for self-determination to some extent. The key aspect of sover-
eignty, however, remains. Most notably, if the states fail in implementation or have 
governments that break away from the successful policies of previous governments, 
they are subject to external critique in the form “naming and shaming”. This has 
been particularly apparent in the fields of human rights and climate policies. In 
contrast to the human-rights framework, the possibility of military intervention for 
environmental reasons is virtually non-existent, although in some areas, poaching 
and wildlife trafficking have become a problem of a massive scale that are causing 
civil and park ranger casualties and, indeed, armed forces are being deployed from 
time to time. These difficulties in the implementation of conservation laws can be 
confronted partially by means of law enforcement and, therefore, the presence of 
civil society actions are vital for successful conservation. If so, a naturally arising 
idea is that nonstate actors should have opportunities to have an effect on interna-
tional environmental legislation. As mentioned earlier, the topic is outside the scope 
of this chapter.
Although the compliance to international laws constrains the states’ possibilities, 
sovereignty has still a key role in the actual drafting of conservation policies. States 
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can decide on which populations, species and habitats they invest their conservation 
efforts. The states thus make priorisation decisions when such decisions need to be 
made. States can also open or close their gates to newcomers. States may even clas-
sify particular populations as species proper in cases where the majority of taxono-
mists recognise merely a subspecies. All in all, sovereignty is as noticeable in 
biodiversity conservation as in other areas of policymaking.
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